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For Margaret Reynolds and James Walter 
Then keep your heads 
I say my boys 
Your comrades in the town 
Will help you yet to win the vote 
And put your tyrants down. 
Throw your old guns aside, my boys, 
the ballot is the thing 
They did not have to reckon with 
when George the Fourth was king. 
The ballot is the thing, my boys 
the ballot is the thing 
Will show these men how long 
it is since George the Fourth was king. 
from 'The Ballot is the Thing" by William Kidston, 
(published in the Worker, April 1891). 
But Freedom's on the Wallaby 
She'll knock the tyrants silly. 
She's going to light another fire 
And boil another billy. 
We'll make the tyrants feel the sting 
Of those that they would throttle; 
They needn't say the fault is ours 
If blood should stain the wattle. 
From "Freedom on the Wallaby" by Henry Lawson, 
(published in the Worker, May 1891). 
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Preface 
The Australian Labor Party, the oldest political party in the 
nation, began in Queensland, yet nowhere else has it been out of 
office for so long. The decisions made in the 1880s and 1890s to 
direct the politicial energies of the labour movement into capturing 
parliamentary seats have been fateful for the movement. The 
requirements of the ballot box have considerably modified the 
industrial and political objectives canvassed by labour leaders. In 
office. Labor governments have been forced by their perceptions 
of electoral reality to act harshly against militant sections of the 
union wing of the movement, thereby dividing and weakening it. 
Yet the failure of Labor to win office in Queensland since 1957 has 
equally demoralised the movement, rendering it incapable of 
resisting mounting attacks on its legitimacy and ability to 
organise. 
The first part of this book examines the rise of Labor as a 
parliamentary party and its performance over its marathon forty 
years of almost unbroken government from 1915 to 1957. After an 
analysis of the split of 1957 — its origins, development and 
immediate aftermath — the second part looks at the workings of 
the ALP (Queensland Branch) as it adjusted to being a party of 
seemingly permanent Opposition. It focuses in particular on at-
tempts since 1977 to reform the party and to restore Labor's 
credibility as an alternative government to the increasingly 
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xiv Preface 
authoritarian and anti-labour National Party regime, led until 
1987 by Johannes Bjelke-Petersen. 
The Queensland labour movement has a long tradition of mili-
tant organisation in support of radical redistributive economic and 
egalitarian political goals. The Labor Party shares this tradition. 
Yet Labor in office abandoned such goals and laid the groundwork 
for anti-labour governments, and Labor out of office failed to 
provide adequate leadership. It is no accident either that the elec-
toral malapportionment which sustained the Bjelke-Petersen Na-
tionals was established by Labor, or that the weapon of states of 
emergency to crush strikes was provided by Labor government 
legislation. 
After a hundred years of Labor in Queensland Parliament and 
thirty years on the Opposition benches, we ask: Should the 
Queensland labour movement continue to define itself in terms of 
the ballot box? 
August 1988 
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1 
Glory Days, 1888 to 1915 
Labour's Early Industrial Action 
The defeat of the 1891 shearers' strike is so famous in verse and song 
as to be legend. This strike was one of several bitter industrial strug-
gles fought during the 1890s depression; others include the 1891 
maritime strike and the less-remembered shearers' return bout of 
1894.^  The effects of these defeats on the Queensland labour move-
ment and the Queensland political environment were considerable. 
The decade leading up to the 1890s had seen notable victories by or-
ganised labour throughout Australia. Following the 1890s struggle 
the new organisations took a different direction. 
The second Inter-Colonial Trades Union Congress (ICTUC) was 
held in Melbourne in 1884, though no representatives from Queens-
land unions participated. In that year the Melbourne Trades Hall 
established a parliamentary committee.^ In 1885 a Trades and Labor 
Council was established by ten unions in Brisbane,-' and seven dele-
gates from Queensland unions attended a third ICTUC in Sydney. At 
the ICTUC of 1885 it was decided that the labour movement should 
seek direct representation in the colonial parliaments.^ In 1886, the 
labour movement in Queensland made the first attempt to secure the 
election of a labour candidate to the colonial parliament when Bris-
bane alderman, W.M. Galloway, secretary of the Seamens' Union 
and first president of the Brisbane Trades and Labor Council (TLC), 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
2 The 1880s to 1957 
contested but failed to win a by-election for the seat of Fortitude 
Valley. 
A fourth ICTUC was held in Adelaide in 1886, with four dele-
gates from Queensland unions attending^, and a delegate from the 
Australian labour movement attended the Trade Union International 
in Paris. That year also saw the establishment of several major 
unions, including the Amalgamated Railway Tramway Service As-
sociation (organised in New South Wales by W. F. Schey) and 
branches of the Australian Shearers' Union (ASU) organised by 
W.G. Spence, general secretary of the Victorian Miners' Union.^ 
An Australian Labor League was first mooted in Brisbane in 
1887. By then there were 2359 members of unions registered under the 
Queensland Trades Union Act^. In November 1887, following a 
political convention called by the Brisbane TLC, a Workers' Politi-
cal Reform Association was founded in Fortitude Valley for the pur-
pose of ruiming candidates in the 1888 Queensland colonial elections. 
The Brisbane TLC later endorsed six candidates in the colonial elec-
tions, four in Brisbane and two in country seats. The fifth ICTUC, 
held in Brisbane in March 1888, boosted the profile of the labour 
movement in Queensland: twenty-nine Queensland unions and labour 
associations were represented. Secretary of the ICTUC, Albert 
Hinchcliffe, who was also secretary of the Brisbane TLC, delegated 
to the Brisbane TLC the task of devising a federation of labour 
throughout the colonies. The main event of the year was a by-elec-
tion for the seat of Bundamba in which Thomas Glassey was elected, 
the first self-proclaimed "Labor" MLA in Queensland and, for that 
matter, Australia. 
In 1889 the Queensland Shearers' Union (QSU), which had 3000 
members, began to work closely with the ASU, while shearers in the 
Barcoo district of western Queensland formed a Workingmen's 
Parliamentary Representatives Association. By June 1889, following 
the decision of the fifth ICTUC to draw up a plan for the federation 
of labour, the Brisbane TLC dissolved itself and the Queensland 
Provisional Council of the Australian Labour Federation (QPCALF) 
was established. 
At the beginning of the 1890s prospects seemed propitious for 
union organisation in Queensland. In 1890 there were fifty-four unions 
registered under the Queensland Trades Union Act, with 21,379 
members,^ and the mass unions of non-metropolitan workers, includ-
ing the Queensland Labourers Union (QLU), the Carriers' Union, the 
QSU and the Miners' Association, began to affiliate with the 
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Australian Labour Federation (ALF). In May 1890 a dispute at the 
Jondaryan station, where the owners had hired non-union workers 
was successfully concluded: the Brisbane seamen and wharf labourers 
refused to load non-union sheared wool and the Jondaryan owners 
agreed to hire only workers who were members of a imion. 
Later that year there were the first indications of a counter-at-
tack by capital. One hundred special constables were enrolled be-
tween August and October after marine officers went out on strike. 
The strike, which was not supported by unions such as the QSU and 
the Carriers' Union, was called off in October. During the first month 
of the strike Liberal premier Samuel Griffith formed an alliance 
with conservative politician Thomas Mcllwraith to form what be-
came known as the "continuous ministry". Griffith's move was pro-
voked by the August 1890 ALF manifesto which identified, according 
to Griffith, "the intention ... to take into their irresponsible hands 
the management and control of all the industries of the colony".^ 
In 1891 the counter-attack continued. In December 1890 
pastoralists, meeting in Sydney and Melbourne, had decided on a 
new agreement for shearers that would ignore the eight-hour 
day/six-hour day week, cut wages by between 15 and 33 per cent and 
include the hiring of non-union labour. On 5 January 1891 a group of 
shearers rejected the new agreement and set up a strike camp in 
Clermont. Between January and June 1891 the Griffith-McIIwraith 
government introduced extraordinary represssion to crush the shear-
ers: 1100 special constables were used by the Queensland government 
during the strike. In February 1891 military forces were dispatched 
to Clermont. In March 1891 there was a general call-out of the QSU, 
the QLU and the central Queensland Carriers Union, an action 
which led to further troop deployments. In April 1891, at 
Rockhampton, fourteen strike leaders were tried for conspiracy and 
twelve were sentenced to three years in prison, their intercepted 
mail being used as evidence against them. In June 1891 the strike was 
called off as uiuon funds had been exhausted. Pastoralists armounced 
even lower pay scales for shearers and other bush workers in 1893 
and in July 1894 the shearers called another strike over the issue, 
which, three months later, they were forced to call off. 
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The state of affairs in the North-west has reached a pass which can no 
longer be tolerated under constitutional government. Whether it be the 
natural development of lawlessness, the conviction that their time is 
short, or the excitement born of the call out which must be pouring in 
additional thousands into the camps of the strikers, their exploits in the 
way of outrage have reached a height fitted to convey to the dullest or 
the most sceptical an alarming sense of the peril of the situation. The 
path of the unionist is now marked by fire. Failing to intercept the free 
labourers on the way to Peak Downs they ignited the grass along the 
route. Clermont telegrams state that nearly all the country between that 
town and Emerald is on fire, and fences are being destroyed, and the 
gates left open. On Sunday Biddenham and Oakwood runs were fired in 
many places, and yesterday flames followed the track of a party of 
unionists travelling from Lome to Minnie Downs. Baulked in the at-
tempt to wreck trains through the employment of pilot-engines, they 
open the railway gates across the rails and threaten to place dynamite 
on the bridges. At Capella they rush hotels, jump the bars and drink, 
make night hideous with riot and disturbance, and in their hundreds 
challenge the handful of police to come out and have bullets put 
through their hearts. At Barcaldine they tamper with the allegiance of 
the troops, urging them by surreptitious written invitations to join the 
shearers' camps in a body, and promising them protection. They do not 
scruple to kill the squatters' sheep for rations as they travel, reckless of a 
theft which is but one of all the things considered fair in war. The arms 
which it was supposed had been laid down or hidden away, are 
reappearing here and there, and seem to be ostentatiously exhibited as 
instruments of terror. Mass meetings are held in which unionists march 
to the intimidation or interception of the free labourer, "Breathing out 
threatenings and slaughter", and withheld from bloodshed only by the 
painful consequences which, but for the presence of a powerful 
protective force, would too plainly ensue to themselves. Such are the 
present facts; and speedily or even as we write, they will be aggravated, if 
the labour leaders are to be believed, by an influx into the strikers' 
camps of many thousands of additional idlers under the call out of 
yesterday. 
Extract from an editorial in the conservative Brisbane Courier, 
24 March 1891. 
The 1891 and 1894 strikes took place during a period of economic 
depression. In both cases anti-labour state governments passed puni-
tive legislation to aid in the violent suppression and dispersal of 
strikers. The Peace Preservation Bill, 1894 (passed but not enacted) 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Glory Days, 1888 to 1915 5 
made it clear that in Queensland the state was prepared to dispense 
with the most basic civil rights, such as trial by jury and the right to 
silence. Under the legislation any person could be imprisioned for six 
months without trial if suspected of violence, intimidation or dis-
turbing the peace. The Brisbane Worker of 8 September 1894 reported 
that colonial secretary Horace Tozer wanted to use the legislation to 
arrest strike leaders, a practice which in the 1891 strike had been 
illegal. To accompany the legislation, the Queensland government 
issued police, or "peace officers", with a manual which authorised 
them in certain specified situations to disregcird the rule to fire low 
and to pick off "leaders". The Sydney Daily Telegraph of 30 August 
1894 was horrified: "This ghastly official armouncement... Not even 
in the most autocratically governed country in Europe has a more 
cold-blooded incitement to take human life been issued with official 
sanction."^^ 
In the strikes of the 1890s the primary issues were the rights of 
unions to organise and to act as the sole legitimate agents of the 
workers in bargaining with employers over wages and conditions. 
Defeat was all the more crushing in Queensland because it came as 
the result of a counter-offensive by employers. The closed-shop prin-
ciple had been won in the Queensland wool sheds, after years of agi-
tation, only in 1890. Queensland was not the only battleground in 
1891 and 1894, nor were the wool sheds the only front. The strength of 
the entire industrial labour movement was tested and found wanting. 
Robin Gollan summarises the effects of the strikes. 
The defeats in the strikes were not the single cause of the formation of 
the Labor Party, but were the final incentive needed to launch it. The 
strikes were so decisive because the issue at stake was the right of the 
unions to act on behalf of the working class in all their relations with the 
employers. They were decisive also because, in the minds of both the 
workers and employers, they were a test of strength on a wide front be-
tween forces that had been skirmishing for the previous five years. ^ ^ 
Aside from ruthless employment of state coercion against strik-
ers, the other salient feature of the 1890s strikes was the unprece-
dented solidarity of the employers. With their greater financial re-
sources and the backing of like-minded governments, employers were 
seen as a class that was demonstrating its ability to smash even the 
most hard-fought workers' struggle. The working class was then left 
to face the bitter years of the 1890s depression in disarray. 
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The lessons drawn from these unpleasant experiences by politi-
cal and industrial labour were many. A significant strand of 
Australian labour historiography has been devoted to discussing the 
political results of the debacles of the 1890s and the depression.'^ 
The birth of the Labor parties early in the decade may not have been 
a direct response to industrial rout, since the groundwork for the po-
litical movement had been laid in the 1880s—in the main by British 
immigrants, including in Queensland the likes of William 
THE GENERAL COUNCIL'S APPEAL 
TO UNIONISTS AND THE GENERAL PUBLIC 
There is an organised attempt being made by Australian Capitalism to 
break down unionism, the immediate point of attack being the 
Queensland bush unions affiliated with the Australian Labour 
Federation. This attack is made by the whole capitalistic force of the 
continent, with the evident intention to extend it if successful to every 
organised body of wage-earners throughout the colonies. It is backed by 
the unlimited funds of the banks and federated employers' associations, 
is endorsed by the Queensland Government, and is justified by the mis-
representions and misstatements which always accompany the attacks 
of Capitalism upon Labour... 
No attempt whatever was made by capitalists to meet the bush 
unions in a friendly way to secure an alteration of any of the former con-
ditions of labouring and rates of wages, the much-talked-of 
"agreements" and reduced rates of wages were concocted in secret 
meetings of the Australian capitalists held in Sydney and Melbourne, 
and sprung suddenly on the men who came to work for their livelihood 
at the earlier sheds. 
These new agreements and new wages scales make certain serious 
alterations of former accepted conditions of labouring. Among the most 
serious of these alterations are—(a) A reduction in the wages to be paid 
for certain classes of bush work affecting large numbers of bush workers; 
(b) The ignoring of the Eight-Hour Day; (c) The tacit admittance of all 
classes of coloured labour upon an equality with white labour in White 
Queensland... 
"Freedom of contract" either means nothing more nor less than 
the freedom to victimise unionists, or it is capable of being so defined 
that the unionist shall be secured against victimising by something more 
than valueless promises. This General Council endorses thoroughly the 
statement that it is the universal opinion of wage earners that close 
unionism is the only secure safeguard under existing conditions against 
the cruel victimising of unionists for unionism, which is the common 
practice of many unscrupulous employers, and considers that the bush 
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unions give a most sincere proof of being actuated throughout by a de-
sire to deal justly when they offer to discuss this vital principle on its 
merits, and to endeavour in open conference to come to some mutually 
acceptable conclusion. The employers refuse to have any such discus-
sion. They want "freedom to victimise" and seem prepared to go to any 
lengths to secure it. They are determined to crush unionism, and do not 
want a conference at all. 
The introduction of organised gangs of blacklegs from Victoria into 
Queensland as a part of the concerted capitalistic scheme to prevent 
wage earners having any voice in the conditions of labouring is regarded 
by the bush unions as a gross violation of a natural right which rises su-
perior to any privilege of property... 
The Southern colonies are responding nobly to the call of 
Queensland Labour. Queensland Labour itself must not be behind in 
working... for its own defence. During the maritime strike the 
Queensland bush unions poured out thousands after thousands of 
pounds to feed their fighting comrades of the coast districts, and if only 
for this reason they have an unanswerable claim upon Queensland 
unionism and its sympathisers. When we further remember that they 
now bear the brunt of a battle in which Australian unionism itself is at 
stake, a battle forced upon them by the organised capitalism that 
threatens us all and which refused to listen to fair proposals, their claim 
is doubly unanswerable. Therefore we urgently appeal to every 
Federation, district and union, to every affiliated union, to every individ-
ual unionist, and to every sympathiser with unionism, which in spite of 
slanders and provocation and shortcomings strives earnestly to be hon-
est and to raise men to manhood and women to womanhood, to help our 
common cause and our bush comrades in this great battle. 
Extract from the Worker, March 1891. 
Lane and Matt Reid.^'' However, the reallocation of organised 
labour's resources to the political struggle after 1891 was primarily 
caused by the disastrous failure of industrial action. 
Unionism, although still in its infancy in 1891, waned following 
the defeats: some unions ceased to exist while those that remained 
declined in membership. Industrial militancy was widely perceived 
to be bankrupt. Militant union leaders were replaced with more 
"moderate" leaders, and those who all along had counselled against 
confrontation rose to greater prominence.^'* On the one hand, the 
trade union movement had shown itself to be incapable of beating 
the combined might of the state and disciplined organisations of 
employers. On the other, unions were so weakened by defeat that 
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some means other than direct action had to be found to prevent t e 
downward spiral of wage cuts eroding all the relatively impressive 
improvements in living standards won by Australian workers up to 
the 1880s. 
In 1891 Labour Electoral Leagues were formed in Sydney, 
Newcastie and New South Wales Countiy, on the initiative of the 
Sydney TLC parliamentary committee, to contest the New South 
Wales colonial elections of that year. Labor candidates won thirty-
seven seats in the New South Wales Legislative Assembly, more 
than a quarter of the House. This success was repeated in the other 
colonies. In 1892 ten Labor candidates were returned to the Victorian 
Legislative Assembly. As a result of these colonial elections of the 
1890s men took their seats who later became renowned labour leaders 
in the post 1901 federation parliament. Andrew Fisher, who left 
Scotiand in 1885, became the Labor member for Gympie in the 1893 
Queensland colonial elections. John Watson, commissioned to form 
the first federal Labor goverrunent in 1904, and William Hughes, 
who left Wales in 1884 and was deputy leader of the Australian 
Labor Party in 1910, were both elected to the New South Wales 
Legislative Assembly in 1894. 
In Brisbane in August 1892 preparations were made for labour's 
electoral success the following year when the first Labor-in-PoIitics 
Convention was held. Twenty-four delegates met, representing the 
Labor members of parliament, the ALF and various Workers' 
Political Organisations (WPOs—the local political branches). An 
executive council of twelve was elected: four were members of par-
liament and eight were elected by the convention. The platform was 
substantially the same as the March 1891 ALF platform'^. 
The structure of the unions themselves changed in this period of 
convalescence. Attempts were made to broaden the base of individ-
ual unions to cover all occupations and grades within one, or across 
several, industries. This move was not yet One Big Unionism, a phe-
nomenon of subsequent decades and of the rise of militant syndical-
ism. As Australian Workers Union (AWU) leader W.G. Spence 
claimed, it was partly a strategic move to facilitate the solidarity 
of workers within an industry and to prevent isolation of segments of 
the workforce in a confrontation with disciplined employers in the 
midst of a depression.'* The trend to industrial unionism was also an 
organisational response to declining membership and the disorgan-
ised condition of labour in key Australian industries.'^ 
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The prime movers in the amalgamations and extensions of cov-
erage that took place through the 1890s and after were the bush-
workers' unions. The AWU, initially the Amalgamated Workers' 
Union (AmaI.WU), was formed in Queensland in December 1891 from 
the depleted QSU and QLU. By 1889 it had become the colony's 
biggest union with 2000 members and funds of over £2000.'* The other 
states followed suit in 1894. In 1913, two years before Labor won of-
fice in Queensland, the sugar workers and some miners were brought 
into the fold by the further amalgamation with "Red Ted" Theodore 
and William McCormack's north Queensland-based Amalgamated 
Workers Association (AWA). 
The other union aspiring to industry-wide coverage in the 1890s 
and after was the railways union, the Queensland Railway 
Employees Association, formed in 1888; it advocated "all-grades" 
unioiusm from the outset." The union was eventually federated as 
the Australian Railways Union (ARU) in 1920. 
The effects of this structural change on the face of unionism in 
(Queensland are debatable. Ian Turner argues that the broadening of 
the AWU, in particular, led to a decline in militancy.^" Turner's 
view is that the structural constraints of representing diverse seg-
ments of workers, mass membership and the preponderance of itiner-
ant workers forced the AWU into a sometimes undemocratic and col-
laborationist, but always conciliatory, stance. According to Turner, 
the insistence of the AWU leadership on the greater value of 
political rather than industrial action is symptomatic of this ten-
dency. There are also some writers who, while agreeing with 
Turner's analysis, would see these changes as being improvements on 
an outdated and untenable militant line.^' Against this it needs to be 
said that those involved in the amalgamations which broadened 
the AWU intended the union to become more militant and industri-
ally effective.22 
Turner's correlation of the rise in industry-based centralised 
unionism with a decline in union militancy (as measured by strikes) 
can be disputed. Factors other than the structure of industry and the 
union movement may have equal or even greater significance in de-
termining levels of strike activity.^'^ Of particular relevance to the 
Queensland situation is the suggestion that government by a work-
ing-class party itself becomes a major determinant of strike levels.^* 
The dominance within the ALP machine of the AWU, a situation 
arising from its great voting strength following the 1913 merger, can 
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be seen to have produced concomitant effects on the AWU industrial 
posture. 
The defeats meted out to the Australian unions in the 1890s were 
more profound in their long-term impact on the labour movement 
than was expected at the time. Only a small proportion of 
Australian workers were unionised even before the defeats led to de-
fections and by no means all uiuonised workers were involved. By the 
middle of the next decade, real wages had risen above their pre 1890 
level and another boom was under way. 
The effects of the stirring industrial events of the 1890s on the 
Queensland union movement were threefold: there was a shift of 
emphasis and resources to the political movement; confidence was 
lost in the strike weapon as a lever for generating social change in 
favour of labour; craft unionism declined to the advantage of indus-
try-based mass unionism centred particularly in rural industries and 
railways. Each of these trends had been present before the 1890s and, 
to this extent, the revisionist account playing down the significance 
of the 1890s struggles holds good.^^ Revisionist analyses, however, 
do not confront a vital issue—what if the strikes had achieved vic-
tory rather than crushing defeat? Would not the militants' hand 
have been strengthened? Would the shift to electoralism have been 
so rapid? Would the implicit acknowledgment of state legitimacy by 
unions have been so complete? A hypothetical alternative history is 
valid here, given the relatively disorganised petty-bourgeois and 
export-dependent structure of Queensland capitalism at a time 
which actually gave the unions some tactical advantage. 
As Denis Murphy points out, the mythology bom of the 1890s 
came to have its own life and reality, constantly reproduced through 
such media as songs written long after the event: "Legends in any so-
ciety are important and, as the strike receded and memories dimmed, 
the legendary foundation of the Labor Party emerged as having a 
basis of fact."2* This mythology of the 1890s defeats helped to en-
gender the feelings of solidarity and "mateship", and appreciation 
of the class "enemy", which held the labour movement together. 
Although the immediate effect of the defeats was a change towards 
political action in the parliamentary arena, they also continued to 
serve as an inspiration for more militant action. 
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Parliamentary Labor versus the Unions: 
The Kidston Split 
While Glassey in 1888 called himself a "labor man" and was later 
endorsed as an official Labor candidate, it was in the 1892 Barcoo by-
election that the Labor Party—at that time in the guise of the 
People's Parliamentary Association (PPA)—had its first 
Queensland parliamentary success with the election of one T.J. Ryan, 
who was no relation of later premier T.J. Ryan, also coincidentally 
member for Barcoo. Formal separation of the political and industrial 
arms of the labour movement occurred later that year at the first 
Labor-in-Politics Convention. A Labor Party was formed, based on 
local WPOs and a Central Political Executive (CPE) with represen-
tation from the parliamentary Labor Party (PLP) and the unions, to-
gether with delegates elected by the Convention.^^ This was a fate-
ful move, since it symbolically reaffirmed and reproduced the prin-
ciples of representative electoralism within the party organisation. 
At the same time, the unions' control of the CPE left them with ap-
parent de facto control over the politicians. 
The party platform remained sketchy on the detail of a Labor 
government's legislative and administrative programme for the first 
decade of the party's parliamentary life. In particular, little was 
offered in the way of an alternative to the orthodox economic strat-
egy advanced by the colonial government.^* Instead, the extra-par-
liamentary party relied on the goodwill and hard work of the PLP^^ 
and coi\fined its general platform to demands for electoral reform and 
opposition to anti-labour programmes such as the importation of 
Melanesians and the Peace Preservation Bill. Electoral reform de-
mands included universal suffrage on the one-vote one-value princi-
ple and abolition of the unelected Legislative Council. 
Despite the wooUiness of its specific promises, the PLP in-
creased in parliamentary numbers to the extent that in December 1899 
PLP leader Anderson Dawson was asked to form a goverrunent after 
brawling among non-Labor parties had brought down the short-lived 
Liberal administration of James Robert Dickson. It took only a week 
for the non-Labor forces to recover from their shock and eject Dawson 
in favour of their leader, businessman Robert Philp. The Dawson 
ministry had been the first Labor government in the world. Despite 
its brevity, its formation meant that the prospects of Labor achiev-
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ing a more lengthy tenure of office had become real: from 1903 to 1907 
there was a Liberal-Labor coalition. The party platform, and the 
exercise of party discipline over the PLP, became a battieground for 
strategists of the resurgent labour movement. The goodwill and ca-
maraderie which flourished during the time of politically impotent 
Opposition had to give way to the serious business of constructing a 
strategy for wielding state power and attempting social reform in 
the interests of labour. 
The 1905 Labor-in-Politics Convention, after bitter debate, 
adopted for the first time since 1899 an objective for Labor in govern-
ment, which included a demand for the "collective ownership of the 
means of production, distribution and exchange."^ ALF leaders Matt 
Reid, David Bowman and Albert Hinchcliffe were concerned to re-
assert principles in the compromising context of coalition govern-
ment. This wording was rejected later that year by the Federal 
Conference in favour of a less radical proposal from the New South 
Wales party, but the battle for control of strategy had been joined. A 
large section of the Queensland PLP, including leader William 
Kidston, soon after rejected the 1905 objective and much of the plat-
form. Although Kidston had risen in the ranks of the coalition gov-
ernment to be premier in 1906,^' the 1907 Labor-in-Politics 
Convention reaffirmed the principle of PLP allegiance to the deci-
sions of the party convention and executive. Kidston refused to back 
down, and abandoned the party along with a majority of the then 
PLP, and remained in government with his supporters and the 
Liberals;^^ the Labor Party was reduced to a rump. 
If the industrial wing of the labour movement had reasserted 
control over its parliamentary creation, the cost was another decade 
of impotence in Opposition. Moderate coalitionism had at least re-
alised some of the objectives set out for the political wing of the 
movement in the 1890s. Among these, the Adult Suffrage Act, 1905 
stands out as having realised a major demand for electoral reform. 
Such measures may not have addressed what might be taken to be 
the fundamental demands of labour—indeed they were clearly 
shared with bourgeois liberals—but they did represent major ad-
vances which could not have been achieved without Labor partici-
pation in government. A Labor Party led by men such as Matt Reid, 
Gilbert Casey, Albert Hinchcliffe and Charles Seymour could be re-
lied upon to stick to its principles, but it might not achieve govern-
ment. 
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The 1907 split was unfortunate for the Queensland labour 
movement since the return of boom times had engendered a resurgence 
of uruonism and industrial agitation. Labor had lost its hold on gov-
ernment at a time when unionism was broadening its electoral base 
and economic conditions favoured more radical fiscal policies geared 
toward redistribution of social wealth and state capital formation. 
The conservative parliamentary beneficiaries of the split and of the 
collapsed coalition lost little time in extending state administrative 
authority to restrict union organisation.^^ 
The Sugar and Tramways Strikes, 1911-12 
Although the issue of PLP independence had been resolved by 1905-
1907 in favour of the party organisation (and through it, the indus-
trial wing of the movement), the battle over electoral and govern-
ment strategy had only begun, and with a new cast of characters. 
Reid retired as CPE president in 1909 and Hinchcliffe as secretary in 
1910. What strategy would most quickly lead to electoral triumph? 
What should be the goals of a Labor government? What interven-
tions deserved the greatest priority? What sort of society could or 
should Labor aim at achieving? 
The victory of the AWA under William McCormack in the 1911 
sugar strike was the first major victory won by a union in industrial 
struggle in Queensland for twenty years. Leaders of the strike, 
Theodore, McCormack and Ryan, were natural labour heroes and 
were rapidly propelled to dominant positions in the PLP, replacing 
the discredited Kidstonites, as Labor seats were recovered. The goals 
of the 1911 strike were strictly limited, being primarily recognition 
of the AWA's coverage of workers in negotiating a log of claims over 
wages and conditions. The employers insisted on treating only with 
their preferred Free Workers' Union, an organisation of non-unionists 
set up after the strike had begun. The employers in this instance, 
while themselves unified and backed by the conservative Liberal 
government of Digby Denham, were confronted not only by excellent 
union organisation, but also by sympathy with the strike from the 
public, press, sugar growers and the Commonwealth Labor govern-
ment,^ "* in part because of racist antagonism toward non-European 
"scab" labour. The AWA was content with an arbitrated solution and 
a general inquiry into conditions in the sugar industry. 
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Although the 1911 strike deUberately confined itself to matters 
which were the "legitimate" prerogative of unions, namely wages 
and conditions, many unionists saw this as a first step on a road to 
more radical demands. The AWA simply insisted upon its 
"moderate" tactics and steered clear of extra-legal confrontation. 
While some other unions became involved, notably the maritime 
unions in blacking non-union sugar, the AWA sought throughout to 
confine the dispute to its own claims and jurisdiction. 
By contrast, the 1912 tramways and general strike was allowed 
to develop into open conflict with the civil authorities, including 
replacement of the official currency with strike committee vouchers 
redeemable for food. In January 1912 representatives of forty-three 
unions in Brisbane declared a general strike over the dismissal of 
Brisbane Tramway employees for wearing their union badges. In 
February 1912, fifteen thousand workers gathered in Market Square 
(later King George Square) to protest against the lock-out and 
mounted police, aided by irregular special constables, viciously at-
tacked the crowd with batons. Later that month. Justice Henry 
Higgins (former attorney-general in the Watson federal Labor gov-
ernment), presiding over the Commonwealth Conciliation and 
Arbitration Court, ruled that the Tramway Company's ban on the 
wearing of union badges was illegal. After five terrible weeks the 
strike was called off in March 1912 when Brisbane Tramways reluc-
tantly agreed not to victimise those workers who had been on strike. 
Although Labor had hoped to win the 1912 election, the general 
strike cruelled its chances. Liberal premier Digby Denham, on a 
"law and order" platform, won the election. Soon after, PLP leader 
David Bowman retired on grounds of ill health and T.J. Ryan and 
Ted Theodore were elected parliamentary leader and deputy leader 
respectively. In 1912 Ryan was also elected president of the CPE. 
Like the 1891 and 1894 strikes, the 1912 Brisbane defeat has ac-
quired something of a legendary status in the labour movement, per-
haps because like its predecessors it involved marked struggle be-
tween a cross-section of the organised working class and the combined 
forces of capital and state. From its beginnings as a lock-out of 
Brisbane Tramways workers wearing union badges, to the savage 
street fighting of 2 February 1912 ("Black Friday") when volunteer 
"special constables" were unleashed on the unarmed strikers, to the 
eventual crumbling of solidarity, the general strike of 1912 failed 
because it had no clear goals and inadequate organisation. Although 
the issue in dispute was eventually won by Tramways unionists some 
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weeks after the strike's collapse, the whole affair was viewed as a 
defeat by its leaders because it had achieved nothing. Moreover, it 
had shown to many that the militants' strategy was hollow, since 
the requisite working class solidarity was not achieved, and 
perhaps could not be achieved, in such an ambitious confrontation. 
The "heroes" of the 1911 strike, the champions of conciliation 
and arbitration, were thus secured in their positions of leadership of 
the Labor Party and of the state's biggest union. The isolation of the 
Brisbane Trades Hall militants was symbolically sealed in 1913 by 
the transfer of the newly amalgamated AWU to new offices across 
town from the Trades Hall. The AWU also absorbed the old ALF 
Worker newspaper, and emerged in 1913 as the largest bloc of votes 
in the CPE. The significance of these events, however, was not 
widely appreciated by the militants at the time. 
Labor political leadership was reconfirmed in its convictions 
that the path of militant confrontationism was the road to defeat 
and ruin. Moreover, Digby Denham's government had used the crisis 
to defeat Labor at the 1912 elections, a factor which led Labor lead-
ers to believe that the militants had played into the conservatives' 
hands, and accelerated the formation of an election-winning al-
liance. The opinion that the unions had unwittingly played into 
Denham's hands was not confined to the Labor camp: even the 
governor voiced this opinion in his reports to the Colonial Office.''^  
However, despite the wild scenes surrounding the crushing of the 
general strike, anti-union feeling inflamed by pro-government pro-
paganda, and gloom in the labour movement in general. Labor fared 
rather well in the 1912 elections, winning twenty-five seats, includ-
ing some metropolitan seats. This result prepared the path for vic-
tory in 1915. 
In May 1915 in the Queensland state elections. Labor won forty-
five seats and its first majority in the Legislative Assembly. The 
Ryan government was not what Matt Reid and old ALF stalwarts 
would have envisaged: its members were drawn from western 
Queensland and the AWU. Despite the absence of Reid and 
Hinchcliffe from the CPE, Ryan's programme was one that still ad-
hered to many ALF principles. He campaigned on a radical platform 
which explicitly sought to confront monopolies and proposed the es-
tablishment of state enterprises, notably in the production, distribu-
tion and retailing of food.^ ^ 
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Liberalism as interpreted by Mr Denham [then Premier] declares to the 
people that, "Dear meat is the sacrifice you are making on behalf of the 
empire ... It is idle for Mr Denham to contend that the war alone is re-
sponsible. He would have the people believe that trusts, combines, mo-
nopolies, honourable understandings, and speculators have had nothing 
to do with the extraordinary forcing up of prices. 
The Labor Party refuses to allow the people to be exploited by the 
greed of speculators on foodstuffs ... There are certain enterprises and 
businesses which obviously can be better managed and controlled by 
the State than by private ownership ... This is partly admitted by the 
Liberals in their acceptance of State ownership and management of 
railways, harbours, wharves, savings banks etc. ... By this means the evil 
of private monopoly can be counteracted; new industries can be estab-
lished; and goods and manufactures can be supplied to the people at a 
reduced cost.-''' 
Enough of the old fire survived to make the next decade the 
most radical reformist period of the Labor Party in Queensland. 
Labor had at last won office in its own right, and there were many on 
both sides who thought the millennium had arrived. 
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Industrial Relations, 1915 to 1957 
The Labour Movement and Political Labor 
The founders of the political Labor Party expected that it would 
carry on the struggle of the industrial labour movement through 
parliamentary means. The very point of establishing a political 
party was that universal suffrage should be harnessed by the 
organised working class. Selection of candidates and determination 
of platform was to be undertaken by the proven representatives of 
that class—the union leaders.' The Labor Party, established for this 
purpose, was subject to the same canons of solidarity and discipline 
which bound the industrial labour movement, and its policies were 
governed by forums dominated by the unions. The notion that the 
party could exercise poUtical power contrary to the interests of 
workers would have seemed unlikely to its founders. Yet the history 
of Labor governments in AustraUa and elsewhere is the history of 
constant conflict between political Labor and labour. Queensland 
witnessed the development of these conflicts in an intense form. 
None the less, the labour movement remained sentimentally 
strongly attached to the Labor Party throughout the period and 
remains so today. Elements of the movement which advocated 
alternative, non-electoral, strategies for the advancement of labour 
remained on the fringe and came to prominence only at times of open 
confrontation between unions and Labor govermnents. Militants who 
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attempted to gain election themselves were better rewarded, but 
never amounted to more than a tiny minority on the floor of parlia-
ment. The majority of Queensland unions retained their affiliation 
to the party for the duration of Labor's period of office, effectively 
funding and organising for the party at each election. 
Labor electoralism, to which most Queensland unions remained 
loyal for so long, was based on the notion that manipulation of the 
state was the most effective strategy for labour advancement. The 
immediate goals of this strategy were at no stage more ambitious 
than the modest extension of state enterprise and social welfare 
services, and "socialism" was consciously redefined to fit vdthin 
these bounds. Agrarian corporatism, used to win the confidence of 
Queensland's economically dominant rural community, was likewise 
included in Labor rhetoric as a natural working class demand. The 
agrarian bias of the Queensland economy ensured also that the 
AWU, the union representing bush workers, was able to deliver suf-
ficient support at the party's decision making fonmis to insulate the 
party leadership from most militant demands and lend proceedings 
a convincing air of solidarity. 
Labour-State Relations 
In Australia, state provision of services is more widespread than in 
most Western countries; these include not only the almost universal 
road, port, and mail services but also railways, shipping, telecom-
munications, electricity generation and distribution, health and 
education. An Australian state government is both guarantor of eco-
nomic order and major participant in the economy, being the largest 
single employer of labour within its jurisdiction. In Queer\sland one 
state enterprise alone, the railways, was the largest employer in 
the state in 1915.2 
Given that the state employed such a large segment of the 
workforce, the labour movement was all the more likely to find 
itself locked in periodic internecine conflict with the state appara-
tus, which was sometimes directed by comrades of the political wing 
of their movement. Even though the government's management of its 
workforce was mediated through the agency of statutory managers 
like the Commissioner of Railways or the Public Service Board, the 
potential for serious tension and struggle within the labour move-
ment was never far from the surface. 
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In Australia, and certainly in the Queensland of 1915, while 
few union leaders would admit any congruence of interest between 
their members and management, they would almost always pursue 
policies that had a similar effect: conflict avoidance and the accep-
tance of industrial discipline . In this way they behaved as though 
they did believe in such a congruence. Unions then and now commonly 
adopt a posture of passive acceptance of the dominant rules, 
precedent and established frameworks which help to reproduce 
capitalist relations of production. As labour-market collectivities 
within the capitalist state, unions have an instrumental role to 
provide representation and organisation for their members operating 
in the market. This basic instrumental role leads them to concentrate 
on the mechanics of the market's operation, for example through 
wage rises rather than any direct assault on capitalism. 
Arbitration and Industrial Quasi-Corporatism 
The institution of a quasi-judicial system of industrial arbitration 
with the powers to determine and enforce awards on wages and con-
ditions was a central demand of the labour movement since before 
the turn of the century. Commonwealth machinery to this end had 
been established in 1904 but Commonwealth labour market jurisdic-
tion was, and remains, limited to those industrial disputes 
"extending beyond the limits of any one State" (S.51(xxxv) Com-
monwealth of Australia Constitution Act, 1901 ), thus leaving with 
the states the authority to determine most wages and conditions. 
Queensland had no indigenous, general system of arbitration 
before 1915. Unions had attempted to circumvent this absence by 
fabricating interstate disputes so as to achieve federal coverage, as 
in the 1911 sugar strike when the AWA had investigated the signing 
on of sugar workers in the New South Wales Northern Rivers 
district. Instead of a quasi-judicial body backed by state authority, 
(Queensland had adopted a form of the Victorian Wages Board 
model. This provided for the establishment of boards, consisting of 
employers' and workers' representatives, which had the power to 
rule on wage rates and hours. 
Unions objected to the Queensland workers' lack of any auto-
matic recourse to an arbitral procedure, as the appointment of a 
board to cover an industry was a government responsibility. Follow-
ing the 1912 general strike, the Industrial Peace Act, 1912 estab-
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Ushed an Indush-ial Court under a judge, but this body was equipped 
to penalise unions for strike action and boycotts rather than to 
arbitrate on claims. The institution of a centralised state system of 
quasi-judicial industrial arbitration had by 1915 become a key plank 
of political Labor and the union movement. Militants who, by 
contrast, favoured direct action and confrontation had been largely 
discredited by the failure of the 1912 general strike. Further, the 
success of the original strike claim (the right to wear Tramways' 
Union badges) in the Commonwealth jurisdiction, suggested that 
"State-sponsored systems of third-party intervention"3 might 
accomplish more for workers, in the short term at least, and cer-
tainly with less suffering, than could frontal industrial assault. 
Unions remained suspicious of the likely class bias of the 
arbitral quasi-judicial personnel. As Spence has it, "it was long ere 
[the unionist] was prepared to hand over his destinies to a Supreme 
Court Judge who, he knew, had come from different stock, and who 
had never shown any sympathy for him or his class."* A Labor 
government, however, could safeguard the unions' welfare through 
the appointment of sympathetic, or at least "neutral", persons to the 
arbitral benches. Here was a mechanism for translating poUtical 
power into industrial gains, obviating, it seemed, the often desper-
ate and always costly process of orgarused withdrawal of labour. 
The 1915 Labor platform, swiftly incorporated into the leg-
islative programme, laid great emphasis on the mediation of 
industrial conflict through the introduction of centralised quasi-
judicial arbitration. Further gains for labour were foreshadowed in 
the promised introduction of compulsory no-fault workers' 
compensation insurance, but the flagship of intervention in the 
labour market was certainly the arbitration plank. 
The Industrial Arbitration Act, 1916 repealed previous 
legislation and set up an Industrial Arbitration Court with a bench 
to be drawn from the judiciary. To ensure ease of passage through the 
hostile Legislative Council, the act also provided for the 
appointment of wages boards of the old type, but little use was ever 
made of these provisions.^ T.W. (Tom) McCawley, the crown solici-
tor, was appointed president. McCawley was allegedly something of 
a Fabian and the appointment was the subject of criticism and even 
legal action by conservative elements.^ 
Confirmation of the Labor government's bona fides and of the 
rectitude of the political wing's strategy for the advancement of 
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Labor came with McCawley's first judgments. The Mt Morgan copper 
mine decision of March 1917 granted preference in employment for 
unionists, an intervention in the free contractual labour market 
process which appeared to underscore the conservatives' worst fears. 
Unions could now depict themselves as the sole recognised legiti-
mate actors on the labour side in the resolution of industrial conflict. 
As an employer, the Ryan government was able to boost the 
depressed wages of state employees and aid in the formerly 
prohibited unionisation of groups of civil servants, notably the 
police.'' By 1920, each department was able to boast of massive pay 
increases for its employees over the period of Labor goverrunents: in 
some cases, such as the teachers', pay in the lower grades had 
almost doubled over pre 1915 levels.^ It is for achievements Uke 
these that labour historian Ian Turner dubs the Ryan government 
"the high water mark of Labor in politics".' 
Successes like these made Labor's strategy of industrial quasi-
corporatism look very attractive to union leaderships. Queensland 
Labor erected the most complete, potent and centraUsed corporatist 
structures for mediating industrial conflict of any of the Australian 
states,^" with the full acceptance and enthusiastic support of most 
union leaders.'' Agitation within the movement for further leg-
islative or administrative action confined itself largely to claiming 
for further legislated reductions in hours and automatic indexation 
of minimum wages. Such demands were unsuccessful in the short run 
following opposition in 1918 by the political leadership (notably 
Theodore and McCormack) on the grounds that these concessions 
ought now to be won by the industrial wing using the structures 
available. None the less, the restricted scope of those claims is 
indicative of a general acceptance by the labour movement off 
Labor's quasi-corporatist strategy. 
The First Decade, 1915 to 1925: 
Exclusion of the Militants 
The Shape of Radicalism 
Sections of the labour movement opposed to the electoralism of the 
Labor Party had commenced organising politically prior to 1915. 
Australia-wide, the best-known organisation of leftist opposition 
was the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), a syndicalist 
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group with roots in the American labour movement and often referred 
to by the pejorative nicknames "Wobblies" and "I Won't 
Work[ers]".'2 ji^g i w w platform specifically rejected a poUtical 
strategy which was not the outgrowth of industrial confUct, and 
called for acts of industrial sabotage as well as more traditional 
forms of direct action to bring down the capitalist system. Some 
IWW strategies, notably the goal of One Big Union (OBU), found 
more widespread support in the Queensland labour movement of the 
time than did revolutionary confrontationism. 
The strength of the IWW was nowhere as great as feared by 
conservatives, and less in Queensland than in New South Wales, 
where alarmism at its influence and anti-war stance led to the 
imprisonment of twelve prominent members on treason charges in 
1916. None the less, some uiuons were sympathetic to the impeccable 
radical credentials of the IWW, and certain prominent officials 
maintained a dilettantish liaison with the organisation. Until May 
1917 when it was forced underground, permission was given for the 
IWW to hold its meetings at the Brisbane Trades Hall, where it was 
kept under surveillance by Commonwealth agents.i^Two major unions 
sympathetic to IWW radicalism were the Queensland (later 
Australian) Railways Union (QRU) and the Amalgamated Meat 
Industry Employees' Union (AMIEU), but the consensus at Trades 
HaU was at this time only one of tolerance towards the syndicaUsts. 
When the organisation was proscribed by the Hughes Common-
wealth government in May 1917, an anti-conscriptionist body called 
the Universal Freedom League was set up at Trades HaU in what 
Commonwealth informants beUeved to be an IWW front. The main 
Trades HaU leaders, however, involved themselves chiefly in the 
official Labor Anti-Conscription Campaign Committee. 
Relations between the IWW and the Labor Party were neces-
sarily chilly, as the IWW platform utterly rejected the concept of 
the state as any sort of vehicle for social change, let alone the 
strategy of a parUamentary road for the labour movement. Unions 
sympathetic to the IWW continued to be affUiated to the Labor 
Party throughout this period, which is an indication again of their 
lack of real commitment to syndicalism. Despite the natural enmity 
of the Labor leadership towards the IWW, the Ryan government 
was conscious of IWW commitment to the advancement of labour and 
saw the suppression of the organisation as part of the same pattern 
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of Commonwealth War Precautions Act abuses to which the whole 
labour and radical movement was then being subjected. 
The IWW reached its zenith at this time, and rapidly 
departed the industrial and political stage in the years following 
the Bolshevik revolution in Russia in November 1917. OBU-ism was 
a syndicalist legacy with a longer life than the IWW; it survived, 
at least in rhetoric, for another decade. OrganisationaUy, many 
members of the now iUegal IWW re-emerged in the form of the OBU 
Propaganda League. A difficulty with the OBU objective was that 
it was alien to the craft-based union structure which characterised 
most labour organisations. The one great industrial union extant was 
the AWU, which could alone have formed the foundation for an 
OBU, but AWU enthusiasm for the revolutionary aims of the OBU-
ists was at best lukewarm, given its close attachment to political 
Labor. Ian Turner paints a scathing picture of the AWU leadership, 
in league with Labor parUamentarians, sabotaging the OBU project, 
to protect their elite position in the labour movement.''* Other, 
militant, unions including the Railways Union, which had a fair 
measure of industrial coverage and large membership, did not fare 
better at forming One Big Union. The ARU was strong on OBU 
rhetoric but weak in any activity which threatened its own position. 
In any case, syndicaUsm was losing its popularity and theo-
retical gloss in the wake of events in Russia, and labour militants 
eventually came to lean towards Leninist-politicaL rather than 
IWW-industrial, strategies for the overthrow of capitalism. This 
shift in strategy was given added impetus in Queensland by the 
presence of large and poUticaUy active communities of emigre Rus-
sians in Brisbane and the far north.'^ The Brisbane-based Russian 
Association was a hot-bed of Bolshevism, from whose ranks had 
come the first Soviet diplomatic appointee to Australia (although 
his credentials remained unrecognised).'^ A former leading Ught of 
the association, Artyom, otherwise known as Sergeyev, had returned 
home in March 1917 to become a major leader of the Bolshevik 
Revolution;'^ his remains now Ue in honour in Moscow's Kremlin 
wall immediately behind Lenin's mausoleum and next to American 
journaUst John Reid, author of Ten Days that Shook the World. 
The Russians had been involved in radical politics and indus-
trial agitation in Queensland for some time before the overthrow of 
the provisional government in Petrograd, but the Bolshevik victory 
in Russia gave them added cachet in their dealings with the 
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AustraUan labour movement. But since revolution also brought sepa-
rate peace with Germany, the Russians suffered increased 
harassment from the Commonwealth government under the wide-
ranging provisions of the War Precautions Acf.'® 
After the 1918 Armistice in Europe, Brisbane Industrial Council 
(BIC—the Trades Hall unions) joined with the Russians in 
organising protest action against continuation of the War Precautions 
powers. The so-called Red Flag Riots of March 1919 were a result. 
PubUc display of red flags was one of the activities banned by the 
Commonwealth, and their proud and provocative flaunting at 
demonstrations (organised in part by genuine Russian Bolsheviks) 
brought swift and savage reaction in the form of counter-
demonstration by enthusiastic returned soldiers' groups backed by 
Opposition politicians and the anti-labour press.'^ Armed state 
poUce battled with both sides. 
The Russians, better versed than their Australian comrades in 
Leninist theory, were active in getting a local Leninist vanguard 
poUtical party off the ground. In the days before the Russian Bol-
sheviks under Stalin gained utter hegemony over the international 
communist movement through the Comintern, AustraUan conununists 
and labour movement radicals had considerable freedom to develop 
their own poUtical strategies. For some years the ferment of ideas on 
the left caused by such factors as the persistence of syndicaUst 
doctrines of mass working-class mobilisation, the ideological 
struggles going on within the Russian Communist Party itself and in 
the Comintern, and the proliferation of ceUs and factions with di-
vergent dogmas, militated against the establishment of the one 
properly credentiaUed Communist Party of AustraUa.^o 
In Queensland there was no wholesale attempt of the kind 
found in New South Wales to convert the Labor Party to Bolshevism 
by capturing its organs. However, there was some airing of com-
munist ideas in Labor Party forums, as, for example, at the 1920 
Labor-in-PoUtics Convention: there, motions calling for workers' 
control on a Soviet model in the State Enterprises were put (and 
decisively lost on the conference floor) by the Bowen Coalfields and 
Townsville branches. Whatever the communists' theoretical prob-
lems with the Labor Party, they remained keen on union 
involvement. Communists nevertheless failed in Queensland to 
capture any major unions not already known for radicaUsm and 
militancy—certainly not the AWU. The heated agitation of the 
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Russian community cooled as many Russians themselves departed for 
the revolutionary homeland begirming in late 1919.^' Penetration of 
Labor Party branches was most evident in the north, where 
communist ideas found converts among a labour movement with a 
radical tradition. 
Labor and the Unions 
Election of the Ryan government was greeted with wholehearted 
celebration by both the BIC militants and the AWU in their 
respective publications, the Daily Standard and the Worker.^^ The 
grim news from the war (ANZAC had landed at GaUipoU on 25 
April 1915) had no dampening effect on the speed with which the 
Labor government began to move on implementing its reform pro-
gramme, and this general public support from militant and 
"moderate" unions continued unabated into the following year. The 
federal Labor Party's 1916 spUt over the conscription issue, which 
saw former Labor leader Billy Hughes assume the mantle as na-
tional anti-Labor ("Nationalist") leader, was kept out of Queens-
land. In Queensland the party was solidly against conscription. 
The Labor Party executive's offices had moved in June 1913 from 
the Trades HaU to the AWU's Worker building, a move which the 
BIC unions came to view with some disquiet. Still, the 1916 Labor-
in-Politics convention proceedings are full of expressions of mutual 
goodwill, in part because of the former AWA's more radical 
credentials, and the AWU and BIC unions combined to change the 
party structures so as to give unions direct representation at future 
conventions on an affUiated membership basis. The formula adopted 
actuaUy appeared to favour the BIC unions, which gained eight 
delegates to the 1918 convention against the AWU's four (plus the 
Clerical Workers' one). The AWU was, of course, well represented 
among the WPO (branch) and PLP delegates. 
The numbers at conventions remained firmly with the branches, 
of whose delegates by far the largest identifiable bloc was the PLP, 
which sent sixteen delegates to the 1918 convention. Premier Ryan 
was ousted in June 1916 from the chair of the executive and replaced 
by Bill Demaine in an apparent assertion of control on the part of 
unions and the party organisation (although Demaine soon after 
joined the PLP via appointment as an MLC). As Murphy observes, 
however, "on the surface it seemed that the industrialists had 
ousted the poUticians from control of the CPE, but as with many such 
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simpUfications of Labor baUots, the reality was otherwise."23 The 
majority which deposed Ryan was purely transitory, and the PLP 
and its supporters continued to be able to muster the numbers on issues 
of importance. 
The first major test of strength between the more miUtant unions 
and the Labor government began the year after the CPE rearrange-
ments. The issue was union acceptance of industrial arbitration deci-
sions, and the QRU was the major miUtant union involved. A sb-ike 
based on TowmsviUe broke out m the begirming of August 1917 arising 
from the unwillingness of McCawley, as president of the Industrial 
Arbitration Court, to award retrospectivity in a pay rise to the 
majority of railway workers.^^ In the face of moves by the 
Commonwealth to use its war powers to take over the dispute and 
sign on non-union labour, Ryan was able to secure the agreement of a 
joint meeting of railway unions to refer the matter to the Common-
wealth Arbitration Court. When some northern strikers then refused 
to return to work, the government, citing the combined unions' support 
for its compromise solution, gave the continuing strikers an ultima-
tum after which they would be sacked. The strikers backed down on 
the beU. 
Although Prime Minister Hughes attempted to rekindle the 
strike by refusing Justice Higgins of the Commonwealth Arbitration 
Court permission to hear the case, the unions aUowed the govern-
ment to find another appropriate arbitrator. Other events then in-
tervened, notably the anti-conscription referendum campaign, and 
finally the whole business was forgotten, the railway workers 
achieving pay rises through the legitimate forum of the arbitration 
system. 
Labor had shown itself quite wiUing to draw upon the arsenal 
of strike-breaking weapons available to it as employer. The gov-
ernment had resisted exhortations to sign on non-union labour in order 
to restore essential services,^^ but this can be construed, primarUy, as 
a shrewd non-inflammatory tactic designed to dampen down an 
explosive situation. Labor had shown that, faced with industrial 
confrontation, it was not prepared to take off its "legitimate govern-
ment" and "employer" hats and don its "labour soUdarity" hat. 
In the context of the anti-labour assaults of the Hughes federal 
goverrunent and of Queensland's isolation as the only Labor state, 
the labour movement closed ranks behind Ryan in the 1917 conscrip-
tion referendum and 1918 state election campaigns. BUI Demaine, 
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still CPE president^^ (he was to hold that position for more than a 
decade), almost certainly echoed the general opinion of the Trades 
Hall unions in his address to the 1915 Labor-in-Politics Convention 
held at the opening of the campaign: "the Queensland Labor 
Government, with aU its faults and weaknesses, and it is not without 
both, is the best and most truly democratic Australia—not to go 
further than that—has ever had."^'' The Ryan government was 
returned with an increased majority in April 1918, a remarkable 
achievement in the climate of hysterical reaction to the Russian 
revolution and British Empire jingoism then rampant. This victory 
was due in large part to the soUdarity the union movement showed 
in support of the Labor government. 
A renewal of the public schisms between Labor government and 
miUtant unions was not long in coming. Again, the issue revolved 
around the coverage and legitimacy of the arbitration system; again, 
the location was the north. On this occasion the conflict erupted in 
an industry where management was in private (indeed, foreign) 
hands, and one which provided no service or goods vital to the 
preservation of individual safety or to the general operation of the 
economy. 
The workers concerned were employed at the two TownsviUe 
export abattoirs, and their union was the militant Amalgamated 
Meat Industry Employees' Union (AMIEU). The AMIEU in 
TownsviUe had been able for some years to negotiate its own wages 
and conditions with the abattoir managements outside the 
arbitration system, thereby extracting some notable concessions, 
including a closed shop and a monopoly over nominating workers to 
be hired. In most other Queensland shops, the AMIEU had accepted 
the jurisdiction of McCawley's bench. McCawley had in March 1918 
made an award covering the TownsvUIe workers but they refused to 
acknowledge it and confUct persisted on and off for the remainder of 
the year as the managements attempted to split the union's 
memberships.^* 
In January 1919, the meat companies applied for and were 
granted deletion of union preference provisions in the award—an 
award which, in any case, the union still refused to recognise. 
McCawley, to the delight of the non-labour press, specificaUy cited 
the workers' mUitancy and interference with management preroga-
tives as justification for the deletion. When the managements 
promptly began to hire non-union labour from the growing pool of un-
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employed (constantiy fed by reinforcements from miUtary demobUi-
sation) the uruonists went out on strike. The managements remained 
intransigent and spurned union overtures since they were able to op-
erate at fuU capacity using non-union labour, and the strike col-
lapsed at the end of March. 
It erupted anew in June, when it became clear that the 
managements were determined to employ only non-union labour. The 
strikers won the support of transport unions, but internal disputes 
over tactics and suspicion of some of the leaders served to bring on a 
breakdown in discipline.^' Union frustration grew at the continued 
smooth operation of the meatworks by non-union labour and on the 
night of Saturday-Sunday, 27-28 June 1919, some strikers, supported 
by pro-strike unemployed, vandalised the stockyards and released 
store cattle. MiUtant strike leaders were arrested on the Sunday for 
inciting the disturbance. Later the same day a rowdy demonstration 
demanding their release led to an exchange of gunfire between poUce 
and demonstrators and left at least lune demonstrators with gunshot 
wounds.^" Some of the dispersing crowd then raided nearby hard-
ware stores and gunshops and continued to exchange fire with the 
poUce who had barricaded themselves in the gaol. This encounter 
was to become famous as "Bloody Sunday". To prevent other major 
incidents of unruly behaviour on the part of strikers and their sup-
porters, the Ryan government rushed squads of armed poUce to 
TownsviUe. When the QRU refused to carry a trainload of poUce to 
TownsviUe, union members who refused to work as directed were 
sacked and the trains driven by non-union staff. '^ 
Within the labour movement, the goverrunent's stance and the 
violent defeat of the strike had some noteworthy effects. First, the 
humUiating defeat of the strike was used as yet another potent ex-
ample of the folly of pursuing claims other than those legitimated 
by the arbitration system. IWW tactics of effective on-the-job con-
trol of the productive process by mass refusal to accept shop floor 
discipline from management were thus seen to be self-defeating by 
many in the labour movement who might otherwise have been at-
tracted to syndicalist ideology.^^ Second, the Ryan government had 
laid down its interpretation of the limits to industrial action within 
the state: rejection of the arbitration process by a section of labour 
would place that section beyond the pale and the full array of 
management strike-breaking measures could be unleashed with 
government connivance and support. Third, unions were expected to 
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discipUne their own branches: it was clear that industrial relations 
processes had to be centralised with full disciplinary authority 
vested in the central leaderships. Fourth, it was now to be un-
derstood that labour would make industrial gains legitimately 
through the arbitration system or not at aU; Labor in office would 
strongly resist labour acting independently to effect gains. 
PoUticaUy, it was opportune for that moderate wing of Labor 
associated with the PLP and AWU to make these delineations clear. 
Political reaction to the actions of mUitant labour was fierce, as 
were radical ideas generally, in the context of revolutionary struggle 
in Europe and counter-revolutionary intervention by the AUied 
powers.33 
Queensland Labor, as the sole Labor government in the country, 
was about to enter the national stage. Ryan resigned the premier-
ship in October 1919 to contest (successfuUy) a federal seat. His suc-
cessor Ted Theodore had close personal and political links with the 
AWU. Both had something to gain and little to lose by disciplining 
miUtants in the Trades HaU unions. The Trades Hall militants were 
themselves in disarray over competing radical theories and 
strategies (all of which were, nevertheless, tempered by an abiding 
loyalty to Labor in office). 
However, in the face of fiscal crisis in 1920 and following hard 
on a disappointing Queensland Labor vote in the 1919 federal elec-
tion,''* the PLP-AWU dominant axis found itself obUged to make 
some concessions to its opponents in the party at the 1920 Labor-in-
Politics Convention: the support of the miUtants was essential for 
successful electoral mobiUsation at this time. Numerous "radical" 
motions affecting the working conditions of state employees and 
education were carried, whUe an AMIEU motion censuring poUce ac-
tions during the 1919 strike was gently handled. An amendment re-
quiring consultation between the government and unions concerned in 
strike action in which police were to be used was moved by PLP sup-
porters and carried. 
The mUitants were not entirely molUfied, sensing that their 
own minority position within the party machine denied them any 
chance to dictate poUcy. Trades HaU support for Labor in the 1920 
Queensland election was lukewarm. This faUure to support Labor 
wholeheartedly in an election was blamed by many for depriving 
Labor of much of its parUamentary majority. Moreover, the big elec-
toral losses were in the metropolitan (Brisbane) electorates, where 
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the influence of the Trades HaU unions was strongest. Thus the PLP-
AWU dominant faction had reason to feel embittered at the spunung 
of its conciUatory overtures. 
In March 1919 Theodore and Ernie Lane (one of the few ex-AWA 
miUtants to remam an official of the AWU) drafted a document en-
tifled Solidarity or Disruption? which called on the labour move-
ment to close ranks behind the Labor Government. The document was 
endorsed by the (Queensland Cenh-al Executive ((^CE) and ckculated 
to branches and affUiated unions; ^^  it specifically reaffumed the 
legitimacy of leftist dissent within the party: 
The Queensland Central Executive fully recognises that the suppression 
of bona-fide and honest criticism is vicious in principle and reactionary 
in effect, and would inevitably result in stagnation and the early decay of 
the Labor party. Without the driving force of the Left or extreme wing of 
Labor and an inteUigent or advanced criticism, progress and virility are 
impossible. Lately, however, advocates of other doctrines have insinu-
ated their way into the ranks of the workers and are seeking to spread a 
crafty and disruptive propaganda in the working class movement.^^ 
But the traumatic events of 1919 and 1920 conspired to ensure 
that this hoped-for soUdarity among party and industrial factions 
was not to be fully realised. No further such statements were forth-
coming. 
Fiscal Crisis and Wage Cuts 
Queensland's fiscal crisis deepened through 1920 and into 1921, pre-
cipitated by the evaporation of loan funds, the impact of a recessed 
economy on revenue, and the drain on the exchequer of losses in the 
State Enterprises. From 1920 until the Great Depression, steadily 
worsening recession was reflected in a steady deflation in retail 
markets, reversing the wartime inflationary trend. 
With the stated objective of cutting goveritment expenditure, 
Theodore successfully approached the Arbitration Court, in July 
1922, seeking a flow-on of a five-shilling reduction in the basic wage 
to apply to aU state employees. The stronghold of the miUtants, the 
ARU,^'' was now seen to be under direct assault. This time the 
moderates in the QCE used their majority to prevent any action 
stronger than voicing "strong disapproval" of the move or "urging" 
the government to change its stance, although a deputation was sent 
to the premier. A motion from George Rymer of the ARU calUng on 
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the PLP to "take all reasonable steps" to secure a return to the old 
rate was rejected.'* 
The ARU then decided on a policy of pubUc opposition to the 
government and to its much-vaunted arbitration system. A Govern-
ment Employees' Anti-Reduction Committee was formed under the 
auspices of the ARU, comprising representatives of twenty-nine 
unions with coverage of state employees.^' UnhappUy for the long-
term credibility of the ARU, it adopted a tactic of personal 
vilification of Theodore and his close associates. 
At the 1923 Labor-in-Politics Convention, ARU delegates 
George Rymer and Tim Moroney attempted to force the PLP leader-
ship to confess to what were seen as fundamentaUy anti-labour atti-
tudes. They moved what amounted to a manifesto of miUtant union-
ism: "That, in view of the fact that the Arbitration Court's poUcy of 
reducing workers' wages confUcts with the poUcy of the ALP, this 
Convention is of the opinion that the workers should immediately 
adopt the means of redress laid down by the AU AustraUan (Trade 
Union) Congress."*^ Those "means of redress" included the estab-
Ushment of the OBU and training for workers in the control of in-
dustry. Theodore stayed out of this debate, leaving the running to 
his deputies, one of whom—McCormack—declared ominously of the 
ARU, "They might honestly believe in their attitude, but he 
(McCormack) hoped to Uve to see the day when some of them got in-
volved in some big industrial trouble. Some of them would run away 
when this happened." 
The R)rmer/Moroney motion went dov^ m by twelve votes to sixty. 
Theodore outmanoeuvred the miUtants by bringing on a debate over 
a motion expressing support for the principle of arbitration (which 
was accepted by aU but the militant unions) before the much more 
contentious motion to restore the basic wage to the 1921 level of £4 5s. 
The debate was then gagged and the motion to restore the five 
shilUngs was lost by thirty-seven votes to thirty-five. 
Although Theodore conceded some measures, including in-
creased workers' compensation payments, the damage was done in 
the eyes of the miUtants. Because of canvassing by miUtants among 
selected parliamentarians and also threats of loss of preselection, 
Theodore lost the PLP leadership on a caucus vote in July 1924*1. 
HaU an hour later, he was reinstated. As part of a compromise, he 
was forced to bring on immediately the delayed Industrial Arbitra-
tion Act Amendment Act, 1924, lowering working hours to forty-four 
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per week (five and a half days). This was in confUct with the arbi-
tration-only approach insisted upon since 1916, but in making this 
concession the government played down the existence of confUct be-
tween longstanding poUcy and the act's provisions.*^ 
The forty-four hour concession was enough to satisfy the less 
miUtant unions and sections of the party. Faced with continued frus-
tration on the wages issue, the ARU, however, resolved to make life 
difficult for Theodore. It campaigned among its members to en-
courage informal voting in the federal seat of Herbert. Theodore had 
resigned to contest the seat at the March 1925 federal election*' and 
he lost by barely two hundred votes. 
In May 1925 the Arbitration Court again rejected union sub-
missions for a rise in the £4 basic wage. When further repre-
sentations to the court and government faUed, the ARU succeedeid in 
cobbling together support from other raUway unions for industrial 
action. The goverrunent had further antagonised the raUway imions 
in these last negotiations by its insistence on AWU representatives 
being included in negotiations. (The AWU had been active in 
"poaching" members from the raUway unions.**) FoUowing the ex-
piry of several ultimatums, the combined raUway unions went out on 
strike at midnight, 27-28 August 1925. 
After a week, the GilUes government capitulated. To the dis-
gust of the non-labour press, WilUam GilUes agreed to the statutory 
restoration of the five shilUngs removed by the 1922 Arbitration 
decisions. The ARU appeared to have justified its strategy of forcing 
the Labor government into legislating for labour gains as a result of 
industrial action. ARU membership soared to an aU-time peak of 
11,000 in the months foUowing the strike. 
The following month the ascendant forces within the Labor 
Party unveiled a counter-strategy. The Industrial Arbitration Act 
Amendment Act, 1925 , aboUshed the Court and substituted a Board 
of Trade and Arbitration of which only one member out of the three 
was to be a judge. The lay appointees were former AWU secretary 
WilUam Dunstan and former premier WiUiam GiUies, who resigned 
to take the post. This began a twenty-six year tradition of AWU 
representation on the Arbitration bench. Former AWU secretary and 
Theodore numbers-man BiU McCormack had by then ascended to the 
premiership. 
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The Pledge 
McCormack, now urifettered as leader of the PLP, and supported by 
his old comrade Theodore who was back at the AWU office, moved 
swiftly to purge the ARU and its backers from the party. Earlier in 
1925 the QCE had circulated a Member's Pledge form to aU branches 
and affiUates, worded as foUows: "I declare that I am not a member 
of any Communist Organisation or Party, or of any political party 
having objects or methods in any way opposed to the Australian 
Labor Party."*^ At the time, the circulation of this pledge purported 
to be nothing more than compliance with Federal Conference's 
decision the previous year concerning membership of communist 
organisations*^ and it was largely ignored by party members.*-' Then, 
without apparent warrvUig, McCormack successfully moved at the 
November QCE meeting to have aU QCE members sign the pledge 
forthwith or be thrown out of the QCE. Two of the three ARU 
delegates, Rymer and Moroney, withdrew in protest. 
No longer privy to the QCE discussions, the ARU delegates de-
termined to recover their ground at the February 1926 Labor-in-PoU-
tics Convention and signed their pledges with an over-typed 
protest.** They were not to know that the QCE had determined that 
for credentials to the convention to be recognised, pledges would need 
to be presented without reservation. The scene at the 1926 convention 
when the four ARU delegates were denied entry was reported with 
the coy notation: "the Credentials Committee had decided that the 
four gentlemen representing the ARU were not entitled to stay."*' 
Outraged at these sly manoeuvres, the ARU and some co-miUtant 
unions from Trades HaU disaffUiated from the party in the second 
half of 1926. Some, including the ARU, were not to reaffiliate until 
after the 1957 split. 
At the 1926 convention and afterwards, McCormack and his 
AWU supporters sought to justify their actions by reference to the 
communist menace. Government advertising and transport privUeges 
were withdrawn from the Trades Hall's Daily Standard and the 
ARU's Advocate pubUcations during 1926 on the same pretext. The 
chief effects flowing from McCormack's purge were to isolate the 
militant unions and deprive them of access to the government 
through the organs of the Labor Party; to bind unions remairung 
within the Labor fold to the state's arbitration system as a sole 
mechanism for industrial gains and confUct resolution; and to remove 
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the only union with enough decentralised members to challenge 
AWU hegemony within the party. 
This exclusion deprived miUtants of the mechanisms, formerly 
made available through party membership, for canvassing and le-
gitimating a broader poUtical and economic agenda than that de-
termined by the instrumental role of unionism.^" The goal of manip-
ulating the state envisaged by the labour movement at its es-
tablishment and in its continued sentimental attachment to the 
Labor Party was redefined to exclude direct intervention in the 
labour market in effecting even basic industrial aims, let alone 
radical social and economic change. Having excluded the militants, 
the party leadership was given greater freedom to co-opt 
alternative, non-labour, sources of support, such as the farmers. 
The AWU and the Labor Leadership 
Through the 1890s and early 1900s the AWU, via a series of defeats 
and subsequent reorgarusations, moved more and more towards a pro-
arbitration and confUct-avoiding posture. This was despite the fact 
that it retained strong Unks with the ALF (Australian Labour Fed-
eration—precursor to the ALP) and into the first decade of the 
twentieth century still applied a militant rhetoric created by 
earUer Worker editors WilUam Lane and Henry Boote.^' 
Several factors determined the AWU shift away from 
miUtancy. The defeats of the 1890s revealed the difficulty of suc-
cessful strike action in such a quintessentially decentralised working 
environment as the pastoral industry in the absence of efficient cen-
tral union organisation backed by the enforcement of closed shop. 
Moreover, because much work done by pastoral workers was at best 
semi-skUled, non-union labour could easUy be recruited to defeat a 
strike, especially where management policy had government 
backing. The AWU was thus in the paradoxical position in which 
the organisational preconditions for successful direct actions could 
only be achieved through the agency of the state. Facing up to the 
realities of the situation, the AWU leaders successively moderated 
their policies to the extent that "fair" arbitral arrangements became 
the prime industrial goal, although its members, especially 
itinerant workers, were inclined to outbreaks of direct industrial 
action in defiance of the leadership. Throughout the 1890s and early 
1900s the union had conducted isolated guerilla action against non-
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union labour, but no decisive victory had been possible without legal 
recognition and closed shops. 
The AWU achieved its first national award from Justice 
O'Cormor of the Federal Arbitration Court in 1907 in a case costing 
the union £4000. Highly centraUsed organisation had won, but at 
the price of surrendering the strike weapon. 
Tight central organisation has its own imperatives—a phe-
nomenon first observed by elitist writers in the tradition of Robert 
Michels. As Colin Crouch notes, "the people charged with running an 
organisation of workers may come to have different interests from 
those of their members, and ... may be able to ensure that the 
organisation primarUy serves their own interests".^^ The structure of 
the AWU was ideally suited to the operation of the Michels "Iron 
Law" which holds that large organisations lend themselves to con-
trol by cUques which operate to convert the organisation's goals into 
those which serve the cUque's interests.^' The backbone of the AWU 
(even after the 1913 amalgamation with the AWA) remained the 
dispersed, atomised and seasonal gangs of pastoral workers and 
cane-cutters. Units of workplace organisation were thus so smaU, and 
the total membership of the union so large (over one-third of all 
union members belonged to the AWU), that internal opposition be-
came almost impossible to organise successfully. Indeed, by the 1930s 
the union leadership had banned non-approved candidates from 
standing for union positions,^ and had enforced the union's own ver-
sion of the anti-communist pledge. 
Meanwhile, the AWU was the ideal mechanism for Labor 
Party organisation throughout the non-metropoUtan electorates of 
Queensland so vital to the Labor electoral strategy. The AWA 
amalgamation of 1913 had brought in the sugar workers and miners 
of the north, whUe the AWU pastoral workers constituted the sole 
effective labour organisation west of the Great Dividing Range.^^ 
The organisational strength of the revamped AWU became reflected 
in an interchange of key personnel between the union and the PLP. 
McCormack, who became AWU Queensland president after the 
amalgamation, held on to his union position for some time after his 
election to parliament and to the Speaker's chair. Theodore, the 
former AWA leader, returned to the AWU payroU for some time af-
ter his defeat in the 1925 federal election. The location of the Labor 
Party offices in the AWU building served to emphasise the organi-
sational closeness of the two bodies. 
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AWU leaders derived added benefits m the form of poUtical 
patronage from their closeness to Labor leadership. Lucrative and 
prestigious goverrunent appointments, such as those to the new Board 
of Trade and Arbitration established in 1925 and those to semi-
governmental authorities such as hospital boards often went to 
AWU officials upon retirement. 
Lastly, the AWU's leading role in the Labor Party meant that 
many of the contradictions and ambiguities afflicting Labor in 
government rubbed off on the union leadership. Being so close to the 
government, the AWU leaders were naturally constrained in their 
expression of any open confUct with government poUcy. Compromises 
on conflicting positions were therefore likely to be resolved in 
private discussions so as not disturb the unified PLP-AWU front 
which could deUver the numbers on nearly every issue. 
The political and industrial battles leading to the exclusion of 
militant unions from the Labor Party in 1926 had two interrelated 
aspects. First, there was the overt fight waged on the shop floor and 
in the party organs to shift industrial relations poUcy radicaUy in 
the direction of workers' control of industry and legislated wage 
rises. Second, insofar as these struggles forced the AWU-PLP faction 
to back down, they represented a serious threat to the internal 
control exercised by the leadership of both organisations. Thus the 
personal antipathy between the leaders of the ARU and of the 
AWU-PLP, emphasised by writers such as Kett Kermedy,^^ should 
be seen as merely a by-product of these ideological, organisational 
and control factors, not as a cause of the breach between the two 
organisations. 
The 1927 South Johnstone Mill and Railway 
Strike: Discipline with Violence 
The ARU, chief exponent of miUtancy and direct action strategy in 
the Queensland labour movement, curiously mirrored the AWU in 
organisation. Like the AWU, it was a mass uruon of at best semi-
skiUed bushworkers (although membership was open to skiUed 
grades) who operated by and large in small gangs of fettlers and 
others. Like the AWU, the ARU was organised on industrial as op-
posed to craft lines. Again Uke the AWU, the ARU had a tight cen-
tral organisation which admitted little open opposition to the 
leadership. For example, J. Hayes, the only ARU QCE delegate to 
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sign the anti-communist pledge, attempted to oust the Rymer-
Moroney ruling group and was purged from the union. 
On the other hand the ARU was a union composed entirely of 
state employees whose labour was absolutely essential to the 
operation of the economy. Thus the union's position in the labour 
movement was central to the grid of ambiguities affecting the Labor 
government's industrial relations poUcy. Within the labour move-
ment the claims of a miUtant pubUc sector union are viewed in quite 
a different light from the legitimate struggle of labour against 
capital: "The fact that the State is the employer in [a] dispute cre-
ates a confUct of loyalties for those workers asked to join sympathy 
strikes."^^ These confUcts of loyalties certainly applied in the case 
of the Queensland RaUways. 
Other tensions which weakened the ARU's potential call on 
labour movement solidarity included the belief, then more 
widespread than now, that state ownership in itseU constituted an 
achievement of socialist and labour movement goals. Workers in a 
state enterprise could therefore be seen by their counterparts in pri-
vate industry as protesting too much. For those colleagues state own-
ership was an unrealised goal. 
Furthermore, the ARU's insistence on OBU-ism led it to adopt 
an arrogant attitude towards the craft railway unions, which it 
dubbed "sectional" unions. The fact that some of these unions had 
split off from the ARU or its predecessors, and had in general 
charged lower dues erU\anced the ARU's sense of moral superiority.^* 
The Australian Federated Uivion of Locomotive Enginemen (AFULE), 
tacticaUy crucial to the success of industrial action, came in for par-
ticularly vituperative—if not unjustified—treatment. In the pages 
of the ARU's Advocate, the locomotive drivers' union was referred 
to as "A. Fule". Such remarks from the ARU succeeded only in 
encouraging suspicion and enmity in the ranks of the other raUway 
unions. Even in the 1925 basic wage strike, the ARU had difficulty in 
holding the other unions together, and its victory in the dispute only 
served to inflate its self-righteous posture. 
The ARU's departure from the Labor Party isolated the union in 
a way not perceived, or at least not pubUcly admitted, by the uruon 
at the time. It remained, after all, the most powerful union on the 
TLC (which had succeeded the BIC in April 1922, following two 
years of loose formations) and hoped through its unadulterated ad-
herence to labour principles to shame the rest of the movement back 
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to its side. The 1927 action in the raUways thus began as a demon-
stration by the ARU of its unstinting soUdarity with workers be-
trayed by their own uiuon, appropriately enough the AWU. 
Since its exclusion from the 1926 ALP convention the ARU had 
played a leading part in undermining union support for the McCor-
mack goverrunent. The traditional AustraUan fawnmg reception ar-
ranged by the Queensland government for the Duke and Duchess of 
York on their visit to Brisbane in AprU 1927 incensed the miUtants, 
who thereupon moved to exclude government members from 
participation in that year's May Day parade. An Ironworkers dele-
gate told the TLC that "if the workers beUeved that the poUticians 
had faUed in their duty to the movement, then the workers should 
take a stand and decline to recognise them".^^ McCormack was over-
seas on the annual loan-raising trip at the time, so the acting 
premier, William Forgan Smith, replied on the government's be-
haU: "AU this serves to indicate an effort at a form of blunt and 
savage dictation, which is cowardly in its inception, and would only 
be submitted to by the politicians and the feeble-minded."^" The 
May Day parade was abandoned, but the war of words between 
George Street (Parliament House, Brisbane) and Turbot Street 
(Trades HaU) continued over the ensuing months. 
A dispute at the South Johnstone sugar miU had begun in April 
1927 and initially attracted little interest. The mill had been ac-
quired from the state by a farmers' co-operative under the Primary 
Producers' Co-operative Associations Act, 1923 and the new man-
agement had dismissed the existing all-union workforce at the end 
of April and replaced it with a new crew including some non-union 
labour. At the end of June the AWU, with some reluctance, declared 
the strike official and the TLC announced support for the strikers. 
The dispute reached boiUng point when on 5 July a picketing striker 
was shot dead. (No-one was ever charged with the murder, and it 
still remains unclear whether or not the incident was directly 
connected with the strike.) Acting premier WiUiam Forgan Smith 
immediately invoked the Sugar Acquisition Act, 1915 to confiscate 
aU firearms within a twenty-mile (thirty-two kUometre) radius of 
the Innisfail Post Office: "An authorised State officer, with any 
necessary assistance may, for the purposes of this proclamation, 
enter any place at any time and use any force considered necessary."*' 
Though tempers were further inflamed by this suspension of civU 
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Uberties, the strikers restrained themselves from physical confUct 
with poUce and for a couple of weeks pressure once more subsided. 
A further Arbitration Board hearing then recommended rein-
statement of aU workers, but the strikers refused to go back as long as 
any "scab" labour remained at the mill. At the end of July the local 
(Innisfail) TLC blacked the mill, although the AWU had been 
anxious to confine the dispute. At this point the AWU leadership 
began to have cold feet about the widening dispute and shifted to a 
posture of urging a return to work. The raUways became involved in 
the second week of August when the mill management requested raU 
transport for its produce. The AFULE refused to be bound by the 
InnisfaU TLC ban decision, but the ARU members abided by the ban, 
despite exhortations from AWU secretary WUIiam J. Riordan to the 
contrary. 
McCormack, who had returned to Queensland, assumed personal 
charge of the dispute, which was widening by the day as more and 
more railway workers were directed to perform work subject to the 
bans. On 29 August McCormack issued an ultimatum to the entire 
ARU membership that they would be dismissed unless work as di-
rected was resumed by midday on 3 September. ARU members seek-
ing to return would also need, under the terms laid down by McCor-
mack, to sign a no-strike pledge. This directive was extended to in-
clude the entire staff of the railways when it was realised that the 
Commissioner had no ready means of distinguishing ARU members 
from their feUow workers. 
In a final bid to prevent the government's lockout, the TLC 
caUed for the QCE to be permitted to arbitrate on the dispute. 
Then, if the Government chooses to adopt an imperious attitude that will 
allow of no amicable settlement. Labor will know where it is, and will not 
be hampered, as it is now, by consideration for a political entity, which 
disavows primary responsibility to the workers.^^ 
The QCE saved McCormack the trouble of rejecting this demand 
by disclaiming any jurisdiction in the affair.^ -' QCE motions calling 
for intervention lapsed for want of seconders. The government ap-
pealed for volunteer workers to come forward and present them-
selves for work in the positions about to be vacated by ARU members. 
The TLC now openly declared itself behind the ARU and 
against the government. 
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If Labor in Queensland can govern only by the aid of scabs there is 
something radically wrong with the structure, and the sooner this is 
overhauled the better it will be for the workers.^ 
Let there he no hesitancy and wobbling on the workers' side. The unions 
must go in and win now. They, too, must be audacious. Certain erstwhile 
trusted representatives of Labor have deliberately chosen a course that 
could only end in cleavage. They must now be resisted in the interests of 
the thousands of workers who have rung true to the fundamental princi-
ples of unionism.*^ 
McCormack carried out his threat of sackings on 3 September, 
and the lock-out began. The non-labour press swung strongly behind 
McCormack, even abusing the Opposition for not supporting the gov-
ernment strongly enough.^ Tributes for the Queensland goverrunent's 
"courageous stand" poured in from AustraUan and foreign con-
servative leaders.^'' 
By 11 September, the unions had coUapsed. Thousands of raU-
way workers had already signed their pledges. The ARU, isolated, 
finally ordered its members back to work on the government's terms 
but with a guarantee of no victinusation. Having purged and beaten 
the miUtants, the McCormack government was free to dispense with 
any reformist pretensions. Accordingly, it announced the suspension 
of its reform programme on 20 September, ostensibly as a measure to 
combat the drought. The Brisbane Courier noted the move with ap-
proval, observing that the government's victory in the strike had 
freed it from subservience to "sectional interests".^ TLC uruons used 
the 1929 state election to make good their veUed electoral threats 
against the "strike-breaking scab-enUsting McCormack" .''^  
The 1927 strike was a watershed in industrial relations under 
Labor. The McCormack government had caUed upon every means it 
had as a government, as employer, and as leader in the labour 
movement to humiUate the militant unions led by the ARU. Labor 
had unambiguously staked out its function in government in terms of 
the "public interest", a definition explicitly excludmg what Forgan 
Smith characterised as the "sectional interest" of the unions.^" 
Politically, the crushing defeat of the militants further isolated 
them within the labour movement. The PLP had in its industrial re-
lations policy declared itseU independent of direction from the union 
movement; unions (like the AWU) which continued to support the 
PLP in party forums impUcitly subordinated themselves to PLP 
prescriptions on industrial affairs. 
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The humiUating defeat of the 1927 strike fuelled the tendency 
of Queensland uruons to jettison mUitancy and the direct action tac-
tics of the syndicaUsts. Although large sections of the labour move-
ment had been aUenated from Labor by McCormack's handling of the 
dispute, they were paradoxically driven to electoral opposition in 
continuing the struggle. The anger of the ARU and other disaffected 
sections of the labour movement translated into the defeat of the 
McCormack goverrunent at the 1929 election and its replacement by 
an administration that owed nothing to the labour movement. The 
1927 strike defeat had iUustrated weaknesses in union organisation 
and deprived the membership of any will to carry on the industrial 
struggle. The installation of a non-Labor regime to administer 
(Queensland in the worst years of the Depression served to restore le-
gitimacy to Labor electoraUsm: the goal of returning Labor to office 
overrode other considerations in the unemployment-ravaged labour 
movement of these disastrous years. 
Restoration: Industrial Relations, 1932 to 1945 
It took mUitant unions some time to recover from the severe setbacks 
sustained in 1927. For example, the ARU was so much persuaded of 
the weakness of its position as the union primarUy of the unskiUed 
workers that it decUned to become involved in the 1931 dispute be-
tween the official AWU and a breakaway militant body called the 
Pastoral Workers Industrial Union (PWIU) urUess the AFULE also 
became involved. 
In the 1930s the main eruptions of industrial conflict occurred 
among sections of the AWU, with the union led by Clarrie Fallon in 
close co-operation with the Labor leadership attempting to dampen 
down or confine the disputes. The ostensible cause of these eruptions 
was the Forgan Smith government's faUure to alleviate conditions in 
the sugar industry, especially by way of combating the endemic 
leptospirosis (Weil's disease), a disease which in the long run was 
eradicated by pubUc health campaigns presided over by the direc-
tor-general of Health, Sir Raphael Cilento. Underlying this issue, 
and the immediate cause of the strike action, was the unwillingness 
of the AWU leadership to pursue rank-and-file claims, with the 
result that for a time communists were able to gain a toehold in the 
union leadership in the north. The ultimate success of Cilento's 
pubUc health measures was sufficient to ensure the longer-run conti-
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nuity of AWU leadership. One of the AWU leaders to emerge from 
the 1930s struggles was "Midnight Joe" Bukowski, so caUed because 
of his aUeged nocturnal strike-breaking activities during the WeU's 
disease strike of 1934; he was to play a crucial role in the 1957 
split.7' 
The 1930s witnessed the highpoint of Labor electoralism 
within the labour movement. Fear of unemployment enforced disci-
pline among the miUtant uruons. The modest welfare and employ-
ment-creation measures introduced or restored by the Labor adminis-
trations of the period were sufficient proof of Labor legitimacy 
among the broad movement, given the harsh fiscal regimes and wage 
reduction poUcies maintained in other states and federaUy. The role 
of arbitration was strengthened and the system underwrote a 
gradual restoration of wages to their pre-Depression level at a time 
when miUtant action did not appear to be an option and when em-
ployers would otherwise have been able to lower wages on an 
oversupplied labour market. Unions in this climate were incUned to 
confine their activities to disciplining their ov^ m ranks in support of 
the party in office and the arbitration system, and the AWU, whose 
numerical dominance is highUghted in figure 1, was the most enthu-
siastic among Queensland unions in this role. The AWU confirmed 
the distance between itseU and the militants by its disaffiliation 
from the TLC in 1939. 
From 1932 to 1945 under premiers WUIiam Forgan Smith and 
Frank Cooper, the Labor industrial relations edifice survived with-
out major chaUenge. The war in the Pacific saw an end to Queens-
land's unemployment problems, although not its problems of indus-
trial development. Strains on the state's economy posed by the influx 
of over a miUion miUtary persoimel were not reflected in any upsurge 
of industrial activity by militant unionists who were devotedly 
anti-fascist and supportive of the war effort. 
The Early Postwar Boom and the 
Reassertion of Discipline, 1945 to 1950 
As at the end of the First World War, militants in the labour move-
ment had anticipated a significant shift in the pattern of industrial 
relations in favour of the workers as a just reward for wartime sacri-
fices. Militancy had elicited wide popular support in the so-caUed 
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Figure 1 Union membership at time of AWU's disaffiliation from Trades Hall in 
1939 
Source: Queensland Year Book (1940), p. 267. 
"Red North" during and after the 1930s strikes, with communists the 
chief beneficiaries.'^^ The war against the German Nazis and Italian 
Fascists had also yielded the communists additional support as a 
by-product of the Soviet Union's leading and popular role in the de-
feat of Germany. Fred Paterson, having been deprived of ALP 
preselection in 1925 over the anti-communist pledge issue, won the 
state seat of Bowen as an endorsed Australian Communist Party 
candidate in April 1944. 
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The stage was set for further confrontations between miUtant 
labour and the Labor goverrunent over the government's insistence 
upon strict adherence to arbitration procedures. These confrontations 
were not long in coming. Ned HarUon, the new prenuer, was a veteran 
of the QRU and the 1912 Brisbane general strUce committee,^^ and so 
was weU versed in the dynamics of the labour movement and in its 
likely responses to state coercive action. 
The first great postwar test of the firmness of Labor's resolve on 
arbitration came in 1946 in a meatworkers' strike involving that old 
opponent of Labor industrial poUcy, the AMIEU. As m 1919, the cen-
tral issue was trespass of workers into the field of managerial pre-
rogatives, in particular hiring and firing—the "first on, last off" 
rule.^^ Again, as in 1919, miUtants looked to the Labor adminis-
tration to prove its working class bona fides by supporting, or at least 
acquiescing in, the workers' action.^^ As in 1919 the government held 
fast to the decisions of arbitration panels, which ruled that the kind 
of worker control over the hiring and firing processes demanded by 
the union was illegitimate . Unlike 1919, the dispute became 
statewide.''^ 
Meatworkers had been able to negotiate favourable conditions 
under the wartime regime which gave a high priority to food 
production. Some few days after the aboUtion of wartime controls at 
the beginrung of March 1946, a number of known AMIEU miUtants 
were dismissed from a Toowoomba meatworks.''^ By the end of 
March, the AMIEU was on strike throughout (Queensland. After some 
weeks of strike action, when it became clear that the arbitration 
system would be unable to negotiate an end to the stoppage, the 
Hanlon government took dramatic action. A state of emergency was 
declared under the Transport Act, 1939. This had Uttle direct effect 
other than to empower the goverrunent to make directions overriding 
the arbitration process, and this it did in a radio broadcast on 7 July 
1946 by ordering the workers back on the conditions of "past custom 
and practice". The strike collapsed in the face of the emergency 
powers proclaimed by the government. Within the unions, the 
government's order was used as an excuse to turn on the communists 
who had led the strike committee, a response in line with the then 
strengthening anti-communist mood.''* 
A renewed campaign began during 1946 within the Labor Party 
organisation to purge the party and, if possible, the unions of 
communist influences: 
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Pretending to be friends, bent upon the unity of the working class, the 
enemies of Labor within the movement are just wreckers in disguise, 
determined to destroy the ALP and aU that it means. Fortunately for the 
(Queensland Labor Party the QCE, composed of representatives of trade 
unions, watches the activities of these parasites and works against them 
wherever possible.''^ 
Although the party had some qualms about the propriety of 
intervening in the unions' internal affairs, it did move to lend sanc-
tion to those anti-commurust bodies called Industrial Groups and 
thereby gain some party control of these until then secret organisa-
tions. The Groups had been estabUshed within unions during the war 
years by a shadowy lay Catholic body called The Movement, 
ostensibly to combat communist influence. An Industrial Groups 
Committee was set up under the auspices of the QCE, comprising Joe 
Bukowski from the AWU, Tom Rasey from the Brisbane City CouncU 
and E.J. (Ted) Walsh (ex-AWU) from the PLP, "to assist ALP sup-
porters in unions to fight against the Conununist members of those 
unions securing control of the organisations and doing everything 
they could to injure the ALP".*° 
In Queensland the Groups were less successful than their 
Victorian counterparts, due in part to their lack of local inteUectual 
leadership from long-serving Archbishop James Duhig, who, it 
seems, had Uttle interest in or knowledge of the Byzantine manoeu-
vrings of the lay CathoUcs behind the Industrial Groups.*^ Promi-
nent Grouper successes were in the white collar unions, notably the 
Federated Clerks' Union (FCU), the Shop Distributive and AlUed 
Employees' Association (SDA) and the Queensland State Services 
Union (QSSU). Moreover, the AWU's leadership of the Queensland 
Industrial Groups Committee did not help their cause, since AWU 
leaders were not held in good odour at Trades Hall.*^ The Groups in 
Queensland were never able to unseat communists from their 
positions at Trades Hall; the communist TLC secretaries, Mick 
Healy (to 1952), then Alex Macdonald, enjoyed continuity of incum-
bency from 1942 untU well after the 1957 spUt. 
At the same time, the communists themselves adopted in this 
postwar period a strategy of militant confrontationism, partly in 
conformity with the international communist ideological line then 
being foUowed and partly in an effort to reaffirm their bona fides as 
natural labour leaders in the face of the Groupers' chaUenge and the 
onset of the Cold War. Although the Communist Party had ex-
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ercised a restraining influence in the 1946 meatworkers strike, the 
entrenchment of its mUitant strategy after that tune was demon-
strated by its leadership of the 1948 railway strike (aUhough Mick 
Healy and Ted Bacon maintain that the Australian Communist 
Party had no leading role m causing the dispute)*^. 
The 1948 Railway Strike 
Queensland's railways had been put under great stram by the exi-
gencies of wartune tiansport logistics. A sudden near-doubling of the 
state's population with the influx of United States and Australian 
military personnel in 1943-44 had necessitated astounding 
makeshift organisation and caused wear and tear not merely to track 
and roUing stock but also on railway workers. As minister for Rail-
ways Jack Duggan recaUed: 
In theory [sic] we carried more on our single lane tracks than the experts 
thought possible. We flogged everything, men and machinery to the 
limit. [After the war] the railways were very run down, morale was un-
doubtedly low and amenities poor.^ 
The wartime efforts of the Queensland raUway workers were 
forgotten when they were denied a flow-on of increases granted to 
metalworkers under federal awards foUowing the Victorian metal 
trades strike of 1946-47; and they were also denied an extension of 
the penalty rates granted to railway workers in other states.®^ In 
addition, the state award covering metalworkers in private em-
ployment had been adjusted for the flow-on in September 1947. 
From the Labor government's viewpoint, the raUway workers' 
demands for flow-on increases were unreasonable. FoUowing the 1947 
convention's resolution, the government had at last legislated for a 
forty-hour working week, matching the earlier New South Wales 
decision. Queensland workers had thus received the one-hour 
reduction six months before the Federal Arbitration Commission had 
made forty hours the national standard. Other legislated benefits 
made by the Queensland government in 1946-47 included sick leave 
and extra annual leave. Perhaps more importantly in terms of its 
long-term industrial relations strategy, the government was con-
cerned to support the Arbitration Court which had before the war 
adopted as a principle the discounting of over-basic-wage awards in 
(Queensland to take account of supposed lower living expenses there. 
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Consequently, Queensland wages were kept down with concomitant 
incentives for capital to invest, an outcome which meshed with 
Labor's revamped postwar development plans, but which 
antagonised the unions. Hence, whUe the government could point to 
a higher basic wage than the national norm, the unions were upset at 
differentials with their southern counterparts of as much as £3 IBs. a 
week in the case of some miners. In 1948-49 average male weekly 
earnings in Queensland were the lowest in AustraUa, representing a 
reversal of pre-war conditions. 
When in January 1948 the government offered as a maximum in-
crease to the raUway unions a sum of 6s. a week for skUIed trades, 
reducing to a few pence for semi-skUIed grades, and insisted on a 3s. 
8d. discount to any wage increase for the free raUway travel privi-
leges enjoyed by railway employees, the unions rejected the offer as 
an insult. On 2 February 1948 a compulsory conference at the 
Arbitration Court faUed to yield significant advances on the earUer 
offers, and at midnight the strike began. 
As the raUways ground to a halt, the government stood down 
affected workers and thereby turned what had been a strike confined 
to metalworkers into a general lock-out. The combined union disputes 
committee prepared for a prolonged siege and sent out a caU to uiuons 
throughout the country for funds: £35,000 was coUected from aU 
states over the period of the stoppage for reUef pay, propaganda 
and organisation. The strike soon widened as waterside workers re-
fused to handle goods freighted by road which would in normal cir-
cumstances have been handled by the raUways. Brisbane Tramways 
workshop staff joined in a sympathy strike at the end of February. 
MeanwhUe the government initiated a campaign of counter-
propaganda, backed by the press,*^ which sought to blame the strike 
on "communist subversives". Communist agitators were said to be 
being imported from the southern states.*^ The federal Labor 
government intervened within the first few weeks of the strike in 
support of the Queensland government by banning social service 
payments for strikers, regardless of whether their participation was 
voluntary or the result of lock-out action. On 27 February, as in the 
1946 meatworkers' strike, the government on Treasurer Vince Gair's 
instigation, declared a state of emergency and further offered to ne-
gotiate separately with any union or uruonists who could be per-
suaded to break ranks. Hanlon noted that "there is ample protection 
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for anybody in the State to go about theU- lawful occupation. The 
poUce wiU see to that."^^ 
When this failed to prevent further widenmg of the dispute, 
HaiUon took the extraordmary action, backed by the Opposition, of 
passing the Industrial Law Amendment Act, 1948, making it a cruni-
nal offence not orUy to participate m picketing or demonstrations (s. 
4), but also to caU for such participation, or merely to speak or ad-
vertise in favour of continuu\g the strike (ss. 5, 6, 7). Onus of proof in 
a prosecution was reversed (s. 5(2)) and arrest without warrant on 
suspicion was provided for (s. 8). Repeal of this legislation then be-
came a central strike demand, as the unions issued a defiant state-
ment endmg with the words, "Stand firm—our cause is just, our luiity 
unshaken, victory wiU be ours".^^ On the day the act became law, 11 
March, warrants were issued for the arrest of several communist 
strike leaders, including TLC Secretary Healy. Brisbane Trades 
HaU was besieged by the police, and those for whom warrants had 
been issued resorted to disguises to enter the buUding.^ 
The government also attempted, with some success, to spUt the 
strikers by increasing its offers to non-miUtant unions. The AFULE 
pulled out of the strike on 15 March, against the urgings of its 
communist leaders, and the workshops unions began to lose heart af-
ter this time, particularly in the Central Coast district.'^ For the 
time being most unions stood firm and defied the new act's bans on 
picketing and demonstrations. On 17 March, St Patrick's Day, a 
demonstration against the act was set upon by uniformed and plain 
clothes poUce as it moved off from Trades Hall dov^ m Edward Street. 
Several communists and other radicals present were singled out by 
police and savagely beaten, including Fred Paterson MLA, who sus-
tained permanent head injuries. Five, including Mick Healy and 
Max JuUus, were arrested .'^  
The St Patrick's Day poUce violence served only to inflame and 
unify the strikers, who responded by denouncing the goverrunent as 
"fascist". Despite further arrests, mass demonstrations were suc-
cessfully held in Brisbane over the foUowing days. Early in AprU, 
the government finally weakened on the wages issue, agreeing in 
essence to all the original demands. The workers returned on 6 April 
1948. Details of the bargain were ratified by the Arbitration Court 
over the ensuing months. 
Repeal of the offending act was not part of the deal negotiated 
to end the strike and strike leaders charged under this legislation 
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were in August imprisoned for non-payment of fines. FoUowing fur-
ther demonstrations and lightning strikes, most of the men were re-
leased from Boggo Road gaol after their fines were paid by an 
"anonymous benefactor". Realising that the act's penal provisions 
were only solidifying much of the union movement behind the com-
munist martyrs, Hanlon at last repealed it in early September 1948. 
Both sides claimed victory in the dispute. The strike severely 
weakened the unions involved, however, and provided a spring-
board for the Industrial Groups in some of them. There were those in 
the goverrunent and Labor Party who advocated an unyielding hard 
line and were disappointed with Hanlon's lack of fortitude. This 
faction was led by Vincent Clair (Vince) Gair, who was to succeed 
Hanlon a few years later as premier.'^ 
The Queensland labour movement's attachment to electoralism 
was sorely tested by the 1948 strike. The return to full employment 
after 1945 had released pressures for wage rises above those which 
the arbitration system was prepared to concede. The legitimation of 
Labor electoralism had rested on the party's abUity to deUver gains 
which could plausibly be portrayed as unattainable (at least with-
out unacceptable cost) under alternative regimes. The 1948 strike in-
volved Labor in office and the prized arbitration system in denying 
Queensland workers benefits which were already enjoyed by col-
leagues in other states who had not had the benefit over three 
decades of almost continuous Labor administration. WhUe the unions 
involved were again the excluded militants, the framework of 
legitimation built up over decades by Labor in office was under 
strain. 
Fearful lest the 1948 strike should have similar disastrous 
electoral repercussions to the 1927 strikes, Hanlon early in 1949 
rushed through the Electoral Districts Act, 1949. This highly con-
tested legislation, by dividing the state into four electoral zones 
with significantly different quotas of electors for each zone, max-
imised the value of votes in traditional Labor-voting areas. The 
ploy was successful as Hanlon was returned in 1950, whereas on the 
old boundaries he would most certainly have been defeated. Labor 
had turned fuU circle since 1915 when electoral reform had been one 
of the incoming Ryan government's priorities; in practice Queensland 
had had Australia's fairest electoral system since that time. 
Another electoral "reform" introduced by Hanlon in 1949 was 
the restoration of first-past-the-post voting. Although this was jus-
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tified at a time when nearly aU electoral contests were between two 
candidates, irorucally it was to maximise the electoral damage to 
the ALP caused by the 1957 spUt. 
Cracks Begin to Show: The Groups into the 1950s 
The party monolith, so carefully nurtured and reinforced by Labor 
leaders such as Theodore, Forgan Smith and Hanlon, and by union 
leaders such as AWU secretary Clarrie Fallon, had begun to show 
cracks by the close of the 1940s. Differences over industrial poUcy 
within the government's own ranks were brought into the open at the 
1950 Labor-in-PoIitics Convention. MiUtants from unions affiUated 
with the party had often advocated that labour advances of one sort 
or another should be legislated by Labor governments, whereas the 
Labor leadership in office had maintained a stance of ostensible non-
interference through recourse to the arbitration system. As has been 
shown, the miUtants had from time to time been able to force Labor 
in office to legislate on such issues as working hours, but the Labor 
leadership was usuaUy able to resist such demands. 
The ruling compromise had depended upon the Labor leader-
ship being pressured only by iruUtants in the direction of legislated 
labour gains. Labor in office could always refer to its legitimate role 
as guardian of the (Queensland pubUc as a whole, reject direct inter-
ference and defer to the arbitration system. Concessions were thus in 
general granted only when a claim was such as to involve parts of 
the labour movement upon which the Labor leadership reUed for 
organisational support, or when the parUamentary leaders were un-
sure of the appropriate response. The granting of the forty-hour 
week in 1947 and the raising of the basic wage in 1925 are examples 
of these two modes of influence. 
By 1950, however, a third force was at work—the Groupers' 
faction. Anti-communism had been an appropriate mantle for the 
dominant Labor axis during the long period when challenge came 
only from the miUtant minority. When the ideological implications 
of the anti-communist posture were taken to heart by aggressively 
anti-communist (CathoUc) Movement-inspired elements, the stabU-
ity of the Labor leadership's orgaiusational support became endan-
gered. 
The Movement's insistence on petty-bourgeois economic units as 
ideal forms of enterprise, especially its fondness for the smaU rural 
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producer, was attractive to some members of a government which for 
decades had stressed the role of smaUholding farmers in economic 
development and cultivated them as electoral alUes. Moreover, The 
Movement's reverence for "legitimate authority"^^ flattered some of 
those who wielded that authority. In terms of Labor's longer-term 
stabiUty, it was a signal misfortune that chief among those who 
identified with Movement thought and activity was heir apparent 
to the premiership, Vince Gair. 
Since it operated as a secret society. The Movement's existence 
was not widely appreciated and was always denied when allega-
tions were made. Not until after the federal and Victorian party 
denunciations and spUts of 1954 was The Movement forced partiaUy 
into the open though awareness of its operations was evident at the 
1950 Labor-in-Politics Convention. According to documents obtained 
by Denis Murphy,'^ The Movement maintained two fuU-time officers 
in Queensland, one of whom, W.T. Thornton, represented Hinch-
inbrook branch at the 1950 convention and was elected as Federated 
Clerks' Union (FCU) delegate to the QCE. 
Several motions were moved at the 1950 convention, caUing for 
goverrunent intervention in unions to combat the commurust menace. 
One motion, moved by state minister E.J. (Ted) Walsh on behalf of 
the Industrial Groups Committee (seconded by Thornton), caUed for 
the legal proscription of the Communist Party within the union 
movement.'^ The motion was defeated with, significantly, AWU 
opposition. AWU delegate G. Pont (later a member of the Queens-
land Industrial Commission) speaking against the motion, said: "I 
say to those concerned with the activities of the Communist Party 
that they should do as the AWU has done and that is, fight the 
Communists in the open field."''' AWU leaders perceived The 
Movement as presenting something of the same kind of organisa-
tional threat as did the communists: as a secret, cabaUstic organisa-
tion it had the potential to infiltrate the union and oust unwary 
incumbents. 
When the RaUway Maintenance Employees' Union delegate 
moved for immediate implementation of workers' compensation 
increases agreed to at the 1947 convention, Gair seconded an amend-
ment, which was passed, leaving implementation at the govern-
ment's discretion. The Grouper faction, sensing victory, then moved 
for compulsory state-supervised secret baUots for state-registered 
unions; this debate was gagged and the motion lost. Thornton, sup-
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porting the motion, noted that "at the present time it is necessary to 
establish a prima facie case to the satisfaction of the Industrial 
Registrar and that is not an easy matter" .'^ As the argument con-
tinued it became obvious that the Labor leadership was under pres-
sure from both miUtants and Groupers. 
The PLP representatives at the convention, as was traditional, 
responded verbally to criticism and demands from the militants. 
Against the Groupers it was sUent and preferred procedural means of 
avoiding debate. Clearly, the leadership was uncertain how to re-
spond to this new challenge, since certain of The Movement ideals 
were close to theu own. PubUc opposition to principles lUce compul-
sory secret baUots would be electoraUy damaging and such a move 
could only weaken the coalition of industrial and poUtical factions 
upon which the Labor leadership relied. The Grouper chaUenge 
discomforted the party leaders touching as it did matters best left 
alone. 
The Groupers reached the zenith of their influence within the 
Labor Party in (Queensland and the labour movement generaUy in the 
period between the 1950 and 1953 conventions. Ned Hanlon, the 
champion of the old axis, died in office on 17 January 1952 and was 
succeeded by Vince Gair. Although Gair subsequently denied that he 
had fallen under the influence of The Movement at this time,'' his 
refusal of the AWU membership traditionally held by Labor 
premiers in favour of continuing membership of the Grouper-con-
troUed FCU, and his appointment of Movement man Brian Mullins 
as private secretary, suggest otherwise.^"" It is doubtful whether 
Gair would have accepted discipUne from the Movement, given his 
notorious arrogance; rather it seems likely he saw the growing dom-
inance of the Groups in the party as a vehicle for increasing the in-
dependence of his government from union pressure.^"^ 
As we shall see in a later chapter, Gair and his backers were 
gravely mistaken to think a Labor government could act against the 
combined strength of TLC unions and the AWU. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Indusfarial Relations, 1915 to 1957 59 
Notes to Chapter 2 
IW. G. Spence, Australia's Awakening: Thirty Years in the Life of an 
Australian Agitator (Sydney: The Worker Trustees, 1909), p. 220. 
2 In 1915 the Railways Commission employed 11,267 workers, with a further 
3000 contracted on construction projects. 
3 Braham Dabscheck and John Niland, Industrial Relations in Australia 
(Sydney: Unwin, 1981), p.65. 
4 Spence, Australia's Awakening, p.312. 
5 E.I. Sykes, "Labour Relations—Law", in Labor in Power, p.237. 
6 See D.J. Murphy, "Labour Relations—Issues" in Labor in Power, pp.246-
248; Courier, 12 January 1917. 
7 Turner, Industrial Labour and Politics, p.75; Murphy, "Industrial 
Relations—Issues", in Labor and Power, pp. 248-249. 
8 "Administrative Actions of the Labor Government with Certain Further 
Statistics and Extracts". Pamphlet. (Brisbane[?]: Government Printer!?], 
1920[?]), p.l7. Pay was £30 per annum lower for women than for men in all 
grades. 
9 Turner, Industrial Labour and Politics, p.76. 
10 Ibid. (Turner does not make use of the term 'corporatism'); Kenneth F. 
Walker, Industrial Relations in Australia (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1956), pp.26-29. 
11 For example. Worker, 7 December 1916. The boldness of the Queens-
land Industrial Arbitration Act of 1916 lies not so much in the experimental 
nature of the proposals it carried into law as in the wide area of callings 
covered and the complete power conferred upon the court. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
60 The 1880s to 1957 
12 See Ian Tumer, Sydney's Burning (Melbourne: Heinemann, 1%7); R. 
Coates, "Notes on the Industrial Workers of the World", in Labour History, 
no. 6, May 1964, pp.25-28; Turner, Industrial Labour and Politics, pp.111-138; 
Fitzpatrick, A Short History of the Australian Labour Movement 
(Melbourne: Rawson's Bookshop, 1944), pp.158,186 and elsewhere. 
13 "Ryan's Disloyal Associations—Dossier", Australian Archives Accession 
B197, Defence Army, Secret and Confidential Correspondence Files, 
multiple number series 1906-1935, file no. 2021-1-270. 
14 Turner, In Union is Strength, pp.69-70; Industrial Labour and Politics, 
pp.192-194. 
15 See Diane Menghetti, The Red North: The Popular Front in North 
Queensland (Townsville: James Cook University, 1981), p.9-16; E.H. Lane, 
Dawn to Dusk, pp.194-195. 
16 See Eric Fried, "The Union of Russian Immigrants", in Labour History, 
forthcoming. 
17 See Eric Fried, "Artem: A Bolshevik in Brisbane", in Labour History, 
forthcoming. 
18 The Russian Association was proscribed and its office raided following 
the revolution; the confiscated documents are still held as Australian 
Archives Accession MP 95/1. See Raymond Evans, Loyalty and Disloyalty: 
Social Conflict on the Queensland Homefront (Sydney: George Allen and 
Unwin, 1987). 
19 See Courier, 24 and 25 March 1919; Frank Farrell, Intematioruil Socialism 
and Australian Labour: The Left in Australia 1919-1939 (Sydney: Hale and 
Iremonger, 1981), pp.1-3. Also see Raymond Evans, The Red Flag Riots 
(Brisbane: UQP, 1988). 
20 Robin Gollan, Revolutionaries and Reformists: Communism and the 
Australian Labour Movement (Canberra: ANU, 1975), pp.1-18; Tumer, 
Industrial Labour and Politics, pp.206-210. 
21 See Fried, "The Union of Russian Immigrants". 
22 Daily Standard, 24 May 1915; Worker, 27 May 1915. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Indusbial Relations, 1915 to 1957 61 
23 Murphy, "Queensland", p.l93. 
24 See D.J. Murphy, "The North Queensland Railway Strike 1917", in The 
Big Strikes, pp.132-143; E.H. Lane, pp.204-206; QPD, vol. 126, 1917, pp.828-
830. 
25 For example. Courier, 8 August 1917. 
26 The Central Political Executive became the Queensland Central 
Executive (QCE), and the WPO's became "branches" at the end of 1918. 
27 Official Record, Ninth State Labor-in-Politics Convention, 1918, p.6. 
28 Doug Hunt, "The Townsville Meatworkers' Strike, 1919", in The Big 
Strikes, pp.144-146; Terrence Cutler, "Sunday, Bloody Sunday", in Strikes: 
Studies in Twentieth Century Australian Social History, ed. John Iremonger, 
John Merritt and Graeme Osborne (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1973), 
pp.84-90 (hereafter Strikes). 
29 Cutler, pp.92-93: On the grounds that it was easy for the management to 
recruit "scabs", the IWW faction within the AMIEU called for on-the-job 
sabotage rather than strike action. 
30 Hunt p. 153; Cutler, pp.94-95. Each side blamed the other for firing the 
first shot, but the subsequent royal commission accepted the police version 
of events. See QPP, 1919, vol. 2, pp. 589-598. 
31 William Morrow (QRU northern organiser) quoted in Margaret Bridson 
Cribb, "The A.R.U. in Queensland: Some Oral History", in Labour History, 
No. 22 (May 1972), pp.19-20. Morrow went on to become a Labor senator for 
Tasmania and a prominent radical in the federal caucus. He remains the 
only Australian to have been awarded the Lenin Peace Prize, for his work in 
the nuclear disarmament movement. See Audrey Johnstone, Fly a Rebel 
Flag: Bill Morrow 1888-1980 (Melbourne: Penguin, 1986). 
32 Cutler, p.100, claims that this syndicalist failure accelerated the move 
towards Leninist tactics amongst the militants, citing W. Davis, In Pursuit of 
the Millennium (Brisbane: AMIEU, n.d.), pp.188-191. 
33 See Humphrey McQueen, "Shoot the Bolshevik! Hang the Profiteer! 
Reconstructing Australian Capitalism, 1918-1921", in Essays in the Political 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
62 The 1880s to 1957 
Economy of Australian Capitalism,, vol. 2, ed. E.J. Wheelwright and K. 
Buckley (Sydney: ANZ, 1978), pp.185-206. 
34 Labor won no Queensland House of Representatives seats in 1919; see 
Official Record , Tenth Queensland Lal)or-in-Politics Convention, 1920, p.6. 
35 QCE Minutes, 11 March 1919. 
36 Ibid. 
37 The QRU changed its name to ARU, Queensland Branch following the 
national conference of railways unions in September 1920. See Turner, 
Industrial Labour and Politics, p. 194. 
38 QCE Minutes, 14 July 1922. 
39 Daily Standard, 20 July 1922; Margaret Bridson Cribb, "Ideological 
Conflict: The 1927 and 1948 Strikes", in Labor in Power, p.386. 
40 Official Record, Eleventh Queensland Labor-in-Politics Convention, 1923, 
p.31. See also pp.46,72. 
41 Larcombe, Notes on the Political History of the Labour Movement 
(Brisbane: Worker Newspaper, 1934) pp.81-83; D.J. Murphy, "Edward 
Granville Theodore: Ideal and Reality", in Queensland Political Portraits, 
pp.328-329; Anne Smith, 'The Railway Strike, 1925" in The Big Strikes, p.l64. 
C.A. Bernays, Queensland: Our Seventh Political Decade (Sydney: Angus 
and Robertson, 1931) pp.33-34 does not mention this aspect, which casts 
some doubt on the allegation, since, as Clerk of the Legislative Assembly 
and notorious gossip, Bernays would certainly report such goings on if 
rumours had reached him. Murphy cites Larcombe in support, but 
Larcombe was after all a member of the Theodore Government. 
42 QPD, vol. 144 (1924), pp.1792-17%. 
43 Interview with George Rymer, notes held by Margaret Bridson Cribb. 
44 E.M. Higgins, "(Queensland Labor: Trade Unionists Versus Premiers", in 
Historical Studies Australia and New Zealand, vol. 9, no.34 (May 1960), 
pp.142-143. 
45 QCE Minutes, 25 February 1925. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Indusbial Relations, 1915 to 1957 63 
46 Farrell, p.62. 
47 QCE Minutes, 25 September 1925; 82 branches accepted, 6 indefinite, 3 
refusals, 209 no reply; see also K.H. Kennedy, "The Anti-Communist Pledge 
Crisis" in Labor in Power, pp.371-372. By 27 November, QCE Minutes 
record 154 acceptances, 6 indefinite, 5 refusals, 129 no reply. 
48 See Kennedy, "The Anti-Communist Pledge Crisis", p.375 for photograph 
of an ARU pledge; also Advocate, 15 February 1926. 
49 Official Record, Twelfth Queensland Labor-in-Politics Convention, 1926, 
p.5. 
50 See chapter 3 on the attempts made to fill this gap by worker education. 
51 See Spence, History of the A.W.U., pp.138-152. 
52 Crouch, Trade Unions, p.l72. 
53 For criticism of Michels's Iron Law and its application, see F. Parkin, 
Class, Inequality and the Political Order (London: Paladin, 1971); E. Davis, 
"Participation in Six Australian Trade Unions", in journal of Industrial 
Relations, vol. 23, no. 2 (June 1981), pp. 190-216. 
54 See, for instance, interviews with Fred Paterson and Bluey Bliss, in W. 
Lowenstein, Weevils in the Flour: An Oral Record of the 1930s Depression 
in Australia (Melbourne: Hyland House, 1978), pp.180, 382-383. 
55 The union was also able to use its considerable financial resources to 
secure preselection for its preferred candidates and support their 
campaigns, allegedly employing corruption on occasion. See D.W. Rawson, 
"The Organisation of the Australian Labor Party 1916-1941" (University of 
Melbourne: PhD. Thesis, 1954), especially pp. 20-25. 
56 Kennedy, "The Anti-Communist Pledge Crisis", pp.378-379. 
57 Michael Ignatieff speaking of the 1984-1985 British miners' strike in 
"Strangers and Comrades",NeK; Statesman, 14 December 1984, p.26. 
58 Conversation with Ted Bacon, 14 February 1985. 
59 Daily Standard, 21 April 1927. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
64 The 1880s to 1957 
60 Daily Standard, 29 April 1927. 
61Dfli7yMfl/7,7Julyl927. 
62 Daily Standard, 31 August 1927. 
63 QCE Minutes, 31 August 1927. 
64 Daily Standard, 2 September 1927. 
65 Daily Standard, 6 September 1927. 
66 Courier, 8 September 1927; Daily Mail, 8 September 1927. 
67 Courier, 9 September 1927. 
68 Courier, 21 September 1927. 
69 Daily Standard, 14 October 1927. 
70 Courier, 7 September, 1927. 
71 Conversation with Mick Healy, 14 February 1985. 
72 Diane Menghetti, The Red North, pp.42-58, 85; Ian Moles, A Majority of 
One: Tom Aikens and Independent Politics in Townsville (Brisbane: UQP, 
1979), pp.62-71. 
73 Worker, 16 March 1912. 
74 Douglas Blackmur, "The Meat Industry Strike, 1946", in The Big Strikes, 
pp.210-220; The Truth About The Meat Strike (Brisbane: TLC, 1946), pp.1-6 
(hereinafter The Meat Strike). 
75 The Meat Strike, pp.5-7 and elsewhere. 
76 It is also worth noting that V.C. Gair, later premier and centre of the 1957 
split, was minister for Labour during this dispute. 
77 The Meat Strike, p.2; Blackmur, "The Meat Industry Strike, 1946", p.221. 
78 See Blackmur, "The Meat Industry Strike, 1946", p.230. 
79 Official Record, Nineteenth Queensland Labor-in-Politics Convention, 
1947, p.96. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Industiial Relations, 1915 to 1957 65 
80 Official Record, Twentieth Queensland Labor-in-Politics Convention, 
1950, p.95. 
81 T.P. Boland, James Duhig (St Lucia: University of (Queensland Press, 
1986), pp.352-353; John Hepworth, "The Bishops and the Movement", 
unpublished seminar paper. University of Adelaide Politics Department, 
1983. See also Ross Fitzgerald, "Peasant, Tory and Priest", review of Boland, 
in Sydney Morning Herald, 17 January 1987. 
82 Conversation with Ted Bacon, 14 February 1985. 
83 Conversations with Mick Healy and Ted Bacon, 14 February 1985. 
84 Interview with J. Duggan, 1967, quoted in R. Shearman, The Politics of the 
1948 Queensland Railway Strike (University of Queensland: B.A. Thesis, 
1973) pp.25-26. 
85 Report and Balance Sheet of the Queensland Railway Strike February 
2nd to April 6th, 1948 (9 weeks) (Brisbane: QRCDC, 1949), p.6. 
86 The labour newspaper Daily Standard had ceased publication in 
September 1931; no other mass circulation Queensland newspaper followed 
a pro-union editorial policy by 1948. 
87 Sunday Mail 22 February 1948. 
88 Courier-Mail, 28 February 1948. 
89 Report and Balance Sheet, p.24. 
90 Conversation with Mick Healy, 14 February 1985. 
91 Blackmur, "The Railway Strike, 1948", p.248; Margaret Cribb, "State in 
Emergency: The Queensland Railway Strike of 1948", in The Big Strikes, 
pp.243-246; Ted Bacon claims this was a result of Movement influence in 
the Rockhampton area—conversation with author 14 February 1985. 
92 Report and Balance Sheet, pp.26-30; Telegraph, 17 March 1948. These 
events were dramatised by Errol O'Neil in Popular Front, performed in 
Brisbane in 1985 and Melbourne in 1987. 
93 The original February state of emergency declaration, which first gave 
the Labor administration extraordinary powers to smash picket lines, search 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
66 The 1880s to 1957 
and seize, and arrest on suspicion, was perhaps forgotten in the heat of the 
subsequent melee, and deserves to be recalled. The declaration was made 
under the Transport Act, 1938, and remained in force to be used by the 
Nicklin government in the 1965 Mt Isa strike, by the Bjelke-Petersen 
government in the 1971 Springbok tour and many times thereafter. 
94 For example, see Douglas Blackmur, "The ALP Industrial Groups in 
Queensland", in Labour History, no. 46 (May 1984), pp.99-102. 
95 D.J. Murphy, "The 1957 SpUt", in Labor in Power, p.486. 
96 Official Record, Twentieth Queensland Labor-in-Politics Convention, 
1950, pp.58-59. 
97Ibid.,p.59. 
98 Official Record, Twentieth Labor-in-Politics Convention, 1950, pp.58-60, 
63. 
99 Conversation with V.C. Gair, January 1975, quoted in Murphy, "The 1957 
Split", p494. 
100 Letter to H.T. from Sir Gordon Chalk, 25 March 1985. 
101 H.T. in conversation with Ted Bacon, 14 February 1985. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
3 
Queensland Labor in Office, 
1915 to 1957 
Queensland State Enterprises, 1915 to 1930 
The intioduction of state enterprises had been a plank of Labor pol-
icy since the 1907 Kidston split and the end of coaUtionist strategies. 
The driving principles embodied in the 1915 fighting platfonn con-
tained sociaUst and bourgeois-reformist elements. On the one hand, 
workers' poUtical representatives could regulate working conditions 
through public management; control investment and direct it to so-
cially useful production; limit repatriation of profit to foreign 
speculators; and ensure public sector capital accumulation within 
(Queensland. On the other, it was argued that state enterprises would 
smash restiictive trade practices through competition, iron out more 
painful fluctuations of the trade cycle through subtle manipulation 
of market forces; and, through price stabihsation in primary produc-
tion, help reduce costs of existing services and fund state services 
through means other than taxation. 
Expropriation of private business, whether through outright 
confiscation or some form of nationalisation with compensation, 
seems never to have been seriously considered. As Premier Theodore 
remarked, "capitaUsm is well entrenched here in Queensland".' The 
kind of assault necessary to winkle out such determined resistance 
was clearly beyond the means of Theodore's Labor Party. 
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The areas of private business activity selected for state entry 
chosen on the basis of the various, often conflicting, rationales out-
hned above, were cattle production; coal mining; fish marketing; 
fruit canning; hotel trade; insurance and estate management; iron and 
steel production; railway refreshment rooms; retail butchering; 
sawmilling; and sugar milling.^ With the major exception of iron and 
steel production, all were areas previously exploited solely by the 
private sector in (Queensland. 
Al though limited, the selected areas traversed much 
significant business activity developed in Queensland (with the 
important exception of wool growing). The export-oriented wool 
industry was to be made to benefit Queensland through contiibutions 
to consolidated revenue via land and associated taxes. Use of public 
capital for broadening Queensland's industrial base was considered 
Table 1 State Enterprises Established 1915-1928 
Enterprise Date Opened 
State Butchers' Shops 12 November 1915 
State Pastoral Stations 8 June 1916 
State Railway Refreshment Rooms 1 January 1917 
State Government Insurance Office 1 January 1917(a) 
State Fish Supply 1 April 1917 
State Hotel, Babinda 29 May 1917 
State Cannery 29 May 1917 
State Produce Agency 8 April 1918 
State Smelters, Chillagoe 1 January 1920(b) 
Hamilton Cold Stores 1 July 1928(c) 
(a) Opened as State Accident Insurance Office and allowed to take general 
insurance with the passage of the Workers Compensation Act Amendment 
Act,1917. Independent statutory uthority. 
(b) Operated under the Mines portfolio for the duration of the enterprise. 
(c) Already existing enterprise, gazetted to State Trade Commissioner on 
this date. 
Sources: QPP, 1929, vol.2, p.3; QPP, 1927, vol.1, p.l404; Socialism at Work, 
pp.85-87. 
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only in proposals for a state steelworks. 
The establishment of state enterprises proceeded willy nilly 
immediately following the Ryan government's election in 1915. 
Table 1 shows inaugural dates for major enterprises. The State 
Enterprises Act, 1918 gave legislative existence to the enterprises. 
Their estabUshment was an ambitious programme in the context of 
wartime fiscal restrictions, although the war-induced anti-profi-
teering campaign was deployed to support the enterprise initiatives. 
The immediate object was "to protect the pubUc by competing ... on 
fair and efficient Unes".^ It was generally thought that unscrupulous 
mercantile traders, the notorious "middle men", were extracting 
"unjustified" profits because of the wartime shortages of basic com-
modities. 
(Queensland Labor's objectives were to remove some rougher 
edges of the labour-capital interface without expropriating or di-
rectly controlling capital. The State Enterprises were to be a primary 
tool, using market forces to influence certain labour and commodity 
markets. This is not to deny the leading, indeed lonely, role that the 
Queensland administration—the only Labor government in Australia 
by 1917—was playing in resisting the worst excesses of wartime 
-jingoism, but Ryan's Labor administration was none the less 
constrained by popular belief in the rectitude and primacy of the war 
effort. The need to avoid confronting capital and anti-Labor 
political forces under wartime conditions had a continuing effect on 
Labor's thinking on the state enterprise question. 
Ryan's pubUcists were happy, therefore, to trumpet to the pub-
Uc, in a booklet called Socialism at Work, that the enterprises had 
nothing to do with chiselling at the edifice of capitalism—they 
were, rather, more of a steam cleaning job: "Where the Goverrunent 
has entered into the areas of trade, the object has not been to secure 
monopoly or to squeeze out of business legitimate private traders." 
The apologia for this substantial redefinition of sociaUsm shows a 
concern on the part of Queensland Labor leadership to associate its 
performance in office with sociaUst language. This concern was sub-
sequentiy jettisoned. 
For many generations, the natural operation of forces of supply and de-
mand protected consumers from exploitation at the hands of producers 
or middle-men. The results of this industrial revolution of nearly a cen-
tury ago, arising from the invention of steam and the evolution of the 
joint stock company, brought slow death to competition as a beneficial 
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force in industry and commerce, and the tendency ever since has been 
for capital and control to concentrate in fewer and still fewer hands.'' 
The identification of producers, middlemen and consumers as 
the prime agents of political economy throws light on the philo-
sophical tradition being invoked. Yet labour movement militants 
and indeed many in the movement mainstream, such as the president 
of the Queensland Labor Party Bill Demaine, preferred to charac-
terise society in terms of worker and capitalist. 
The pro-state enterprise pamphlet Socialism at Work was not 
an internal party discussion piece, but was intended as electoral 
propaganda. The specific reference to socialism in the title has since 
been interpreted as an attempt to defuse criticism of Labor's 
intentions by presenting socialist objectives as being quite innocuous. 
Denis Murphy sees this inappropriate use as meeting a need "to 
convince Queenslanders that it was a good, not a bad term" 
(emphasis in original) .^  Other less generous writers see this loose 
employment of the term as rather more sinister, as an attempt to 
mask the reality of "state capitaUsm".^ 
Theodore himself gave some credence to this less kindly view 
when in 1923 he said: "State Socialism is the first stage of 
Socialism, people who advocate the introduction of a Soviet system 
here forget that we have our fight to wage."^ 
There are two things to remember before judging the State 
Enterprises movement as the surreptitious instrument of bourgeois 
ideology that communist leader Stan Sharkey and others suggest.' 
First, many genuinely sociaUst goals were firmly held by both the 
leading actors and Labor rank and file. Stormy applause, for exam-
ple, greeted the keynote address to the 1918 Labor-in-Politics 
Convention, which read in part: 
We need first to make the [labour] movement more definitely socialistic 
to have our people realise that Labour objects and ideals are more than 
high wages and shorter hours. [The ideal is] the abolition of private own-
ership and control of industry for the common good ... There can be no 
possible identity of interest between employer and employees ... only by 
the communalisation or Socialisation of capital can the interests of 
Labour and capital become identical.' 
Second, Queensland capitalists and their parliamentary or 
journalistic supporters strongly opposed the State Enterprises. 
Clearly they did not perceive this set of irmovations as being in their 
interests. 
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State steamship. State refineries. State crushing mills. State Bakeries, 
State wash tubs. State ironies [sic]. State Brickeries, and so on, are but 
some of the modest schemes of Mr Ryan. To carry them out, he wants 
not the poor little revenue of Southern (Queensland, but "all the wealth 
ofOnnuzandofInd".'° 
By establishing the State Enterprises, the Labor leadership 
desired to provide, at least, an analgesic for certain painful symp-
toms of capitalism. At its most optimistic, this school of thought 
which saw the worker primarily as consumer wished for capitaUst 
society to become benign. Brian Fitzpatrick called this set of notions 
consumer socialism." Labour movement militants wished to use the 
enterprises to storm the citadel of capitalism rather than as a mar-
ket palUative. They expected that exemplary public production and 
exchange units would demonstrate to the electorate the viability of 
social rather than private ownership. Militants also supposed that 
the State Enterprises could engender improved working conditions 
generally through the operation of market forces. State en-
trepreneurialism is an appropriate title for this school of thought. 
Establishment of the Enterprises 
The very idea of state enterprises was a radical step. In a political 
climate where almost any Labor government move was viewed with 
acute alarm by the political Opposition which at that time domi-
nated the Legislative Council of the Queensland Parliament, Labor 
was understandably keen to clothe its innovations as respectably as 
possible. This process was difficult to camouflage for measures seen 
to have benefits for the working class in particular. The rudimentary 
unemployment relief measures embodied in the Unemployed 
Workers' Act, 1919 were, for example, characterised by conservative 
publicists as "loafers' paradise laws".'^ Consumerism as a justifica-
tion for state enterprises was free of this taint of sectionaUsm. Thus 
consumerism had obvious political appeal to an embattled Labor po-
litical leadership as an appropriate ideological vehicle for estab-
lishing the enterprises. 
The parUamentary deadlock faced by Labor was both an actual 
disincentive for any ambitious reform measures and a source of 
justification to the labour movement for immobility on the more far-
reaching measures then being canvassed. The Legislative Council 
(whose membership owed nothing to popular suffrage having been 
appointed by previous non-Labor governments) blocked or emascu-
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lated any legislation which looked at aU contentious or suggested 
gains for labour. From 1915 to 1920 twenty-nine biUs lapsed following 
rejection or amendment by the Legislative Council. Faced with such 
obstruction, Ryan tried to abolish the body by referendum in May 
1918. The usual difficulty of winning a contested referendum was in 
this instance complicated by contemporaneous campaigns for No 
votes m the conscription referendums and local option polls to reduce 
the number of Uquor Ucences. The move not only faUed, but demor-
alised the Ryan government's legislative reformists and lent legiti-
macy to the power arrogated by the council. 
Effectively deprived of legislation as an instrument of change 
(although not entirely hamstrung, as wUI be shown) Labor resorted 
to administrative action to achieve its objectives in this area. In the 
"Westminster System" of government the executive has freedom of 
action in aUocating portfoUos and in the appointment of functions to 
a ministry. Queensland did not depart from the pattern in this re-
spect. It was thus possible to create administrative entities which 
had de facto responsibility for new functions within a given min-
istry. In this manner, the State Butchery, State Stations, State 
Sawmills, State Fish Supply, a state hotel and the Railway 
Refreshment Rooms were created under the aegis of the Premier's 
Department, and the State Coal Mines under the Railways 
Department. 
A unique development was the State Government Insurance 
Office (SGIO). Created by the Workman's Compensation Act, 1916 
the SGIO had both de jure independent existence and a monopoly of 
underwriting in the workers' compensation sphere. This act was 
spared the usual fate at the hands of the Legislative Council by 
shrewd drafting and sheer incompetence on the part of Opposition 
councillors, who passed amendments which, contrary to their inten-
tions, left the substance of the legislation intact. The self-
aggrandising members of this Capricornian duma were so shocked at 
Premier Ryan's sneakiness in declaring the act as passed—when the 
councU's intentions were so plain—that they demanded a recall of 
the legislation. Labor attorney-general John Fihelly disdained to 
reply, although Ryan eventually dispatched a poUte refusal.'^ 
This early divergence in the administrative histories of the 
SGIO on the one hand and the remainder of the State Enterprises on 
the other was to prove of considerable import in the development of 
the enterprises. The exceUent habit the SGIO adopted from the start 
of investing funds in state government securities—£50,000 was 
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invested in the first year—was another insulator against the 
ideologically inspired depredations of subsequent non-Labor 
governments. The thirty-eight storey Suncorp building with its 
illuminated digital clock dominates the Brisbane skyline from the 
Ann Street heights today. Most of the other state enterprises are a 
dim memory. Agencies which are brought into being with the stroke 
of the governor's pen on an administrative arrangements order may 
be as easily dissolved. 
This was less the case with the State Enterprises, many of 
which had no legislative existence. One reason for this was to avoid 
public scrutiny of instances where Labor leaders were directly tam-
pering with the administration of these non-statutory enterprises. 
For example, William Gillies, later Labor premier after Theodore, 
wrote on 3 February 1918 to John Hunter, then minister in charge of 
the State Enterprises, asking that favourable consideration be given 
to opening a State Butcher's Shop in Herberton (Gillies's electorate): 
It will help me if you will hand the spare copy to the "Standard" reporter 
saying that I have placed the matter before you &c. &c. I might add that 
the men behind this besides having a good case are to a man staunch 
supporters of the Party. ^ '* 
Such direct interference in managerial prerogatives is not as 
simple in the case of an independent statutory authority operating 
outside the public service like QANTAS or the SGIO. Subtle pres-
sures, as in the selection of board of directors' appointees and else-
where, are the rule, but are not as clean as defined lines of responsi-
bility. The statutory corporation form of state enterprise is much 
more likely to enjoy a long life free from arbitrary policy dictation 
than is the more ephemeral departmental trading agency. 
Success Stories 
Some Queensland departmental enterprises were none the less effi-
cient in delivering services and in returning profit to the public purse. 
The State Butcher's Shops and the State Hotel at Babinda, north 
Queensland, are shining examples. The State Hotel began with a to-
tal capital investment of £19,474 14s Id. The enterprise opened for 
business on 29 May 1917, as the Brisbane Courier noted. 
The Home Secretary [William Huxham] has performed the noble func-
tion of declaring the State groggery at Babinda open for public business. 
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Whether this historic deed was done by pulling the first cork, or drawing 
the first beer, or ejecting the first tipsy man we are not told.^^ 
The enterprise, despite cyclones, economic fluctuations and 
occasional changes in management, netted profits for every year of 
state ownership, as high as £5106 12s 6d for the fiscal year ended 30 
June 1925. Total profit of state operation untU it was sold in 1931 was 
£32,569 12s 6d.'^ The objection that this success was due to any 
monopoly or artificial advantage must be discounted: the enterprise 
was heavily capitalised and enjoyed no monopoly. Indeed, the ini-
tial capitaUsation included a sum of £2387 5s 3d to the proprietor of 
the Babinda Creek Hotel for "goodwill".^^ PubUc Works Department 
day-labour was used for construction and maintenance work, the full 
cost being charged against the enterprise. The only major faUure to 
achieve objectives shown by the State Hotel in its thirteen years of 
pubUc ownership appears to have been the continued existence of sly 
grog outlets in the district—an occurrence attributed by the one-time 
State Hotel bookkeeper to trading hours' being limited to 8 a.m. to 8 
p.m. daily. 
The State Butcher's Shops were a much grander operation than 
the State Hotel. From its first branch (opened in Roma Street, 
Brisbane, on 12 November 1915), the State Butchery grew to a com-
mercial empire with seventy-two retaU outlets at the end of the 
1922-23 fiscal year.^^ 
The system of retail management developed by the State 
Butchery under manager Charles Ross and minister John McEwen 
Hunter is famiUar to urban consumers today, but was revolutionary in 
1915 Queensland. A limited number of standard product lines were 
traded, on a strictly cash-and-carry basis, at fixed, widely adver-
tised prices which were good for any branch. This was seen as unfair 
or sharp practice in a trade where credit and home delivery were 
the norm.' ' Further, all meat sold was either chilled or frozen, 
thereby minimising on-premises butchering and reducing the impact 
of seasonal fluctuations. 
Purchasing was by bulk futures contracts, the same system used 
by the Imperial military meat order to provide bulk buying for the 
troops in France. Ross's intimate personal knowledge of the 
Queensland Meat Export Co./Australian Stock Breeders' Company 
meat cartel and its trading practices, both as former chairman and as 
Imperial Meat Officer, would undoubtedly have been useful in the 
state's purchasing negotiations. Ross wrote on 19 September 1918, for 
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example, in the context of purchase bargaining, that the 1918 profits 
of the cartel "show sUghtly over 80% on invested capital, and the 
dividends for twelve months on capital paid up slightly over 
67.5%".^ ° The implied threat to publicise such super-profits in a con-
text of wartime austerity and anti-profiteering ideology must have 
been a useful bargaining counter. Such figures also give the lie to 
charges that the State Butchery was "bleeding the industry dry" 
through restrictive trade practices. 
The enterprise's popularity was from the outset phenomenal, 
the Roma Street branch serving 2500 customers per day. Turnover for 
the whole enterprise for the 1919-20 fiscal year reached £688,119 16s 
9d ^^ ' and the total turnover for the operation when wound up had 
reached £5,745,844.^^ The anti-profiteering effect of the enterprise's 
operation must have exceeded consumerists' expectations. Ryan gov-
ernment publicists claimed an overaU retaU price reduction for meat 
of 40 per cent following the entry of the state between 1915 and 
1917.^ ^ State meat prices remained a penny to a penny-halfpenny per 
pound cheaper than ruling private butchers' prices. For example, by 
1917 private butchers were charging ninepence per pound for prime 
rump steak when the state charged sevenpence halfpenny per pound. 
The enterprise was extremely profitable in the first half decade of 
trading and remained profitable until its final year (1929) when the 
onslaught of the Depression put trading into the red. 
The efficient and profitable managerial system estabUshed by 
Ross was accompaiued by the adoption of private enterprise indus-
trial relations. Although bound by the general Labor government 
policy of giving preference in hiring to union members, the State 
Butchery had little time for organised labour. In reply to Butchers' 
Union complaints of "sweating" workers at some state shops—in ref-
erence to forced overtime without prior warning—Ross replied that 
"some clear understanding [should] be arrived at immediately 
whereby Union Officials are not allowed to run our 
Establishments".2^ Early in the history of the enterprise a branch 
manager was disciplined for augmenting employees' wages during 
heavy trading periods with meat for their families. Another man-
ager was instructed to sack a clerk as it had been decided to get out of 
the bulk meat trade with restaurants and institutions.^^ This 
emphasises the private enterprise-managerial principles at work 
within the enterprises, which eschewed any notions of worker con-
trol or participation in decision making. 
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The State Smelters and Stations: Scandal, Loss and Waste 
The success of such retail enterprises as the State Butchery was 
overshadowed by the disastrous losses sustained by the State 
Stations (cattle properties) and by the State Mines and Smelters at 
Chillagoe. Between them, these enterprises accumulated losses 
amounting to nearly £2 million; they also ruined the poUtical ca-
reers of two Labor premiers and helped bring down both the 
McCormack government and the whole state enterprise edifice. 
The ChiUagoe operations are inseparably associated with the 
Mungana Royal Commission and the poUtical scandals that racked 
the Scullin federal goverrunent. The expenditure of large amounts of 
pubUc money provides opportunity for graft by those in a position to 
influence transactions. Australian political leaders have not been 
slow to make use of these opportunities. As Cyril Pearl points out, an 
alternative history of Australia could be constructed based on the 
corrupt and extra-legal activities of the country's rulers.^^ 
Labor leaders Ted Theodore and BiU McCormack were aUeged 
at the 1930 CampbeU Royal Commission to have received £7000 
each for their part in promoting the purchase by the state of two 
mines associated with the smelting enterprise. Neither the royal 
commission nor historian K.H. Keimedy in 1978 '^' produced any con-
crete*, evidence to substantiate the charges against Theodore. 
Kennedy's case is essentially that made by the Crown in a civU ac-
tion for recovery of the allegedly misappropriated funds in 1931, 
namely, that corruption is the most likely explanation for the series 
of cheques made out to Theodore by McCormack totalling the £7000. 
Kennedy, Uke the Courier leader writers of the time, finds it partic-
ularly damning that Theodore made no use of certain legal avenues 
(that is, defamation action) available to clear his name. 
Nevertheless, the Crown was unable to convince a jury on the civil 
test of balance of probabUities. The huge losses sustained by the 
ChiUagoe operation attracted pubUc attention and helped give cre-
dence to allegations of criminaUty in some questionable dealings 
which, had the enterprise been profitable, would probably have es-
caped attention. 
The ChiUagoe Company was one of Queensland's largest indus-
tiial concerns. The effects on the fragile north Queensland economy of 
its closure were for the Ryan government unconscionable. The area 
was, moreover. Labor heartland—Theodore's own Woothakata 
electorate. The price negotiated with the company's receiver looked 
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like a bargain—the bond and debenture holders were furious at the 
loss reaUsed on the face values of their holdings. The Brisbane 
Truth, at the time pro-Labor, quotes extensively from the London 
Financial News of 13 March 1917, which attacked Ryan for 
parsimony with the Chillagoe Company capitalists. Truth's re-
marks indicate that the beUef that the state was getting a bargain 
on the purchase was widespread. 
The Financial News, along with local capitalists, has, first of all, a 
grievance against the Government for not buying the Chillagoe concern 
at the company's own price, and, secondly, indulges in criticism because 
the Government would not compensate the debenture holders for all 
they had lent the company. Were the Government a charity concern for 
broken-down capitalists, this attitude would be understandable, but the 
commercial gentry are the first to jump on a Government for bad busi-
ness, so it is well to be careful.^* 
The state paid £701,000 for the ChUlagoe and Etheridge railway 
with aU rolling stock, the smelters and associated works, mining 
plant and other property including Einasleigh Mine. Mines at nearby 
Mungana were subsequently purchased for £40,000. It was this pur-
chase from which Theodore and McCormack aUegedly benefited. 
Inaccurate assessment of the Mungana mines' ore potential was 
only a minor factor in the whole enterprise's commercial faUure, al-
though it became central to evidence against Theodore. The basis of 
the enterprise's financial disaster was a failure to gauge accurately 
the postwar international metals market (Australia in the 1980s 
witnessed a similar phenomenon with the collapse of the expected 
resources boom). High ruUng prices make medium-grade ores in out-
of-the-way places extremely profitable. Since the mining operation 
requires a high level of capitalisation in the development phase, 
there is a definite price line below which exploitation is unprof-
itable. The profit needs to be high in order to compensate for the ex-
tended period capital may lie idle. 
The Queensland Labor government was ill advised to have as-
sessed the ChUlagoe Company's assets as a bargain at £701,000, de-
spite the face value of the company's scrip. One Opposition member 
noted this in the second reading of the 1916 bill when the proposal 
was first canvassed: 
The main point is that no matter what happens there has been a loss. 
They may have given work to thousands of men, but they have made no 
money ... But the government now intend ... to work the mine, and I ven-
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ture to predict that if they do so it will be the worst day's work they ever 
did in their lives. ^ ' 
In reply Theodore asserted that conditions then obtaining, 
namely higher metal prices and the existence of local suppUes for 
the furnace, would ensure profitabiUty.^ Labor offered no explantion 
as to why debenture holders in the company would be prepared to 
accept ten shiUings in the pound on their investment (the offer then 
being negotiated) if the mines could so easUy be made profitable. 
Mining was presented by Labor as being a worthwhUe industry 
for the economic development of a sparsely populated region of the 
state, analogous to heavy engineering, shipbuilding or power 
generation. The ChUlagoe enterprise was thus portrayed as a first 
venture into the entrepreneuriaUsm advocated by labour movement 
visionaries, and its subsequent faUure served to discredit this stiat-
egy. Further, the opposition mounted by non-Labor parties to the 
move was taken as proof of the scheme's ideological bona fides. The 
enabUng act finaUy became law in 1918. 
As the former ChUlagoe Company had discovered, additional 
capitaUsation on expanded operations and diversification of mter-
ests was no guarantee of profitabiUty. The continued depression in 
copper prices forced the closure of the enterprise's Einasleigh copper 
mine in May 1922, by which time the Mungana mines' sUver-lead 
production had come into operation. Dismal performance in the 1922-
23 fiscal year brought forth optimistic prognostications from the 
management which were repeated by the government as, for the 
third year ruiming, the enterprise lost over £50,000 after deduction of 
interest.^' When the 1922-23 loss was declared, based on the continu-
ing optimism of the enterprise management, and despite looming fis-
cal troubles, the government decided to advance the enterprise a fur-
ther £275,000 for upgrading the smelters and extending mining 
operations. Mines nunister Alfred Jones argued that the state had, in 
any case, an "obUgation to feed people who could not get work, and it 
was better to provide work even at a loss than to create a whole 
army of unemployed".^^ 
The government responded to a 1923-24 loss of over £100,000 by 
announcing a moratorium on interest from 1 July 1924 and the writing 
off of the enterprise's £280,000 accumulated debt. This period marks 
the transition of the ChUlagoe Smelters from a putative asset to a 
recognised liability with full poUtical protection. 
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At this time Theodore gained party preselection for the federal 
seat of Herbert, which included Chillagoe, and prepared the way to 
step down as premier to enter federal parliament. Concerns within 
the party at the direction of political leadership and fiscal admin-
istration erupted in a backbench revolt. On the opening day of the 
1924 session (29th July), the Theodore government was forced by cau-
cus to resign over the tardy introduction of the forty-four hour week 
and the depression of the basic wage . For seven and one-half min-
utes, Charlie Collins (Bowen) was elected leader of the PLP, before 
Theodore and his ousted government separately caucused, agreed to 
compromise, and were immediately reinstated. The initiatives 
sought did not include winding up either of the two main loss-making 
state enterprises; apparently the operations had become sacrosanct 
within the party. The man most responsible for the smelters—Alfred 
Jones, later lord mayor of Brisbane—was to continue as minister 
responsible for the Chillagoe operation in the ensuing Gillies and 
McCormack governments. 
The enterprise lost £155,893 8s 5d in the 1925-26 fiscal year, al-
most equalling the accumulated losses on all the previous years. 
Gillies had retired to a seat on the new Board of Trade and 
Arbitration in October 1925 and Premier McCormack, who had to an-
nounce the loss, was moved to caU for a report from the auditor-gen-
eral. On 22 October 1926, a year to the day after he became premier, 
McCormack finally confessed that the enterprise was a failure. 
The Government thought that they could again revive in North 
Queensland an industry carrying a mining community, which is one of 
the best communities for the development of a country. That has always 
been our experience, and so we embarked on this expenditure. The re-
sults have hieen unsatisfactory because of many causes which I have not 
the time to go into at the present time, nor would anything he gained if I 
did so. We find that we have failed to establish profitably the mining in-
dustry in the hinterland of Cairns... What the Government desire to do, if 
it is possible...is to try in a limited way to keep the mining industry alive 
in that district... The policy of the Government is not to continue mining 
and smelting as a big operation, but to endeavour, with as little loss to 
the State as possible, to provide facilities for the smelting of ore.^^ 
Within a few months of the admission, the state withdrew from the 
mining side of the venture. Smelting facilities, as McCormack had 
indicated, were kept in skeleton operation in order to provide smelt-
ing and marketing for the private operators and fossickers of the 
area. Workers were sacked as the enterprise wound down and the 
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Chillagoe branches of the State Butchery and State Store closed as 
their custom dropped in mid 1927.^ 
Public disquiet about the enterprise management's honesty fol-
lowed hard on announcement of the closure. Details of lucrative 
deals made at the ailing enterprise's expense were leaked to 
Opposition parliamentarians, leading to a series of specific questions 
from Opposition frontbenchers including later Premier Arthur Moore 
during September and October 1926. The auditor-general's "Spedal 
Report on the State Smelters, Ore Reduction and Treatment Works 
and Mines, ChiUagoe" submitted on 24 August 1927 disclosed, apart 
from certain dealings by the mine managers, a trading loss for the 
enterprise in the 1926-27 fiscal year of £156,126 2s l id . 
McCormack's abandonment of the enterprise with which he 
had been so closely involved should be seen in the context of the 
state's financial position. The 1925-26 disastrous loss contributed 
significantly to the state's £554,685 13s lOd deficit for the year, 
which was, as the auditor-general noted, "the largest in the history 
of the State" .^ ^ The accumulated overdraft in ConsoUdated Revenue 
had reached nearly £1 million. The Chillagoe State Smelters' 
deficit was the largest single item of unforeseen expenditure in the 
year. The scale of this deficit may be seen when compared to the 
state's total receipts of £15,559,718 9s 4d.^ ^ In such circumstances the 
continued operation of a major loss-maker like Chillagoe, despite 
the large political and capital investments made in it by the gov-
ernment over the years, was difficult to justify. 
Despite Opposition demands, McCormack refused to hold a 
royal commission into the affair, but the embarrassing dealings at 
the Chillagoe enterprise continued to haunt Labor. The State Enter-
prises as a whole could not avoid being tainted with the stink ema-
nating from ChiUagoe, and in the late 1920s the Labor leadership 
ceased to defend them with any vigour. Although ChUlagoe had 
only briefly been operated as a commercial venture, the non-Labor 
parties' taunts that trading enterprises could not be efficiently run by 
other than private management seemed to have been confirmed. 
Party leadership would not forget the political dangers to be faced 
in marketplace intervention of this sort. 
The full extent of the substantial loss made by the ChUlagoe 
state mining and smelting operations is debatable. It can reasonably 
be estimated that the figure is in excess of £1 million. Had that £1 
million not been wasted at Chillagoe in the early years of Labor's 
tenure, it could have been possible to realise some of the ambitious 
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state entrepreneurial schemes, such as a state steelworks, put for-
ward by the more enthusiastic champions of pubUc enterprise. 
Labor commitment to estabUshing state pastoral stations was by 
no means central to the party's platform. As has been shown, the re-
tail enterprises appealed to the dominant consumerist tendency in 
the ALP state enterprise movement. The Chillagoe enterprise was 
embarked upon and kept going for the northern development elec-
toral necessity it seemed to represent, although along the way its 
faUure damaged the whole idea of state participation in the mar-
ketplace. The State Stations, by contrast, were an entry into the most 
lucrative and concentrated of Queensland's rural industries and so 
seemed to be a toehold in the escarpment of local capitalism and 
thus a concession to the state entrepreneurialist tendency of the 
party. Moreover, the simultaneous foundation of the State Butchery 
offered the chance for vertical integration of production along Unes 
pioneered by the Vesteys' meat concerns. 
The degradation of land by private graziers and other irra-
tional effects of private pastoral production were advanced by Labor 
leaders as preferred rationales for the State Stations' establish-
ment. The State Stations would show private grazing interests how 
they should be rurming their leases. 
If the Allies' line of troops in France were divided into sections, each un-
der separate control, and none aiding the other, so that, when a particu-
larly ferocious attack was made on one point, reinforcements could not 
be brought from elsewhere, that policy would resemble the system, or 
lack of any system whatever, underlying the conduct of the Queensland 
pastoral industry.^^ 
Yet again. Labor leaders took pains to deny that their intentions 
were in any way inimical to continued operation of the private mar-
ket. State Stations were not estabUshed with any intention to use 
them in scaling the battlements of "Fort Capitalism",^* but rather 
they were to encourage by example rational market reorganisation . 
Owing to the war production regime, the meat export side of the 
pastoral industry was already subject to a considerable degree of 
state control at the time of the Stations' purchase. The state's plan-
ners had a unique insiders' view of the profitabUity of cattle grazing 
at a time of unprecedented demand and stable, high, prices. The 
profitabUity of pastoral production depended on being party to the 
cartel arrangements, since access to international markets had been 
sewn up by international companies at an early stage in the Indus-
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try's development.^^ Private pastoral interests, and the interna-
tional companies in particular, were implacably opposed to state 
participation in the industry. This opposition was heightened by 
the tiansfer pricing deals worked out by the international companies 
which allowed them to play off one nation's taxation system against 
another's through the use of paper transactions that presented a 
false picture of profitability.^" Pastoralists' anti-Labor activities 
extended to interference with the state's borrowing activities, an ac-
tion which V. Gordon Childe credits as having "at once ruled out any 
'extension of the industrial and economic functions of the State'".''^  
The first and major mistake was to pay excessive prices for the 
stations between 1917 and 1920. Leases on many of the stations had 
either expired or had Uttle time remaining, a position which should 
have been exploited to the advantage of the state as buyer. In fact 
top prices were paid for the properties because of inadequate or in-
competent muster figures. Instead of "bangtail" (that is, physical 
count) mustering, book muster figures which turned out to be enthusi-
astically overestimated were accepted by the state's agents. Since 
cattle prices were at a premium because of heavy wartime demand, 
the state paid handsomely for non-existent assets. The deficiencies 
were written off in subsequent years and accounted for as stock 
deaths. 
As with the Chillagoe Smelters, the enterprise was over-capi-
talised on the mistaken expectation of everlastingly high world 
commodity prices and was equaUy ill-equipped to face the lean 
1920s with massive debt to the Treasury. Despite misgivings within 
the PLP,''^ the broad party was happy with the enterprise's expan-
sion and continued to urge purchase of more holdings and further 
steps at vertical integration of the state's pastoral/meat interests 
through the addition of a tannery and boot factory as late as the 
1920 Labor-in-Politics Convention. By this time the financial diffi-
culties of the enterprise were fully apparent to the state's officials 
overseeing its administration. The auditor-general's report on the 
1919-1920 year noted that the ledger net profit announced by the en-
terprise of £25,661 9s 3d had only been achieved through "an infla-
tion in the values of the cattle" entered as assets in the accounts and 
a deceleration in the rate of depreciation on plant from ten per cent to 
five per cent "although the conditions were the same in each year [of 
previous operation]".'^^ No amount of juggUng could disguise the in-
creasing losses: 1920 was the last year the State Stations declared a 
profit. As with the Smelters, the suggestion of corruption tainted the 
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enterprise. In this instance the beneficiaries of the corrupt dealings 
were alleged to be Labor Party funds. '^* As it became clear that the 
enterprise was going bad, suggestions of corrupt motives began to be 
aired by senior officials and politicians. 
McCormack was sufficiently disenchanted with the State 
Stations' performance by August 1926 to order the enterprise to be 
wound up and its assets Uquidated. 
The Government have adopted a policy that we will not continue to lose 
the money of the taxpayers on ventures that are unprofitable... Until the 
public show that they are willing to give the social service that is so nec-
essary to make [the enterprises] successful, the Government will not 
persevere with these ventures... The people who have been charged with 
the responsibility of conducting some of these concerns have not done 
their duty to the State... If [a manager] thought [an enterprise] was his 
own property it would be all right. That is the evil—he does not.*^ 
The State Stations' property portfolio was put up for sale by 
auction in AprU 1927, but nearly all properties were passed in with-
out reaching reserve prices. No bids at all were received on some 
properties. The state was attempting to make good some of its trad-
ing losses, and the depressed pastoral property market would not 
bear the huge volume of property at the prices needed to balance the 
Trade Commissioner's books. The McCormack government hung on to 
the enterprise's assets waiting for better times and higher seUing 
prices, although the subsequent Moore non-Labor administration had 
no scruples about selling pubUc assets on a dead market. Labor ad-
ministrations in the 1920s were compelled to wait for the economic 
upturn which would aUow the enterprise to be wound up with hon-
our. Those few properties in country suitable for closer settlement 
were broken up for that purpose;"*^ the rest were kept in minimal op-
eration until the reserve price could be obtained. 
End of the Enterprises 
Having defeated the McCormack government in May 1929, the 
Country and Progressive National Party government of New 
Zealand-born Arthur Edward Moore advertised the State Stations 
for freehold sale by pubUc auction on 17 September 1929. The proper-
ties were sold at significant loss, most after secret private negotia-
tion, having failed to attract bids at auction. Conversion to freehold 
was a special bonus to the private buyers when one considers that 
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many leases were close to expuy at the time of original purchase by 
the state. 
The Moore government's policy of dismantUng state tiading en-
terprises extended to aU businesses under control of the State Trade 
Commissioner. No time was lost in disposing of the various assets, 
either as whole businesses or as separate assets. Some enterprises, 
such as the State HoteL the State Cannery, the State Fish Shops 
and the State Produce Agency, operated out of one or two premises 
and so were sold in their entirety as going concerns. The State 
Butchery was too large and dispersed an enterprise to attract interest 
as a single concern, and the shops were sold severally. 
Only the RaUway Refreshment Rooms (RRR) enterprise of the 
Trade Commissioner's empire was retained by the state, being tiems-
ferred to the Railway Commissioner's jurisdiction at the end of the 
1928-29 fiscal year. Always the biggest money-spinner of the tiading 
enterprises, the RRR was a natural extension of the raUways. Its 
profitabiUty made the enterprise a desirable asset for a government 
pathologically committed to fiscal prudence and its services were 
appreciated by the Country and Progressive National Party's rail 
travelling rural constituency. 
All but a handful of the Trade Commissioner's assets were sold 
by the end of the 1929-30 fiscal year, the handful consisting of a few 
butchers' shops in undesirable locations, three of the stations, and 
the HamUton Cold Stores. Considering that the sales coincided with 
the onset of the Depression, this turnover is some indication of the 
bargain basement deals the state was offering. The goodwiU gener-
ated by some enterprises was shown by the retention of the "State" 
business name by the new private owners. Henry Jones Pty Ltd re-
tained not only the "State" brandname but also a styUsed version of 
the Queensland Maltese Cross on its jams and other food products 
canned at the Bulimba cannery. The State Hotel at Babinda is still 
called the State Hotel. 
Statutory enterprises not under the control of the Trade 
Commissioner were spared the accelerated privatisation treatment. 
The SGIO continued to operate with its monopoly of workers' com-
pensation business and as the only significant Queensland-based un-
derwriter. The former State Sawmills had been passed to Forestry 
Department control in 1921 and continued in their major role of pro-
viding sleepers for the railways. The various mines, treatment works 
and batteries under control of the Mines Department (with the ex-
ception of the Chillagoe operations) were abandoned as their prof-
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itabiUty dictated; in most cases this was well before the election of 
the Mcx)re government.'*^ 
State Enterprises: Keeping the Market Safe for Capitalism? 
The (Queensland State Enterprises are not alone as examples of state 
participation in production, distribution and exchange under Labor 
administration but the Queensland experience with management of 
trading businesses deserves more of an airing than it has received. 
The Queensland State Enterprises encroached upon the area of the 
economy normally occupied by the entrepreneur and the small 
business owner. Mining, shop proprietorship, fishing, sawmilling, 
cattle grazing—such activities were the natural domain of the pri-
vate sector, indeed by and large of smaU-scale capital. This sector of 
the economy has a mystique in the Australian political pantheon 
which transcends party boundaries, the Labor Party often being as 
infatuated as conservatives with the aUeged sterling qualities of 
the family business, and with the votes delivered by support for the 
"milk bar" economy. 
The experiment was not, and could never have been, an attempt 
to assert control over the engines driving the accumulation processes 
of capital. Theodore, the promoter of the Blackburn Declaration at 
the 1921 federal party conference, advocated a "socialist objective" 
that sought to estabUsh "coUective ownership [only] for the purpose 
of preventing exploitation".'** The enterprises were mechanisms not 
to eliminate the private market itself, but only to cancel the 
temptations standing before private business to exploit commodity 
shortages by inflating prices paid by consumers or restricting the 
prices paid to suppUers. 
The grander visions of those arguing for a state 
entrepreneuriaUsm—state steelworks in particular—failed not so 
much because of opposition on the part of the consumerists in the 
party and government, but because the state's exchequer had been 
drained by poor investments in the State Stations and the ChiUagoe 
Smelters operation. The £3 million poured down the drain in these 
two commercial disasters—this amount including interest left owing 
to Treasury as weU as trading losses—left the state with few funds 
not already tied to recurrent expenditure, especially when the ef-
fects of the City of London loan embargo of the early 1920s were felt. 
Moreover, the commercial failure of state management in these two 
enterprises tainted the electorate's perception of the desirabiUty of 
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direct intervention. The electoral winner of 1915 had become some-
thing to be apologised for, if mentioned at all, by 1929. When Labor 
returned to office in 1932, there were no promises to restore state en-
terprises, although some publicity was given to the allegedly give-
away prices paid for the enterprises when they had been sold off, 
and to the alienation of the State Stations' land through freehold 
tenure.'*' 
While those in the party who pursued the goal of sociaUsm 
through state enterprise were stymied by the haemorrhage of funds 
to the two big loss-makers, those influenced by syndicaUst thinking 
who proposed workers' control of the enterprises established in their 
name were given short shrift by dominant elements in the party. 
Militants such as V. Gordon ChUde, who pubUcly advocated giving 
"State employees a substantial share in the control of the industiies, 
which they work",5" were gagged and defeated in party conventions 
with less observance of debating niceties than was normal even for 
mUitant motions.^* There appears to have been no use by these mili-
tant forces of the ammunition which constant aUegations of poor 
management and evidence of low morale and absence of organisa-
tional loyalty (pilfering and so on) could have provided for their 
cause. The suggestion that workers' control could have been a factor 
in improved market performance was, it seems, beyond the miUtants. 
While the enterprises were run supposedly on behaU of the 
workers, or at least the "people", most were managed along strictly 
traditional lines and the labour movement had nothing other than a 
sentimental stake in their success. The State Enterprises might in-
deed have been forays into the heartland of the Queensland econ-
omy, but they were too far away from the heights to equip a Labor 
government with the tools to forestall or even slow down the slide 
into depression. 
Cocky Want a Block of Land: Agrarian 
Socialism and Land Settlement 
Rural Socialism and Its Place in Queensland 
Electoral success in Queensland has long been dependent upon culti-
vating the rural electorate. Labor's maintenance of majorities from 
1915 to 1957 owed much to its early implementation of intervention-
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ist agricultural poUcies which shielded farm incomes against mar-
ket fluctuations and kept up the small family farm as the premier 
unit of agricultural production. Although the Labor Party drew its 
organisational strength from the broad labour movement, 
(Queensland Labor governments from the start pursued an agriculture-
based development policy which favoured the interests of small 
farmers rather than workers. Much attention was devoted by the 
state Labor leadership to constructing an electoral alUance between 
workers and farmers which served to placate potential opposition 
within the party and to put distance between many farmers and 
their self-proclaimed political representatives in the Country 
Party. 
Rural Queensland suppUed the same firm electoral base for 
Labor administrations during forty years of office as that later sup-
ported the National Party. Recognising Labor's achievement in cap-
turing the Queensland farmer's vote, the succeeding coalition and 
National Party governments after 1957 left intact the rural policy 
apparatuses established by Labor. Queensland state administration 
since the 1920s has accordingly been characterised under goverrunents 
of aU parties by a complex system of quasi-autonomous rural product 
marketing and distribution agencies, the prime function of which is 
to insulate the farm sector from market uncertainties. From the dis-
tribution and improvement of the land, through the planting or 
rearing, growing, marketing and processing, to distribution and ex-
port of agricultural and pastoral commodities, the guiding hand of 
the Queensland government is much in evidence. In the 1980s the 
continued electoral hegemony of the avowedly "free enterprise" 
Nationals owes much to their maintenance of the Queensland system 
of "agrarian sociaUsm" which Labor developed. 
The Origins of the Small Fanner-ALP Alliance 
The Queensland ALP had a history of romantic attachment to an 
ideal rural communism simUar to that found in the contemporary 
Russian Social Revolutionary Party. William Lane, inspirational 
leader of the New Austialia movement which estabUshed communes 
in Paraguay, was a leading early Labor propagandist and ideologue. 
The institution of settlement schemes to encourage prospective com-
munes to be established in Queensland was among the first docu-
mented poUcy achievements of the poUtical Labor Party in 1893.^ ^ 
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Within the ALP, the rural-based AWU became pre-eminent in 
both the organisational and parUamentary wings. Ted Theodore was 
a prominent figure in the rise of the AWU, having played a promi-
nent part in the amalgamation of his own northern-based 
Amalgamated Workers' Association (AWA) with the older south-
ern-based AWU. Bill McCormack Ukewise was a former AWA 
official and continued to press within the party for greater AWU 
representation. 
The Queensland ALP had grown from the need to give poUtical 
voice to the predominantly rural, organised working class foUowing 
its defeat at the hands of the rural aristocracy, backed by the coer-
cive state apparatus, during the 1890s depression. The period of the 
rise of the Labor Party had also seen the replacement of extensive 
Melanesian-worked sugar plantations by small owner-operated 
farms employing seasonal white labour, and the growth of processing 
monopolies. Labor leaders saw a community of interest between the 
rural working class, the party's natural support, and the smaU 
farmer. The forging of this alliance was correctly perceived to be a 
winning electoral strategy, and policies were developed to take ad-
vantage of this. The Labor victory in 1915 was quickly foUowed by 
enactment of measures to effect radical changes to support farmer 
allies. 
Theodore in 1922 stated the romantic Labor vision in unambigu-
ous terms: "The best way to get a greatly increased virile population 
in Queensland [is] to get men to go on to the land and to inaease 
wealth production."^^ Pastoral production was less favourably 
viewed. Squatters, the proprietors of pastoral properties, were his-
torical enemies from the 1890s strikes. Pastoral production tech-
niques of extensive grazing conflicted with Labor poUcy of northern 
development. Huge stations of one beast to the acre holdings could 
support only a sparse permanent human population. Although pas-
toral production was responsible for a significant proportion of the 
state's wealth, graziers were seen as peripheral to Labor rural 
policy. 
Growth of Queensland Smallholding 
The sugar industiy was a signUicant industry supporting small farm-
ing populations in Queensland. The industry had grown up under a 
system of indentured labour which had given way in the 1890s and 
early 1900s to small farming. This transformation in the industry 
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had been accompanied by political agitation against the system 
from farmers, Uberals and the nineteenth century labour movement. '^* 
Indentured Melanesian labourers (referred to as kanakas) had been 
imported from South Pacific islands, many of them under circum-
stances of dubious legality, by seagoing recruiters known as black-
birders. Conditions for kanakas on plantations were not good, death 
from disease being common especially in the early years of the 
industry.^^ 
Small-plot selectors and rural workers had similar enemies. 
Both hated kanaka labour. Squatters and planters frustrated the 
farmer by grabbing and holding the best land, and frustrated the 
worker by combining to defeat the unions and depressing wages. It 
was the dream of many rural workers one day to work their own 
plots. In smashing the kanaka-worked plantation system, 
(Queensland workers and farmers won what they thought to be a 
glorious victory over a substantial sector of the local rural 
aristocracy. Queensland sugarcane farmers had natural alUes in the 
local labour movement not possessed by the rural slum dweUers of" 
New South Wales who formed the core support of the Country Party 
in that state. As Murphy noted, "the Australian dream of a nation of 
yeoman farmers was held as strongly by the Labor movement in 
Queensland as by any other group in the coimtry".^^ 
The Alliance and ALP Electoral Ascendancy 
The Labor-farmer alliance was part of Labor dogma by 1915. When 
on 30 November 1914 Ryan moved a Want of Confidence motion in the 
Denham goverrunent, four of the eleven charges referred specificaUy 
to agricultural policies, and a further charge was levelled at the 
operations of agricultural trusts like the Colonial Sugar Refining 
Company (CSR). Later Premier Theodore was foremost among Labor 
leaders in wooing the rural electorate and cementing the Labor-
farmer alliance. 
I would like the real man on the land, the man who has been working 
and struggling on the land and who has established himself by real en-
deavour... I would like the farmers to realise the simple facts and give 
their allegiance to the Party that has some identity of interest with their 
own.^  
Voting at the 1915 election indicated the soundness of Labor's 
appeals for an aUiance with farmers. Sugar-farming areas in 
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particular showed strong support. Labor majorities were recorded in 
seven of the eight Northern seats and aU sbc Central (coast) seats. 
The demographic preponderance of the rural working class ensured 
victories also in most of the grazing seats in the North-West, 
Central-West and South-West. Less success was achieved in the 
Wide Bay area north of Brisbane, with its more diversified and 
larger holdings. Labor victories being recorded orUy in the provincial 
towns of Bundaberg, Gympie and Maryborough. The prosperous grain 
and mixed-farming belt of the DarUng Downs remained with the 
non-Labor parties, as did most of the relatively affluent cattle-fat-
tening and dairy lands of the South-East. Brisbane seats were di-
vided between Labor and non-Labor parties along tiaditional votmg 
patterns. 
The ambitious legislative programme introduced in the early 
years after 1915 was directed to cementing the aUiance more than to 
any other goal. Ryan's first address-in-reply as premier contained 
the following observation. 
Throughout the late election, from almost every platfonn from which I 
and the members of this Party addressed public meetings, we pointed 
out that the true alliance—the foundation of sound government—was 
an alliance tietween the primary producer and the industrial worker.^ * 
(Emphasis added.) 
The edifice of political legitimacy fabricated by Labor can thus 
be seen, as Ryan affirmed, to rest solidly on foundations constructed 
by the alliance. The main elements were a claim to represent the 
people as a whole, hence to be the keepers of Queensland's 
"national" interest; and the identification of the political opposi-
tion as representatives of divisive sectional interests, in particular 
the interests of profiteers. 
Labor's electoral achievement under Ryan was to separate the 
rural Labor strongholds, that is to say, small farmer- and wage 
labour-dominated constituencies, from the conservative constituen-
cies inhabited by the more prosperous broad acre fanners. The smaU 
farmers of the north were won to the alUance with Labor and were 
thus divided electoraUy from their fellows in the south and south-
east. An electoral wedge had been driven between the state's main 
groupings of rural producers. Conditions prevaUing in the sugar in-
dustiy of the north in 1915 assisted in this process, since farmers were 
demanding, and only Labor promised, full-scale regulation of the in-
dustry. 
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Enactment of Alliance Policy 
At the time of Ryan's accession to the premiership in 1915, CSR had 
angered both farmers and Labor's worker electorate by attempting to 
export the entire 1914-15 sugar production in order to cash in on high 
wartime prices in Europe, and thereby creating domestic shortages 
and driving up local prices. The new Labor government responded to 
consumers' and sugar producers' concern at this behaviour and quickly 
reached an agreement with the Commonwealth to overcome CSR's 
market manipulation. The Commonwealth was concerned at the po-
litical unrest the shortage of a staple such as sugar could cause for a 
sweet-toothed nation at war. The Queensland government used its 
powers to effect the compulsory acquisition of the whole year's pro-
duction, whereupon the Commonwealth purchased it and negotiated 
a fee with CSR to have the crop refined. The Commonwealth then 
marketed the refined products, having retained ownership of the 
goods throughout the refining process. CSR's margin therefore be-
came only what were calculated to be justifiable refining costs. The 
agreement was given legal status through the passage of the 
Queensland Sugar Acquisition Act, 1915 which empowered the 
Queensland goverrunent compulsorily to aquire Uterally "any thing 
whatsoever". 
Labor had proved its reliability in rural policy by acting 
swiftly on pronuses to cane farmers and legislating to remove their 
prime grievance. Moreover, the intervention had demonstrated to a 
sceptical electorate that profound state intervention in a major mar-
ket could hold benefits for both producer and consumer. The anti-
Labor Legislative CouncU allowed the legislation to pass despite its 
economic interventionism, although concerns were voiced.^^ The free 
market dogma held by conservatives to be self-evident and im-
mutable—namely that free markets delivered the product through 
the most efficient production at the lowest possible price—was 
shown to be flawed: free markets could operate counter to the pubUc 
good. As with the State Enterprises, Labor was at its most effective 
and energetic in assaulting the dysfunctional market operations of 
private monopolies rather than the walls of Fort Capitalism itself. 
The rural petty bourgeoisie, elevated by Labor rhetoric to the status 
of honorary workers, were granted price support and market control 
in the same spirit that workers were given enhanced access to indus-
trial arbitration: the farmers were entitled to a "fair" profit in the 
same way that workers were entitled to a "fair" wage. 
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Socialism and Alliance Policy 
Small-scale owner farming was perceived by Labor as having a so-
ciaUst character. The relations of the farmer to the productive pro-
cess appeared little short of ideal, especially where co-operative 
ownership of plant was in evidence: farmers owned their means of 
production; no coercion was used in the social relations of production 
on the fanuly farm; farmers appropriated their own surplus and con-
trolled its use. Moreover, the farmers' product constituted a major 
generator of export income and so smaU farming seemed to be an ap-
propriate base for the Queensland economy. Converting "waste" land 
to profitable use was a prime example of praiseworthy economic 
"development". Farmers, unUke pastoraUsts, were able to populate 
the vast tracts of land which were Queensland's most obvious asset 
whUe carrying on this sociaUy useful labour. 
Labor was thus emboldened to claim an identity of interest be-
tween its worker and farmer supporters: both engaged in actual 
value-adding labour and thus were subject to exploitation by the 
same class of non-working capitaUsts who derived their profit from 
buying and selling, that is, profit from alienation. Theodore sum-
marised Labor's claim of worker-farmer identity as follows. 
No one has a greater claim to be regarded as a worker than the man who 
tills the soil; and no one is more entitled to participate in shaping the 
policy and governing the affairs of this State than the members of that 
great and influential class. The farmer is the mainstay of our civilisation 
and the most indispensable worker in the community.^ 
Labor's perception of farming as a wholesome and economically 
viable way of Ufe made it look to farming as a remedy for workers 
trapped in the exploitative relations of capitaUsm. If the ranks of 
farmers were swelled by former workers organising themselves in 
agrarian co-operatives. Labor's notions of sociaUsm could also be re-
aUsed. As GUUes, then Secretary for Agriculture and Stock, noted in 
1915: "There are many men who desire to leave the labour market 
and become their own masters, which is a very laudable desire, and 
one that should be encouraged."*' 
Growth of Rural Corporatism, 1915-30 
While the State Enterprises appeared to conservatives as dangerous 
socialist initiatives, they were marginal from the farmer's point of 
view in that they did not interfere with the market structure. For 
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the farmer, the ostensible effect of State Enterprises' market inter-
vention was limited compared to corporatist market controls on the 
sugar model. So, as the enterprises went sour commerciaUy, market 
contiols on the sugar lines began to become a more attractive proposi-
tion for a Labor Party in an electoraUy precarious position. 
The Labor Party was concerned that Opposition parties should 
not weaken the electoral alliance by taking credit for initiatives 
such as the creation of a wheat marketing pool in 1920. The narrow 
win. in the 1920 election heightened this concern, and accordingly 
Labor determined that the extension of the corporatist market-con-
trol scheme on the sugar model should receive priority treatment. 
During debate on the Wheat Pool bill, whUe Opposition members 
took credit for the move on wheat, government speakers emphasised 
their commitment to orderly marketing arrangements for a range of 
food products. Much Labor rhetoric was couched in terms of equitable 
prices for consumers and this was clearly meant for the ears of 
Labor's working class constituency. Unemployment was on the rise 
and Theodore was already considering the PubUc Service wage cuts 
introduced a few months later. Price control would sweeten the blow. 
Agrarian interventionism became the main instrument for maintain-
ing and extending the worker-farmer alUance and bolstering Labor's 
faiUng electoral stocks. 
The anti-Labor pastoral forces meanwhile blotted their work in 
building up the conservative parties into popular organisations 
through their association with the notorious "stinking fish" delega-
tion in 1921. The pastoral companies, aided by conservative allies 
particularly at the federal level, sent a delegation led by former 
premier and magnate Sir Robert Philp to ask the City of London to 
deny loan moneys to the Queensland government unless it agreed to 
reduce pastoral rents. Theodore refused to submit to the policy dic-
tates of foreign financiers and as a result he had to forgo the loan, 
although he was able to negotiate a more expensive loan on the New 
York financial market later in 1921.*^ Against this background and 
the need to come to terms with the electoral losses of the 1920 
election, a by now impecunious Labor goverrunent was forced to make 
concessions to the demands of pastoral interests. 
This experience also impeUed Labor to attract more farmers into 
the aUiance fold. The political success of the policies thus engen-
dered was demonstrated in 1922 when the United Graziers 
Association, which had been organising funds for anti-Labor "non-
poUtical" groups, decided it had no further need to involve itself in 
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politics. By 1925 the fiction of a separate Country Party was aban-
doned by amalgamatmg conservative forces to form the Country and 
Progressive National Party (CPNP).*^ 
Rural Corporatism—The Theodore Initiatives 
In February 1922 conciliatory Labor initiatives made their public 
appearance. Theodore announced a bold plan to extend agrarian cor-
poratism to practicaUy every agricultural market in the state (the 
exception was wool). 
In Queensland we have passed the gold era, and have not yet begun a 
manufacturing era; but we are on the threshhold of a great agricultural 
era. We have been endowed by Providence with a wonderful heritage— 
a land which is richer in natural resources, climate and fertility than any 
other undeveloped country on earth. It is to agriculture, and to the 
industries dependent on agriculture, that we must turn our attention in 
formulating future policies... An agricultural policy, to be effective, must 
include proposals dealing with all of the following topics; these would 
constitute some of the leading planks of an agricultural programme:-
1. Co-operation. 
Z Pools. 
3. Advisory Boards for the different sectior« of the 
agricultural industry. 
4. Agricultural education. 
5. Main roads. 
6. Extension of social amenities to rural life. 
7. Opening land for settlement. 
8. Representation abroad to promote trade for 
primary products.^ 
A platform along these Unes was proselytised at successive in-
dustry conferences organised by the Department of Agriculture and 
Stock over the following months. An interim CouncU of Agriculture 
was set up, as a first step, to advise the government and to confer 
with farmers' associations. 
Proposals as they emerged included incorporation of aU farmers 
in Queensland into a statutory body to be known as the Queensland 
Producers' Association. The tiers of this organisation were to include 
Local Producers' Associations, District Councils, and the CouncU of 
Agriculture. The association was to receive Public Service secretarial 
and expert support. The CouncU of Agriculture was to be like the in-
terim council in having direct access to government. The organisa-
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tional moves to establish the association were put in train straight 
away. Elections for representatives at all levels were held even be-
fore the introduction of the enabling legislation. 
Part of the intention was that political manoeuvring or pressure 
activity by farmers' orgarusations would be diverted into what was 
for Labor an electoraUy harmless arena: farmers' grievances were to 
be directed to the organs of the Queensland Producers' Association. 
Admirustrative structures with direct Unks to the state bureaucracy 
were established to supersede and make formal what had previ-
ously been non-governmental orgarusations. 
Armed with enthusiastic support of industry conferences, the 
Labor administration proceeded to enact its plans in the latter half 
of 1922. This timetable allowed enough leeway for the new iitstru-
mentalities to become fully operational weU before the next election. 
The session of 1922 was replete with agricultural legislation intro-
duced to enact the new measures. The Queensland Agricultural 
Journal noted with unintended irony that "the third session of the 
twenty-second Queensland Parliament may well be regarded as a 
distinctly agricultural assembly".*^ 
A deterioration in Labor's control on the floor of parliament 
when Labor MLA J.C. Peterson defected to the Country Party, leaving 
Labor with a majority of one, led to legislation being rushed on to the 
books in case an early election was forced. At the same time, the 
Opposition, concerned about the appeal of Labor's agricultural poli-
cies to farmers, saw the one seat majority—requiring the Speaker's 
casting vote on every division—as an important chance to unseat 
Labor. An attempt was made by two journalists close to the conserva-
tive camp to bribe another Labor MLA, Frank Brennan, in an effort to 
engineer a further defection and bring down the government. 
Unhappily for the would-be seducers, Brennan had alerted the po-
lice, who were in an adjoining room taking notes.** Sadly for 
Opposition tacticians, this incident took place the day before a No 
Confidence debate in the parUament, allowing Theodore to exploit 
the situation to maximum advantage.*^ 
Unflustered by this debacle, the Opposition, contrary to par-
liamentary tradition, refused to grant pairs for absent and sick Labor 
members. Theodore responded in like manner, indicating that no 
chicanery would deflect Labor from its legislative path. In the 
words of the then Clerk of the House: 
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Thereupon [Theodore] sent his two heaviest weights downstairs and or-
dered them to bring up the sick [D.A.] Gledson [MLA]—dead or alive. 
He would vote breathing or breathless, for there was nothing in the 
Constitution Act to prevent a dead member from voting so long as he 
had not been actually buried and his seat declared vacant. It was a very 
sick and emaciated man who was carried in, swathed in blankets and 
removed from side to side of the House according as necessity arose 
from him voting "Aye" or "No". And to make matters more spectacular, 
a member of the Government party constructed a large red cross and 
hung it over the head of the sick member.^^ 
This farce was only ended with the passage of the Legislative 
Assembly Act Amendment Act, 1922, which allowed the casting of 
proxy votes on behalf of sick members. (This legislation is still in 
force and was used in the 1986-87 session by the National Party gov-
ernment to avoid having to consult with the Opposition on pairs.) 
Fed up with Opposition tactics, Theodore subjected the Legislative 
Council to a similarly final solution. Labor had achieved a majority 
of members of the Legislative Council through the stratagem of ap-
pointing a Labor lieutenant governor (William Lermon, MLA) in the 
interregnum caused by the departure of the previous governor, then 
appointing enough new MLCs to ensure an indefinite majority. These 
Labor MLCs were dubbed the "suicide squad" on account of the 
party's policy to abolish the chamber, and with the passage of the 
Constitution Act Amendment Act, 1922. they did indeed vote to 
abolish their own sinecures. 
Establishment of the "Queensland System" 
The main agricultural bill passed in the 1922 session was proclaimed 
the Primary Producers' Organisation Act, 1922, which created the 
statutory Queensland Producers' Association and Council of 
Agriculture structures. The Council of Agriculture, consisting of one 
representative from each of the nineteen District councils and five 
government representatives, immediately set about developing a 
legislative programme. While the government did not always ac-
cept its advice, the council never faltered in its interventionist role, 
nor did it shirk political controversy. In 1923-24 the council ap-
peared in the Arbitration Court to oppose the AWU farm workers' 
award submission. The government's AWU backers cannot have been 
happy about a semi-government instrumentality being accepted by 
the Arbitration Court as representative of private employers. But if 
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Labor was aware of any contradictions generated by the worker-
farmer alUance strategy it made no public display of this awareness. 
By 1925 boards, established under the Primary Products Pool 
Act, 1922, controlled the marketmg of most farm produce in the state, 
with the important exceptions of wool and red meat. The system of 
market control mechanisms under corporatist state and farmer 
management became officiaUy known as the "Queensland System".*' 
Elsewhere in Australia, the agricultural vote was more of a bloc, 
with the Country Party the beneficiary of rural soUdarity. Country 
interests as a whole, as against city interests, were supposedly 
represented by the Country Party. But in Queensland, at least at the 
level of state poUtics, the Country Party was successfully portrayed 
by Labor as the creature of the big landed interests, especially the 
"squattocracy", while the Labor Party passed itself off as the 
political representative of the rural "battler".'''^ The failure of the 
Country Party in Queensland in the 1920s to capture the small farmer 
vote forced an amalgamation with urban conservatives in order to 
sustain a credible Opposition to the Labor Party. The amalgamation 
did little to counter Labor's presentation of the Country and 
Progressive National Party as the political front of the urban and 
rural rich. 
Adjustments to the "Queensland System", 1925 to 1929 
The agrarian road to socialism in Queensland was not without pot-
holes. The initiaL regionally based, structure of the Queensland 
Producers' Association was unwieldy. Some industries complained of 
under-representation, whUe others, because of fortuitous concentra-
tion of their membership, were clearly over-represented. Rational 
organisation would be better served by restructuring the association 
on an industry-weighted basis, thus mirroring the parallel 
commodity board system. The Labor government, sensitive to such 
criticisms, responded with the omnibus Primary Producers' 
Organisation and Marketing Act, 1926. 
The act was introduced by the new minister, WilUam Forgan 
Smith, who, like GiUies, was to progress from the Agriculture and 
Stock portfolio to party leadership. The 1926 act replaced all 
previous legislation, but the only significant changes were in the or-
ganisational structure of the (Queensland Producers' Association. 
Producers were grouped and represented on an industry basis. The 
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legislation had wide public endorsement and was supported by the 
parliamentary Opposition. 
Labor's electoral alUance strategy for continuity in government 
in Queensland bore fruit again at the 1926 elections where the party 
was comfortably returned. Signs of contradictory elements emerged 
later in the decade when the interests of workers and farmers which 
the strategy treated as complementary came into confUct. The South 
Johnstone strike of 1927 embroUed Labor in a bitter confUct between 
uiuons and sugar farmers. 
The experience of the Gillies and McCormack leaderships 
showed that for the worker-farmer alUance strategy to work in the 
longer term, conflict between the two classes of Labor supporters 
needed to be carefully suppressed. The corporatist structures which 
were subsumed under the umbreUa of the Queensland Producers' 
Association needed to be kept at a distance from poUcy-making cen-
tres of the party in government. Labor since 1915 had avoided com-
promising the conflict mediation role of the state administration in 
its industrial relations policies by putting distance between itself 
and the union movement. The defections of some core supporters from 
the ranks of workers and farmers in 1929 amply demonstiated to the 
new generation of Labor leaders the value of preserving the alUance 
at all costs. 
Recruiting Farmers for the Alliance: Land Settlement Schemes 
There were two pillars of the worker-farmer alliance. Farmers' po-
litical and economic interests were incorporated with the state ap-
paratus through the "Queensland System" of rural representation 
and marketing schemes. The other side of the alUance structure was 
the array of mechanisms affording workers the opportunity of be-
coming farmers themselves. Soldier settlement schemes, closer set-
tlement programmes, irrigation works, land selection schemes and 
rural infrastiucture programmes were designed to encourage agrarian 
population growth and to intensify land use by converting wage 
workers into farmers. 
The nineteenth century land settlement schemes had left as a 
legacy the system of leasehold tenure. Liberal administrations had 
been aware of the minimal improvements made to land by the early 
pastoralists. Squatters' efforts in opening up the land and establish-
ing the beginnings of pastoral industries were legitimated through 
leasehold title, which gave them possession of the land but did not 
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aUenate land from the Crown. The unalienated status of this land 
promised to enable painless resumption by Labor for new agricultural 
settlement; the state as lessor had a ready-made source of revenue in 
the form of rent; desirable land use could be encouraged through the 
leverage of rent. 
When the Ryan government—arguing that good seasons and 
high wartime prices meant that leases were sigiuficantly underval-
ued to the advantage of pastoralists—sought to legislate for easier 
lease-rental hikes, the Legislative Council blocked the enabling 
legislation. The Opposition accused the government of "repudiation" 
and there was an outcry from the non-Labor press at Labor's 
intentions. It was claimed that rent ceiUngs introduced in 1905 were a 
quasi-contractual arrangement between the state and pastoraUsts. It 
was not until the Legislative Council had been stacked with Labor 
nominees in 1919 that Labor was able to unlock pastoral rents and 
proceed to launch its more ambitious land settlement schemes. 
Some new closer settlement was encouraged between 1915 and 
1920 by schemes designed to make farmers out of returned soldiers. 
When judged to be adequately trained, soldier settlers acquired plots 
by ballot, with the area (minimum twenty acres—eight hectares) 
dependent upon soil fertility, water avaUability, presence or other-
wise of prickly pear, and so forth. Loans up to £500 were made 
available to cover establishment capital requirements. Infra-
structure and employment generating schemes were frequently 
provided for settlement areas. 
Great hopes were expressed for these schemes but they yielded 
relatively small results. By 1920 the Beerburrum project had settled 
only 144 families and Stanthorpe, 62. The planned Innisfail settle-
ment faUed to materialise. Others started at Cecil Plains, Mount 
Hutton, Rockhampton and Atherton attracted an average of less 
than 50 settlers. The Ryan government had envisioned settUng many 
thousands of repatriated veterans and had made grandiose appro-
priations of land in this expectation. 
Soldier settlement was not a success. The main fault with the 
programme was laid at the feet of the repatriated veterans them-
selves who in their contrariness showed a recalcitrant preference for 
urban Ufe. For aU the government's, and indeed the Opposition's, 
determination to reward veterans' sacrifice with a healthy life on 
the land, most of the men who had survived GalUpoli and Flanders 
rejected their state's generosity. 
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Pastoral Rents and the Closer Settlement Schemes of the 1920s 
With the removal of the conservative majority in the Legislative 
CouncU in 1919, Labor was at last able to move on the pastoral rent 
issue. The Land Act Amendment Act No. 1, 1919-1920—the 
"Repudiation Act" as the Courier preferred to call it—was Labor's 
vehicle for raising pastoral rents. Hardline hostUity from pastoral 
company bondholders and their friends was an instant reaction at-
tended by pressure on the (Queensland government through such tac-
tics as the "stinking fish" affair, already mentioned, when Sir 
Robert Philp led a delegation to the City of London to plead for the 
frustration of Theodore's 1920 loan raising attempts.-^' The City of 
London's view of the pastoral rents issue would already have been 
known, since in June 1918 London banks, pastoral and finance compa-
nies had passed a resolution warning that "legislation to remove the 
existing contractual limitation on rent for pastoral leases in 
Queensland would be a breach of Governmental undertaking, would 
render confiscation possible and would undermine the confidence of 
British investors" .^ ^ Yet Labor persisted with closer settlement, fi-
nanced by high pastoral rents, despite the powerful opposition 
ranged against it. In 1923 McCormack, the new and ambitious 
Secretary for Lands, floated a new programme of land settlement 
schemes. The Upper Burnett and Collide Land Settlement Act, 1923 
set aside 2.4 million acres (1 milUon hectares) of the Burnett and 
Callide basins in central Queensland for a closer settlement pro-
gramme based on mixed farming and cropping. The cost of the raU 
component alone of the infrastructure costs for the Burnett-CaUide 
scheme amounted to over £2 mUUon over six years. A sizeable new 
tov^ti, Monto, was buUt from scratch. 
The size of blocks was intentionally kept low. Labor's land set-
tlement was to create independent smallholders but certainly not to 
create a new wealthy landed class. WhUe conservatives continued to 
call for large blocks with freehold title. Labor stuck to leasehold 
and, even against expert advice, kept blocks down to a size that 
proved on the whole to be uneconomic. 
Another irrigation scheme on the nearby Dawson River was also 
pushed by McCormack during his period as Minister for Agriculture 
and Stock and then as premier. However, the capital shortage frus-
tiated some schemes canvassed by Labor under McCormack's leader-
ship. Other factors frustrating Labor's 1920s closer settlement 
schemes included poor plarming decisions such as the decision to press 
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for cotton production just before the bottom feU out of the cotton mar-
ket with the Depression. These frustrations served to explain away 
and to distract Labor's attention from the continuing intractable 
problem of insufficient recruits for the schemes either to justify the 
level of pubUc expenditure or bring to fruition the goal of closer set-
tlement. 
McCormack responded to the growing difficulties of the closer 
settiement programme by appointing an expert committee to advise 
on remedial action. The inquiry's recommendations were swiftly en-
acted in the Lands Act Amendment Act, 1927 with the exception of 
extending pastoral lease terms.^^ The government accepted that a 
land settlement strategy based on pastoral production represented 
the most effective Queensland land use policy at that time.'^ '* 
Accordingly, the new act extended various reUef measures to grazing 
selectors, including greater security of tenure and the establishment 
of an independent Land Admirustration Board to determine rents, 
having regard to prevaiUng industry conditions.'^^ 
By the end of the 1920s Labor's closer settlement policies had 
been transformed almost beyond recognition. Existing schemes bat-
tled on with scaled-down objectives but pastoral production had be-
come the policy priority that its earning potential, if not its 
ideological soundness, dictated. In 1924 McCormack persuaded cau-
cus, under pressure from the City of London, to accept de facto pas-
toral rent ceiUngs. In 1927 rent levels and lease tenure conditions 
were removed from the arena of pubUc poUtical decision and given to 
an independent Land Administration Board, thereby depriving the 
Executive of many of the wide powers in such matters it had acquired 
with great difficulty only seven years earlier. 
Healthy revenues were dependent upon taxation derived from 
the pastoral industry, including income tax levied on its employees 
and raU freight transporting charges on the product. Declining meat 
and wool prices had, together with the drought of the mid 1920s, re-
duced profitabiUty in the industry. In the period of economic sUde 
towards the Depression there was considerable pressure appUed to 
the Queensland government to act according to the "laws" of eco-
nomics by adjusting policy in favour of profits. McCormack was the 
outspoken initiator and defender of policy revision, as reported in 
the Daily Standard: 
Australia needed developing, and the Government must have money to 
do it, and the money should be secured at a rate their credit indicated. 
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They could not borrow willy-nilly, simply to keep some public works go-
ing. He [McCormack] did not subscribe to that policy... Labor must also 
learn something about economics. Labor must learn that there is only 20 
cwt. of potatoes in a ton; also that they can only have what they eam.^ * 
As part of this effort to avoid a strike of capital, significant 
concessions were made to the pastoral industry. Throughout the first 
half of 1927 irrigation and settlement projects were aborted for lack 
of funds. Labor leaders' rhetorical attacks on militancy withm the 
party and the union movement were stepped up. A press report of a 
meeting addressed by McCormack shows: 
McCormack: We cannot allow our policy to be dictated to by people 
who, speaking in the name of Labor, attempt to create chaos that will 
give them the opportunity of putting their revolutionary ideas into prac-
tice. [Interjections] A voice: Communists! Another voice: No, 
Pomunists!" 
Meanwhile the Labor leadership stepped up its land settlement 
rhetoric at the same time as funds for land settlement programmes 
were cut back. Attempts were made to compensate by attracting fed-
eral funds. For example, Miiuster for Agriculture and Stock Forgan 
Smith announced to the Melbourne press during a tiip to the southern 
states that: 
Undoubtedly... some foreign countries are quietly and seriously concen-
trating on having a large population of their own in the North. For the 
first time (Queensland is seriously considering migration. The Dawson 
Valley will be one of the biggest things it has ever tackled.^ * 
The conciUatory turn in Labor poUcy towards pastoral capital 
pleased no one. For aU the McCormack goverrunent's declarations of 
its own responsibiUty and competence, its faUure to produce the 
goods in terms of Labor movement and alUance demands antagonised 
Labor's long-term electorate. At the same time, though the 
conservative press strongly supported the government's change of 
tone, it did not support Labor against the conservative parties at the 
1929 elections. 
Political ineptitude on the part of the McCormack-Ied Labor 
administration further hastened its electoral doom. Such a decision 
was the announcement in 1927 of an open season on koalas, or native 
bears as they were then caUed. This appears to have been a nuscon-
ceived attempt at revenue raising from the hunting Ucences and the 
levy on pelts. It was a gross electoral blunder. The spectacle of tens of 
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thousands of koalas being blasted out of their bluegums robbed the 
government of much of the credit it had buUt up among conservatives 
through its handUng of the South Johnstone strike. The Courier, 
which had so recently been solidly behind the government, ran a 
"Spare the Bear" campaign, accusing the goverrunent of murdering 
the cuddly Uttle creatures.^' At length the season was closed, but 
only after half a million had been slaughtered. 
Agricultural Policy under Forgan Smith 
When Premier Forgan Smith and the new Labor government took of-
fice after the 1932 election they intended a less orthodox economic 
posture than that foUowed by the former Country and Progressive 
National Party (CPNP) administration, but room for political and 
economic manoeuvre remained Umited. The Premiers' Plan was a fait 
accompli and continued to be rigidly enforced. Joseph Aloysius Lyons, 
the Labor defector and founder of the United Australia Party was 
prime minister. Federal Labor had split and the avowedly radical 
Labor premier Jack Lang had been dismissed in New South Wales. 
Once more (Queensland Labor in government found itseU isolated in a 
conservative Australia. Labor oppositions elsewhere were weak and 
divided. 
In these unpromising circumstances Queensland Labor under 
Forgan Smith set itself to revive agrarian sociaUsm, proceeding by 
means of admirustrative reforms rather than by floating expensive 
schemes for which funding was impossible under the Premiers' Plan. 
Thus the Primary Producers' Organisation and Marketing Act 
Amendment Act, 1932 enabled commodity boards with the consent of 
growers to Umit or set quotas for the production of a commodity. The 
model so estabUshed is stiU followed. Armed with this power com-
modity boards could act to prevent the glutting of markets and the 
consequent reduction of farmers' unit profit. Boards were also 
empowered and encouraged to seek new markets through export and 
through diversification of product Unes.*° 
There were thU-fy-six planks to Labor's 1932 election platform, 
sbcteen of which concerned "industrial development"; of these one 
plank was about mining, one about manufacturing and fourteen were 
about agriculture. Agriculture was clearly the overwhelming prior-
ity. Forgan Smith saw primary production as "the natural occupation 
of mankind".^* In the Depression context the agricultural road to 
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economic growth appeared to look brighter than other development 
policy directions. 
The low relative size of the Queensland wage labour force left 
it with the lowest registered unemployment of any state, half the 25 
per cent and more suffered in New South Wales.*^ The farmers, 
though their cash income had plummeted, were not about to starve-
indeed the worst years of the Depression (1929-33) were years of 
bountiful rainfall. The Depression wrote large the message that in-
dustrial workers were exposed to the danger of starvation, a spectie 
not faced by the farmer. 
The general emphasis of Labor agricultural poUcy in the 1930s 
was on improving the profitabiUty of the agricultural sector through 
crop development, stock improvement, upgrading of produce quaUty 
and more effective marketing. The bases of the systems buUt up in 
the 1920s were preserved, but the detail of policy formulation in the 
"scientific" approach now favoured devolved more and more on ex-
pert bureaucratic advisers. The 1920s success of this approach in the 
eradication of the prickly pear was followed in the 1930s with pro-
grammes administered by the Department of Agriculture and Stock 
to eUminate diseases of pigs, improve the butterfat content of milk 
and increase the tonnage of sugarcane produced per acre. Success was 
claimed for aU these ventures. 
The net effect of all this admirustrative activity under Forgan 
Smith was significantly to raise the productivity and the total 
value of production of the Queensland agricultural sector. In a pam-
phlet produced at state expense for the 1935 election, Forgan Smith 
boasted that under his administration "every section of human en-
deavour shows an improvement and every department of commerce 
records healthy advances" .^ ^ At a time of over 9 per cent unemploy-
ment this may have sounded extravagant, but Queensland then, as 
the pamphlet went on to proclaim, had Australia's highest basic 
wage, lowest cost of Uving, lowest average working hours for those in 
full-time employment and Australia's lowest unemployment. The 
pamphlet makes it clear that agriculture was the engine driving the 
premier's spirit of confidence. 
Lang Labor in New South Wales was in Queensland perceived 
as adventurous and dangerous. Forgan Smith's administration was 
anxious to dissociate itself from Langism electoraUy, by projecting an 
image of competency in management. In an Australian atmosphere of 
economic despair, caution replaced boldness and innovation in 
Queensland. Under Forgan Smith Labor ceased to confront the pas-
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toraUsts. Avoidance of outright social confUct was the mainstay of 
Queensland Labor in the period and agricultural poUcy reflected 
this. Subsequent land settiement and rural development schemes such 
as the Peak Downs collective farming venture and the Brigalow 
clearmg scheme of the 1940s and 1950s were natural successors to the 
alUance-forging programmes of the 1920s and 1930s. 
The Electoral Alliance and Economic Development 
(Queensland Labor's successful electoral strategy was to substitute for 
a demographicaUy preponderant industrial working class an al-
liance with the numericaUy strong smallholding farmers. The al-
liance's two broad poUcy outcomes were, first, a redefmition of 
smallholding farmers in party rhetoric as workers, given special 
treatment through a quasi-corporatist system of farmers' organisa-
tions with direct access to state market control powers; and, second, 
mobility between the industrial working class and the class of 
smaUholding farmers, facilitated by means of ambitious land set-
tlement projects. Though electoraUy triumphant, these poUcies ran 
into powerful political and economic opposition from the excluded 
pastoral interests. This, together with the growing world economic 
malaise of the late 1920s, brought into relief the contradictions in-
herent in the alliance strategy and helped defeat Labor in the 1929 
election. The three year interruption of Labor rule was used by the 
party to recast the alliance strategy in terms of an economic growth 
stiategy, with the twin objectives of coping with the Depression and 
evolving a stance more appealing to the interests previously ex-
cluded. 
Depression conditions, which were less harsh in Queensland 
than elsewhere, led to significant success for the rural programme. 
For Queensland Labor, this was the lesson learned from the 
Depression, whUe for Labor in the other states just the opposite les-
son was drawn from the Depression trauma. In the other states the 
emphasis from the late 1930s on was to be on manufacturing devel-
opment through import replacement.^ (Queensland with its growth 
strategy of decentralisation and promotion of rural industries, gave 
Uttle attention to metropolitan public facUities and consequently 
gave Uttle stimulus to manufacturing. It is an indication of the low 
priority given to urban capital works that Brisbane was unsewered 
until the 1960s. 
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The rural growth strategy had paradoxical results from 
Queensland Labor's point of view. ElectoraUy, smaUholding farmers 
did not in the long term prove as reliable an electoral base as a large 
industrial working class might have been expected to do. Cut off from 
the mainstream of Australian capitalist development, Queensland 
escaped the worst trials of the Depression but it was also to miss out 
on the surge of prosperity brought by the postwar industrial boom to 
the rest of Australia. Yet Labor became more and more tied to its al-
liance strategy with the passage of time: the Electoral Act, 1949 en-
shrined a system of electoral malapportionment in favour of the 
rural electorate by minimising the effect of the metropoUtan vote. 
From Cold Charity to Free Hospitals 
Queensland Labor's provision of free state hospital treatment for aU 
looms as a significant proof in Labor mythology that the party is 
progressive. Free hospitals feature in the Labor pantheon alongside 
the State Enterprises, workers' compensation, unemployment insur-
ance and the abolition of the Legislative CouncU. However, the 
Queensland free hospital system was a creation largely of the state 
bureaucracy, owing more to administrative rationaUty than to Labor 
refomung zeal. Labor ministers' role in the genesis of the system was 
one of passive support for the administrators rather than active 
policy generation. 
Health Services in 1915 
Although Labor had nationalisation of and free admission to pubUc 
hospitals as a plank of its platform from 1905 onwards, Queensland 
was not well placed to experiment with the rationalisation of its 
medical services. Lacking a medical school of its own until 1935, it 
had to rely on the southern states and the British Isles for appropri-
ately qualified medical practitioners. Well-to-do citizens paid pri-
vate medical practitioners to visit the sick at home. At the other 
end of the spectrum the public health care system provided care to 
those whose disabilities were such as to put them beyond the pale of 
civilised society. The indigent were treated at public charitable 
hospitals by voluntary medical staff and received free hospital 
ward accommodation. Such charity carried the stigma associated 
with dependence. 
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Labor policy included nationalisation of public hospitals, but 
made no mention of any free, uruversal system of hospital ward and 
outpatients' care. The party's reform agenda focused upon the eco-
nomic wellbeing of workers through such devices as the State 
Enterprises, workers' compensation and a restiuctured industrial ar-
bitiation system. 
The only major adrruiustrative reform in the Health portfoUo 
between 1915 and 1922 was the assigiunent of Golden Casket (State 
lottery) profits to public hospitals. This move occurred in 1920 and 
remains in 1988. In short, radical change in health administration 
was neither a vital ideological goal of the party nor was it per-
ceived by Labor leadership as offering potential electoral rewards. 
Moves toward Change 
The Hospitals Act, 1923 was the first move toward reform, but was 
engendered more by a spirit of admirustrative efficiency than by re-
fornung zeal. Government members speaking to the biU were con-
cerned to emphasise its absence of controversial content. Minister 
Thomas Stopford, for example, noted that "no sane Government are 
going to force any system of management upon any section of the com-
munity that is maintaining its hospitals in a proper and fair man-
ner."^5 J]^Q g t^ contained no provision to coerce voluntary hospitals 
into accepting state control, although some commentators have 
mistakenly gained this impression.^* 
Under the act hospitals could choose to accept fuU pubUc fund-
ing but were not forced into the arms of the state bureaucracy. The 
state was prepared to accept only 60 per cent of operating costs, the 
balance to be raised by local authorities within the hospital's des-
ignated area. This legislated a rise in the local authorities' contri-
butions from 25 five per cent of supplementation grants under the 
previous scheme. 
The 1923 act, while clearly at variance with Labor's stated na-
tionalisation objective, did introduce several administrative fea-
tures which were to survive in the subsequent state (nationalised) 
pubUc hospital system. The establishment of the Brisbane and South 
Coast Hospitals Board (BSCHB) to administer the state's largest 
public hospital, the Brisbane General Hospital, represented an un-
welcome duninution of authority for Brisbane medical specialists. 
Opposition to the move by the British Medical Association (BMA) 
was somewhat muted by its contmued privileged access to and bar-
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monious relations with Miruster Stopford. For example, in 1927 the 
BMA complained to the government of non-indigent patients al-
legedly seeking free treatment at hospitals and hence placing unnec-
essary burdens on the honoraries' charity. Labor promptly responded 
by introducing a means test.*^ Thus at the BMA's behest. Labor insti-
tuted a system whereby the sick and injured seeking adnussion to a 
pubUc hospital were greeted not by medical or paramedical staff, 
but by clerks.^ 
Attempts were made at the 1926 and 1928 Labor-in-PoUtics 
Conventions to loosen the government's ties with the BMA by at-
tempting to secure government support for methods of treatment re-
garded by the profession as "quack medicine". In both cases govern-
ment delegates led by Stopford reaffirmed the profession's monopoly 
of authority in determining approved treatments and accrediting 
qualifications. Government arguments on these issues proved persua-
sive. Both motions were lost. 
The one pubUc health area to get a boost from the state Labor 
Government in the 1920s was maternity and infant welfare. The 
Maternity Act, 1925 provided for free, state-run, pre- and post-natal 
clirucs, together with maternity hospitaUsation. Significant sums 
were pumped into capital works to provide the faciUties encom-
passed by the act and this programme represented the greatest part 
of new investment in health faciUties for the period. 
The Royal Commission on Hospitals, 1930 
Although Labor governments had generally upheld the prerogatives 
of the BMA, the association saw a conservative administration as 
offering much more opportunity for consoUdating and furthering the 
profession's interests. Conservative parties had never been reluctant 
to adopt BMA poUcies as their own. The BMA's commitment to pri-
vate medical practice echoed conservative economic wisdom and 
anti-Labor parties were able to declare unreserved support for this 
cornerstone of the association's platform. By contrast. Labor's de 
facto support for private practice was necessarily hedged by a stated 
commitment to its eventual aboUtion. 
The Moore government, faced with a running adnunistrative 
battle over hospital management and finding itself beset by partisan 
public service advisers, opted to avoid direct intrusion into poUcy 
formation in this dangerous field and instead ordered a royal com-
mission. Three commissioners were appointed, including one private 
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medical practitioner. There were many terms of reference, concen-
tiating on questions of finance, controL and goverrunent mtervention 
in hospital administration. 
The BMA wanted a state commitment to private practice as the 
foundation of (Queensland's health care system. To this end it wanted 
to see coercion used to return non-indigent patients to the private 
tieatment market, and also wanted the regulation of health insur-
ance systems to make medical fee recovery more secure. The BMA 
was keen to regain unchallenged control of hospital administration 
which the profession had enjoyed up untU the mid 1920s. The mech-
anisms it favoured for achieving this second goal were the guaran-
teed appointment of honoraries to hospital boards and the greater 
intiusion of private (paid) practice into public hospitals via the 
creation of intermediate wards. 
The commission's findings were congruent with the BMA's main 
objectives. StruggUng with an economic catastrophy and lacking po-
Utical resolve, the Moore government procrastinated over the adop-
tion and implementation of the commission's report. The recommen-
dations of the Royal Commission on Hospitals offered the Moore 
administration few poUtical benefits and many probable incitements 
to opposition. The only sure beneficiaries from adoption of the rec-
ommendations would have been the honorary medical officers, a nu-
mericaUy insignificant and geographically dispersed group whose 
allegiance to the non-Labor parties was more or less assured. 
Accordingly, the report was shelved. 
In the event, the most interesting outcome of the royal commis-
sion was the sundering of the hitherto harmonious relationship be-
tween the BMA and the Labor leadership. The BMA was widely 
perceived in the party and the broad labour movement to have 
thrown in its lot with the conservative parties. The speed with 
which the Moore goverrunent appointed the royal commission and 
the dose correspondence between its findings and BMA poUcy was 
taken as indicating a sinister degree of coUusion between Cabinet and 
the BMA.89 
None the less. Labor's 1932 election platform contained Uttle 
indication of the scope of reforms which, as events proved, were to be 
undertaken in ensuing years. The only commitment in the health 
area was to the "continuation and extension of baby clinics, mater-
nity hospUals and pre-natal clinics".^° An obvious priority m the 
1932 platform was government action to reduce unemplojonent and to 
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review the less popular administrative policies of the conserva-
tives. Health was a minor item on the agenda. 
Imposition of Central Control 
Forgan Smith's home secretary was E.M. ("Ned") Hanlon, a compe-
tent and hard-working minister who was an outstanding member of 
the Cabinet and threw himself into the portfolio with enthusiasm. 
He found the calls from the Courier and the BMA for a separate 
Health portfolio immediately attractive. In spite of their source, 
these suggestions offered the chance of accelerating reform in line 
with Labor policy, represented a new and electoraUy visible action, 
and held out the prospect of achievement directly attributable to 
the minister himself. Hanlon was to emerge as a leading figure in 
Labor welfarism of the 1930s and 1940s.^ ^ 
The BMA was deUghted when in 1934 Hanlon appointed Dr 
Raphael Cilento to conduct an internal departmental inquiry into 
the management structure of the department and of the Queensland 
pubUc hospital and pubUc health systems. From the BMA's point of 
view, Cilento was both a distinguished member of the medical fra-
ternity and a friendly outsider among the detested Queensland 
health bureaucracy. The BMA was yet more pleasantly surprised 
when Cilento made clear to his colleagues and to the press that fol-
lowing the inquiry it was the government's intention to appoint him 
as inaugural head of a new Health Department.^^ In the Ught of 
Cilento's projected appointment, the BMA pronounced itself willing 
to go along with a major reform in the administration of 
Queensland's health care system. 
An election on 11 May 1935 saw the Forgan Snuth government 
comfortably returned. Between the election and the end of 1935 
Hanlon's plans for administrative change in the Health function 
changed dramatically. Instead of establishing a traditional de-
partment of state structure presided over by a permanent head, 
Hanlon moved towards a Janus-like structure with both a profes-
sional and an administrative head. Cilento was to be the profes-
sional manager as the Director-General of Health and Medical 
Services; the top man of the administrative structure, the Under-
Secretary of the Department of Health and Home Affairs, was to be 
anti-BMA former head of the Brisbane and South Coast Hospitals 
Board, Charlie Chuter. 
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CUento's effective demotion had several Ukely causes. He was 
thought to have offended against the unwritten PubUc Service code 
by bypassing proper channels and dealing direct with Premier 
Forgan Smith. Further, CUento accepted a King's Birthday krught-
hood from the Commonwealth, an honour not Ukely to ingratiate 
him with his new employers.^^ Lastiy, during the 1935 election cam-
paign, Cilento publicly scoffed at treatment methods in the poUo 
clinics conducted by Sister Elizabeth Kenny, methods which had 
widespread pubUc and Labor Party support. 
The new administrative arrangements bore fruit with the pas-
sage of the Hospitals Act, 1936, which gave authority over aU ex-
penditure for all pubUc hospitals (including voluntary hospitals) to 
the Department of Health and Home Affairs. Under the act Hanlon 
ruled the hospital system in an administrative line through the di-
rector-general to the medical superintendents and through the under-
secretary to the hospital managers. The superintendents and man-
agers constituted the sole sources of advice for each board and were 
effectively departmental officers, being appointed by and owing al-
legiance to the department.^'* 
The act was presented in parliament as a move to extend more 
independent authority to hospital boards. Hanlon argued that 
"local control through boards will give more efficient, more 
economical and better service all round to the people of a community 
than would a series of hospitals throughout the State controlled en-
tirely from Brisbane" .^ ^ The act was worded to conceal the legisla-
tion's main intention, an indication that Labor leadership was anx-
ious to avoid political confrontation and accusations of radicalism. 
In 1935 the Medical School of the University of (Queensland was 
established at Herston, adjacent to the Brisbane General Hospital 
(BGH). The BGH became henceforth the state's first teaching 
hospital (and the only one until 1957 with the opening of the 
Princess Alexandra Hospital). Such moves placated the BMA in 
Queensland, muting its opposition to the act. When the national 
association established a capitation levy of £10 in order to estabUsh 
a fund to fight the legislation, the Queensland branch was able to 
raise less than 50 per cent of its share of the total and so became the 
subject of attacks in the Medical Journal of Australia. 
The significance of the 1936 act should not be understated. At 
one stioke, the doctors had been forced to accept a salaried medical 
service in pubUc hospitals, administration of the hospitals had been 
lodged firmly with the state Public Service, the remaining volun-
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tary hospitals had been put on notice for possible future state 
takeover and private hospitals had been made subject to state regu-
lation. The subsequent introduction and retention of the free hospital 
system would have been administratively improbable were it not for 
the assumption of state control under the Hospitals Act, 1936. 
The lack of public confUct surrounding the act's passage ensured 
that the event was not reported in the Labor press. The Worker car-
ried no mention of it in November-December, 1936. By comparison the 
simultaneous Racing and Pharmacy bills received substantial cover-
age. In the mass of biUs brought on at the end of the 1936 session, a 
bill making administrative reforms to the health sector was not 
deemed to be of significance by Labor publicists. The move could 
have been announced as a major step in the achievement of party ob-
jectives and so help dampen internal criticism of the Labor govern-
ment's lack of reforming zeal, but the Labor leadership clearly felt 
more comfortable with internal opposition than with pubUc charges 
of radicalism made by anti-Labor forces. 
By the late 1930s Queensland's public hospital system was 
firmly consoUdated under state control. In 1938-39, the proportion of 
the Queensland hospital budget going to the remaining few volun-
tary hospitals had declined to a tiny fraction of the total. Private 
hospital numbers had simUarly declined from 215 in 1936-37 to 155 in 
1938-39.^* The state had substantiaUy nationalised its health care 
institutions—major institutions were aU under direct state contiol 
and the remainder were subject to a high degree of regulation. Labor 
under Hanlon and Forgan Snuth had accompUshed this with mini-
mal resort to coercive methods, and with a continuing rhetorical 
commitment to decentralised and democratic control. A Labor gov-
ernment had achieved this without provoking spirited pubUc debate 
and with little stimulus from the Labor Party orgarusation. 
The changes in hospital administration wrought by the Forgan 
Smith-led Labor governments of the 1930s were introduced in re-
sponse to tight budgetary constraints and heavy demands on services, 
and were influenced by advice from administrators opposed to BMA 
policy prescriptions. WhUe these legislative and administrative 
changes did serious damage to the BMA's ideal of user-pays private 
practice. Labor was cautious in realising the potential of this vic-
tory. Key provisions were phased in over a number of years. Some 
logical corollaries of the changes, such as recruitment of a fuU-time 
salaried medical staff, were supported by the bureaucracy but were 
jettisoned by the goverrunent in order to placate opposition. 
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Although Labor seems to have been slow to exploit this victory, 
by 1940 the potential for major restiucturing of health care provision 
was being explored. Queensland had a system of de facto State-run 
hospitals which equipped it with the administrative apparatus 
needed to reaUse Labor objectives of universal free health care. The 
unsung victory over private medicine won in the 1930s when the BMA 
was forced to accept salaried work in public hospitals left 
Queensland in a far better position than other states to implement 
the national insurance and free health care programmes developed 
by federal governments of the 1940s. Within the party the realisa-
tion was dawning that there were possibilities for real reform in the 
health area, and the development of Labor health policy became 
charged with some vigour. 
In September 1942 Hanlon was promoted deputy premier to new 
leader Frank Cooper following Forgan Smith's retirement to head 
the Sugar Cane Prices Board. Hanlon continued to hold the Health 
and Home Affairs portfolio for the remaining years of the war with 
Cilento as his director-general. 
Free Hospitals, 1944 to 1952 
Federal government poUcy, with the ascension to office in 1941 of the 
Curtin Labor government, envisioned a range of free and universal 
health benefits. Under federal minister Senator J.M. Eraser, the 
Curtin and Chifley administrations pursued a vigorous programme in 
the area, producing a number of legislative proposals. A referendum 
was held, empowering the Commonwealth to make laws for the 
provision of pharmaceutical, sickness and hospital benefits, and 
medical services, among other welfare areas. 
Federal Labor's main reform in the health portfolio was the 
estabUshment of free public ward treatment under the Hospital 
Benefits Act, 1945. The move had been recommended by the Joint 
ParUamentary Committee on Social Security m February 1944 and 
had been agreed upon at a meeting with all relevant state mmisters 
in August of that year. The Commonwealth agreed under the 
legislation to pay a bed subsidy of sb< shiUings per day for each oc-
cupied bed in public hospitals, an amount reckoned to equal average 
fees. In order to qualify for this subsidy, hospitals would in return 
have to offer free beds m public wards and beds in other wards at a 
charge now reduced by the six-shiUing subsidy rate. 
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Queensland passed complementary legislation in the Hospitals 
Act, 1944. Owing to the poUcy of lax enforcement of pubUc ward hos-
pital fees in Queensland, the contribution from Canberra was some-
thing of a bonanza which enabled Queensland Labor to abolish the 
local government hospital contribution which had disadvantaged 
Labor's rural constituency. The act also formaUy abolished what re-
mained of the voluntary hospital system. 
The Commonwealth's bed subsidy came into effect on 1 January, 
1946 and in all states charges for public ward treatment ceased. 
Queensland alone extended the free service to include outpatient 
services, although the Commonwealth did not agree to fund outpa-
tients apart from chest X-ray services associated with the 
tuberculosis eradication campaign. This inclusion of outpatients was 
a logical extension of the poUcy Une foUowed since Prenuer Hanlon's 
arrival in the home secretary portfolio in 1932 and reflects the re-
ordering of priorities he was able to achieve as head of goverrunent. 
Government financial commitment to the state's pubUc hospi-
tals rose rapidly over the years of Hanlon's premiership. The 
Commonwealth bed subsidy rose to eight shilUngs a day in 1948 but 
this did not represent a significant increase in the Commonwealth's 
share of costs. The Menzies administration offered to accept a larger 
share of hospital funding for the Commonwealth, but under condi-
tions that were not acceptable to Queensland's ALP leadership. The 
federal Hospital Benefits Act, 1951 ended the arrangement which 
had provided (Queenslanders with free pubUc ward services after 
1946. Instead, the Commonwealth offered more money, the catch be-
ing that this had to be coUected in the form of fees from patients: the 
federal bed subsidy was to be charmeUed through registered private-
hospital benefits funds. Taking into account twelve shUIings of 
Commonwealth subsidy and the six-shilUng contribution from the 
patient's benefits fund, the offer of eighteen shillings a day was 
calculated to be the full average cost of hospital care. Prolonged ne-
gotiations with the Commonwealth followed. HarUon died in office, 
in January 1952, with the negotiations incomplete. The agreement 
which was finally hammered out gave (Queensland the full 
Commonwealth twelve shillings direct, with additional amounts 
payable for pensioners and chronic patients, in return for 
Queensland's agreement to provide more intermediate and private 
ward facilities at public hospitals. The arrangement stUl left the 
Queensland hospital system worse off than other public hospital 
systems to the tune of six shiUings per pubUc bed per day, a deficit 
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which worsened as the amount of the private insurance contributions 
increased. This amounted to a significant continuing drain on the 
(Queensland Treasury when compared to other states. 
The success of the Labor goverrunents m the 1940s in mtroducing 
free community medicine was effective in retaining party unity be-
hmd the leadership during a time of major discontent m the broad 
labour movement. Anticipating the introduction of the free hospital 
system, Hanlon boasted to parUament that "if there is one thing 
(Queensland people have to be proud of it is the magruficent hospital 
service they are getting";^^ gj^ j^ ^^^^ ^^^ estabUshment of free hos-
pitals, he used them as proof of his government's socialist bona fides 
when criticised in the party over punitive actions against miUtant 
unions. 
The free hospital system was the greatest policy success of the 
Labor leadership in the 1940s and 1950s. That the system never came 
under serious threat from subsequent Country (later National) Party 
administrations (among whose natural allies were to be found the 
bitterest opponents of the system) clearly shows how dear free hos-
pitals had become to the hearts of the Queensland pubUc. Popular 
with the electorate, within the party the free hospitals were pro-
duced as an exercise in ALP socialism and were used to fortify the 
aheady dominant forces behind the parliamentary leadership. 
Instructing the Public: Education in 
Queensland, 1915 to 1957 
It is historically curious that Queensland was almost the first juris-
diction in the world to make statutory provision for free, compulsory 
and secular primary education. The provisions of the Education Act, 
1875 were, however, not fuUy enforced for some time after the act's 
pioneering entry on the statute books. 
The notion that access to education above primary school should 
be open and free had by 1915 gained only a precarious toehold in the 
Labor platform. The 1891 Australian Labour Federation election 
platform called for "compulsory education absolutely free in State 
Schools",'^ but there is no reference even to secondary education. 
Labor goals from the outset were Umited to basic state education and 
reflected an egaUtarianism which argued that public funds ought 
not to be squandered on institutions which can only benefit the al-
ready privileged. Labor poUcy thus favoured the extension of state 
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primary and, to a lesser extent, state secondary education, over the 
creation of new tertiary institutions. 
The fightmg platform in use at the 1915 elections called for ter-
tiary education to be "Secular and free, to aU those qualifying by ex-
amination".^^ This change represented a more radical shift than at 
first appears, since the Labor education paradigm was altered from 
one embracing "egaUtarianism" to one proclaiming "equality of op-
portunity". The ambiguity of the "qualUying by examination" clause 
meanwhile, as will be seen, aUowed the PLP to adopt a rather less 
liberal interpretation than the poUcy's framers might have wished. 
Labor Educational Debate 
More radical elements in the party had some concerns that higher 
education represented a redistribution of wealth from the poor to the 
rich, or were keen to see some extra and ideologically sound elements 
in curricula; for example, a motion of the Buderim WPO passed at 
the 1916 Labor-tn-PoUtics Convention read: "That Peace be taught in 
State schools and that it be a definite instruction to the Minister of 
Public Instruction to include in each issue of the school papers at 
least one article dealing with the causes of war and written with a 
view to train the mind of the child in the ideals of peace".^°° 
Such concerns had Uttle impact on Labor's performance in gov-
ernment which was based on a consensus allowing Queensland educa-
tion to remain a low priority political agenda item. EgaUtarian de-
mands for greater priority to be given to other poUcy areas, such as 
land settlement, unemployment relief and public hospitals, were 
met. Minimal public funds would be made avaUable for education 
above primary level, but avaUable funding and support would be 
equally distributed among students on the basis of academic abiUty 
alone. The Scholarship and Senior external examinations were to be 
the points of academic assessment for entry into secondary school and 
university, respectively. The political difficulty of assaulting the 
denominational schools was to be avoided, although Labor princi-
ples were to be assuaged by denying direct state aid. 
That strand of Queensland Labor thinking which saw virtue in 
the general notion of education while objecting to elitist institutional 
arrangements was able to secure some government backing in the 
early years of Labor power. The idea of worker education had been 
given impetus in Queensland as in the rest of AustraUa by the 1913 
tour of British worker education activist Albert Mansbridge, who 
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had been largely instrumental in setting up the British Workers 
Educational Association (WEA) m 1903.^ °^  At a meeting at Brisbane 
Trades Hall the night after his lecture it was agreed to estabUsh 
the Workers Educational Association of Queensland under the inau-
gural presidency of CPE secretary L. McDonald. The university was 
induced to provide a room for WEA classes and, mdeed, to fund a lec-
turer to work part-time on the programme, although the Denham 
Liberal government refused special funding for the position.^°2 
The new Ryan administration in 1915 had no specific platform 
commitment to the WEA, but was receptive to representations from 
association activists, given Labor's criticism of the previous govern-
ment's parsimony.'o^ Influenced by acadenucs' concerns to maintain 
enrolments and a standard curriculum, the WEA drifted away from 
the radical designs of its founders despite an attempt at re-radicaU-
sation under the influence of V.G. ChUde (tutor) and N.P. Freeburg 
(WEA councU member). The original target cUentele of working class 
activists rapidly fell by the wayside and, by the late 1940s, the 
former WEA (by now Trades Hall) library had, according to 
Brisbane expatriate writer David Malouf, the best fiction collection 
avaUable in Brisbane.^'''* 
By 1919 the WEA had so far departed from what the more 
radical worker educationalists took to be its natural function that a 
rival body, the Workers School of Social Sciences (WSSS), was set 
up to cater for the traditional working class clientele which the 
WEA was taken to have abandoned. The WSSS posed a number of 
uncomfortable questions for the uruon leaders who were expected to 
fund the new body. For one thing, education finances would either 
have to be withdrawn from the WEA, or the unions would need to 
find additional funds for the new body. There was also doubt over 
the desirabiUty of an independent force for radicalism. Despite caUs 
made by Ernie Lane (alias Jack Cade) in the Daily Standard for 
greater efforts at workers' education and sociaUst propaganda,^"^ the 
WSSS folded for lack of union support only one year ^ e r its founda-
tion. 
This faUure did not permanently discourage those who saw 
worker education as offering a real prospect for heightened sociaUst 
consciousness among workers, and spasmodic attempts in this 
direction were undertaken by the ARU in subsequent years, notably 
under former WEA lecturer Gordon Crane.i°* At the end of the 1930s 
Norman Richmond, former New Zealand Rhodes Scholar, academic 
and sociaUst, was appointed director of tutorial classes at the WEA 
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and soon set about restoring the lost radical curricula of the 
association's classes. Coincidentally, the Queensland branch of the 
Left Book Club was established amid much initial enthusiasm.^^^ 
WhUe Richmond left intact the considerable "traditional" cur-
riculum, he expanded the association's activities in political educa-
tion and worker consciousness-raising. Richmond stepped so far be-
yond the pale as to address a strike meeting of Ipswich miners in 
October 1938 at a time when the prenuer had just commenced an at-
tack on communists by "reveaUng" a secret communist plot to sabo-
tage Labor's new rural relief-work scheme. Forgan Smith announced 
an inquiry into the WEA and the university tutorial classes soon af-
ter, stating that "the WEA should, on principle, be a strictly neutial 
organisation in coimection with the working class movement".'^^ The 
inquiry demonstrated to Forgan Smith's satisfaction that the WEA 
was "more a propaganda organisation than an organisation for the 
dissemination of knowledge".^^ 
The government accordingly cut off state funding for both the 
WEA and the university tutorial classes from the end of 1939. 
Deprived of funds, the WEA coUapsed as a teaching body and of-
fered no classes in 1940. Richmond, in a parting shot, declared that 
the government's action bespoke growing fascism,^ ^ ° but the Labor 
leadership remained unmoved. Forgan Smith declared to the 1941 
Labor-in-Politics Convention that there was "no reason why the 
State should provide funds to educate certain people to become 
Communists"."^ The state continued, however, to provide fimds to 
educate people to become Catholics, and no traditional educational 
institutions or individual teachers were ever isolated in this manner. 
The subsequent decision to legislate for a majority of government 
appointees on the University Senate (1941) is Unked to uiuversify 
criticism of the WEA move. Politically, the dominant PLP Labor 
faction of the late 1930s could afford to antagonise the generally 
quiescent militants, knowing that anger was unlikely to translate 
into damaging forms of political or industrial action at that time. 
The subsequent prominence of WEA activists such as Mick Healy and 
Ted Bacon in the industrial turmoil of the 1940s suggests that Forgan 
Smith would have been better advised to keep the left occupied in 
educational, rather than industriaL political activity. 
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Secondary Education 
The incoming Labor administration of 1915 found itseU with a new 
and as yet tiny state secondary school system. Labor had no poUcy 
commitment to an expanded, let alone universaL state secondary 
education programme. The platform caUed only for "Compulsory 
[education] up to 14 years of age, higher optional, both Secular and 
Free in State Schools"."^ Labor claimed credit for doubling enrol-
ments in state secondary schools between 1914 and 1919,"^ a claim 
which rests on dubious foundations since several schools buUt in the 
pre-war period had not opened before the beginning of the 1914 
scholastic year.""* The comparatively rapid expansion of the early 
years, arguably under the planning of the former regime, ground to a 
halt. 
From 1924 to 1939, no new state secondary schools were buUt in 
(Queensland. Humphrey McQueen ascribes immobiUty to a covert al-
liance between Labor governments and Roman Catholic clergy to 
leave CathoUc secondary schools the predominant secondary educa-
tors in Queensland."5 Rupert Goodman on the other hand maintains 
that Labor administrations were essentially phiUstine and opposed 
secondary education in principle."* Neglect, in Goodman's analysis, 
was a predictable symptom of Labor dislike for educated eUtes. 
The secondary scholarship system had expanded and been lib-
eralised appreciably under the first period of Labor rule. Labor con-
tinued the non-competitive qualifying scholarship examination sys-
tem intioduced in 1914; by 1927 the number of secondary students re-
ceiving scholarship support had risen to 1886 from a base of 515 in 
1914. "7 Average attendances at state secondary schools increased 
from 548 m 1916 to 1947 m 1927. 
The Moore government, under its minister Reginald King, 
scrapped the qualifying principle for the scholarship (which en-
taUed an open-ended commitment) and brought back a competitive 
examination for a limited number of places. The number of scholar-
ships avaUable was reduced to a maximum of 1000. At the 1930 
scholarship exammation, 5692 students sat, 1865 quaUfied and only 
1003 were awarded scholarships."^ Opposition to these moves came 
from aU sides of the education debate. Denominational and grammar 
schools saw a major source of funds disappearing, the Catholic 
Church being particularly enraged."' Moore's decision to hold the 
line on the scholarship cuts against the storm of public protest 
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handed Labor a gift vote-winning issue and thereby helped to tie 
Labor fortunes to the system for many years thereafter. 
The non-competitive scholarship was reintroduced at the first 
examination held after the return of Labor in 1932. By 1937 the 
Secretary for Public Instruction could boast of 4012 scholarship win-
ners for the previous year.^ ^o provided that each year the govern-
ment could demonstrate an increased number of scholarship winners, 
the poUty could be kept content with the existing arrangements. The 
events of 1929-32 had brought the churches effectively into the 
Labor fold, or at least stopped them from supporting the non-Labor 
parties. 
Real expenditure on state secondary education for chUdren rose 
in the postwar years but it was hardly an exponential movement. 
The stasis in state secondary education can be seen to have led to real 
declines in avaUability of funds for the "free, secular education" of 
Queensland youth, at the same time that scholarships to non-gov-
ernment schools were rapidly increasing. Even at the height of ex-
penditure, state high schools accounted for a Uttle over £1 per year 
per head of population in Queensland in constant 1915 pounds. 
Moreover, the period of the Forgan Smith government emerges as one 
of real decline in expenditure, and this at the same time as Labor 
was proud to trumpet scholarship increases as evidence of its educa-
tional munificence. 
A report of the Department of PubUc Instruction in 1957 showed 
the results of this parsimony to be a high rate of "wastage" of gifted 
chUdren, that is, of chUdren who achieved very high results in the 
scholarship examinations but who did not then progress to matricu-
lation or tertiary levels.'^i "Wastage" among girls from working 
class famiUes was found to be particularly severe. Rupert Goodman's 
description of the generation of children undergoing schooling under 
Labor as a "lost generation"'22 j^ ^g some basis in fact. 
Whereas McQueen posits an almost conspiratorial relationship 
between the Catholic Church and the Labor educational 
administration, Goodman assumes a natural Labor anti-inteUectu-
aUsm as the prime culprit for policy immobility. Both versions ap-
proach the truth. The support of the churches for the scholarship 
system was an important ingredient in ensuring its survival. 
Provided that they got the scholarships, the churches were content 
to take a back seat in Queensland party poUtics. The dominant fac-
tional position in the Labor Party allocated education above pri-
mary level a low priority on both ideological and pragmatic grounds. 
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Minority left positions would have aUocated increased funds to edu-
cation, but would have upset the fine balance of interests arrayed 
behmd the existing poUcy by withdrawing aU state mdirect funding 
for denominational and grammar schools. The channeUing of funds 
into worker education advocated by this view would certainly have 
excited massive opposition from the churches and others who bene-
fited from the existing system. Labor poUcy sought to limit poUtical 
damage. 
Labor and the University of Queensland 
The Labor governments started off weU in their relations with the 
Uruversity of Queensland with the welcome injection of funds for ex-
tension classes connected with the WEA in 1915. Labor leaders were 
not, however, unanimous in their support even of the concept of the 
university. For example, Ted Theodore was a reluctant supporter of 
the University Bill, 1909. The concerns of Labor governments with 
university education related less to the class concerns articulated by 
Theodore and more to the embarrassment caused by the opiruons and 
lifestyles of inteUectuals of the left. 
A number of academics concerned with the establishment of the 
WEA publicly advocated views to the political left of the dominant 
Labor line. V.G. ChUde, for instance, during his term as tutor at the 
university, wrote for the Daily Standard under various pseudonyms 
as weU as in his own name regular articles attacking the government 
for various breaches of socialist principles in fulfilling its plat-
form.'23 He also supported the more radical line in the WEA debates 
of the late 1910s. Childe's appointment as lecturer in Classics, a sub-
ject for which he was extraordinarUy well qualified, as his subse-
quent chair at Cambridge attests, was disallowed by the Senate al-
legedly under government pressure.^ '^* 
"The uruversity administration was pleased to exhibit naturaUy 
conservative inclinations which from the government's point of view 
made it more or less politically self-regulating. Vice-ChanceUor J.D. 
Story observed that foremost among the university's duties to the 
people was the duty to "co-operate with Rulers and Leaders in the 
advancement of the spiritual and cultural welfare of the people".i25 
Even students were reluctant to aUow poUtical debate to intrude on 
to the campus: the first political club (the Radical Club) was ap-
proved by the Uruversity of Queensland Uruon as late as 1937.^ 26 
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The greatest contribution made by Labor to university education 
was the construction of the new campus at St Lucia, some eight kilo-
metres from the Brisbane city centre on the banks of the Brisbane 
River. The site itself was donated, along with a substantial portfo-
lio of other investments, in a private bequest.^^'' Funds for the works 
were provided by the Forgan Snuth government in 1935 under its sec-
ond phase relief works programme. Sections of the university 
administration were not iiutially keen on a move so far away from 
the central business district, but the prospect of access to the extia 
funds overcame reservations about the isolation of the St Lucia site. 
Attractions of the site for the government lay not orUy in its poten-
tial as a prestigious public work, but also in its unique abUity to 
combine the traditional discipUnes with agricultural pastoral dis-
ciplines on the one campus. The expenditure of £500,000 in pubUc 
funds ^  2^  on university education was a sweeter pUl to swaUow when 
it could be Unked to Labor policy on rural development. 
Labor in government was reluctant to uphold the myths of Ub-
eral education and university autonomy, having been suspicious of 
the class and ideological location of universities at the outset. The 
PLP was home to numbers of men who deUghted in asserting their 
superiority over the supposed "eggheads" of the university. Any 
overt signs of university insubordination were to be met with admin-
istrative and legislative measures to restore goverrunent authority. 
The principle was clear and indeed bipartisan: those providing the 
money had the right to control what went on in the institution.'" 
This meant in practice that the university could be "autonomous", 
provided it did nothing to offend the state Executive. When, as in 
the instance of the WEA's demise, the university attempted to 
thwart government wishes by pubUcly opposing a decision. Labor 
governments reacted swiftly and radicaUy. The threat of such action 
was normaUy sufficient to ensure seU-regulation on the university's 
part and to keep alive the officiaUy approved image of harmony 
and goodwill. 
The timidity of University of Queensland academics in criticis-
ing the government went unrewarded in terms of state appointments. 
Queensland administrations preferred to seek expert advisers from 
outside the state. Professor J.B. Brigden, appointed to head the 
Bureau of Industry in 1934 came from the University of Tasmania. 
His successor, CoUn Clark, was a Cambridge economist at the time of 
his appointment. Raphael CUento was a London graduate and in the 
Commonwealth service at the time of his appointment as Director-
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General of Health. Few royal commissioners appointed by Labor 
admirustrations were University of Queensland acaderrucs. The uru-
versity was unable for many years to secure even a few appointments 
to the Brisbane and South Coast Hospitals Board when the effective 
operation of the Medical School depended upon board policy. 
University of Queensland academics were passed over both for gen-
eral appointments within the gift of individual ministers and for 
expert appointments decided by Cabinet. Junior examination entry to 
the state PubUc Service and the absence of a graduate recruitment 
scheme kept the bureaucracy free of any university connectiorw.^'''' 
The Gail government's 1956 legislative attack on the uruversity 
thus upset a deUcate balance. Gair's moves were all the more sur-
prising considering the absence of any obvious provocation on the 
part of the university and so were in terms of poUtical tactics en-
tirely avoidable. No clear political purpose was served by interven-
tion in the university's administration at the time; there had been no 
discussion of the issue at the 1956 Labor-in-Politics Convention, and 
the QCE had not discussed the matter before legislation was pre-
sented to parUament. The Opposition was as mystified as was the 
University of Queensland Staff Association when Secretary for 
Public Instruction Frank Diplock introduced the University of 
Queensland Acts Amendment BiU, 1956 into the House without prior 
notice. The first reading of the bill passed with little fuss because 
the Opposition had little inkling of its contents'^': the minister gave 
no clues in his speech about the major provisions of the legislation, 
but talked instead about the alleged generosity of his administra-
tion toward tertiary education.'^^ Much was made, for instance, of 
the increase in state contribution from £10,000 in 1910 to £662,000 in 
1956.133 
By the second reading of the bill the Opposition had been 
briefed by University Staff Association president (also University 
Librarian and later National Librarian) Harrison Bryan on the sub-
stantive provisions of the legislation. In a letter quoted by D. 
Herbert (Lib., Sherwood), Bryan argued against the bill's provision 
for a new Public Service-style Appointments and Promotions Appeal 
Board (s.25, 31) noting that such a proposal was "an attack on the 
self-goverrunent of the University" and "required a breach of the 
confidentiality required by academic appUcants, in that their ap-
pUcations could be made known to coUeagues".'^ The worth of these 
objections was not debated specificaUy by Labor speakers other than 
to commend the fairness of any move to institute an appeals provi-
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sion. The slight increase in the government-appointed majority in 
the Senate also provided in the biU aroused no interest on either side 
of the House.'^^ 
Why was the government proceeding with the legislation, 
given that the moves were opposed by those who would be affected 
by it and were supported by no particular interest group? The 
C)pposition claimed that the biU was brought on by the disaffection 
of a certain Labor supporter who was overlooked for an appointment 
to the chair in Mathematics in the months preceding the drafting of 
the legislation. Gair implicitly admitted the charge, but rather 
than entertain argument over the ethics of legislation to protect 
friends of the administration, continued to justify the principle of 
appeals. Gair's personal leadership of the debate, and his refusal to 
countenance amendments requiring expert membership of appeal 
boards or Staff Association representatives on boards indicated a 
deep personal interest in the legislation which went beyond the 
norms of Labor government practice in pushing business through the 
parliament. 
StUI, Gair could most likely have escaped from the imbrogUo 
unscathed were it not for the unfortunate coincident legion of de-
stabilising political factors he managed to bring on his 
administration in 1956-57. Gair's insistence in taking on his numerous 
enemies (many of his own making) aU at once formed some unusual 
alliances in 1957, and not least of these was that between the 
university acaderrucs and the anti-Gair faction on the QCE. 
Labor's Caution on Education 
The most favourable description of the Labor Party's adrruiustiation 
of the education portfolio would be "stable". The various radical and 
dissenting education poUcies advanced by individuals in and on the 
fringes of the labour movement and, less fervently, by minority fac-
tions and groupings within the Labor Party itself, faUed to influence 
state education policy as it affected the mass of Queenslanders. The 
one significant concession to the educational road to socialism—the 
WEA—was reduced in implementation to the kind of adult education 
programme familiar in Australian states led by conservative 
administrations. Occasional forays into the kind of activity envi-
sioned by the founding radicals were treated with unremitting 
harshness. 
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Education was for (Queensland Labor administrators a potential 
source of dangerous destabilisation. The safest course was to leave 
untouched the status quo ante. The task of dismantling the denonu-
national and grammar school systems could be seen to yield few po-
litical and dubious social benefits, whUe courting certain poUtical 
disaster. The prospect of every church pulpit and most school speech 
nights tunting mto anti-Labor propaganda organs was too frighterung 
for the Labor leadership to contemplate. On the other side, radical 
intellectuals enjoying state salaries forging links with militants in 
the unions and the Labor Party were a risk to be avoided. As with 
the public health system, so with education: government control of 
its own servants and institutions was a lynchpin of Labor 
administrative philosophy. 
Labor in (Queensland effectively reversed the trend of the 
decade before 1915 when much was done to catch up to other 
Austialian states. The dominance of the Country Party among the 
non-Labor parties after 1915, the performance of the Moore govern-
ment, and the rhetoric of the Opposition suggest that Queensland 
would have seen little better in education poUcy under the alterna-
tive governments. The (Dpposition only expressed concern over educa-
tion policy at times when government legislative moves threatened 
certain institutions or interest groups (and only then after lobbying by 
those groups), as is evidenced by acquiescence over first reading de-
bates of subsequently controversial bUls. 
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The Split 
Origins of the Split 
The industrial turmoil of the late 1940s was to have profound reper-
cussions for the continued electoral success of Queensland Labor. The 
alliance between the dominant anti-militant forces in the 
Queensland labour movement and the parliamentary Labor leader-
ship, which appeared rock-solid, was behind the scenes undergoing 
considerable strain. The electoral rigging introduced by Hanlon in 
1949, while it provided insurance against the electoral backlash ex-
perienced the following year was an admission of weakness. As in 
1929, the heavy-handed measures introduced to suppress miUtants 
also deeply offended many traditional Labor loyalists with dire 
electoral and organisational consequences. UnUke 1929, the parlia-
mentary leadership was spared the salutary experience of a term on 
the Opposition benches. With the death of Hanlon in 1952, the 
leadership passed to the unrepentant architect of the 1948 emer-
gency powers, Vince Gair. Rather than seeking to repair the damage, 
Gair beUeved he could forge a new dominant alliance, based on 
Grouper-controlled unions and Movement-inspired branches which 
would free him from the odious necessity of kow-towing to tradi-
tional Labor machine power-brokers. 
The first indications of an attempt to forge a new alUance 
emerged in 1952. Former AWU secretary Joe Riordan retired from his 
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traditional uruon seat on the Arbitration bench. He was not replaced. 
In 1952 also, a form of long service leave was introduced by legisla-
tion (Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Acts Amendment Act). 
This appeared to herald a sigruficant unprovement in workers' wel-
fare, but it had no appUcation to seasonal or casual workers and was 
negated by any break in service brought about by UUcit strike action. 
At the same time, Gair granted three weeks' annual leave to pubUc 
servants, a benefit not enjoyed by the members of the unions covering 
private sector employees which formed the majority of the Labor 
leadership's support. The chief beneficiaries of these actions were 
the Grouper-contioUed Queensland State Services Uiuon (QSSU) and 
FCU while AWU members were largely ignored. 
The forces dominating the party hierarchy were prepared to 
aUow PLP leaders considerable leeway in interpreting and imple-
menting party poUcy, provided the PLP occasionaUy deUvered key 
legitimating reforms such as the forty-hour week and free hospitals. 
By the same token, dominant forces in the party collaborated in 
keeping poUcy within the narrow confines of what the PLP took to be 
electoraUy acceptable. This arrangement allowed the party to claim 
with some justification that Labor parUamentarians were merely 
the servants or agents of the rank-and-fUe broad labour movement 
and branch memberships. The party hierarchy and the PLP acted 
together in the interests of the working people of Queensland. 
Branch members and union conferences determined poUcy motions 
democraticaUy. If party conventions rarely attempted to interfere in 
the minutiae of state administration or to direct the PLP, this was 
projected as reflecting the harmonious relations between party or-
garusation and political leadership. The PLP remained able to por-
tray itself to the electorate as the independent repository of the 
state's "national interest", beholden to no special interest group. 
The harmonious coaUtion received the continued support of all 
those involved only so long as it continued to work in their mutual 
interest. From the AWU's viewpoint, this meant that certain tiadi-
tional signs of respect had to be observed by the PLP in its dealings 
with the union and the party hierarchy it dominated. The AWU 
leadership was to be kept informed of policy changes and consulted 
on important issues. AWU nominees were to be appointed to key 
positions, such as the vacancy on the Board of Trade and Arbitiation. 
The PLP would exercise its good offices to secure certain key AWU 
industrial gains and refrain from using state coercive powers to 
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defeat AWU industrial actions. No attempt would be made to 
dimiiush AWU industrial coverage or political influence. 
This relationship had been mutuaUy advantageous for its par-
ticipants. Union leaders from unions associated with the dominant 
forces had been suitably rewarded with seats in the Queensland and 
federal parliaments and with various government appointments. 
This was perfectly compatible with received party ideology which 
had it that one of the prime roles of Labor in office was to staff the 
organs of the state, particularly those parts of the state apparatus 
which regulated workplace organisation and industrial relations, 
with personnel drawn from or at least friendly towards the labour 
movement. That such appointments should be made largely from the 
ranks of the largest and broadest-based uiuon in (Queensland was un-
exceptional. 
The 1953 Labor-in-Politics Convention highlighted the growing 
stiength of a Grouper-Gair axis. On the crucial issue of extending long 
service leave provisions to seasonal and casual workers, the relevant 
AWU-supported motion was amended from an instruction to the gov-
ernment to intrcxiuce such a scheme to an instruction requiring only an 
investigation of a suitable scheme.^ Gair himself expressed some an-
noyance that the government had not been adequately thanked for 
its earUer good works and accused those supporting the original mo-
tion of being malcontents. 
[It has been said] that a great deal of discontent has been created by the 
long service leave provision. I suppose most reforms lead to some dis-
content and you will always hear about the discontent. No one has said 
here that the Government are to he complimented on having introduced 
this great industrial reform for the workers. (p.l02) 
Earlier in the convention, the report of the Industrial Groups 
Committee had been overwhelmingly endorsed (p.77), although a 
move by some of the Groupers to add further qualifications to the 
party's "sociaUst" objective had failed (p.13). 
The Industrial Groups Committee at this time was almost en-
tUely made up of PLP members; committee member Tom Rasey had 
been elected to parliament and Mick Brosnan MLA, an ex-ETU 
Grouper,^ had replaced Ted Walsh who was now treasurer. Gau-, 
through his Ueutenants, thus wielded perhaps more direct mfluence 
in the union movement in Queensland than any previous premier, a 
fact which disturbed those union leaders excluded from the informal 
chaimels of communication with the party poUtical leadership. 
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The year 1954 saw a reversal of the growth in Grouper influence. 
Dr Evatt's expose of The Movement and the subsequent Victorian 
spUt led to a proscription of links between the Groups and the ALP. 
Gair and some like-minded PLP and Grouper delegates boycotted the 
1955 Federal Conference which purged the Victorian party and dis-
banded the Groups. The AWU, having been expelled from its posi-
tion of dominance in the party, reopened Uaison with the TLC in 
1956 via the rising TLC leader Jack Egerton of the Boilermakers' 
Society.^ It had passed one and a haU decades in isolation. 
Anti-Gair Forces Unite 
During the last quarter of 1955, the AWU suffered a serious setback 
when the state shearing award was cut by 10 per cent on appUcation 
by the United Graziers Association. This particularly aggravated 
the AWU, since it had lost "its" seat on the Arbitration Court in 1952 
and the wool industry was enjoying near-record profits.'* Preparations 
for the first major official shearers' strike in sixty years helped to 
cement the still tentative alUance with the TLC. The period leading 
up to the February-March 1956 Labor-in-Politics Convention was 
thus also a period of close AWU-TLC co-operation over strike plans.^ 
The shearers actuaUy went out on strike on 1 January 1956, but TLC 
co-operation became essential as non-union shorn wool began to reach 
the market. 
The depth of the rift within the party was revealed at the 1956 
convention. QCE president and AWU representative H. Boland set 
the scene in his address, which contained, amongst the calls for 
unity, a veiled demand for a backdown by Premier Gair. 
Let us function as one big family. Let us forge unity in the Labor 
Government. We cannot have that unity at the expense of the destruc-
tion or throwing overboard of some principle associated with the [labour] 
Movement which many of those people would have us do. The majority 
decisions have always been obeyed by the minority and that is how it will 
continue, and I suggest that that is how it should be.^ 
The weakness of the Grouper-Gair faction emerged in the defeat 
of a QSSU motion which would have supported the sponsorship of 
the proscribed Industrial Groups under a different guise. State 
treasurer Ted Walsh, speaking to a version of the motion, was 
heckled with taunts about his absence from the previous year's 
Federal Conference. 
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The AWU-TLC grouping resolved to force Gair to back down on 
the leave issue. As the Amalgamated Engineering Union's (AEU's) 
QCE delegate Jack Devereux reported to the convention, Gair had 
refused to be bound by QCE resolutions on the matter (a questionable 
stance on his part), but had conceded in October 1955 that he would 
be bound by convention. The AWU-TLC forces wanted a clear direc-
tion which dictated the time to introduce the extra leave measures. 
Gair responded by declaring the goverrunent to be above direction by 
the convention: 
It is very obvious... that Parliament would not be a supreme body if its 
members were subjected to outside coercion, intimidation or direction... 
But, surely, you must have some confidence in us, the elected members 
of the Government itself. Surely you must give us some credit for know-
ing where we are going, and what is in the best interests of the commu-
nity! (p.81) 
Transport miruster Jack Duggan, who, whUe loyal to the government, 
was close to the AWU-TLC grouping, preferred to argue on the old 
principle of arbitration being the sole legitimate industrial forum, 
but the debate had already moved weU past the stage where such 
rhetoric could calm the situation. 
AWU-TLC delegates pointed out that convention had twice al-
ready (in 1924 and 1947 over the forty-four hour and forty hour week) 
forced goverrunent action on labour advances. Moreover, this was a 
time of economic boom. Devereux noted in reply: 
We should have had our three weeks' annual leave by now...does Mr 
Gair suggest that as a memtier of the parliamentary Labor Party he is 
not subject to any discipline from... the Queensland Branch of the 
Australian Labor Party? ... Is it suggested that outside the ballot box or 
the plebiscite Parliamentarians are completely free to do as they 
choose? I submit that you do not believe that. (p.l04) 
A TLC-AWU coalition motion, requiring Gair to mclude the 
leave issue in his election poUcy speech was carried seventy-five to 
fifty-eight. 
Gair responded later in the convention by armouncing Cabinet's 
rejection of the convention decision. Accordmg to Murphy,^ Gair gave 
a private undertaking during the convention to the effect that he 
would include the leave issue m his poUcy statement, and subsequent 
events indicate that those on the convention-appointed committee 
who discussed the cabinet stance wUh Gair were given such an 
Undertaking.^ In any event, the actual poUcy speech contained no 
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promise of action on the leave poUcy. Whether or not any undertak-
ing was given, Gair had blatantly defied the party organisation. 
Although the conservative press supported Gair on his pubUc 
defiance of convention,' there were other matters brewing which 
were to deprive the premier of a good deal of conservative, and in-
deed Uberal, support. Among these, the University Act Amendment 
Bill, 1956-57 is perhaps the best remembered by researchers smce it 
affected the employment conditioiw of academics! This biU included 
in its provisions power for the miruster (for PubUc Instruction) to in-
tervene in appointments of academic staff. CivU Ubertarians were 
also gravely concerned at the continued operation of the Printers and 
Newspapers Act, 1953, which required, among other provisions, 
registration of all printing presses and duplicating machines and 
provided stUf penalties for non-registration. A royal comnussion into 
corruption over the granting of Crown leases caused months of 
embarrassment for the Queensland Labor administration.^" Further, 
the mysterious (even to the (^CE)" source of some £12,000 received by 
Gair for the 1956 election campaign was a cause for concern among 
party members. 
Meanwhile, the shearers' strike continued to fester and drive 
the AWU into an unfamiliar posture of miUtancy. In July 1956, the 
AWU-TLC reconciliation was consummated with the reaffUiation, 
after seventeen years, of the AWU. During August and September, a 
war of words erupted between AWU secretary Joe Bukowski and 
Premier Gair, with Bukowski accusing Gair of siding with the gra-
ziers. In October, (after nine months of strike) Gair declared a state 
of emergency. The Brisbane wool store workers (members of the 
Federated Storemen and Packers Union), whose sympathy action 
had been vital in preventing non-union wool from getting to market, 
capitulated in the face of the sackings, penal sanctions, stories of 
AWU shearers secretly working during the strike, organised non-
uruon labour and the urgings of the Grouper<ontroUed Storemen and 
Packers Union leadership.^2 jj^g jo^g strike ended a few days later, 
with the shearers agreeing on a rate lower than the rate they had 
enjoyed before the 1955 award change, but higher than the 1955 
award reduction of 10 per cent. At a time when booming profits were 
going to graziers, the outcome was seen by the unions as arising from 
treacherous government intervention on behalf of bloated capital-
ists.^^ Non-labour pubUcists were also unhappy with Gair, since his 
administration had allowed the strike to drag on for rune months 
before finally intervening.^* 
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Towards the Abyss 
By the time it became clear that grave electoral damage to the 
party would result from a successful move to expel Gair, all avenues 
for compromise had been sealed. The precipitating issue—the gov-
ernment's refusal to implement the three-week annual leave pol-
icy—was a strange ground for Gair to have chosen to fight. Three 
weeks' annual leave was not so expensive, dUficult to implement, or 
radical that it would cause an economic or legitimacy crisis for Gair's 
government. State public servants and railway workers, workers 
covered by Commonwealth awards and many covered by state 
awards in other states already had this benefit. 
Yet Gair chose to defend his stance on the basis that the state's 
coffers were empty and that industry could not afford the move in 
Ught of the then current mild credit squeeze introduced by the fed-
eral government. In the midst of a nationwide economic boom, Gair 
declared that three weeks' annual leave would lead to unemploy-
ment. 
Just as sincere as you are about the three weeks, I would sooner see the 
maintenance of full employment for our people until such time as we 
know where we are going, before expending money on extension of holi-
days. Is it not better for men to be fully employed and get two weeks' an-
nual leave than to be out of work for half the year, with those who are 
privileged to work the full year getting three weeks' leave?'^ 
This might have carried more weight were it not tied to his ar-
gument that appeared to belittle the party's role in determining 
policy to be foUowed by Labor governments. 
Parliament would not be a supreme body if its members were subjected 
to outside coercion, intimidation or direction. [Convention] as a political 
body, has the right to make recommendations to the Government of its 
own political kin, and no-one takes exception to that, and, if your 
Government is truly representative of your party, unless it has some very 
good reason, it is not going to disagree or delay implementation... There 
are lots of things we could do domestically and which would bring ruin 
and disaster. There are lots of things we could give our children to please 
them, but we do not because we cannot afford to, and we find it difficult 
to say "No", rather than "Yes". But circumstances compel us to do so.'^ 
The unpUcation that convention, the senior poUcy-making body 
of the party, was a coUection of spoilt brats needing the disciplme of 
Gair as stern but fair parent was not lost on delegates. 
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Jack Egerton's response was to scorn the reasons advanced by 
Gair in defence of his position. Egerton asserted that his stance was 
purely in defence of party institutions. 
I do not know what the Parliamentary Labor Party is worried about. 
Thousands of public servants and railway workers get three weeks' an-
nual leave, so surely to goodness the slave in industry can have it. They 
say, "Where is the money coming from?" Thousands of small employers 
will foot the biggest percentage of the bUl. I think the Government is 
afraid they cannot resist possible moves by the Public Service for exten-
sion of their three weeks to four weeks. There is a nigger in the woodpile 
somewhere. The Premier asks us to be logical. The time for logic has 
passed, and the Parliamentary representatives will take direction... I be-
lieve that Cabinet misled the Labor Caucus and that they have to be 
shown that this is the governing body of the Labor Party and that this is 
where policy is made. If they do not carry out that poUcy, they can join 
some other Party.^^ 
By "some other Party" Egerton clearly implied the newly 
formed Democratic Labor Party which had arisen from the Victorian 
branch's spUt in 1955. The "time for logic" had passed. 
The issue had now become the authority of the party machine 
to direct Labor government policy; the specific three weeks' leave 
debate had thus been invested with a force it would not otherwise 
have developed. Gair's stubbornness had foreclosed possibUities for 
compromise, since the terms of his refusal meant that a backdown 
could only be interpreted as acknowledgment that the unions, and not 
the government, were "running the state". The one opportunity he 
had to escape from this bind was the 1956 election speech, and this 
opportunity went begging. A major showdown had become inevitable. 
The Split: The Downfall of Gair 
and the Rise of Egerton 
On 24 April 1957 the Queensland Central Executive of the Labor 
Party expelled the leader of the Parliamentary Labor Party and 
longserving (since 1952) premier of Queensland, Vincent Clair Gair. 
This was the first split involving the Queensland PLP since the 1907 
Kidston split, the Queensland party having avoided the ravages of 
the 1916, 1931-32 and 1955 spUts which had devastated the 
AustraUan Labor Party federally and in other states. The (^CE vote 
to expel Gair from the ALP was close.^^ Taken in the small hours of 
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25 AprU 1957, it passed thirty-five to thu-ty. Those voting against 
the motion included such longtime Gair enemies as deputy premier 
Jack Duggan, Electrical Trades Uruon secretary Arch Dawson, and 
federal MHR BiU Edmonds, who baulked at actuaUy bringing down 
the government.!^ Only the PLP could have avoided a spUt—by 
dumping Gair—but the majority remained loyal to its leader.^" 
However, Gair's support within the party organisation and among 
the affiUated unions was appreciably lower than the thirty-five to 
thirty spiU vote at the QZE indicated. 
Gau- was supported by the entire Cabinet other than Duggan—a 
factor which was made known to the QCE in a letter, signed by aU 
the Cabinet members, dated 23 AprU 1957.^^ Duggan, who added 
qualification to his signature on the joint letter, resigned his 
commission on 7 May, giving Gair a total of twenty-five members of 
the Legislative Assembly as against twenty-four loyal Labor mem-
bers. QCE meetings throughout May 1957 confirmed the spUt by first 
purging aU parliamentarians and then those branches loyal to Gair. 
Some Gair supporters, like Senator Condon Byrne, pre-empted the 
QCE by resigning from the party. Byrne joined the two Victorian 
Anti-Communist AustraUan Labor Party (ALP(AC)) senators left 
over from the Victorian split of two years earUer, thus confirming 
the ideological credentials of all Gair supporters in the eyes of many 
Labor loyaUsts.^^ Gair proclaimed himseU parliamentary leader of 
the "Queensland Labor Party" (QLP) and continued as premier untU 
parUament resumed on 11 June 1957. Duggan was elected leader of the 
twenty-four ALP members of the Legislative Assembly. 
The aUiance which ousted Gair was made possible by a change 
of direction at Trades HaU itself. The AWU, however much it 
loathed Gair, could not have teamed up with the communist leader-
ship of the 1940s Trades HaU. The 1957 aUiance was made possible 
on the Trades Hall side by the rise to influence of BoUermakers 
Society^^ secretary Jack Egerton. Egerton was active in the Labor 
Party machine, making him acceptable to the AWU leadership, and 
yet had vigorously opposed the growth of the Industrial Groups, 
which helped gain him support from Trades HaU elements to the 
ideological Left of the Labor Party, such as the ARU. 
Egerton's real talent was as an organiser within the party ma-
chine—negotiating deals with various regional and ideological 
groupings so as to secure majorities on key agenda items before party 
forums. Zealous use of this considerable talent enabled Egerton to 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
150 The 1880s to 1957 
secure foUowings in a wide range of normaUy mcompatible circles in 
the labour movement. 
Whereas earlier PLP and union leaders who had dominated the 
party, such as BiU McCormack and Clarrie FaUon, had done so from 
the secure base of the AWU's massive numbers, they needed only a 
few onside unions and some branch support to secure convention and 
QCE majorities; Egerton started with a smaU to middling union 
base '^* and had to buUd his party constituency through careful nego-
tiation and judicious aUiance. As such, Egerton was a new type in 
Queensland labour movement internal poUtics, steering a course be-
tween the estabUshed AWU-dorrunated centre of power and the ex-
cluded and divided elements opposed to them, and unitmg these di-
verse forces in various alUances of convenience. In this sense he was 
more in the mould of labour movement leaders from other mairUand 
states, where no one union had been able to dominate the labour 
movement and party as had the AWU m (Queensland. 
Egerton was a catalyst for and product of the struggle between 
the AWU and Gair's PLP for the leadership of the Labor Party in 
the 1950s. Were it not for this struggle. Trades HaU would have con-
tinued in its long-accustomed role as an impotent and divided minor-
ity forum for the militant fringe and as an umbrella for the many 
smaU unions. A significant minority of the Trades HaU unions could 
always be reUed upon to support the dominant AWU/PLP axis. No 
Trades Hall leader before Egerton had been able to weld the dis-
parate and fractious mass of craft unions into any kind of unUied 
force. Egerton's success in ousting Gair was but one, if decisive, victory 
in a campaign which was to deUver control of the (Queensland labour 
movement for the next twenty years to the Jack Egerton Trades Hall 
groupmg. 
The anti-Gair AWU-Trades HaU coalition forged by Egerton 
and AWU secretary Joe Bukowski was unstable. The AWU and 
Trades HaU members of the coalition had incompatible goals. 
Bukowski and the AWU had in mind the restoration of the AWU's 
former unchaUengeable pre-eminence in the labour movement and 
control over the party's key decision-making bodies. The AWU was 
anxious to regain access to poUcy formation in the highest councils of 
the state and to senior government appointments. Egerton and his 
comrades at Trades Hall sought nothing less than the overthrow of 
those forces which had controlled the party and dominated the 
Queensland labour movement for at least the previous thirty years. 
WhUe the prime immediate goal was to purge Gair and his Grouper 
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supporters, a close second objective for Egerton and his forces at 
Trades HaU was to prevent the AWU from ever attairung its earUer 
status. 
WhUe considerable work was done to stitch up the numbers on 
the Queensland Central Executive to expel Gair, it seems that nei-
ther side of the anti-Gair coaUtion researched Gair's support base in 
the ParUamentary Labor Party. WhUe the PLP's representation on 
the (3CE was insufficient to thwart the anti-Gair forces, it was vital 
to eliminate Gair's support in the parUamentary caucus U Labor was 
to survive in office. Labor's majority of twenty was big enough to 
withstand a number of defections. If Labor remained in office and the 
party organisation remained intact, the depleted ranks could be re-
plenished at the next election. Although some Grouper unions sup-
porting Gair had large memberships, for example the Federated 
Clerks Uruon and the Transport Workers Union, none was vital to 
Labor's electoral organisation. The electoral system introduced in 
1949 gave added weight to the abiUty to organise in provincial and 
rural areas where the AWU and a few core Trades HaU unions like 
the ARU and the MisceUaneous Workers were at a natural advan-
tage. 
Egerton and Bukowski gave little thought to the likely upshot 
of their moves should the PLP continue to support an expeUed Gair. 
It was, it seems, inconceivable that any significant number of Labor 
parUamentarians would refuse to accept party discipUne, especiaUy 
in such a discipUned party as Queensland Labor. Gair, on the other 
hand, regarded the loyalty shov^m him by the PLP as his trump card. 
The party would surely not take the step of expellmg its parliamen-
tary leader so soon after re-endorsement by the electorate. The party 
branches would support their local members of parUament, and they 
would stick with him under caucus discipline. As premier of 
Queensland, Gair could claim a higher loyalty than that to the 
party admirustration. Neither side checked the strength of opinion 
prevaUing in the other's base camp. 
Labor Relinquishes Office 
In the confused month between his expulsion and the resumption of 
parliament, Gair is reported to have approached Country Party 
leader Frank NickUn with a view to forming some sort of coaUtion. 
According to then Liberal deputy leader Gordon Chalk, Gair's 
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conditions included demands that he remain as premier and that he 
retain a majority of his existing Cabinet ministers in any coaUtion. 
NickUn toyed with the idea for a time, but was dissuaded by the 
vigorous opposition of Liberal leader Ken Morris and by the inter-
vention of federal Country Party leader and deputy prime minister 
Artie Fadden, both of whom urged the defeat of Gair to take advan-
tage of Labor's seU-destruction.^^ 
When parUament resumed, Gair must have been aware that his 
government's days were numbered. Apart from Duggan, the only 
other former Labor office bearer to remain loyal to the ALP was 
Speaker Johnno Mann. As a parUamentary rather than a government 
office holder, Mann had not been required to resign, and so remamed 
as presiding officer when parUament resumed. It was immediately 
evident that the May 1957 purges (which resulted in the expulsion of 
pro-Gair parliamentarians, unions and branches) had served to in-
flame antagonisms as debate erupted over the Speaker's ruling that 
Duggan, leader of the second largest party, should be recognised as 
leader of the Opposition. Gair's QLP and Country/Liberal coaUtion 
numbers combined to overturn the ruling and reappoint Country Party 
leader Frank Nicklin as Opposition leader. 
The newly re-credentialled Opposition thereupon joined with 
the ALP, amid wUd scenes on the floor of the Legislative Assembly, 
to deny the passage of Supply biUs. On the second day of the sitting, 
Gair announced that he would advise the Administrator^* to dis-
solve parliament and that an election would be called. While Gair 
was absent advising the Administrator, and with the support of the 
Speaker, the Legislative Assembly was kept sitting so that the 
Opposition and the ALP could move to disallow the proclamation of 
contioversial legislation introduced by Gair.^^ 
Aftermath of the Split 
The "official" ALP and Gair's breakaway QLP both fielded a fuU 
Ust of candidates at the 4 August 1957 elections. The former Labor 
electorate was fairly evenly divided in its loyalties, a confusion 
which the first-past-the-post voting system exaggerated to the ben-
efit of the non-Labor parties. The seats won by official ALP or QLP 
candidates were those formerly safe seats where the branch struc-
tures survived intact and supported incumbent candidates. The ALP 
carried such seats as Bremer, Port Curtis and Maryborough, and the 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
The SpUt 153 
QLP held Gair's seat of South Brisbane, together with rural 
stiongholds like Condamine and Bundaberg. 
Although the Country and Liberal parties won forty-two of the 
seventy seats in the Legislative Assembly, their vote was in fact 
down on the 1956 numbers.^^ The ALP retained twenty seats and the 
QLP fourteen, the ALP thus becoming the official Opposition. WhUe 
seven of Gair's former QLP Cabinet of ten survived, the ALP was fur-
ther hurt by the loss of Duggan's seat of Toowoomba, leaving the 
party with a dearth of talent in parliament as against the revi-
talised coaUtion parties and the QLP. The organisation of the party 
was given priority in the years following the spUt. 
The zonal malapportionment enshrined in the Electoral Act, 
1949 , together with a CoaUtion Agreement that forbade competition 
between coalition members in the light of the first-past-the-post 
system, ensured that the Country Party emerged as the senior coaU-
tion member despite a higher Liberal vote.^^ In 1957 the two coaU-
tion partners were pubUcly unconcerned with the fairness of their 
relative positions given the incredible events which had catapulted 
them into office. Federally and in most of the other states the two 
conservative parties were at that time coexisting in blissful har-
mony. Given the Queensland ALP's history, the inequitable electoral 
system was not a priority item on its reform agenda. There was 
sUence on the subject from both sides of parliament. 
In the absence of Jack Duggan (and also Dr Felix Dittmer, the 
AprU-August 1957 deputy leader, who was defeated in Mt Gravatt), 
the PLP elected former schoolteacher Les Wood (Toowoomba East) as 
leader, with former CoUiery Employees Union organiser Jim Donald 
(Bremer) as deputy. Duggan attempted to return in a by-election for 
the normal Labor stronghold of Gregory, where the August election 
had been ruled invaUd, but was defeated. 
Holdmg together the branches and preventing disaffUiations of 
unions became the main task for the purged ALP organisation. The 
QLP was quick off the mark m laying its hands on branches' funds; 
Jim Keeffe reported to the QCE in September 1957 that he had orUy 
been able to recover about £250 from the thirty branches expeUed. 
Most moneys had been withdrawn within days of the split.^° The 
main Grouper and pro-Gair unions disaffUiated between June and 
August 1957 after the dissolution of parUament. The QSSU disaffU-
iated on 6 June, the FCU on 30 June, and the Federated Ironworkers 
Association on 17 August. The only clot in this haemorrhage was the 
re-affiUation of the ARU on 16 May 1957 m support of what it took 
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to be the return of the ALP Queensland Branch to its union base. The 
Railway Advocate editorial, dismissing the new QLP as a "bogus 
outfit", noted that: "A Labor Party that sets itself in opposition to 
the industrial organisations wiU never accompUsh anything. Under 
such drciunstances it becomes a body bereft of soiU."^! 
The Bukowski-led AWU was seemingly blind to the danger this 
reaUgnment of QCE numbers represented. The unions which had dis-
affiUated had also traditionaUy supported the AWU anti-commu-
nist Une in the QCE and Labor-in-PoUtics Conventions, whereas the 
ARU was firmly aligned with the Trades HaU militant grouping. 
Once the initial goals of ousting Gair and limiting damage to the 
party structures had been accompUshed, there was Uttle to hold the 
essentiaUy incompatible forces together and in the first few months 
foUowing the split, the AWU-Trades HaU alUance persisted only 
by dint of frantic work undertaken by both sides to hold the party 
structures together. 
Why the Split Occurred 
While at first sight the Queensland split arose from organisational 
and personality confUcts rather than issues of poUcy, there was an 
important ideological component: as we have seen, the relationship 
between the parUamentary leadership and the uruon movement has 
always been a major ideological battleground in the Labor Party. 
The organisational dominance of unions in the party is no accident— 
the party was founded by them to pursue economic and poUtical 
goals supposedly unattainable by industrial struggle—and the de-
gree to which Labor poUticians can arrogate independence from the 
party organisation has always been a major area of debate. 
In Queensland the Labor Party had for decades achieved an en-
forced consensus based on the AWU-PLP aUiance and the exclusion of 
dissident elements. The PLP had been able to exercise considerable 
autonomy provided that it gave its orgarusational backers enough in 
the way of poUcy achievements and kickbacks to key personnel to 
legitimate their support. Gair's rejection of the AWU membership 
customarUy accepted by Labor premiers in favour of continumg with 
the Grouper-controlled FCU, his failure to fiU the Arbitration va-
cancy left by Riordan, and to consult with the party hierarchy, his 
declaration of a state of emergency to end the 1956 shearers' stiike, 
and his cultivation of an alternative power base in the Grouper-con-
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troUed unions aU drove the AWU to seek alliance with the previ-
ously despised Trades HaU unions. 
In summary, changed industrial and internal organisational 
stiategies pursued by the Gau- government from 1952 to 1957 were re-
sponsible for the break-up of Labor's electoral dominance which had 
looked so unassaUable in 1950. While The Movement's precise role in 
this shUt is debatable, orgarusational backing for Gair's moves cer-
tainly came from the Movement-inspired Industrial Groups. UntU 
such time as the National Civic CouncU opens its archives to public 
scrutiny, the exact part played by The Movement in pushing Gair 
along his fateful course wUl remain unclear. 
Gair had committed a cardinal political sin; he had tackled aU 
his enemies at once, thereby aUowing them to make alUance against 
him. Individually, the mUitant unions, the AWU, academics, civU 
libertarians, and oU companies could have been defeated. But be-
tween 1955 and 1957 the domineering Gair took them all on and in so 
doing split the party in Queensland in such a devastating way that 
it StiU had not recovered in the late 1980s. 
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Conclusion to Part One 
Part One followed the role of the Labor Party in (Queensland from its 
formation to the 1957 split when it passed from office to become a 
party of seemingly permanent Opposition. The key to this was 
Queensland Labor's electoralism—its redefinition of party goals and 
ideology to conform with the central strategic objective of obtaining 
and maintaining parliamentary majorities. While electoral success 
at the outset was merely a necessary precondition for manipulating 
the capitalist state to advance the interests of labour, it later 
became the sine qua non of Labor ideological debate. Almost any 
progressive policy goal or objective could then be jettisoned in the 
pursuit of electoral success. 
ElectoraUsm requires sophisticated and detaUed analysis be-
cause of the inseparable organisational links between the Labor 
Party and the union movement which reflect the party's origins as 
the "political" arm of the unions. The Queensland Labor experience 
until 1957 was an outstanding example of electoral success; at the 
same time it featured dialectical collisions between the party in of-
tice and the union movement which spawned it. This analysis of the 
ALP in Queensland also throws light on theoretical explanations for 
the behaviour of social democratic parties. The wUUngness and ca-
pacity of the parliamentary wing allied wUh sympathetic union 
leaders to act ruthlessly against militant sections of the union 
movement, mcluding on occasion members of their own unions, is con-
sistent with Michels's "Iron Law of OUgarchy", which holds that 
organisations, no matter how democratic, egalitarian and 
participatory in inspiration—such as unions and social democratic 
parties—wiU eventually be controlled by a clique or eUte. Again, 
the constant inability of Queensland unions to press goals beyond 
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immediate instrumental demands supports theorists like Crouch and 
MiUband who argue that unions are structurally prevented from ex-
ercising any greater role.^ 
Labor Electoralism and the 
Worker-Farmer Alliance 
Labor's electoral base in Queensland lay in the rural working class 
and among sections of smaU famUy farmers. (3ueensland's economy 
was largely dependent on rural industries employing a large itiner-
ant and highly unionised workforce. The most economicaUy signUi-
cant were pastoral industries, the products of which were processed 
by transnational capital. Other agricultural industries, such as sugar 
and mixed farming, while less remunerative in terms of the state's 
export income, were founded on numerous small family farm units. 
These agricultural sectors also employed itinerant labour, particu-
larly for harvesting crops, and were a vital source of votes for any 
workers' party seeking office in Queensland. 
Queensland Labor's electoral strategy required this family 
farming vote to be won and retained; to do this the party propounded 
the view that workers' and famUy farmers' interests were identical. 
The propagation of this ideology was a consideraable feat given 
that many of these farmers simultaneously employed many members 
of Queensland's largest union, the AWLf. The AWU was also the 
most influential bloc determining policy and preselections within 
the Labor Party itself. The AWU's position as an organisation of 
agrarian, as opposed to industrial, labour, divided it from the other 
main Queensland unions in stiucture as well as ideology. The success 
of the worker-farmer electoral alliance owed much to the internal 
dynamics of the AWU, which purged itself of residual miUtant ele-
ments and constitutionally insulated the leadership from further 
challenges during the crucial 1915-20 period. The uruon's leaders es-
chewed direct industrial action, at times openly collaborating, with 
employers to break "wildcat" strikes mounted by disaffected AWU 
members. 
Family farmers, meanwhile, were brought into the alliance 
through erection of "agrarian socialist" structures which afforded 
them co-operative control over the production, processing and distri-
bution of rural commodities. Although the union movement had di-
rect representation in internal policy making, some headway was 
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made in recruiting farmers into party branches and as Labor candi-
dates.^ Constructing the apparatus of agrarian sociaUsm in support 
of Labor's worker-farmer alUance was a shrewd electoral move from 
another aspect: a main policy plank of the Country Party was neatly 
subsumed under the Labor platform. This proved to be a near-fatal 
blow to anti-Labor rural party elements m (Queensland, forcing them 
for many years into amalgamation with the urban non-Labor party 
and fomenting an electoral division between wealthier pastoralists 
and famUy farmers. 
Labor in Office and the Queensland 
Political Environment 
Securing a sizeable portion of the Queensland rural vote was not a 
cost-free process for Labor. The 1915 platform made demands— 
backed by radical rhetoric—for state intervention in a range of eco-
nomic activities. Labour market regulation and the estabUshment of 
the State Enterprises in particular were central to the programme. 
But radical reforms in these areas designed to secure real gains for 
workers would have conflicted with farmers' interests by driving up 
labour costs and depressing commodity prices; hence, a series of re-
treats was undertaken. 
The sociaUst rhetoric of the State Enterprises was refashioned 
in terms of an attack on profiteering "middle men" or merchants 
through imposition of indirect state controls on the consumption sec-
tor, while major productive enterprises were tailored to benefit 
petty-bourgeois Labor supporters. With the important exceptions of 
workers' compensation and unemployment insurance, labour market 
interventions were via the "arms length" quasi-judicial mechanism 
of industrial arbitration. Despite these reorientations of its tradi-
tional poUcy, Labor was in electoral trouble when in the 1921 elec-
tion it scraped home with a majority of only one seat. Electoral dis-
tress was simultaneously compounded by fiscal embarrassment as 
loan funds dried up under the poUtical pressure exercised by local 
and international capitalists on financial markets. 
Labor's executive had a twofold response to these setbacks. 
First, parliamentary opposition was muzzled through abolition of 
the Legislative Council and amendments to Legislative Assembly 
procedures that removed sources of potential parUamentary embar-
rassment. Outrage "at Westminster traditions dispensed with in this 
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process was muted by earUer abuses of the system perpetrated by 
non-Labor parties (such as the refusal to grant "pairs" for absent 
members). Second, electoraUy unpalatable components of the Labor 
platform and objectives were relegated to the political background. 
The initial objectives of 1915 having been achieved, the primary 
consideration was the longer-term survival of Labor in office to con-
solidate reforms already made. Successive Labor-in-Politics 
Conventions defeated motions designed to reinvigorate the party's 
reforming zeal and substituted motions in harmony with party lead-
ers' perceptions of the farming electorate's wishes. 
The one issue on which party leaders were defeated was basic 
wage cuts, made under circumstances of fiscal crisis, which were 
overturned after two years' campaigning by a broad coaUtion spon-
sored by mUitant unions. Yet this defeat, rather than presaging any 
return to radical traditions, spurred the Labor leadership into purg-
ing militants from the party. The return to non-Labor government in 
Queensland for the three darkest years of the Depression under-
scored the notion that Labor had to be kept in office in order to 
guarantee past reforms and safeguard the Queensland working class 
from the excesses of anti-Labor administrations at state and federal 
levels. 
The Queensland radical tradition, which had contributed sig-
nificantly to the formation and rise to office of the Labor Party, thus 
found itself marginalised and excluded from legitimate poUtical 
process in the name of Labor's electoral strategy and the worker-
farmer electoral alliance. Nevertheless, although marginalised, 
the Queensland labour movement's radical tradition kept returning 
in various guises to haunt Labor's leadership. Attempts were made to 
resurrect a radical political and economic agenda. Heavy-handed 
responses to this agitation by Labor in office led to declining elec-
toral stocks in the post 1945 period. This in turn generated the impo-
sition of electoral malapportionment to buttress Labor parliamen-
tary majorities. More traditional gerrymandering was employed to 
purge the Legislative Assembly of its lone Communist member, 
"Fulminating" Fred Paterson, in the 1950 election (for the first time 
in eighty years there was no state electorate of Bowen). The exclu-
sion of those opposing the social system from legitimate political 
debate in (Queensland was thus entombed. 
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Labor in Office and the Queensland Economy 
Labor's 1915 platform envisaged a series of measures to make use of 
state power in transforming the Queensland economic landscape. The 
pre 1915 Queensland economy was affUcted with the same structural 
deficiencies as the general Australian economy, only more so. 
Manufacturing was scanty, being m the main confined to processing 
rural produce for export. Less urban development made for less 
development in industries attendant on urbanisation—buUding ma-
terials, steel manufacture and the like. The 1915 platform envisaged 
the establishment of new state-enterprise manufacturing industries, 
beginrung with steel. 
In the heady rush to estabUsh state enterprises after 1915, en-
terprises were set up along the commanding heights of the existing 
economy—state stations and state mines—and in the retail trading 
sector. EstabUshment of new industries was clearly a matter requir-
ing considerable planning and capital. Planning proceeded, but by 
the time the preliminary stages were complete, capital was lacking 
and the poUtical wUl to reorder pubUc priorities in favour of heavy 
manufacturing capitalisation had vanished. Heavy industry had 
Uttle significance for the worker-farmer alliance. Considerable 
pubUc funds (some of which could have been used for industrial de-
velopment) had meanwhile been dedicated to rural finance and in-
frastructure provision. Much of this capital was expended on faUed 
decentialisation schemes such as the soldier-settler programme, and 
on refinancing existing rural debt at concessional interest rates. After 
Labor's return to office in 1932 new industrial development planning 
mechaiusms turned out to be devoted solely to expanding rural pro-
duction. 
The heavy priority given to rural production had perverse ef-
fects for (Queensland in the 1930s Depression and 1940s and 1950s 
boom. The poUtical faUout put Labor under pressure to postpone 
weUare gains and other improvements demanded by unions. Inelastic 
domestic demand for rural produce, particularly food, helped 
insulate the rural-based Queensland economy from the worst effects 
of the Depression. The same inelastic demand also saw the 
(Queensland economy lag behind m postwar expansion of manufactur-
ing industry which other states were achieving. This lag showed up 
particularly in declining wages relative to other states in the 1950s. 
(Queensland Labor governments' difficulty in presidmg over relative 
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wage and conditions reductions whUe workers in non-Labor states 
pushed ahead was highlighted by an upsurge in industrial disputa-
tion from previously non-miUtant pro-goverrunent unions in the last 
years of Labor in office. 
Implementation of Labor "Goals" 
The Labor Party arose amid fierce industrial struggles in the last 
years of the nineteenth century. These struggles had demonstrated to 
many labour movement leaders and supportive liberals that the 
union movement was not strong enough by itseU to tackle employers 
backed by state coercive power. The key to working class advance-
ment was seen to Ue in the abiUty to use the superior numbers of the 
workers, assisted by disciplined union organisation, to overwhelm 
the representatives of employing classes at the poUs. 
Opinion differed as to exactly how, once Labor achieved office, 
working class advances were to be secured. None the less, there was 
general agreement that Labor would use the state apparatus to secure 
a range of concrete reforms. In early discussions about the Labor pro-
gramme and strategy there were those who held that in order for 
Labor to attain its objectives it would be sufficient simply for work-
ers' representatives to gain office. (Queensland Labor experience with 
coaUtion government leading to the Kidston split in 1907 gave Labor 
pioneers an early lesson in the need for parliamentarians to be re-
sponsible to the Party organisation. 
At an early stage Labor in Queensland had adopted hardUne 
socialist rhetoric: the party's goal was nothing less than the over-
throw of capitaUsm. The Kidston spUt had purged most backsUders 
who might have wished for less ambitious goals. Yet detaUs of the 
socialist policy package were hazy. In contrast with specUic imple-
mentation plans to be found in most modern political policy state-
ments, the 1915 platform was a brief statement of general goals. 
There was to be intervention in the labour market to eliminate the 
more horrific symptoms of market instabUity such as wage cuts and 
unemployment. The state would intervene in many markets which 
had previously been totally within the private sector. A range of 
basic welfare and law reform measures was canvassed. But there 
were no detaUed proposals to transfer economic or poUtical power 
direct to the workers. 
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In this context it is arguable that the Labor Party never had any 
genuine commitment to a sociaUst programme, that the "goals" of 
the labour movement either never existed for Labor governments to 
betiay, or that such goals as existed were fuUUIed by 1920. The so-
cialist rhetoric beloved of the party's leaders and forums during the 
period leading up to 1915 and indeed during the first years in office 
suggests that such analyses are post facto apologia. The vigour and 
political courage attending the early years, when the opposition 
was m the best position to roll back and thwart reforms, attest an 
attachment to more ambitious "goals" than were subsequently 
avowed. Party debates of the period display differences over strat-
egy—over definition of achievable objectives—rather than over 
long-term goals. 
Even though constraints imposed by electoral strategy fore-
closed policy options, the party leadership was nevertheless re-
quired to produce some reforms in line with the original mUitant 
goals to legitimate their continued rule and retain the loyalty of the 
working class electorate. The reform of the public hospital system 
leading to Queensland's unique free hospital programme was the 
most important of these legitimating reforms. Although initial steps 
leading to the free hospitals were undertaken for reasons of 
admirustrative efficiency, the zeal with which Labor prosecuted its 
cause against the medical profession's privUeges owed much to 
tiaditional labour concerns for the weUare of the underprivUeged as 
well as the movement's distaste for the professional petty-bour-
geoisie. 
Labor education policy lacked any such reforming zeal. The role 
of education in reproducing and legitimating the existing social and 
moral order made it a hotly contested battleground, with the main 
antagonists being the established churches. Relations that were 
built up between Labor leaders such as Theodore and the CathoUc 
prelates of the 1920s, especiaUy Archbishop Duhig, set a precedent. 
Risk of sparking sectarian strife miUtated against expending the 
political and capital cost of reform in the area. Experimentation 
with worker education was the furthest Labor was prepared to go, 
yet this was curtailed when mUitants began to make use of state-
provided facilities. 
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(Queensland Labor's tenure m office at first sight lends support for the 
view that the ALP is not now and never has been a sociaUst party; 
that is, the party's "socialist objective" was never more than 
rhetorical posturing. In this view, the party's miUtants and its po-
litical opponents are barking up the wrong tree if they appeal to a 
tradition of radical reformism or a commitment to fundamental 
change in social and economic relations within the ALP. At most a 
range of palliative, welfare-type measures to shield the working 
class from the worst ravages of the capitaUst economy was seriously 
canvassed as a realistic agenda. The party, it is claimed, faUed to 
rise above a petty-bourgeois ("liberal-democratic pluralist") or 
trade union ("instrumentalist") consciousness to become a vanguard 
socialist party. 
The two periods, 1915 to 1930 and 1945 to 1957, were tunes of in-
tense debate within the forums and assembUes of the Queensland 
Labor Party over goals and ideology. In the first period the victors 
were those who favoured sublimation of ideological considerations 
in an effort to secure electoral support; in the second the ideologues 
overcame the PLP leadership. In both instances the debate was car-
ried out with sufficient force to weaken Labor's "electoraUst" 
strategies and alliances and to see Labor out of office at the subse-
quent election. But whereas in the first case the purged elements con-
tinued to vote for Labor (or not at aU), after the 1957 spUt the de-
feated rump of the party used its residual electoral support to keep 
Labor off the Treasury benches. Much initial support for the Gair 
faction resided in that part of the petty-bourgeois electorate that 
the PLP leadership had for so long courted, and which subsequently 
settled with the Nicklin- and Bjelke-Petersen-Ied Country 
(National) Party. 
Labor's intermittently progressive role and its function as an oc-
casional forum for significant ideological debate should never be 
overstated. Queensland Labor leaders have seldom been men of 
ideas, let alone sociaUst ideas. As early as 1917 the leadership sig-
nalled that in any confrontation between militant workers and em-
ployers in which workers set aside "legitimate" procedures for nego-
tiation, a Labor executive would see such workers crushed with aU 
state power available. Reforms which stand as enduring achieve-
ments to the vision of the early Labor militants include such weUare 
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measures as free hospitals, unemployment benefits and workers' 
compensation, such institutions as Suncorp and the unicameral par-
Uament, and such improvements as the forty-hour week. But leftists 
were never able to see their goals implemented in the important 
ideological battleground of education structure and curriculum, de-
spite the party platform and numerous motions passed at Labor-in-
Politics Conventions. After Labor's forty years in office in 
(Queensland, strikingly successful as it had been in certain areas, the 
goal of transforming the Australian tiopics into any sort of workers' 
paradise was stUl a dream. 
Notes to Conclusion to Part One 
1 Colin Crouch, Trade Unions: The Logic of Collective Action (Glasgow: 
Fontana, 1982); Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society (London: 
Quartet Books, 1969). 
2 See Appendix E to Murphy et al.. Labor in Power , for a list of endorsed 
Labor candidates and their occupations, 1915-1957. 
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5 
The House That Jack Built, 
1957 to 1977 
Aftermath of the Split 
Had U not been for the 1957 spUt, the ALP m (Queensland could have 
remained in office in perpetuity. The spUt left the PLP aU but de-
void of leadership, although the organisational hierarchy was 
hardly touched. Some reports indicate that Jack Egerton began or-
ganising the numbers to bring down the AWU by September or 
October 1958.^  The spur was rivalry between Trades Hall and AWU 
groupings over federal Senate preselections. Senate preselection had 
always been a major Labor prize, since the six-year terms enjoyed by 
senators and the proportional ballot system used in Senate elections 
ensured that incumbents were guaranteed a lucrative, often lifelong 
sinecure. The AWU's decentraUsed and well-disciplined organisa-
tion, which had so weU served the former dominant party faction, 
enabled it to acquire most of these preselections for its own officials. 
Trades HaU unions, who had long alleged that internal AWU elec-
toral practices were dubious, charged that the AWU had rorted 
Senate plebiscites through malpractice in the distribution and use of 
facsimUe ballot papers; these were provided for eligible members of 
affUiated unions who were unable to attend polling booths for a 
baUot in an electoral division where a preselection was being held.^ 
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Trades HaU numbers on the QCE erwured passage of a censure motion 
agamst AWU secretary Bukowski, moved by Jack Egerton on 24 July 
1958.3 
The AWU cause was also weakened by the unfortunate person-
aUty of Joe Bukowski, who appears to have been hated almost as 
vigorously as Vmce Gair had been and for similar reasons. Bukowski 
was fanaticaUy anti-communist, which meant that he was unwUl-
ing to communicate with many of his fellow union officials at Trades 
Hall. His personality was also no less abrasive than Gair's. 
Electrical Trades Union organiser Fred Whitby remarked of him 
that "if Bukowski hated someone there was nothing he wouldn't do 
to undermine or destroy them. It was always impossible to get along 
with the man".^ Whatever the political demerits of purging the 
party of its largest organisational and financial contributing union, 
there was no shortage of people happy to get rid of Bukowski. 
The crisis came six months later at the Trades HaU Christmas 
party. The agreed details of the incident are that Bukowski became 
emotional and got into loud arguments with some other guests at the 
party. The worst statement by Bukowski that anyone could be per-
suaded to swear to was, "You are no bloody good...", to Labor 
Brisbane City Council alderman Jean Howie.^ This was not in itself 
unusual: Trades Hall Christmas parties were traditionally affairs 
where the civilised inhibitions of factional enemies were dimin-
ished by the free consumption of alcohol. Moreover, Joe Bukowski 
was not reputed as a man to back out of an argument, dnmk or sober. 
Some present were incUned to play down the incident as beaten up or 
even deUberately contrived,* but others were upset at Bukowski's 
behaviour and general bitter demeanour.^ 
Bukowski's position was precarious because, as party president, 
better was expected of him and because the AWU had lost its aUies 
among the Grouper anti-communist unions in the split eighteen 
months earUer. Whether or not Jack Egerton had inspired and then 
exaggerated the incident, it certainly provided his anti-AWU left-
ist union grouping with the ammunition they needed to purge 
Bukowski from his official party positions. The QCE's Inner 
Executive, at a meeting on 18 December, just one week after the fate-
ful Christmas party, suspended Bukowski from his position as 
president, citing misbehaviour at the party.® For his part, Bukowski 
reacted to this move of the Egerton forces with much the same 
impetuosity he had displayed at the Trades Hall party: he moved 
at the next AWU executive meeting for the disaffUiation of the 
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union from the party it had helped found. The AWU formally 
disaffUiated from the ALP Queensland Branch on 23 February 1959. 
The union also disaffUiated from the Trades and Labor CouncU, 
endmg the short-lived alUance between Trades Hall and Dunstan 
House. 
In the space of two years, the Queensland ALP had gone from 
the seemmgly invincible "natural" governing party of (Queensland, 
commanding substantial electoral majorities buffered by zonal 
malapportionment, to a rump centred on the former minority 
mUitant Trades Hall faction. In the manner pioneered by earlier 
spUts, the "spUtters" exhibited far more distaste for their former 
comrades than for their former poUtical enemies: the conservative 
parties reaped handsome dividends from the labour movement 
antagoiusms generated by the events of this time. 
Exit Gain Decline of the QLP, 1957 to 1966 
Vince Gair's Queensland Labor Party benefited at the 1957 election 
campaign from the popular perception, supported by the press,' that 
he had been protecting the interests of the people of Queensland 
against the sectional interests of the union bosses who "controUed" 
the Labor Party. Joe Bukowski, whom Gair dubbed "Boss" Bukowski, 
was in particular cast in the role of viUain. This tactic went over 
well with many traditional Labor voters, particularly those who 
had approved Gair's handling of the shearers' strike. 
The new QLP also benefited from the sizeable campaign funds 
Gair had been accumulating; these had been sufficient to make up for 
the shortfall left by the AWU's failure to contribute to the 1956 
campaign. Colin Hughes estimates this fund to have contained at 
least £5000 in 1957,^ ° but it may have been more, given that more 
than twice this amount had been foimd from the fund to contribute to 
the previous year's election. QCE secretary Jack Schmella could only 
guess at the amount, but remembered Gair explaining that the two 
Brisbane breweries were good for £2000 each, with other amounts 
coming from Mount Isa Mines, Evans Deakin and motion picture ex-
hibitors.'i In these days before widespread opinion polling it would 
not have been obvious to business contributors that Gair would not 
win, so the incentives to contribute would have remained. Further 
funds would have been forthcoming from Grouper unions and, it must 
be assumed, from the secret Movement funds in Victoria. 
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Although the QLP lost more seats in the 1957 election than did 
the ALP, it was fortunate in retaiiung eight out of the nine former 
QLP Cabinet members, giving it a stronger performance in 
parUamentary debates than the essentially leaderless, but more 
numerous, ALP. The ALP's greater numbers ensured that it became 
the official Opposition on the floor of parliament, which status 
tended to counteract the superior performance of the QLP debaters, 
since the ALP was afforded the few privUeges (such as preference in 
receiving the Speaker's caU in (Question Time and expanded research 
staff) available for non-government parties in the (Queensland 
Parliament. 
The continued internal problems of the ALP as the AWU purge 
unfolded, the strength of the QLP's parUamentary representatives 
and the weight of press commentary helped keep QLP aspirations to 
be the main "Labor" party alive during the first Country-Liberal 
administration. But as memories of Vince Gair, prenuer, dimmed, 
the majority of the former Labor electorates reverted to the ALP. 
Most of the union movement had remained loyal to the party; even 
though the AWU had left the ALP, it stiU looked upon the QLP 
with loathing, and many AWU members remained active in the 
ALP. Labor voters, Uke conservative voters in more recent years, 
were more concerned to retain government than they were about loy-
alty to particular personalities as local representatives. The QLP 
became identified with the "splitter" ALP (Anti-Commurust) and 
DLP in the southern states, a view actively encouraged by the ALP 
in its propaganda. 
The QLP thus became seen by most former Labor voters as the 
agent of Labor's removal from office and thus an ally of the 
conservative parties. Other QLP voters graduaUy found new loyal-
ties with the Country or Liberal parties, acting presumably on the 
principle that it is better to vote for a winner than a loser. 
Both the QLP and ALP were further disadvantaged by an elec-
toral redistribution carried out by the NickUn goverrunent under the 
Electoral Districts Act, 1958. Despite the lofty sentiments expressed 
by Country and Liberal members in opposition to the earUer Labor 
legislation in 1949, the 1958 act enshrined a further elaboration of 
the zonal malapportionment system first introduced by Premier 
Hanlon. The 1958 legislation was sweetened by decreasing the 
"unfairness" of the 1949 system by reducing the number of electoral 
zones from four to three and marginaUy reducing the difference be-
tween largest and smallest quotas. The new act added a fair measure 
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of gerrymandermg to the 1949 act's reaUgiunent of zonal malappor-
tionment, further diminishmg "Labor" parties' chances of regairung 
office.^ 2 xhe chief effect of the 1959 redistribution was to excise the 
mainly "Labor"-voting provincial cities from their surrounding rural 
hinterlands, thereby bottiing up large "Labor" majorities m a big-
quota zone and maximising the value of non-" Labor" votes in sur-
rounding marginal electorates. Justification for the original zonal 
system under Labor had been to compensate electors for their 
distance from Brisbane, the centre of administration. Under the 
Countiy Party it was rural people in any area who were being 
compensated with extra voting power for their alleged 
disadvantaged access to political representation and for their 
supposed economic and moral contribution to the weUare of the state. 
Hence, electors in the Brisbane Valley were guaranteed far better 
representation than those in the city of Cairns, over fwo thousand 
kilometies away. 
The coaUtion government further disadvantaged the "Labor" 
parties' electoral chances with the Elections Act Amendment Act, 
1959 which increased the residential requirement for electors from 
one month to three months, thereby disenfranchising many tradi-
tionally Labor-voting itinerant workers in rural districts. 
Manipulation of the electoral system to gain advantage over the 
Opposition had become a major prize of office in (Queensland. 
The QLP was unsuccessful in establishing effective branches 
outside the electorates it already held, while the ALP made steady 
headway in organising new branches to replace those which had 
defected in 1957.'^ Most of the pre-1957 party apparatus, including 
the party's full-time staff under secretary Jack Schmella, had 
remamed loyal to the ALP in the split. For all the QLP's superior 
experience on the floor of parliament, it started a long way behind 
the ALP in terms of organisation in the individual electorates. This 
was an outcome to be expected given the nature of the spUt itself, 
where the party's organisational wing had asserted its right to 
contiol the parliamentary wing. 
The 1960 election destroyed any illusions the QLP may have 
had that it could ever regain the mantle of the major "Labor" party, 
let alone regain office. The QLP's parUamentary representation was 
virtually annihilated with both the ALP and coalition parties 
benefiting from the coUapse. Only four QLP members were returned. 
Even Vmce Gau-'s seat of South Brisbane feU to the ALP,^ * the QLP 
being eliminated from Brisbane. 
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Virtually all the QLP's losses in voter support appear to have 
been defections to the ALP. The QLP vote state-wide decUned by 11 
per cent, from 23 per cent to 12 per cent, whUe the ALP vote rose by 
the same amount from 29 per cent to 40 per cent. The coaUtion vote 
remained static, but the electoral marupulations and the coUapse of 
the QLP in some areas gave them a further increase in parUamen-
tary representation, with both the Liberal and Country parties 
benefiting. ^ 5 
After the 1960 election eliminated the QLP as a reaUstic con-
tender for office in Queensland, its role changed to one simply of 
keeping the ALP out of office. Under the first-past-the-post voting 
system which stiU appUed in 1960, the QLP votes were simply 
subtracted from the possible ALP vote. A preferential voting system 
could secure many of these votes for the coalition parties, but they 
were at first reluctant to consider such a move against the possibUity 
of a QLP/ALP preference swap. Even under the 1959 electoral 
manipulations, such a swap would see the ALP returned to office. In 
1960 it was not yet clear that the antipathy between the two 
"Labor" parties was such as to preclude such an event. So, despite 
firm policies in favour of preferential voting held by both coalition 
parties, no move was made on the issue untU 1962. 
The June 1962 State Convention of the Liberal Party proved to 
be the catalyst for the 1962 Elections Act Amendment Act which 
introduced compulsory preferential voting to Queensland and 
transformed the QLP's role into that of guarantor of coalition 
majorities in the Queensland Parliament.^^ The convention passed 
motions reaffirming Liberal poUcy on preferential voting and urging 
action on the issue, moves which were actively supported by the 
press.^^ Vince Gair, still very much the leader of the QLP despite 
his defeat at the 1960 election,^* entered the debate by offering to 
negotiate with the non-Labor parties on conditions for preference 
allocation. Most importantly, Gair indicated that his party would 
on no account allocate preferences to the ALP whUe the present 
"communist"-linked organisational leadership remained. This 
tactic spelt disaster for the remaining QLP parliamentarians, smce 
all four could be defeated should the ALP retaUate by aUocating 
preferences to the coaUtion. Two were accordingly to defect from the 
sinking party and contest the 1963 election (successfuUy) as 
independents.'^ 
On this basis, and after considerable deUberation,^^ the coali-
tion government decided the probable gains from preferential voting 
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were worth the risk of Gair's perfidy. The federal experience, with 
the Menzies goverrunent scraping in by the narrowest of margins on 
DLP preferences at the 1961 federal election, indicated the possible 
dividends to be accrued by the non-Labor cause through recycling 
these former Labor votes under a preferential system. 
The Elections Act Amendment Act, 1962 introduced preferential 
voting and thus secured the core QLP votes for the coaUtion. 
Although few seats changed hands at the 1963 election, the QLP lost 
one of the two seats it entered the contest with, thus ceasing to be a 
meaningful party in parUamentary terms. The combined effect of 
preferential voting and electoral marupulation was most evident m 
the ALP result: despite a swing in its favour of 4 per cent, giving it an 
almost identical state-wide vote to that achieved by the 
coaUtion, '^ it gained only one seat to hold twenty-six as against the 
coalition's forty-six. 
The 1963 election confirmed the QLP's status as Trojan horse for 
the coaUtion government. The hard core of its support numbered Ut-
tle more than 5 per cent of the electorate, a number sufficient only to 
keep the ALP from any hope of office, yet the QLP masqueraded as a 
"Labor" party. QLP ideology, such as it can be separated from the 
person of Vince Gair, stressed obedience to authority, anti-commu-
nism and moral conservatism. 
When Premier Johannes Bjelke-Petersen and new Country Party 
secretary Bob Sparkes set in train the Country Party organisational 
changes which led to the National Party name change a decade af-
ter the 1963 debacle, it was natural they should consider 
amalgamation with the vestigial DLP organisation^^ (the QLP 
fonnaUy affUiated with the federal DLP in 1962, having conducted 
the DLP's Queensland campaigns since the 1959 haU Senate election, 
but only graduaUy dropped the QLP labeP^). The utter demise of the 
DLP after the 1974 and 1975 federal elections saw the remaining core 
of former QLP voters recruited to the then Bjelke-Petersen-led 
National Party, where they remain. 
Transition: Internal Realignments, 1959 to 1963 
The AWU disaffiliation in 1959 removed a major source of 
opposition to Jack Egerton's Trades HaU grouping within the ALP. 
The Egerton grouping was comprised primarily of union officials 
from the miUtant but Labor-aUgned (as opposed to Communist-
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
180 From 1957 to 1988 
aligned) skilled workers' unions, such as Egerton's own 
Boilermakers' Society. Others prominent in the Egerton-led Trades 
HaU grouping included officials of the Electrical Trades Union who 
owed allegiance to Egerton as the architect of their successful 
campaign to wrest control of the union from the former Grouper 
administration.^* 
The departure of the AWU did not immediately usher m the 
Egerton mUlenium. The party orgarusation, branches and the PLP 
were heavily infUtrated with AWU-aligned members. The AWU 
was such a significant contributor to ALP funds and organisation, to 
the extent even of housing the party headquarters, that many former 
opponents of the union were soon supporting moves for reaffUiation. 
Like the AWU or hate it, the ALP's fortunes were inextricably bound 
up with (Queensland's biggest union. 
A further factor miUtating against a takeover of the Party's 
institutions by the Egerton forces was the universally perceived 
paramount need for party unity to make good the organisational 
losses sustained in the split. The disaffiliation of the AWU had 
horrified many of the party's rank-and-file members, workers and 
supporters who were still reeling from the shock of the spUt and 
subsequent loss of government. So long as the blame for disaffiUation 
could be laid on the widely hated and reputedly unstable AWU 
secretary Joe Bukowski, the Egerton forces on the QCE were secure. 
Any moves to antagonise the AWU further, for example to deny pre-
selection to a fair proportion of AWU-aUgned rightist anti-commu-
nist candidates, would likely lead to significant internal 
disputation and to general questioning of the bona fides of the Trades 
HaU grouping. 
The loss of the AWU seriously damaged the ALP's organisation 
outside Brisbane and the provincial cities; especially under the new 
coalition electoral arrangements, these were the areas the party 
needed to win in order to regain office. The Trades HaU unions were 
conspicuously weak outside Brisbane and the provincial cities, 
where their electoral organisation could do little more than protect 
seats already held by adding to large majorities. 
Labor's parliamentary performance was given a boost of talent 
with Jack Duggan's return in the Toowoomba West by-election forced 
by the death of interim PLP leader Les Wood in March 1958." 
Duggan was the only member of the former Labor goverrunent, a sta-
tus which entitled him to use the honorific "Honourable", to stay 
with the ALP Opposition. He was thus also the only ALP member of 
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the (Queensland Parliament with a significant public profile and 
record of government, a background which gave him considerable 
status both with the electorate and the party membership. Duggan 
stressed party unity as the sine qua non for return to office and pro-
moted resolution of internal confUct through compromise solutions 
where all groups gamed something, rather than the wmner-takes-
all ethos which had dominated the party institutions under the 
former regime. 
Based on the rationale that electoral roUs were late in becom-
ing avaUable for the redistributed boundaries, thereby making im-
possible the credentialUng of eligible voters, the QCE intervened in 
the preselection process for the 1960 election. Although the AWU 
expressed concerns through circulated propaganda to the effect that 
the QCE preselections were to ensure endorsements for "Comms, 
Groupers, Scabs and rats" as against "fair dinkum Labor men",2^ the 
(2CE preselections m fact appear to have secured winnable nonuna-
tions for several key AWU-aligned candidates. Col Bennett in South 
Brisbane was one example. Available evidence of QCE minutes 
indicates that Jack Egerton and other members of his grouping on the 
QCE at least acquiesced in this process. This suggests either that 
their detestation of the AWU "Right" had lessened or (more likely) 
that they had been unable to secure the numbers on the QCE and 
determined that acquiescence would be the most appropriate 
strategy pending better factional organisation. 
On one question only, that of abolishing facsimile ballot 
papers, the Trades Hall grouping was determined to have its way 
before the inevitable return of the AWU. Although many, including 
PLP leader Jack Duggan, counseUed against the move on the ground 
that it would antagonise the AWU, this was a move which enjoyed 
widespread support among branch nominees. The coUapse of the old 
AWU-PLP axis, the split and the AWU disaffiliation had given 
rank-and-fUe branch members an unprecedented say in the affairs of 
the party; the former practice of branches endorsing sitting members 
or union officials had declined with the destabilisation of the old 
order. Many of these newly involved rank-and-fUe members were 
keen to avoid a return to the guided democracy of the past. 
Accordingly, Egerton must have been confident of his support when 
he moved at the 1960 Labor-in-Politics Convention to abolish the use 
of facsimUe baUot papers. In a convention remarkable for its display 
of consensus, this rule change inspired some heated discussion but 
passed easUy.^ ^ 
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The 1960 Labor-m-Politics Convention was indeed so lacking in 
evidence of internal dissension that PLP leader Duggan's hopes for 
return to office through renewed unity appeared feasible. Even the 
normally hotly contested elections for agenda committee and 
convention officials, positions which determined both the order of 
and the personnel presiding over debate, were non-contests.^^ Apart 
from the facsimUe ballot issue, only the QCE convention delegate 
elections revealed much division. Here Jack Egerton's low, first-bal-
lot vote of fifty, which barely enabled him to scrape into the 
eleventh position on a second ballot despite his incumbency as (^ CE 
president,^^ is perhaps indicative of his uncertain support base in 
1960 and helps explain his reticence about purging opponents. 
The 1960 state election result emphasised a new problem for the 
ALP electoral strategy: the bush seats were not being recaptured. 
The new zonal and divisional boundaries intioduced under NickUn's 
Electoral Districts Act, 1958 bottled up Labor voters in the 
provincial cities, meaning that the benefits of the increased ALP 
vote were most felt in Brisbane. Moreover, the country voters were 
proving to be more loyal to the QLP than their metropolitan 
counterparts. For the first time in the party's history, half its 
parUamentary representatives were from Brisbane seats.''^ 
The Labor allegiance of many country voters had been depen-
dent on Labor's identification with the poUcies of "agrarian social-
ism" and on parochial and pork-barrelUng politics by local Labor 
MLAs. The coaUtion under Nicklin adopted Labor's rural corporatist 
interventions wholesale, thereby removing this key element m for-
mer Labor hegemony through bipartisanism and becoming able to 
claim credit for continued prosperity in the rural economy. As the 
memories of Labor representation receded further and further into 
the past, it became harder and harder for Labor to win at the poU-
tics of the parish pump: Country Party politicians proved to be as 
adept as their Labor predecessors in providing new schools, bridges 
and police stations for their constituencies at election time.^' 
The virtual destruction of the QLP as a serious contender for of-
fice at the 1960 election also removed at a stroke one of the main 
factors impeUing competing groups within the ALP toward unity 
rather than conflict. The death of Joe Bukowski in May 1961 re-
moved the last obstacle standing in the way of immediate 
reaffUiation and the QCE accepted an application from the union at 
its July 1961 meeting, despite token opposition from Egerton who 
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attempted to secure guarantees of future behaviour before 
readmission.^2 
Egerton and his Trades HaU comrades were galvanised into ac-
tion by the incipient reaffUiation. The divisions of the previous two 
years were soon forgotten in the face of renewed AWU hegemony, 
now a greater possibility in the absence of Joe Bukowski's 
destabUising influence. The primary target was not the AWU or its 
supporters in the QCE and other Party organisations, but the par-
liamentary wing. This may have appeared to be a misdirection of 
effort, but the Egerton strategy aimed not just for the exclusion of the 
AWU, but for Trades HaU hegemony wUhin the party machine. The 
parliamentary wing's capacity for intervention in organisational 
disputes, backed by the prestige the PLP leaders enjoyed with the 
rank-and-fUe members, had to be forestalled. Moreover, many par-
liamentarians were suspected of owing aUegiance to the AWU, being 
former AWU officials or having secured preselection because of 
AWU support. Soon after the 1960 election, Egerton secured passage 
of a motion muzzling the parliamentarians and asserting the (3CE's 
right to make poUcy and give the lead. It read: "that on all general 
questions of social problems in which the A.L.P. is called upon to 
take an active part in the prosecution of public campaigns, the QCE 
he requested to take an initiative in such matters" .•'•' 
Egerton's assertion of the primacy of the industrial wing of the 
labour movement and his distrust of politicians became constant 
themes. He pubUcly rebuked PLP leader Duggan at the October 1961 
Trades Union Congress for not paying enough attention to the indus-
trial labour movement by suggesting that delegates would probably 
not know Duggan as he rarely went to Trades HaU. Egerton further 
opined that the AWU reaffUiation (which he described in terms of 
the union "buying its way back in") would ruin forever the party's 
chance of getting "decent men" into parUament.^ '* 
Having thus attempted to insulate their manoeuvrings within 
the party organisation from intervention by the parliamentary 
wing, the Trades Hall forces began in late 1961 to organise in earnest 
to smash the AWU threat. Trades Hall officials were dispatched 
throughout the state to canvass branch members so as to secure num-
bers for the election of Trades Hall-preferred delegates to the 1963 
Labor-in-PoUtics Convention. AWU organisers, having been out of 
the running for two years and faced with new rules requiring better 
organisation for plebiscites, appear to have been taken unawares by 
the Trades HaU push. 
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The 1963 Labor-in-PoUtics Convention was the first such gath-
ering since 1905 to be dominated by the self-professed "Left". Having 
secured the majority for so long out of their reach, the Trades HaU 
grouping set out at the 1963 convention to discredit and exclude any-
one aUegedly aUgned with the AWU or indeed anyone differing 
from the correct ideological line. Just what this correct ideological 
Une consisted in is harder to identify, but it certainly included af-
firmation of the primacy of the unions and of industrial struggle over 
the electoral game and parUamentary leaders. Other items on the 
Trades HaU agenda included general leftist foreign poUcy stances 
toward the Malaysian confrontation and United States mUitary 
bases. Matters of "social" poUcy, such as education, civU liberties, 
and reform of the various statutes and pay practices discrirtunating 
against women, were less evident on the Trades Hall platform. 
WhUe there was agreement on the reordering of the electoral and 
industrial priorities of the labour movement, Egerton and his sup-
porters were more reticent when it came to concrete poUcy proposes 
with which the party might go to the people at the 1963 election. 
The dominant Trades Hall grouping was far more concerned to 
exercise its numbers in elections for the QCE and the various poUcy 
and administrative committees than it was to transform the Party 
Platform into a sociaUst tract. Jack Egerton's own avowal that "U 1 
had my way I would ask aU candidates if they believed in social-
ism. If they propped, stuttered or stammered at that, I would teU 
them to join the Liberal Party"^^ seems in retrospect to have been 
more concerned with the persormel to benefit from ALP nomination to 
office than the ideological line to be pursued. The Trades HaU fac-
tion made almost a clean sweep of positions elected by the conven-
tion. Eight at least of the sixteen QCE delegates elected^^ were 
closely associated with Egerton, and a further four were soUd AWU 
opponents acceptable to the Trades HaU grouping. Another was PLP 
leader Duggan, one of only two parUamentary representatives to be 
elected to the QCE from convention, who topped the baUot with bi-
partisan support. The AWU managed to secure the election of only 
one delegate from its ranks, union secretary Edgar WUliams. 
WilUams was subsequently to be ousted from the Inner Executive im-
mediately after the election of tiie new QCE at the 1963 convention; 
he was replaced as president by Printing and Kindred Industiies 
Union secretary Bert MUUner. Other AWU candidates for QCE were 
easily defeated. The various poUcy committee elections were even 
more marked in their exclusion of the AWU. The AWU representa-
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tives were impressed at the brutal numbers game played by the 
Egerton forces; WUliams is later reported to have remarked, "we 
beUeve in the numbers game and we would do the same" .3'' 
The Trades HaU group's heady success in sewing up the numbers 
at the 1963 convention led to some electoraUy injudicious humUia-
tion of ALP leaders who were perceived to be supporters of the 
AWU. Deputy PLP leader Eric Lloyd's credentials as proxy delegate 
for the Barambah Electorate Executive Committee (EEC) were re-
jected and he was excluded from the convention despite a strong 
speech m his support by Duggan.^s Duggan was eventuaUy driven by 
the ruthless exclusionary tactics of the Egerton group to suggest that 
certain elements "couldn't care less if the Labor Party is in power or 
opposition".^' 
The image of Labor Party poUticians as subject to the dUection 
of the industrial branch of the labour movement was one long cher-
ished by the formerly excluded industrial mUitants. Egerton at least 
was comfortable with publicity of this sort. Since the Trades HaU 
group was avowedly more committed to the industrial than the 
electoral struggle, and since this group had suffered as a despised 
nunority for so many years, it was entirely appropriate from their 
point of view that loyalty to the industrial labour movement (as 
represented by the Trades and Labour Council) should be the prime 
qualification in selecting candidates for political office. 
As the AWU-PLP alliance had discovered so many years be-
fore, a working majority at convention and the (JCE conferred the 
power to alter and interpret rules and to discipUne party members. 
This power aUowed the dominant grouping to fortify its position 
against any assaults or organisation by opponents. Like the former 
dominant axis, the Trades Hall grouping which triumphed at the 
1963 convention was ruthless in smashing opposition and in denying 
opportunities for other groups to express their views in party poUcy 
and to secure nomination for winnable parliamentary seats. 
Duggan's conspicuous faUure at the convention to impose his 
wiU over the truculent and triumphant Egerton forces was played 
upon by the anti-Labor parties during the 1963 election campaign to 
show Ehiggan's unfitness for the office of premier. Liberal advertise-
ments featured Duggan as a puppet with Egerton the malevolent 
puppeteer. The Trades Hall group was similarly an easier target 
than Duggan's PLP for communist-smear tactics by anti-ALP forces: 
union officials were less pubUc officials than were parliamentari-
ans, and the electorate was more inclined to beUeve the worst of 
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"faceless men". The TLC necessarUy included a number of seU-pro-
fessed communists with whom these ALP union leaders dealt on a 
day-to-day basis; the red-rag rhetoric of Jack Egerton and his asso-
ciates was at times indistinguishable from CPA pronouncements. 
CoaUtion press statements and propaganda played on allegations 
that several members of the Inner Executive had participated in so-
called "unity tickets" with communists in union elections in the 
1950s.''° It was left to Duggan to counter this attack by charging that 
the coalition was attempting to camouflage its own record on 
economic management. Egerton and the other strongmen of the new 
party organisation remained in the background for the campaign, 
adding through their sUence to the electorate's suspicions about ALP 
disunity and leadership under a Duggan government.''^ 
The years 1960 to 1963 witnessed a number of changes in party 
organisation and direction which further distanced the 1960s ma-
chine from the pre-spUt model. AWU attempts in 1959 to embarrass 
the party financially led to the Queensland headquarters' reloca-
tion to offices a hundred metres away on the corner of Albert and 
Elizabeth Streets. AWU-aligned secretary Jack Schmella died in 
July 1960, and he was replaced by the "left"-aUgned Jim Keeffe. The 
AprU 1961 municipal elections saw the ALP gain a new base in the 
Brisbane City Council, Australia's largest local government body. 
The ALP team of ambitious young Brisbane surveyor Clem Jones 
trounced the long-lived Citizens' Municipal Organisation (CMC) 
CovmcU with promises of expanded suburban development, improved 
pubUc transport and, above all, sewerage.^^ j ^ e ALP also captured 
the Cairns, Maryborough and Rockhampton city councils. The victo-
ries prompted state leader Jack Duggan to remark: "The poUtical 
cloud which has been hanging over the ALP for a number of years is 
dissipating".*^ This was a premature assessment in terms of state 
parliament, but the establishment of ALP dominance in the local 
government sphere was indeed to have a major effect on the future of 
the party. 
Egerton Triumphant: 
The Road to Breakfast Creek 
The 1963 election set the scene for the (Queensland ALP for the next 
twelve years. The Trades Hall group, led by TLC president Jack 
Egerton, was firmly entrenched in aU organs of ALP mternal govern-
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ment, ensuring that its preferred candidates were preselected for 
most safe state and federal seats and all Senate vacancies. 
The ParUamentary Labor Party's long and jealously guarded 
autonomy was diminished to the extent that PLP leaders were no 
longer able to secure organisational support by virtue of their elec-
toral prestige or by appeal to electoral considerations. As the PLP 
came to look more and more Uke a permanent, "natural" Opposition, 
the Trades HaU group's rhetorical insistence on the primacy of the 
mdustiial (as distinct from the electoral) struggle came to be more 
and more the common sense view. It was unlikely that the PLP could 
in the short term deliver any of the policies and programmes on the 
labour movement's shopping list. The NickUn government for its 
part had adopted many former Labor programmes and policies, 
including maintenance of the free hospital scheme and the various 
organs of "agrarian sociaUsm". The state electoral game appeared in 
any case to be hardly worth the candle in the midst of decUning 
state powers with both Labor and coalition parties at the federal 
level committed to centralism. A stiong and urufied union movement, 
on the other hand, could and did often succeed in wringing wages and 
conditions improvements out of the employers. 
In this context, the Queensland ALP came to be seen by party 
leaders more as a vehicle for rewarding loyal union officials and 
apparatchiki with well-remunerated and pension-carrying par-
liamentary positions than as a vehicle for social and economic 
change. Egerton and the other Trades Hall union leaders saw the 
working class almost exclusively in blue-collar terms. White-coUar 
miUtancy was not an issue in the mid 1960s, particularly since the 
Groupers had achieved their greatest long-term successes in such 
white collar unions as the Federated Clerks' Union, Shop 
Distributive and AlUed Employees Association, and the state and 
federal Public Service unions. The ideological stance proclaimed by 
Trades Hall rhetoric—that the sole legitimate goals of the labour 
movement were to secure economic and political advances for the 
working class—was thus taken on a restricted definition of "working 
class" which heavUy circumscribed both industrial strategy and 
poUtical horizons. 
The major precondition for working-class advancement thus be-
came, m the view of the dominant Trades HaU group, not a Labor 
victory at the Queensland polls but the liquidation of renegade 
(that is, non-TLC) unions, notably the AWU. The AWU was 
particularly targeted by Trades Hall leaders because it was both 
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the most powerful ideological competitor within the labour 
movement and a major competitor for blue-collar union membership. 
The AWU had long been the bete noire of mUitant union leaders on 
account of its strident anti-miUtancy, restrictive internal structures 
that insulated the union's leaders from chaUenge by rank-and-file 
factions, and frequent refusal to support other uruons' strike action. 
Accusations levelled at the AWU of poaching other unions' members 
and of supporting bosses against action by its own and other uruons' 
members had been commonplace m the (Queensland labour movement 
for thirty years or more. 
Confident at having purged the AWU from all significant 
positions of influence in the ALP, the Trades Hall group was in a 
position from 1964 to 1966 to make moves against the union 
industriaUy. This proved to be more difficult, since the Trades HaU 
unions were themselves vulnerable to intervention in their internal 
affairs; indeed the Industrial Groups' fight of the 1950s had been 
over precisely this issue. The Trades Hall leaders therefore 
hesitated before supporting the AWU's own internal miUtant 
opposition, the Committee for Membership Control (CMC). The 
CMC had been established in the 1950s to oppose the dynastic AWU 
leadership and its policies and by 1964 it was a national 
organisation in its own right. The committee was supported by 
diverse leftist groups including some prominent federal ALP 
parliamentarians. The CMC's first and major action in (Queensland 
was in leading the prolonged Mt Isa Mines strike. 
Booming mineral prices in the 1960s and the upgrading of raU 
and port infrastructure to transport Mt Isa ore and ingots to export 
markets had meant burgeoning profits for the mine owners; and the 
Mt Isa workers, all AWU members, felt they had a right to a greater 
share of the bonanza. The industrial arbitration apparatus which 
the AWU leaders insisted was the sole avenue for resolution of in-
dustrial demands was not coming up with the goods. Workers' 
grievances at being paid lower bonuses than those paid to their 
Broken Hill equivalents were exacerbated by the fact that Mt Isa 
Mines was owned by a United States company which repatriated its 
considerable profits.*'' When the AWU failed to deliver on the wage 
parity issue in several attempts between 1961 and 1963, the workers 
were wUling to Usten to the stronger counsel of CMC organiser Pat 
Mackie. The strike began when management sacked Mackie in 
October 1964 for purporting to represent an unrecognised union, 
namely the CMC. Poor preparation and confused demands by the 
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stiUcers (the issues included reinstatement of Mackie and higher 
pay, but the emphasis changed from time to time as the strike went 
on and on) and the transnational owners' capacity to withstand the 
demands of workers in any one country combined to defeat the strike 
after more than a year. 
The TLC, led by Jack Egerton, intervened in support of the 
stiUcers in an effort to bring down the AWU leadership. Little credit 
accrued for the action: the TLC acted half-heartedly and late in the 
day, and was seen to do so for seU-serving reasons. Much of the TLC's 
energy during the strike was devoted to preventing the estabUsh-
ment of an alternative Mt Isa-based union peak body (such as the 
Barrier Industrial CouncU in Broken HiU) which could have chal-
lenged TLC authority. Accusations were also made that funds raised 
for the strikers were diverted to other uses by the TLC*^ Jack Duggan 
and the PLP had likewise done little other than sit on the sidelines 
and wring their hands, apart from vociferously opposing the emer-
gency powers invoked by Nicklin in an attempt to coerce the strikers 
into retiuning. 
While none of the main Queensland Labor leaders came out of 
the stiike with much credit, the Trades Hall group soon established 
its own mythology about the dispute in which Trades HaU oppo-
nents were the viUains of the piece. The particular chosen victim 
was PLP deputy leader Eric Lloyd, who at one stage during the dis-
pute had protested against the intervention of federal politicians 
Jim Cairns and Clyde Cameron. The 1963 convention had seen non-
members of the Trades HaU group excluded from most party organi-
sation positions. The 1965 Labor-in-Politics Convention failed to 
elect any AWU delegates, or any of the parliamentary delegates 
who had voted with the AWU on any issue of substance, to the C^CE. 
Jack Egerton inflamed passions by openly distributing pamphlets 
accusmg the AWU of "scabbing" in the Mt Isa strike, sparking 
scuffles on the convention floor which were reported with some glee 
by the press.^ Key motions, such as one opposing the commitment of 
AustiaUan troops to Vietnam, were brought forward on the agenda 
in an undisguised attempt to antagonise AWU and Uke-minded 
delegates and to polarise any uncommitted delegates.*'' This motion, 
in particular, split the parliamentary delegates. Eric Lloyd was 
soon after relegated to the back bench and replaced as deputy leader 
by Trades HaU sympathiser Jack Houston. Other AWU supporters 
Jack Mann and Jack Dufficy were also removed from the Opposition 
front bench. 
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What could have been an electoraUy disastrous display of 
divisiveness was mitigated orUy by an eruption of fighting between 
the coaUtion parties over the Country Party's continued status as the 
senior partner despite its lower vote. The Liberal Party threatened 
to stand candidates in winnable seats where the Country Party 
already had an interest. While the Liberal parliamentary leaders 
reassured electors with statements of loyalty to the government, the 
image of disunity apparently had some effect even though the ALP 
made Uttle of the issue, preferring to concentrate on poUcy issues.*^ 
The 1966 election revealed a (Queensland electorate scarcely 
changed in its affiliations from the previous contest. The ALP 
gained Toowoomba East from the Liberals and lost Hawthorne to the 
Liberals. No other seats changed hands, leaving the state of the 
parties in the new Legislative Assembly identical to its predecessor. 
In the context of 1966, with declining ALP electoral stocks in the 
face of popular support for the federal Liberal/Country Party gov-
ernment's intervention in the Vietnam War, the (Queensland result 
reflected considerable credit on PLP leader Jack Duggan. WhUe 
Duggan had moved far in the direction of the Trades HaU camp, he 
was StiU the only seruor ALP functionary not a committed and loyal 
member of the group. This position was resolved in October 1966 
when Duggan resigned, foUowing press revelations that he had de-
frauded the Tax Office, despite a caucus vote of confidence in his 
leadership. Deputy leader Jack Houston (Bulimba) was elected 
leader, and fellow Trades Hall group supporter Percy ("Perc") 
Tucker (TownsviUe North) became deputy leader of the PLP. The 
rearrangement of the party orgarusation begun in 1963 was sealed 
when Jack Egerton secured the QCE vice-president position left 
vacant by Duggan's resignation, ending the time-honoured tiadition 
that the PLP leader held the vice-presidency.*' The new Inner 
Executive was thus entirely composed of, and presided over by, 
members and supporters of the Trades HaU group. Jack Houston and 
Clem Jones, both ordinary members of the Inner Executive, were the 
only poUticians at this level of the party's orgarusation. 
By the end of 1966 the Trades HaU group had sewn up the 
(Queensland ALP's decision-making structures. Proilunent in the new 
Une-up, apart from Egerton, were state secretary Tom Burns (Jim 
Keeffe had left for the Senate in 1966), assistant secretary Bart 
Lourigan, QCE president Bert MUUner, Storeman and Packers' Union 
secretary Errue Adsett and TLC secretary Fred Whitby. The Trades 
HaU group had emerged m the 1950s in the midst of strong ideologi-
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cal confUcts as the putative voice of militant labour, a new broom to 
sweep aside decades of cosy immobUity by the anti-miUtant AWU 
and PLP. This history now became a rhetorical device to legitimate 
Trades HaU domination of the party, the proof of the leaders' left-
wing credentials. 
Labor Defeats and Labor Enterprises, 
1967 to 1974 
The leaders of the Trades HaU group, its control of the party sealed 
with Jack Duggan's resignation, viewed themselves as the authentic 
representatives of the militant working class. Having struggled for 
fifteen years to purge the (Queensland ALP of elements they viewed 
as at best misguided, at worst class traitors, the new party leaders 
guarded their hard-earned status jealously. Yet perceived threats to 
the harmonious leadership of the Queensland labour movement 
exercised by Jack Egerton and his associates were increasingly as 
likely to come from the industrial and intellectual "Left", as from 
the discredited old Grouper "Right". 
There were many in Queensland, and many indeed in the Labor 
Party (especially in Brisbane) who were dissatisfied with ALP re-
sponses to what they felt to be the emerging issues of the day. The 
passage of motions at Labor Party conventions against the Vietnam 
War, for example, was felt by many to be an inadequate response, 
given that the Labor Party was nowhere in a position to give effect 
to its platform on the issue. The enthusiastic response of the elec-
torate to jingoism at the 1966 federal election provided convincing 
evidence of the bankruptcy of electoralism as a stiategy for dealing 
with the Vietnam issue. Similarly, ALP policy on women failed to 
reassure the growing number of Queensland feminists when the 
party's hierarchy was so heavily dominated by men.5° The growing 
number of Queenslanders concerned at destruction of the State's 
natural environment were unlikely to be attacted to an ALP 
environment policy which was scarcely distinguishable from the 
coalition's.^^ Yet the personnel of these various mobiUsing poUtical 
lobbies were, as enemies of the coalition government, part of the 
broad ALP coi«tituency. 
The ALP leadership's response to these chaUenges was to ig-
nore, denigrate, or attempt to integrate these groups' demands into 
the margins of its electoral platform. The organisational fortifica-
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tions erected during the rise of the few at the apex of the party and 
Trades HaU hierarchies were as effective in preventing assauUs 
from the new leftist groupings as they had been in excluding the old 
AWU-Ied "Right". The party's electoraUsm was naturally opposed 
to the direct action strategies championed by many of these new 
groups, and this was a major factor in the ALP's developing relations 
with them. The Queensland ALP lacked leftist leaders in the Jim 
Cairns mould who were able to bridge this gap and incorporate the 
new social protest movements into a powerful pro-ALP electoral 
force. Many rank-and-file party members were active in the anti-
war, envirorunental and feminist groups, but the (Queensland ALP 
leadership failed to adapt to this challenge with the alacrity 
which the impatient new radicals demanded. This major flaw was 
to last throughout a decade or more of widespread protest move-
ments, and cost the (Queensland party dear in terms of the new blood 
which in other states transfused the ALP. 
The feminist movement was particularly alienated from the 
Queensland ALP. Important early links, such as that estabUshed in 
1964 when the new federal member for Oxley BUI Hayden moved a 
Private Member's BiU to remove the notorious "marriage bar" (a de-
vice to exclude married women from public service careers) from the 
Public Service Act, 1922, were ignored by the Queensland hierarchy. 
A successful women's protest in March 1965 led by academic Merle 
Thornton against laws debarring women from public bars in 
Queensland hotels received only lukewarm support from the official 
ALP.52 The official channel for ALP women until 1971 was the Labor 
Women's Central Organising Committee (LWCCXI), which had one 
delegate to convention. This body was Uttle more than a women's 
auxUiary, concentrating on matters of interest to non-working wives 
of male breadwinners rather than addressing the agenda of the 
feminist movement. In something of an attempt to redress this 
peripheral role, the LWCOC was disbanded after the 1968 
convention and replaced by a Labor Women's Conference to be held 
prior to each scheduled convention. The new conference produced 
more motions for the convention to consider than did its predecessor, 
but these motions indicate that only cosmetic change had occurred to 
Labor's attitudes toward women. Most of the Women's Conference 
motions at the 1971 convention concerned issues stemming from a 
traditional view of women's role as housekeeper: consumer issues 
such as misleading packaging, and suburban lifestyle issues such as 
noise and water poUution.^^ The new agenda of anti-discrimination 
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legislation, child care, protection of women's rights in the 
workplace and so on was not addressed. 
Women's position m the ALP hierarchy improved not at aU m 
the decade 1967 to 1977. The aboUtion of the LWCOC in favour of 
the Women's Conference stiucture actuaUy cost Labor women the one 
guaranteed position at convention they had previously enjoyed. 
Women held at best three positions on the QCE m this period. Most 
prominent among these was Joy Guyatt, librarian at the University 
of (Queensland and the sole woman convention delegate to QCE from 
1961 to 1974, when she was defeated in the baUot. 
Some attempt was made to encourage (Queensland youth mto the 
party through the establishment in 1965 of the Young Labor 
Association, open to party members aged from sixteen to twenty-six, 
which was accredited with some of the powers of a branch, namely 
the right to move matters at convention. The Young Labor 
Association was not given any convention delegates despite persis-
tent attempts to achieve this. 
The major organisational change foUowing the 1965 convention 
occurred in the poUcy-making sfructures and the structure of conven-
tion itself. The policy committees of QCE, which had previously 
functioned as gatekeepers for branch and union motions on particular 
policy areas—working out preferred lines and briefing speakers 
about the issues—were now awarded the right to bring forward mo-
tions of their own. As committees of QCE, these poUcy conimittees, 
both standing and ad hoc, were subject to the same selection process 
as QCE. Accordingly, the committees' membership mirrored the 
composition of QCE itseU, thereby affording the dominant group 
wUh an important additional means of moulding the party in its 
own interests. 
Each committee was charged with scrutinising party policy in 
its particular area. Committee motions on policy areas tended 
therefore to rewrite whole slabs of policy rather than tinker with 
particular lines of policy in the ad hoc fashion of branch motions. A 
poUcy committee motion might occupy several pages of text rather 
than the brief wording and simple concepts generally contained in 
branch motions. Expert committees could rehearse speakers and 
lobby convention numbers prior to the event, eliminating the 
uncertainty of traditional mechanisms. This had the effect of 
enabling the dominant forces in the party to make radical 
alterations to the whole platform without the need for extended 
debate on each tiny alteration. Convention itself was restructured in 
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the image of the committees, dealing with each committee's area m 
turn. At the 1968 convention, for example, the committees were 
Selections and Calibre of Candidates, Industrial, Justice, Health, 
Land and Rural, Transport, Aboriginal Welfare, Appeals, Federal, 
Education, Fuel, Local Authorities, Organising and Planning, 
Tourism, Rules, and General.^ 
Protecting and strengthening the financial structure of the party 
organisation exercised the minds of the Inner Executive more than 
capturing new electoral support from among the rising social protest 
movements and the young. The humiUation and exclusion from deci-
sion-making processes which Egerton and his supporters had m-
flicted on the AWU in 1965-66 left the party once again vulnerable 
to the financial disaster of a renewed AWU disaffiliation. When 
the 1968 convention continued and reinforced the AWU's exclusion, 
the union resolved to withhold its dues. On 14 April 1969 the AWU 
was expelled from the ALP,^ ^ leaving the party to fight the 1969 
election without this major contributor to funds and electorate 
organisation. 
The party's chief source of funds was the capitation fees paid 
by branches and affiUated uruons. The main other sources were cam-
paign donations and income from investments, the largest of which 
was Brisbane radio station 4KQ. These investments, which also in-
cluded the party headquarters in Edward Street, were managed by 
Labor Enterprises Pty Ltd, the board of which was essentiaUy iden-
tical to the Inner Executive. Board members held shares in Labor 
Enterprises in trust for the party, and accordingly Labor Enterprises 
was not required to report in detail to any of the party's forums. At 
the 1968 Labor-in-Politics Convention, for example. Labor 
Enterprises gave a three-paragraph report containing such 
unilluminating information as the report that it had purchased 104 
perches of land on St Pauls Terrace, Brisbane City, for a new Party 
office at "below market value".^^ Labor Enterprises' directors re-
ported that plans were weU advanced for the new buUding, but no 
start was ever made on construction. It was decided instead, without 
reference to convention, to co-locate the party office and Radio 4KQ 
at suburban Newstead opposite the congenial Breakfast Creek 
Hotel. This siting took the party offices well away from the cential 
business district and parUamentary offices, thereby further advanc-
ing the status of Trades Hall as the focus of labour movement 
activity. In Breakfast Creek's favour it should be noted that the 
main Brisbane newpaper offices were close at hand, although of 
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course the poUtical journaUsts continued to hover about the city. 
4KQ, meanwhile, was used to make good the losses sustained in 
AWU disaffUiation. In the days of radical rhetoric leading up to 
the overthrow of Gair, Egerton and other members of the dominant 
Trades HaU group had agitated for 4KQ to be used as a propaganda 
organ but such considerations were abandoned in the late 1960s as 
4KQ developed into Brisbane's top-rating commercial radio station. 
Despite the new "professional" financial management, the 
AWU defection caused difficulties in the 1969 state election, where 
coaUtion campaign spending was blamed for Labor's faUure to win 
office despite the coalition's handicap of a little-known and 
unpopular premier with a wowser reputation and a jawbreaking 
name, Johannes Bjelke-Petersen. Bjelke-Petersen had acceded to the 
leadership on the untimely death of Jack Pizzey in 1968 and against 
the opposition of the Liberals who thought that their much more 
articulate, popular and experienced leader Gordon Chalk should 
gain the premiership.^^ Although the ALP primary vote increased 
from 43.8 per cent in 1966 to 45 per cent in 1969, surpassing the coaU-
tion primary vote of 44.7 per cent for the first time since the 1957 
spUt, the QLP vote remained steady and ensured a CoaUtion major-
ity on the two-party-preferred figures.^^ 
The ALP leaders had been sufficiently confident of the result to 
enter into embarrassing secret preference-swapping deals with 
Countiy Party candidates. The most notable of these, which must 
have haunted the ALP participants ever since, was with Country 
Party newcomer Russ Hinze in the South Coast seat. Hinze gave to 
ALP candidate Frank Culell a handwritten note offering the swap, 
provided the deal remain secret until how-to-vote cards were 
printed: "this letter is to be shown to the Inner Executive of the QCE 
and then held in trust by the President of the QCE."^^ The deal was 
accepted, and Russ Hinze won the nominally safe Liberal seat on 
ALP preferences.*" Hinze's trust in QCE president Egerton 
apparently raised no eyebrows among the Labor leadership. 
The year 1969 was disappointing for the ALP federally as weU, 
with the Gorton governirvent narrowly retaining office despite a big 
swing to Labor. The QUieensland party could at least hold up its head 
as moving toward winning office, having increased its share of the 
state-wide vote at every election since 1957. In this context the rela-
tively good showing of the party in Queensland at the 1969 poU was 
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This letter is to confirm discussions between Frank Culell, the 
endorsed ALP candidate for the South Coast seat and myseU. 
In the discussions Frank CuleU assured me that this letter is to 
be shown to the inner executive of the QCE and then held in 
trust by the President of the ALP QIand untU such tune as I 
make public my intentions announcing my How-to-vote card. 
The letter is then to be returned to me. The agreement entered 
into is—In return for the ALP first preference, and the marking 
of the official ALP card as under 
5 BERTOLDO 
6 BISHOP 
1 CULELL 
2 HINZE 
3KEC)GH 
4 LEE 
My How-to-Vote card will be marked 
4 BERTOLDO 
3 BISHOP 
2 CULELL 
1 HINZE 
5 KEOGH 
6 LEE 
I will make my intentions known pubUcly at any reasonable 
time prior to the time that would be required to print my 
cards. [Signed R.J. Hinze] 
Received from Frank Culell Monday April 21 [1969] during 
Special Meeting of [Inner] Executive. 
Letter presented by Frank CuleU to members of Inner Executive at a 
special meeting of the Inner Executive, 21 April 1969. 
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rewarded in the move of secretary Tom Burns to the national presi-
dent's position, giving the Queensland party a say in the federal or-
ganisation it had not enjoyed since it lost office after the spUt. 
The Inner Executive and party office underwent an overhaul in 
response to Bums's promotion and Bert MUIiner's move to the Senate 
at the federal poU. New faces were Tom Burton of the Printing and 
Kmdred Indusfries Union (PKIU), Neal Kane, secretary of the ETU, 
and Tom Chard, secretary of the BuUding Workers Indusfrial Union 
(BWIU). Bart Lourigan moved into the vacated secretary position 
and Gerry Jones, organiser since 1967, mto the assistant secretary job. 
Nick Bos, also of the ETU, acquired the position vacated by Jones. In 
1970, at the start of a new decade and with a rejuvenated organisa-
tional team, (Queensland Labor looked ready to return to office at the 
1972 state election after an interval of fifteen years, and to be a 
major contributor to a federal 1972 victory after an interval of 
twenty-three years. 
The lead-up to the 1972 state election saw the coaUtion gov-
ernment divided over leadership, with Bjelke-Petersen under chal-
lenge from disaffected elements within the Counfry Party and a 
resurgence of Liberal Party desire to become the senior coalition 
partner under the popular and high-profile leadership of Gordon 
Chalk. The acceptance by several ministers including the premier of 
gift parcels of shares from the foreign-owned mining company 
Comalco led to charges of conflicts of public duty and private 
interest which Bjelke-Petersen failed to dispel. Unfortunately, 
Labor was also tainted by the deal when it emerged that some share 
parcels had gone to ALP office holders and to the famUies of Labor 
members. Again, the declaration of a state of emergency under the 
Transport Act, 1938 to deal with protesters during the 1971 visit to 
Brisbane of the touring South African Rugby side (the Springboks) 
and the subsequent police violence outside the Tower Mill Motel 
where the Spingboks were staying was seen by some as the action of 
a desperate government. 
Despite the plethora of new issues which had arisen over the 
previous three years, and despite a reconvened convention in January 
1972 to approve new policies, the 1972 state campaign focused on 
much the same narrow bread-and-butter agenda canvassed in earUer 
campaigns. The environmental and social agenda being addressed by 
the federal ALP was present in the platform, but PLP leader Jack 
Houston was clearly not the man to communicate it to the electors 
and "tiendy" issues were low on the agenda at Breakfast Creek. The 
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faUure of the ALP to tackle the Bjelke-Petersen admmistration on 
civil liberties, environmental and social issues allowed a 
government and Country Party machine, growing in sophistication, 
the luxury of characterising its opponents in these areas as lunatic 
fringe groups and its own exfreme poUcies as moderate, sensible and 
popular. By contrast the ALP was made to look vacUIating and 
hypocritical, refusing to be associated with the protest movements 
and yet refusing to side with the government. 
The year was a good one for Labor electoraUy throughout 
AusfraUa and represented the high-water mark for the post-spUt 
Queensland ALP. The party gained an exfra 1.7 per cent of the vote 
to outpoU the combined coaUtion primary vote by 46.7 per cent to 
42.2 per cent. DLP and independents' preferences saw the coaUtion 
claw its way ahead on the two-party-preferred vote and, but for the 
electoral malapportionment, it could have been close run. FaUvue to 
win at this most propitious time led to a swap of positions between 
Brisbane-based PLP leader Jack Houston and his deputy, the more 
extroverted and pubUcity-conscious Perc Tucker from TownsviUe. 
Defeat at the state level was overshadowed for party members by 
celebrations attending the accession of the Whitlam government at 
the federal level in December 1972. The electoral system in 
Queensland provided a focus for electoral reform at the national 
level, with the new Labor government pushing ahead with legisla-
tion which reduced allowable variations between federal elec-
torates and abolished rural weighting. 
While (Queensland Labor supporters looked to the Whitlam 
government in Canberra for implementation of the reform platform, 
the (Queensland government looked to its constitutional advisers, in-
cluding University of Queensland vice-chancellor and constitutional 
lawyer Zelman Cowen, for ways to thwart the socialist menace. 
Among the more bizarre aspects of this campaign was the faUed at-
tempt to have the (^ueen add "Queen of (Queensland" to her titles in 
order to forestall any move at the national level to declare 
AusfraUa a repubUc. Other ploys were more successful, in particular 
Bjelke-Petersen's refusal, in 1974, to issue writs for an almost due 
half-Senate election at which the casual and additional vacancy 
left by Vince Gair's appointment as Ambassador to Ireland would 
have been filled. This action forced a federal double dissolution 
election in May 1974 and so avoided a Labor-confroUed Senate. Such 
assertions of Queensland's anachronistic sovereign rights as a Crown 
colony, combined with a skilful abiUty on the Queensland govern-
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ment's part to take credit for federal spending initiatives, such as 
the elecfrification of the Brisbane suburban raU network, were used 
to mount a campaign of regional xenophobia to which (Queensland 
Labor had no response. 
The 1974 federal election, whUe it saw Labor returned to office 
in Canberra, was a watershed in (Queensland. Labor's majority was 
substantially reduced and many of the losses were in Queensland 
seats. The subsequent 1974 Labor-in-PoIitics Convention paradoxi-
caUy saw both the passage of numerous motions supporting "frendy" 
causes like litter recycling and industrial democracy, and the 
purging from the QCE of those members such as Joy Guyatt and 
Hantush Linacre who supported such causes. Buoyed by aU this, 
Bjelke-Petersen called an early election in December 1974. Perc 
Tucker's boast that he would "slaughter" the coalition^^ turned out 
to be ironic as, despite a campaign opening that borrowed the 
coaUtion parties' razzamatazz. Labor's vote feU by over 10 per cent 
and its representation in the Queensland Legislative Assembly was 
reduced to eleven members—dubbed a cricket team by the premier 
and the media. Perc Tucker's own seat was among those lost, and the 
newly elected Tom Burns, who moved at last into parUamentary 
poUtics after half a lifetime in the organisational side of the party, 
was created leader of the pathetic rump. 
Sir John Kerr and Sir Jack 
The (Queensland ALP was in considerable disarray following the 
1974 disaster. The new-look Bjelke-Petersen poUtical machme, re-
named the National Party in 1974 (although it only existed in 
Queensland and was strongly regionalist in orientation), had 
apparently convinced a quarter of Labor's former voters that Labor 
as represented by the Whitlam Labor government was out of touch 
with and acting against their interests. Rather than confront this 
newly sophisticated anti-Labor strategy, the Queensland ALP 
leadership opted to accept the anti-Labor parties' premises. Fired m 
any case by native distaste for the new Whitlam breed of Labor 
technocrats, the Queensland Labor leadership shunned the federal 
Labor goverrunent. 
Thus, at a time when there was a need for close co-operation 
between the state and federal leaderships to combat the anti-Labor 
forces' many-fronted offensive (with Queensland as a major battle-
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ground), the (Queensland branch of the party was withdrawing pub-
Uc support from the "feds". To be sure, there were genuine grounds for 
grievance on Queenslanders' part. Whitlam's aboUtion of petrol 
subsidies for rural consumers in nud 1974 had been electoraUy injudi-
cious, discriminating as it did against decentraUsed Queensland. 
(Queenslanders regarded themselves as the appointed experts on 
Queensland politics and resented what they saw as at best 
inappropriate interventions by the Sydney-Melbourne-Canberra 
leaders. As secretary Bart Lourigan remarked to Australian journal-
ist Hugh Lunn, 
The federal government has become known in many areas as a govern-
ment completely centralist in its outlook and against the people in the 
country. There are many, many Labor voters who have lost their tax con-
cessions, lost the petrol subsidy and suffered from indirect things such 
as the end of the superphosphate bounty and the decline in the world 
price of beef. We copped the criticism last time after the double 
dissolution failure here, but we're not taking it again. We've been telling 
them for over twelve bloody months. I thought this had got through to 
Cough [Whitlam]. Like it or not, under our Constitution we are a 
confederation [sic] of states like Germany or the United States and the 
states have certain unique problems and they must be viewed in that 
Ught." 
The 1974 state election saw the greatest electoral realignment 
in Queensland since 1957. The DLP disappeared from the scene and 
for the first time since 1929 the non-Labor parties received a massive 
majority of the primary vote. All the residual Labor seats in the 
north and west, once the party strongholds, fell to the National 
Party. Most provincial cities Ukewise recorded National Party ma-
jorities. For Labor the result brought the backwater of Queensland 
into sharp national focus: as the newspaper editorialists pointed 
out. Labor would lose enough federal seats in Queensland alone on 
the December 1974 state result to lose office in Canberra.^^ 
As it happened, Queensland Labor was unwittingly to provide 
the ammunition to bring down the Whitlam government. The death 
of Senator Bert Milliner, the former secretary, in June 1975 provided 
anti-Labor forces with the constitutional armament to stack the 
Senate, enabling the federal Opposition to bring on a constitutional 
crisis. Using once again the sovereign state powers left in the 
Constitution, and against longstanding practice (although not with-
out precedent—New South Wales had done the same followmg 
Lionel Murphy's appointment to the High Court some time previ-
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ously), Queensland appointed a non-Labor candidate to fiU the va-
cancy. Albert Pafrick Field, sometime convention delegate for the 
Federated Furnishing Trades Society and now a renegade anti-
Whitlamite, approached the premier's office and was soon on his 
confused way to Canberra. Responding to news of the cynical ap-
pointment. Prime Minister Whitlam called Bjelke-Petersen a 
"Bible-bashing bastard",^* a remark which for aU its alUteration 
further antagonised the battered Queensland party who were con-
cerned at the electoral damage it could cause among churchgoing 
voters. The ensuing federal anti-Labor landsUde of 8 December 1975 
was nowhere worse than in (Queensland, where aU but BiU Hayden's 
once ulfra-safe seat of Oxley were lost. 
The humiUation of Labor in 1974-75 was blamed by some on the 
"arrogant" Whitlam government. Bjelke-Petersen's various 
constitutional manoeuvrings were only admirably clever poUticking 
to men who themselves had always played the game hard. The 
carping of Whitlam on the constitutional issue could not disguise the 
fact that Labor had faUed to retain its electoral base. Whitlam had 
been the focus of the anti-Labor campaign, Whitlam was unpopular 
with the electorate, and so Whitlam was to blame for Queensland 
Labor's woes. To some Queensland Labor leaders, it was the federal 
party that was the disaster, not the proudly traditional Queensland 
ALP. 
In June 1976, without giving any of his coUeagues or the party 
any prior warrung. Jack Egerton accepted an imperial knighthood on 
the Commonwealth Queen's Birthday List. Imperial honours had 
always been a difficult issue for Labor and Whitlam had dispensed 
with the imperial honours system at the federal level. The rebuke 
to Whitlamite Labor that the honour represented was compounded 
by the fact that he was dubbed by that great Labor bete noire 
governor-general Sir John Kerr. As Russel Ward had it, this tragi-
conuc happening was the "knighting of a boUermaker by the son of a 
boUermaker".^5 Egerton had not broken the letter of any actual party 
rule and indicated that he had no intention of resigning. He had 
been at the centre of the party for so long that there were few 
prepared to stand up and move for his expulsion over the issue, 
although it soon became clear that the branch members and 
affUiated unions wanted this. At the Inner Executive meeting of 15 
June 1976 Egerton was pressed to resign from his official positions and 
finaUy acceded in a letter handed to Bart Lourigan at Brisbane 
auport (on the way to tiie mvestiture) on 24 June.^^ The 28 June Inner 
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Executive meeting resolved to move for the position of president to be 
declared open, and that any subsequent vacancies be fiUed, at the 
QCE meeting later that day. The motion read in part: 
This Executive declares that while Jack Egerton has not breached any 
rule of the Australian Labor Party, the acceptance of a knighthood by an 
office holder of the Party especially the State President is incompatible 
with the clearly recognised principles of the Party. 
This Executive places on record its appreciation of the lifetime of 
service Jack Egerton has given to the Labor Movement in practically 
every possible position of honorary involvement from rank-and-file 
member upwards and looks forward to the closest possible liaison with 
him in the future.^^ 
The hopes for future Uaison between the party and Sir Jack 
were to prove fruitless. Egerton evinced no contrition for having, as it 
appeared, deserted the movement he had served aU his Ufe, at the 
very time it most needed soUdarity and support from its leaders, in 
return for an imperial bauble. In his view he was entitled to the 
honour and the Labor Party had shown ingratitude and made a tac-
tical blunder by expelling him. Interviewed on the subject a decade 
later he stUl declared: "I think the Labor Party were stupid. A lot of 
the employers would have been squirming if they had had a Labor 
leader with a knighthood".^ Egerton's decision to move into the jet-
set world of the Gold Coast City Council as an independent ensured 
ostracism from the party he had formerly led. It was a bizarre end 
for a career begun by bringing down a Labor government for having 
strayed too far from the sacred principles of the party. 
The 28 June 1976 QCE meeting elected Vice-President Tom 
Burton of the PKIU to replace Egerton. The vice-presidential va-
cancy was filled by Tom Bums, restoring the fraditional status for 
PLP leader which had been overturned by Egerton's clique when Jack 
Duggan had departed a decade earlier. Bill Hayden, MHR for 
Oxley and former Treasurer in the Whitlam Government, was 
elected to fill the Inner Executive vacancy left by Bums. 
Egerton's perceived betrayal, and the subsequent reluctance 
displayed by the dominant grouping within the party to expel him, 
significantly destabilised the cosy state of affairs at Breakfast 
Creek. Party members and union leaders wondered how the party 
could have been led by such a man, and how it was that his former 
loyal supporters continued to run the party. Criticism of the federal 
party by Queensland leaders began to look less Uke comradely ad-
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vice and more like disloyalty. The series of electoral disasters in 
(Queensland finally came to be seen as the fault not of federal arro-
gance, but of Breakfast Creek incompetence. 
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6 
Moves for Reform 
The Reform Group 
In 1977, with everything going weU economicaUy, the Queensland 
coaUtion government's future seemed assured. Moreover, not only 
were women, and women's groups, effectively excluded from the ALP 
(Queensland Branch), but also civU liberties and environmental 
groups received Uttle support from Labor Party leaders. Indeed, to 
many people in Queensland, the "real" opposition to the National-
Liberal coalition were the civil liberties, environmental, peace and 
feminist movements, and not the ALP. At the November 1977 early 
federal election Labor in Queensland increased its representation 
from one to three seats, but its state-wide vote had actuaUy fallen 
from the 1975 all-time low. 
In this context, and in the genteel western Brisbane suburb of 
IndooroopUly, the Reform Group was established at a function at-
tended by approximately eighty Queensland ALP members in 
December 1977. The character of the location is important, for U was 
also the character of the group itself. Its western-suburbs, white-
coUar, tertiary-educated pubUc image was in sharp contrast to the 
self-consciously working class composition of the Trades HaU that 
dominated the Ausfralian Labor Party in Queensland. This domi-
nance of the Reform Group by those sections of the ALP that had for 
so long been denied any influential role in the party's Queensland 
Branch was so pronounced that it was to provide almost a caricature 
of the group in the hands of its opponents within the party, and of 
the party's opponents elsewhere: in 1978 a National Party member 
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of state parUament speculated that the initials ALP might come to 
represent the Academics and Lawyers Party.^ 
The event in IndooroopUly that marked the birth of the ALP 
Reform Group was, in the best traditions of the party, a barbecue-
arranged in the wake of the disappointing 1977 state election. The 
outcome—though a recovery from 11 to 23 seats—was nowhere near 
pre 1974 representation and some thought that the result could have 
been improved U the party's internal organisation had been m better 
shape. The barbecue was held on 11 December, the day after the 
federal election which, as it eventuated, gave even less cause than 
the state poU for confidence in the ALP's future. The federal result 
also gave rise to a fitting atmosphere of discontent for the 
IndooroopiUy barbecue. Those who attended (in pouring rain) com-
mitted themselves to the daunting task of achieving a drastic reor-
ganisation of the (Queensland Branch. 
Soon after the December barbecue, a paper entitled "Can we 
improve the organisation of the Labor Party in Queensland?" was 
circulated by Dr Denis Murphy. In it. Murphy presented a compre-
hensive alternative model for the party's adminisfration. Although 
the paper was intended to be circulated to ALP members only, its 
contents soon became widely known through the Brisbane press. 
With variations in detail only, these ideas became those which 
Reformists advanced regarding adminisfrative structure throughout 
1978. Murphy wrote that: 
Rather than tinker about with the present structure it would be better at 
this stage in the party's history, to look at a completely new organisa-
tional structure that would t>e characterised by broader representation 
on the highest committees, more openness in the conduct of the party 
and less secrecy.^ 
Rather than enlarge the existing Inner Executive of 5 members, 
Murphy proposed that the powerful body be abolished altogether, 
and replaced with an Administrative Committee of 20 members, m-
cluding a president, a branch vice-president and a Union vice-presi-
dent, a freasurer, the state parUamentary leader, a representative 
of the federal parliamentary party and a local government 
representative, with eight union delegates and four branch dele-
gates, and a secretary appointed by the committee itself. The CJCE 
would be superseded by a much larger State Council of about 180 
members, of whom about 95 would directly represent affUiated 
unions and 76 would be elected by branch members based on the nine-
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teen federal electorates. The 18 delegates elected by the Labor-in-
PoUtics Convention would disappear. State CouncU would meet, for 
a whole day, four or six times a year, and its members would elect 
the Administrative Committee with the exception of the secretary. 
AU members of the Administrative Committee and State Council 
would be required to attend at least two meetings of their ALP 
branches annuaUy. Murphy did not address himself to the vexed 
question of preselection of candidates for elections which, he wrote, 
would require a paper of its own. 
Reform was not really about policies. Federal Opposition 
leader Gough Whitlam had rightly observed in his address to the 
1977 convention that "here there are no fundamental or ideological 
divisions of the kind that split Labor in Victoria and Labor in 
(Queensland in 1957".^ The Reformists held a diversity of ideological 
positions, but these differences were submerged in what they saw as 
the more urgent problem of organisational reform. Of the party's 
structures, only the Labor-in-Politics Convention was uncontrover-
sial, although the Reformists demanded it meet more frequently. 
The Reformists attacked no area of existing policy, although the 
presentation of some policies, notably civil liberties policy, was 
critically scrutinised. 
Initial Tactics: Call for a Special Convention 
The Reform Group desired mitiaUy to demonstrate a level of support 
for reform in the party so substantial that the QCE would caU a 
special reform convention before the end of 1978. Under rule 15 a 
special convention could be called only with the explicit assent of 
haU the Electorate Executive Committees (EECs) and Regional 
Head Centres and affUiated unions.^ It was not a measure which 
could be brought about simply by a vote of the QCE. The demand for 
a special convention was, however, one which could readily serve as 
a focus for forces of discontent. In order to establish early in the 
campaign that their objectives were supported to a significant extent 
among the party's rank and file, the Reformists convened a mass 
meeting of ALP members organised by a working party of thirteen 
nominated at the December barbecue. The Reform Group used the 
media, always keen to report intemal ALP disputes, to pubUcise the 
event and the role played by the media (especiaUy Queensland 
Newspapers and Channel 7) at this early stage in the sfruggle for 
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reform was to be decisive. On 21 January 1978 the Courier-Mail 
reported that a meeting which would press for the reform of the ALP 
in Queensland was to be held, again in the western suburbs, at the 
Bardon Returned Services League HaU on the afternoon of 5 
February. 
On 23 December 1977 BiU Hayden defeated Lionel Bowen for 
the federal Opposition leadership. Hayden was known to think the 
Queensland Branch's organisation had to improve if the party were 
to perform more successfuUy in elections. Whitlam, his predecessor, 
had also been an advocate of reform in (Queensland but Hayden was 
better placed and more intensely motivated to assist in the reform 
campaign. After aU he held some senior positions in the Queensland 
bramch, including member of the Inner Executive since Jack Egerton's 
investiture and downfall. In the early days of the movement 
Hayden remained sUent, perhaps doubtful of the Reform Group's 
capacity to achieve its aims,^ but his sympathy was taken for 
granted.^ 
PLP leader Tom Burns made it clear he felt no affinity with the 
Reform Group. On the eve of the Bardon meeting Bums was reported 
to have alleged that "some of the organisers were motivated 
through personal bias and defeat in pre-selections". The Reformists' 
activities were "an exercise in showmanship that could damage the 
party".^ Other Inner Executive members were even more hostUe. 
State president Tom Burton, for example, said that the Reformists 
were "very sfrange people, acting very strangely"; he accused them 
of "condemning the frade unions", and aUuded to "certain individu-
als who are only trying to obtain a power base".* In a joint statement 
Burton and state secretary Gerry Jones declared that the purpose of 
the Bardon meeting was "to create division and mistrust between af-
filiated trade unions and ALP branches" and that the proposals 
about party organisation that would be put to it were "maUcious and 
destructive".' A circular sent by Jones to aU party units a week before 
the meeting warned members not to attend, on the grounds that the 
(3CE had not authorised the meeting and might therefore find that 
those who participated had breached rules which required QCE 
authorisation for a meeting of ALP members.^" 
Jones's letter was more successful in reinforcing the impression of 
the party leadership as intolerant and authoritarian than it was in 
deterring attendance. About four hundred ALP members attended the 
Bardon meeting: thereafter it could not credibly be denied that a 
large number of the party's members saw the reform of its organisa-
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tion as a pressing need. The meeting was chaked by Peter Beattie, a 
twenty-five year old articled clerk and president of the (safe 
Liberal) Ryan Federal Divisional Executive (FDE). His opening ad-
dress elaborated the theme that "the administrative wmg of the 
party" was largely responsible for the ALP's lack of electoral suc-
cess. He chronicled instances of administrative impropriety and in-
efficiency. The QCE's overturning of local rank and fUe preselection 
recommendations in 1977, the lack of opportunity at QCE meetings 
for significant debate and decision making, the tardiness of the ALP 
state office in publishing the amended rules and poUcy decisions of 
the 1977 convention, were aU examples of the ills that resulted from 
the party officers' enthusiasm for advancing their own interests 
rather than for improving the party's position in (Queensland." The 
coming battle, said Beattie, was between "a smaU group of Inner 
Executive members who want the party reduced to thefr personal 
playthmg" and "those who want a broadly based sociaUst party".'^ 
The meeting's main formal business was consideration of a mo-
tion, intioduced by Murphy and easUy carried, calling for a special 
convention to be held by the end of the year. Other speakers 
included former state election candidates Pat Comben and Hamish 
Linacre and Senator George Georges, the only member of parliament 
in attendance. The participation of Georges, resentful at the party's 
hindrance of his involvement in the civU liberties campaign against 
the ban on poUtical sfreet marches infroduced in September 1977, 
may well have been crucial in deterring any disciplinary action 
against those associated with the meeting. 
Reformists were anxious to stress that, confrary to accusations 
leveUed by members of the Trades Hall Group, they were not op-
posed to the party's ties with the trade unions.^-' Murphy had al-
ready asserted that the problem with union representation was not 
its extent but its narrowness: too few unions held too many positions, 
whUe others were not represented at aU. He proposed the creation 
of a larger adminisfrative committee, and a lower membership re-
quirement (500) for affiliated unions to be individuaUy represented 
on the State CouncU than was the case with the existing (^ CE (2000). 
In January the Reform Group had pointed out that several large 
unions, including metalworkers' and misceUaneous workers' unions, 
were effectively excluded from decision making in the party and 
these were looked to for support. A motion affirming support for the 
trade union movement at the Bardon meeting was carried unani-
mously. 
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A proposal that the meeting elect a reform committee to 
coordinate a campaign was not simUarly supported. It was decided 
rather that a subsequent meeting should be held on 9 AprU. In the 
meantime. Reformists' efforts would be directed principaUy towards 
the series of branch members' regional conferences, due to begin in 
March. As these were official party meetings it would be difficult 
for the QCE to ignore any demand by them for a special convention. 
Although the Bardon meeting had faUed to sanction an elected 
committee, some in the Reform Group were prepared to name them-
selves pubUcly. The guarded references to "a spokesman" that had 
appeared in press reports prior to the meeting were replaced by 
names, most frequently that of Peter Beattie, who, with Murphy, 
came increasingly to constitute the face of reformism as portrayed by 
the media. In fact. Murphy was somewhat removed from the hub of 
the Reform Group throughout 1978 and 1979; he had not been a mem-
ber of the original working party because it was thought that, with 
the anti-academic hostUity already estabUshed between him and 
Trades Hall, his inclusion might provoke decisive action against his 
party membership.^* 
As part of the plan to muster support at the regional 
conferences, a letter was sent to aU branches within a few days of 
the Bardon meeting, thereby breaching the party rules requiring 
correspondence between branches to be authorised by the QCE. The 
letter suggested that branches support specified reform proposals, 
and it was signed by Rosalie branch president Beattie and secretary 
Steven MiUer and Bardon branch president Judy BeU and secretary 
AUce Cavanagh. In addition to the call for a special convention, 
other proposals included an increase in Iimer Executive membership 
to twenty, a change in QCE composition to give greater 
representation to smaller unions (both to be along the lines of 
Murphy's alternative structure), the holding of convention 
biennially, with regional conferences in non-convention years, and 
the addition of the nineteen QCE branch delegates to convention 
membership.^5 Queensland was at this time the only state in which 
ALP conferences were not held each year. WhUe the letter was not 
universaUy weU received (the Ipswich branch, for instance, returned 
it to its senders),^^ such rejections were outweighed by expressions of 
support from other branches. Ashgrove branch, for example, notified 
Gerry Jones on 21 February that its members unanimously endorsed 
the aims of the Bardon meeting.^'' 
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The party's finances were a major item on the Reformists' 
agenda. Murphy, who had previously asserted that "the financial 
reports to the trieiinial Labor-in-PoUtics Convention are so bland as 
to be of Uttle value", told the Bardon meeting that he doubted 
whether anyone knew the party's real financial position.^* At the 
meeting also, Beattie drew attention to the failure of 4KQ, the 
party's major asset, to attract listeners and advertising revenue. 
While many looked to a reformed Inner Executive or administrative 
committee to exercise greater responsibility and accountabUity in 
financial affafrs. Murphy urged the necessity of appointing a party 
tieasurer. 
On 26 February the Reform Group's case was further sfrength-
ened by Jones's inaugural State of the Party Report for 1977, deUv-
ered to an audience of three hundred branch presidents and secre-
taries at Brisbane Trades Hall.^' The address completely failed to 
aUay concern about the party's financial shape. Jones claimed that 
about $252,000 had been spent on the state election, and between 
$150,000 and $175,000 on the federal election. At the end of the year 
the party had a debt of $200,000; Jones later claimed that by the end 
of February $134,000 of this had been cleared, leaving a debt of 
about $64,800.2° Revelations that over fifty thousand ALP shares in 
Telecasters North Queensland had been secretly sold shocked many, 
and led to suspicions that further asset stripping might impoverish 
the party in the long term. In particular it was rumoured that radio 
station 4KQ might be sold, though this was denied by Burton.^ ^ 
After Jones's report had been presented to the QCE Murphy 
made his statement aUeging a general ignorance of financial mat-
ters. At this time a scurrilous roneoed occasional sheet under the 
aUas Mickey SpillaU (the "guy who knows all that goes on at the 
HaU") announced unequivocally that the figures were cooked and 
"its [sic] all buir.22 The weekly Nation Review had asserted that 
the party's total indebtedness was in excess of $400,000.^ 3 The State 
of the Party Report afforded an opportunity for Jones to queU these 
doubts, an opportunity which went begging. He was "reduced to vir-
tual monosyUabic answers" in response to the queries of party mem-
bers, and he was not assisted by Hayden, who took the opportunity 
to launch an attack on the management of 4KQ. 
The next day, 27 February 1978, Hayden announced that he 
would resign his Irmer Executive position. He cited pressure of work 
but it seems likely he decided that he would feel more comfortable 
unencumbered by conflicts of loyalty although it was not untU the 
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first day of the regional conferences that Hayden made an unam-
biguous statement of support for the reform cause. 
For the organisation of these conferences, (Queensland's nineteen 
federal electoral divisions had been arranged into ten groups; a con-
ference was called for the branch members within each of these. 
Between one and three "visitors" were assigned to attend each con-
ference, every visiting contingent including an Inner Executive mem-
ber or a senior ALP member attached to the Trades HaU group. The 
first five conferences to be held, covering members in the thirteen 
south-eastern divisions, were scheduled for the weekend beginning 
11 March, four on Saturday and one on Sunday. The Trades HaU 
group had nominated the conferences, undeniably a proper party 
channel, as the forum in which any reform objectives should be pur-
sued. Jones, in his circular warning against attendance at the Bardon 
meeting, asked party members "to ensure that Conferences are repre-
sentative of rank and fUe opiruons and that they give serious and 
constructive attention to genuine matters for reform of the Labor 
Party in this state" .^ ^ Burns also promoted the conferences as a means 
by which the membership, as distinct from the Reform Group, could 
identify the changes that it believed were needed in the party's 
structure.25 
Hayden (member for the federal division of Oxley) chose to at-
tend the Petrie-Ryan-Fisher conference, held at Pefrie, a few kUo-
mefres north of Brisbane, on the morning of 11 March. As the Ryan 
division incorporated most of the western suburbs, this was the con-
ference at which the most substantial support for reform could be ex-
pected. Hayden made clear his concern for the party's situation. 
People in the party have to feel that they have a role to play in influenc-
ing the (party's) future ... We are facing a situation of attrition, with more 
people leaving than are coming in. In some areas there seems to be a 
dead hand settling on branch activity almost as if people have lost their 
optimism. To overcome this we are going to have to experiment with 
granting a larger role to meml)ers of the party.^ ^ 
Although committed to anti-eUtism, the Queensland Branch was 
eUtist in its own organisation. It was "not very helpful to raise ques-
tions about members' loyalty", and people who did so were "trying to 
practice [sic] intellectual intimidation".^7 He supported the 
Reformists' aims. 
The QCE has to be expanded. The Inner Executive has to be expanded 
and there have to be representatives from branches and from other 
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areas. An expanded Inner Executive and QCE is the only way that we are 
to have effective representation from the party, the only way that we can 
have full participation. We should also support the proposition that 
there should be a special State Convention this year (i.e. 1978).^ ^ 
That afternoon he delivered the same message to the Oxley-
McPherson-Fadden conference in Springwood, which covered his own 
electorate. Here he clashed with Trades and Labour Council presi-
dent and ALP junior vice-president Harry HauenschUd, official 
visitor to the conference. To HauenschUd's protests against his ad-
vocacy of a special convention, Hayden replied, "Well, Harry, 
you're one of the people who helped stuff it".^' 
Hauenschild was not the only senior party member to be upset. 
The Sunday Mail reported how PLP leader Burns responded when 
news of what Hayden had said reached the Bowman-Griffith-
Moreton conference, which Burns was attending at Brisbane's 
ColmsUe Hotel. 
It is alleged that Mr Bums called Mr Hayden several uncomplimentary 
names and stormed out of the conference. Hayden is nothing but a —. 
That's it. I'm through. I'm resigning.-'^  
Burns was booed by members attending the conference, and several 
branches later caUed for the QCE to censure him. He later explained 
that he thought branch members should have been able to express 
their views at the conferences without the interference of party 
leaders. He did not resign at this time, and after the conferences 
himself supported an early convention, "because party members 
clearly felt there should be one".''^ 
AU south-east conferences voted for a special, or early, conven-
tion, and for associated reform proposals. The Brisbane-based 
conferences voted heavily in favour of reform with the vote in 
Petiie-Ryan-Fisher being 120 to 9. On Sunday, 12 March, the Darling 
Downs-Maranoa conference in Toowoomba voted unanimously for an 
early convention after Murphy had addressed it by invitation.^^ 
Three conferences outside the south-east region did not support the 
proposal but by 19 March six conferences, representing the party's 
membership in fourteen federal divisions, had done so. The final 
conference, in the Kennedy division, was scheduled to be held in 
May but, as matters eventuated, by this time its opinion would be U"-
relevant. 
Peter Beattie, one of the more voluble members at the Pefrie-
Ryan-Fisher conference, predictably pleased by the conferences' re-
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suits, claimed that pressure for a special convention was now over-
whelming.33 Beattie, meanwhUe, had just been appointed to a ftiU-
time trade union post, that of state secretary to the RaUway Station 
Officers' Association. His conviction of the inevitabiUty of a special 
convention was not shared by the QCE at its meeting on 28 March. 
The main business was to have been the credentiaUing of newly 
reaffUiated AWU delegates. Murphy moved that a party referen-
dum be held, in accordance with the rules, to determme whether or 
not a special convention should take place before the end of the year 
to discuss restructuring; Hayden seconded the motion, which was 
lost. Instead, the QCE supported a move by Senator Jim Keeffe to 
have the Inner Executive consider possible dates for the next sched-
uled convention, and report back to the next QCE meeting. Here was 
hint of a possible compromise, especiaUy as Keeffe was seen as sym-
pathetic to reform.^ "* 
The newly reaffiUated AWU delegates (the union had at last 
reaffiUated in 1977 after Egerton's departure) opposed the special 
convention motion, arguing that by thq time a special conference 
could be convened, it would be only a few months before the ordinary 
convention would have to be held. Another argument against a spe-
cial convention was that it would cost $25,000, and branches and 
unions would be saddled with exfra expenses of funding their dele-
gates. Reformists pointed out that this costing was based on the as-
sumption that the party would maintain its practice of booking con-
vention rooms in luxury hotels. The March QCE meeting also wit-
nessed the first substantial retaUatory action against an individual 
reformist when the Mudjimba/Coolum branch, whose president was 
prominent Reform Group member Hamish Linacre, was suspended for 
making aUegedly anti-party statements.^^ 
Despite the (3CE defeat, the Reform Group pushed ahead with 
preparations for the second Bardon meeting on 9 AprU, to which all 
QCE members were invited; a press statement publicising this invi-
tation was issued by Beattie, Linacre and Gailene Harrison, de-
scribed as "reformist leaders". The statement disingenuously con-
cluded by asserting that "it was time that the public debate on party 
reform ended, and discussion reverted back to its proper place within 
the party membership".^^ 
Shortly before the date of the meeting, Gerry Jones attempted 
to deflect debate toward local, rather than cenfral, admiiustiative 
reform. In an editorial in the newsletter Newsgram, Jones made it 
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clear that his own understanding of reform was rather dUferent from 
that of most members. 
I am pleased generally to see a good deal of debate taking place within 
the Party's ranks about reform of our rules. I am however disappointed 
to see most debate concerned with the distribution of power between 
the Queensland Central Executive and the Executive Committee. 
If the appropriate magic wands were waved over both bodies we would 
not necessarily be in the box seat to win State Government in 1980. 
We should consider far more wide-reaching changes which involve all 
decision-making bodies, from the branches up to the Convention itself. I 
would urge members for example, to consider the delegate-based na-
ture of our grass-roots organisation at E.E.C. (Electorate Executive 
Committee), F.D.E. (Federal Divisional Executive) and M.E.C. 
(Municipal Executive Committee) level.^'' 
Jones's statement also sfressed how long it would take to organise a 
special convention, and he expressed his contentment at the state of 
the party's finances.^^ 
The 9 April Bardon meeting, attended by about two hundred, 
passed unanimously a motion of No Confidence in the (3CE, and less 
enthusiastically (by sixty-seven votes to forty-two) decided to 
picket the next QCE meeting on 24 April. While the party organisa-
tion publicly ignored this move the PLP responded by unanimously 
carrying a motion from former assistant secretary Bob Gibbs dissoci-
ating the PLP from the Reform Group. The picketing plan was aban-
doned in the face of this pressure.^^ 
Also in April, the Reform Group pubUshed one thousand copies 
of a sixteen-page leaflet, entitled The Case for Reform of the 
Queensland Branch of the Australian Labor Party.^° One of the few 
printed documents to emerge from the reform campaign and its mter-
vention aftermath, it included extracts from addresses deUvered by 
Beattie and Murphy at the February Bardon meeting, from Hayden's 
address to the Petrie-Ryan-Fisher conference, and from Whitiam's 
speech to the 1977 convention. Also included were an edited version 
of Murphy's proposals for an alternative structure and selected 
quotes from critical remarks made by Tom Burns in a report to the 
Federal Executive in 1970 about the New South Wales Branch.'*^ On 
the leaflet's cover Reformists adapted the ALP's state election slo-
gan of the previous year: "It's a great party. Let's get it working 
again". 
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As 1978 wore on, speculation grew that party officials were 
preparing to do battle for the prize of a Senate seat. Although none 
of the four ALP (Queensland senators had pubUcly contemplated re-
tirement, it was rumoured that one of the four might be demoted by 
the Trades HaU group in the preselection process in favour of Gerry 
Jones. It was also said that state president Tom Burton might seek a 
place in the Senate, perhaps in competition with Jones. Jones's 
declaration in April that "at this stage he did not intend to nomi-
nate for the Senate" faUed to queU the rumours.'*^ Reformists' concern 
at the possibUity of Jones's election was compounded by the Ukeli-
hood that his replacement as ALP state secretary would be current 
party orgaiuser and former Elecfrical Trades Union organizer Nick 
Bos, further buttressing the power of the anti-reform ETU withm the 
dominant cUque. 
Meanwhile pressure was mounting on Trades HaU to find a 
solution to the party's Queensland difficulties. National ALP pres-
ident Bob Hawke and powerful right-wing officers of the New South 
Wales Branch were said to be voicing concern, and it was expected 
that the affairs of the Queensland Branch would be raised at the 
Federal Executive meeting beginning on 20 April.^^ Concern at 
federal moves was reflected in a decision by the 24 April QCE 
meeting to set a date for the next convention which would prove 
acceptable to the Reformists. It was agreed that the convention 
should commence in Rockhampton on 17 February 1979. This was 
later reported to have been the result of a compromise forged by 
Hayden: in return for the early convention. Reformists would desist 
from further public criticism.'*'' Murphy greeted the decision to hold 
the convention as "a major victory for the reform movement", and on 
the same day the Reform Group announced that it would disband 
itself;''^ henceforth its members and sympathisers would work in 
support of reform resolutions for the convention in their local 
branches.*^ Jones claimed that the decision to hold the convention 
was a response not to Reform Group activities, but to caUs made by 
the previous month's regional conferences.'*'^  
Gough Whitlam deUvered the inaugural T.J. Ryan Memorial 
Lecture at the University of Queensland later the same week. 
Speaking before an audience of eight hundred, he ridiculed the per-
formance of the Queensland Branch: "To win, the AustraUan Labor 
Party must have the best organisation and the best candidates. In 
Queensland we have neither".'** Whitlam criticised the branch for 
depriving talented members of the opportunity to play an effective 
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part in its affairs, and for selecting as parliamentary candidates not 
those whose election would serve the party best in the future, but 
those whom officials wanted to reward for services rendered in the 
past. "They wish to beget candidates in their own image. Clones can 
turn out clowns."'*' Drawing parallels with the Victorian Branch in 
the late 1960s, he warned that "if Queensland does not put its house 
in order then Federal intervention is ultimately inevitable".^^ 
WhUe Whitlam's audience at the university responded with 
rapturous approval, party officials were understandably not over-
joyed by the speech. Jones defended the branch's electoral record, 
making the hoUow boast that Queensland ALP representation in the 
House of Representatives had been trebled the previous year (that 
is to say, from one MHR to three). He dismissed Whitlam's veUed 
threats of federal intervention as "nonsense" .^ ^ Three months later, 
Queensland officials boycotted a testimonial dinner held in 
Melbourne for Whitlam, the first Labor prime minister in a genera-
tion, on the occasion of his retirement from federal politics. 
Lead-Up to the 1979 Special Convention: 
Blunders by the Ruling Group 
Well before mid 1978, Queensland ALP members were preparmg for a 
February convention the next year. Despite Reformists' hopes, the 
rules covering a Labor-in-PoUtics Convention ensured that without 
an exceptional change in the attitudes of key Trades HaU unions the 
convention would deal with reform proposals as in the past. The 
only signUicant alteration in the convention's composition since 1977 
was the addition of a delegate from the AWU, which, despite its 
record of hostile relations with the Trades HaU unions, had no tmck 
with the Reformists it correctly viewed as hostUe. 
In July Reformists claimed, with a pubUc display of shock and 
horror, that the convention would be "stacked" against them.^^ If 
this insight was genuine, it had come remarkably late. It seems more 
Ukely that federal intervention was all along the Reformists' goal, 
and that the special convention caU was merely a ploy to estabUsh 
an alternative group before full federal intervention could take 
place. Indeed, it was noted m the press report of the Reform Group's 
1977 barbecue (wrUten by Denis Reinhardt, hUnseU close to the 
Reform Group) that in the day's discussions federal mtervention was 
considered and dismissed, "not because it was unlikely from the 
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federal end—but because there was no alternative structure or group 
of personalities able to replace the incumbents".^-' Beattie moreover 
admitted on ABC radio in July 1978 that "initially I favoured a sys-
tem whereby complete federal intervention would be the only real 
solution that could solve the problem", although it is not clear from 
this statement's context exactly what he meant by "initiaUy".^* 
If federal intervention was the Reformists' goal, the party 
leadership unwittingly helped provide the needed ammunition. On 
24 April, the day of the QCE meeting that decided to hold the early 
convention, the Archerfield EEC carried a resolution urging that 
Beattie and Murphy be asked to show cause why they should not be 
expelled from the party. It was reported that Harry HauenschUd 
moved the motion, and that Gerry Jones and other Inner Executive 
members were in attendance as visitors.^^ Shortly afterwards, ETU 
organiser Bob Hendricks, among the most vocal opponents of reform, 
circulated a letter in which he referred to Reformists as "fraitors to 
the Labor Cause" and "stooges of the media", and advised members 
"to ignore the garbage that these middle class academics have been 
circulating to branches and pubUshing in the media".^ Another cir-
cular, headed Expel These Grubs and signed by "loyal Labor mem-
bers", urged its readers to telephone Beattie and Murphy: "teU them 
the Labor Party doesn't want them and that you are sick of their 
self-seeking".^'' 
The party was severely embarrassed in June by its ambivalence 
towards civil liberties demonstrations confronting the Bjelke-
Petersen government over the ban on sfreet marches. The PLP decided 
to organise a protest march against the govemment; the QCE ap-
proved the idea, applied for a permit and received it. Having suc-
ceeded in breaking the march ban and in the face of expected partic-
ipation by civU liberties groups and others to the party's left, PLP 
leader Bums had the event cancelled. 
Burns compounded this folly with an incomprehensible expla-
nation that the application for a permit had only been a "ploy" and 
that the ALP had never had any "definite intention of marchmg"^^; 
the Courier-Mail edUoriaUsed that "the Labor Party in Queensland 
[had] made itself look idiotic".^' The whole episode further aUen-
ated those in the party's left who demanded a show of strength 
against the authoritarian coalition government^'' and raised doubts 
about the competence of the party's parliamentary leadership and 
senior officials. The unilateral action of Bums in overturning the 
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QCE's decision to march again focused attention on the size of the 
cUque which made decisions in the party. 
Bums's move was soon overshadowed by a monumental blunder 
by clique member, ETU secretary and ALP Senior vice-president 
Neal Kane. On 29 June 1978 it was reported in Queensland's 
provincial press that Kane had criticised federal Labor leader BiU 
Hayden. Kane referred to a recent opinion poll indicating that 
working class people did not support Hayden's leadership and, in 
effect, suggested that Hayden should resign.^^ By the end of the 
weekend Kane's comments had become widely known among ALP 
cUcles in Brisbane. It is unlikely that Kane intended his words to 
assume the importance that they did. His "statement" was in fact a 
few words spoken impromptu to a journaUst in the context of what 
Kane believed to be improper interference by Hayden in his union's 
elections.^2 Kane had previously criticised Hayden—in December 
1977 he had supported Hayden's leadership rival Lionel Bowen in 
an ABC radio interview, pointing out that Hayden's record in 
economic matters was not one of advancing working class interests.^^ 
Whatever the provenance of Kane's remarks the Reformists 
seized on them as a cause celebre. Before the Reformists pubUcised 
the statement it had not been reported in Brisbane, and thus had 
achieved little of the notoriety later attributed to it. Such infamy 
as it did eventually attain was thus almost wholly due to 
Reformists' efforts. Late on 2 July, a media response to Kane was 
released jointly by Beattie and fellow Reform Group barbecue-goer 
Jim Herlihy, an academic lawyer at the University of Queensland 
and secretary of the western suburbs Auchenflower branch. The 
response described Kane's remarks as "pure nonsense", and caUed for 
him to be dismissed or made to resign from the Inner Executive. 
Unless this occurred, they said, the Federal Executive should 
intervene m the Queensland Branch's affafrs. This was the first call 
for federal intervention. At the same time a petition began to be 
cUculated condemning Kane's "unwarranted, vindictive attack", and 
urging that he be disciplined by the QCE "for undermming the 
confidence of the QCE and rank and file members in Mr Hayden".^ 
Hayden, who was touring Asia, said that he did not know how 
to take Kane's comments: "before taking them seriously, I need to 
know when he made them".^^ Upon his return the foUowing week, 
Hayden extended this theme in an ABC television interview. 
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My impression is that most of the officials of the party are highly embar-
rassed by Mr Kane's behaviour. 
But I repeat, Mr Kane does have a problem maintaining his 
attention on a lot of matters and recaUing a lot of these incidents. 
He has often denied that he has said these things, because he has 
this serious health problem; and I think in his own interests he ought to 
retire so that he can recuperate.^ ^ 
Kane in turn chaUenged Hayden to stop "hiding behind innuendoes", 
and accused him of dealing with "Groupers" like Beattie and 
Murphy.^^ Kane's association of the Reformists with the Industiial 
Groups of the forties and fifties and, by impUcation, with the DLP 
prompted Beattie to threaten him with legal action.^* 
Burton and Burns, meanwhile, had attempted to distance 
themselves from the imbrogUo and had made muted statements of 
support for Hayden's leadership. Burton commented that Kane's 
behaviour would be "discussed in the proper area".*' After Hayden's 
television appearance Burton at last entered the fray with a stiong 
presidential statement. It was far from a defence of Hayden. 
Believing Hayden's attack on Kane to be as regrettable as Kane's 
original statement. Burton instructed that all pubUc comment must 
cease. Apparently speaking with Burns's support he named Kane, 
Hayden, Beattie and Herlihy as offenders, and revealed that he 
would seek disciplinary action against aU of them. He wamed that 
anyone making further public criticisms might face expulsion. There 
was no indication that Kane might be removed from the Inner 
Executive. 
Changing Tack: Reformists Look 
to Federal Intervention 
Beattie and Herlihy had advocated that the Federal Executive 
should intervene if Kane was not removed from party office. 
Hayden, while not explicitly drawing the same connection, wamed 
in a second television interview that unless the party reformed itself 
drastically and speedily, intervention was inevitable.^" He was re-
ported by the Courier-Mail to have had talks with Federal 
Executive coUeagues to this end.''^ 
Burton's comments Ufted calls for intervention to a cUmax. It was 
widely thought to be incredible that the federal leader might be 
punished on the same type of charge as Kane. The prospect horrUied 
the party nationally, and it was reported that the Federal 
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Executive would intervene if Hayden was disciplined, or if Kane 
was not removed from the Inner Executive.-'^ Trades HaU was clearly 
playing with fire, and its standing was not enhanced by the re-
emergence of mmours that 4KQ might be sold as a resuU of its con-
tmumg financial losses.^^ Manfred Cross, former MHR for Brisbane 
(subsequently re-elected), announced that he advocated 
intervention, m any event, "to restore competent admmisfration";^^ a 
number of branches, including Ashgrove, Auchenflower, Barron 
River, and Callide shared his view.''^ The state parliamentary 
party, on the other hand, resolved unanimously (once again on the 
motion of Bob Gibbs) to declare "vehemently" its opposition to 
intervention. 
We believe that any needed change should take place at the party's 
convention in February next year. 
We believe that the Queensland branch is quite capable of coping 
with such changes. 
Any form of intervention in Queensland would bring about disastrous 
long-term results for the party electoraUy, in the Federal and State 
spheres.^* 
One further significant development that came in the wake of 
Kane's comments and did not bode well for the party's officials was 
that, for the first time, union leaders joined the ranks of public crit-
ics. In July Australian Railways Union state secretary Pat Dunne de-
clared his beUef that the Queensland Branch's structure needed an 
"overhaul". ' ' ' ' He was followed by the state secretary of the 
Storemen and Packers' Union, Fred Nicol, who contended that Kane 
had now lost all influence in the party. "Heads will roll—and so 
they should," said NicoL though he added that he supported nei-
ther federal intervention nor some of Murphy's "far out" proposals.''® 
Both Dunne and Nicol headed large unions which had given their 
support to Trades Hall in the past. Also in July, the annual state 
conference of the Australian Telecommunications Employees 
Association adopted a report prepared by secretary Ian McLean 
which concluded that, in Queensland, the ALP's "rules and voting 
systems do tend to maintain the existence of an oUgarchy", and 
favoured an altemative stmcture consistent with the Reform Group's 
aims.''' 
When the (^CE held its monthly meeting on Monday 24 July, no 
disciplinary measures were recommended by the Inner Executive 
against anyone. A motion by Murphy to have Kane removed from the 
Inner Executive was supported by only twenty of the ninety-six QCE 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
228 From 1957 to 1988 
delegates, while twenty-six voted for a motion calling on Kane to 
resign, which was moved by the state president of the 
Amalgamated Metalworkers and Shipwrights' Union (AMWSU), 
Bryant Bums. Manfred Cross moved a motion from the floor express-
ing confidence in Hayden which was carried unanimously.^ Instead 
of disciplmary action, the (3CE decided on an Inner Executive recom-
mendation to formulate guidelines which would prevent further 
pubUc criticism by party members. As part of this procedure, eight 
members who had previously made critical pubUc statements were 
asked to attend discussions with the Inner Executive. Although their 
identities were not officially revealed it was understood that 
Hayden was not among them but that they included Beattie, Cross, 
Dunne, Kane and Nicol.*^ Beattie himself made it known that he 
was included, and also that, in accordance with the wishes of his 
Federal Divisional Executive in Ryan, he would refuse to attend.®^ 
Also at the July (JCE meeting, the election was held to fiU the 
place on the Inner Executive vacated by Hayden in March. Initially 
it had been envisaged that the position would be taken by Edgar 
Williams, in order to give due representation to the newly reaffiU-
ated AWU and this was believed to be Hayden's intention. The 
Trades HaU unions scorned thefr old enemy, however, and retired 
former Brisbane lord mayor Clem Jones was elected instead. 
The QCE's actions at the July 1978 meeting affronted Hayden 
who announced immediately that he would "be seeking a certain 
federal interest in Queensland".®^ The foUowing day, the Young 
Labor state executive, by forty votes to three, carried a motion 
declaring its lack of confidence in the QCE, and calling on the 
Federal Executive to "take decisive action to restore competent ad-
ministration to the Queensland Branch".®^ Senator George Georges 
observed that the Inner Executive appeared to have lost the trust 
and confidence of much of the party in Queensland, and urged that 
"federal action is now the only remedy for the rifts that have 
developed".®^ At the end of the week Hayden formaUy requested 
national secretary David Combe to Ust the question of intervention 
in (3ueensland as a matter of urgency on the agenda for the meeting of 
the Federal Executive that was to begin on 31 July. Branch president 
Tom Burton, meanwhUe, made a final attempt to avoid intervention 
by proposing discussions between the state branch and the Federal 
Executive on how the branch could be improved.®^ He was backed by 
the Brisbane Branch of the Waterside Workers' Federation which, 
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at a meeting attended by over five hundred members, declared its 
fuU support for the QCE and condemned the Reformists.®'' 
The Feds Move In: 1978 Inquiry 
A further consequence of the QCE's faUure to act against Kane was 
the formal re-establishment of the Reform Group, officiaUy dis-
banded in AprU.®® A third Bardon meeting, speedily organised for 
Sunday 30 July, the day before the Federal Executive meeting, was 
attended by three hundred party members. The meeting expressed its 
fuU confidence in Hayden's leadership and condemned the Inner 
Executive for "its failure to support Bill Hayden, its failure to 
discipline Neal Kane, and its failure to provide competent, 
responsible and responsive administration".®^ 
This meeting of ALP members, many of them members of affiliated 
unions, calls for the Federal Executive to take such action as will bring 
about a major restructuring of the Queensland Branch, to build a con-
temporary Labor Party which is a partnership between branch members 
and affiliated trade unionists.^'' 
At the Federal Executive Hayden reiterated the complaints made 
by Reformists during the previous eight months. He colourfuUy 
summed up his case: "There is an amorphous mass that settles on the 
party in a thoroughly suffocating way. What has been under the 
surface for some time is a seething festering unhappiness."^^ 
Hayden further indicated that he might resign from the lead-
ership if the Executive refused to act.^^ There was agreement that 
the Federal Executive ought to act quickly, but in a way that would 
impair as little as possible the credibility of the Queensland 
officers. The Federal Executive's resolution, moved by Hayden and 
carried without dissent, read: 
At the initiative of the Federal leader. Bill Hayden, and on the invitation 
of the Queensland representatives, the Federal Executive determines 
that there shall be an examination of the claims and counter-claims 
concerning the general operation of the Queensland Branch of the ALP. 
This examination shall be undertaken by the National Officers and 
Bill Hayden or his nominee. For this purpose they shall consult with 
Executive Members of the Queensland Branch and with such other per-
sons as may be determined by the Committee including Branch mem-
bers and Officers of affiliated unions. 
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The members shall commence the examination promptly and shall 
endeavour to submit a report to the National Secretary within one 
month of commencing the inquiry. The National Secretary shall con-
vene a special meeting of the Federal Executive in Brisbane within a 
fortnight of receipt of the report. 
The Federal Executive, having made this decision directed towards 
achieving a constructive resolution of this issue, requests all members of 
the Party to desist from further public comment and to participate 
within the structure of this inquiry.^'' 
In addition to Hayden or his nominee, the committee of inquiry in-
cluded Neil Batt (president), David Combe (secretary), John Ducker 
of New South Wales (senior vice-president), and Tom Burton and 
Bob McMuUan, (secretary of the Western Australian Branch) as 
junior vice-presidents. 
Both sides in Queensland expressed satisfaction with the deci-
sion. '^* From the outset the opportunity was given to (Queensland 
officers to save face by maintaining, at least publicly, that the in-
quiry was taking place with their express consent. Burton indeed 
had seconded the motion. Batt, when he subsequently arrived in 
Brisbane, was careful to stress that he was there by invitation, and 
Combe was at pains to refer to federal "assistance" rather than 
"intervention". 
The committee of inquiry began its work in Brisbane on 7 August, 
making the city's Crest Hotel its headquarters. Initially the Inner 
Executive attempted to secure a measure of supervision over the 
committee by requesting that party members who wished to make 
submissions should arrange appointments through the Labor House 
office, but the committee circumvented this infrusion by bringing its 
own Queensland administrative assistant who could be contacted 
directly. The Inner Executive's own discussions with the eight 
members who had made public statements were deferred 
indefinitely.^^ Over a period of three weeks the committee met with 
the Inner Executive, with the QCE, with Reform Group and TLC 
representatives, and with state parliamentarians. Opposition 
leader Burns told it that "the so-called reform group" was "nothing 
but a mob of Queen Street stfrrers".^^ The Reform Group presented a 
set of fifty-two recommendations. 
Gerry Jones announced after an Inner Executive meeting on 4 
August that he could not "see any big problems coming out of the 
committee of inquiry", and predicted that the Queensland Branch 
would be reformed without any upheaval.^'' This announcement con-
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firmed speculation that Burton had leaked the committee's deUber-
ations and lent credence to a story in the Brisbane press of a secret 
lunch involving Batt, McMuUan and Inner Executive member Arch 
Bevis, at which a 'deal' had aUegedly been done on the branch's fu-
ture.^ ® Their suspicions sharpened by Jones's statement, more than 
twenty-five Reformists, headed by Beattie, signed a letter to aU 
Federal Executive members, dated 14 September 1978 expressing 
thefr fears that "no substantial change is to occur".'' 
Brisbane City Council plebiscites on 2 September provided a 
timely iUusfration of accusations of impropriety that had become a 
commonplace in candidate selections of the (Queensland Branch. In an 
echo of allegations of AWU malpractice in the uses of facsimile 
ballot forms in the 1960s, it was aUeged that standard certificates 
(of union membership) were being improperly distributed "by the 
bookfuU",^ ™ and formal protests were lodged in two wards. Carina 
and Waterloo Bay. The impression created by these allegations and 
by an earlier refusal to defer plebiscites in federal seats untU the 
inquiry had reported was that the dominant cUque wished to wring 
every last advantage out of the existing preselection system before it 
was, conceivably, replaced by one less open to abuse. 
The poor standing of the ALP leadership in Queensland was 
further imperilled by the release of the Peel Report, in which the 
state Auditor-General identified parUamentarians of all major 
parties who were guilty of abusing their free air-travel 
entitlements. Six sitting Labor MLAs were named, including Bums. 
Many ALP members were shocked to realise that their own 
parliamentarians were just as ready as their opponents to derive 
improper benefits from their privileges, and the Bowman FDE 
called for re-selections to be held in the electorates of the named 
members of parUament, who had aUeady been re-endorsed.^°^ 
Federal Intervention Mark 1 
On 23 September the Federal Executive announced measures in re-
sponse to the committee of inquiry's recommendations which it 
would require the Queensland Branch to implement. The Inner 
Executive, QCE and Labor-in-Politics Convention would aU be 
abolished, and be replaced with an Administrative Committee, 
State CouncU and State Conference. The State Council and State 
Conference would be constituted m accordance with a 60:40 ratio of 
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union to branch representation. The conference would be held 
biennially. State CouncU would meet quarterly, on Sundays. The 
Adminisfrative Committee would have fifteen members. These 
would include a Senior vice president and six members elected by 
State Conference union delegates, a junior vice-president and three 
members elected by non-union delegates, and the federal and state 
leaders or thefr nominees. A Disputes Tribunal would be elected "to 
hear and determine any matter in dispute within the Queensland 
Branch", and a Finance Sub-Committee would supervise party 
finances. "First-past-the-post", rather than proportional, voting 
would be used for these elections—a vital concession to the existing 
leadership which ensured that no minority candidates could be 
elected. 
For plebiscites, a register would be maintained of those quali-
fied to vote in each contest. AffiUated frade unionists wotUd stiU be 
able to vote in candidate selections, but they would have to register 
in advance to have their names placed on the roU, as would branch 
members. Local State Conference and State CouncU delegates would 
be elected by branch members only. The Federal Executive found ir-
regularities associated with both the Brisbane City CouncU and the 
House of Representatives plebiscites, but decided not to seek any 
change in the results. 
The means by which this package of reforms was to be adopted 
by the branch was specified in a motion moved by New South Wales 
delegate and prominent right-winger John Ducker. 
This executive decides the Queensland branch of the party be required 
to call a convention of the party before the end of November. 
This convention wUl have as its sole item on the agenda the endorse-
ment of proposals adopted by this federal executive for changes to the 
structure of the Queensland Branch. 
Members of the national executive will be in attendance to support 
the proposals of this executive and will meet immediately to consider 
the outcome of that convention. ^ "^  
The final clause of the motion was understood to imply that if the 
branch did not agree to accept the reforms, a federal takeover might 
follow. 
The QCE discussed the Federal Executive's decisions within a 
week of their announcement, and resolved to hold a convention later 
in the year, as required, though the date later set, the first weekend 
of December 1978, was a Uttle later than required by the Federal 
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Executive. The QCE decided to reconvene the 1977 convention, with 
the addition of twelve AWU delegates, obviating the time-consum-
ing election of delegates. 
Among those who had sought reform m the branch, reaction to 
the Federal Executive's directive was divided. Hayden, who as 
federal leader and a member of the committee of inqufry had played 
a large part in formulating the decisions, was pleased. "'The 
proposals for reform", he said, "are reasonable, progressive, and 
ought to be endorsed."^"-^ 
A core of Reform Group members by confrast beUeved that the 
proposed changes were superficial. While welcoming such 
improvements as the abolition of standard certificates, the removal 
of the right of unionists who were not themselves party members to 
vote for branch convention delegates and the greater frequency of 
conferences, they maintained that proportional representation—the 
one measure which might significantly have altered the 
distribution of power in the branch—had been omitted. 
There was, however, no unanimity within the Reformists on 
this issue, with Murphy in principle supporting first-past-the-post. 
There was also disquiet over the continued rights of affiUated frade 
unionists in candidate selections, and the Federal Executive's faUure 
to discipline Kane.^ "'* 
Proportional representation had emerged as a demand during 
1978 as Reformists clarUied ideas about how the Queensland Branch 
could effectively be changed.^°^ No matter how large an 
Administrative Committee or any other Committee might be, if it 
was elected under the first-past-the-post voting system used in the 
Queensland Branch, all its members would owe their places to the 
group with the largest bloc of votes: minorities would never be 
represented. 
Proportional representation, on the other hand, as practised in 
other state branches, would give to each group a level of 
representation nearly equivalent to the magnitude of its support. 
The key opponent of proportional representation was the president 
of the New South Wales Branch, John Ducker. ^ "^  Concerned by the 
formation of an embryonic left faction in Brisbane, Ducker feared 
that adoption of proportional representation in Queensland might 
one day enable the left to wield significant influence there. 
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Aftermath of Intervention Mark 1: 
Dissatisfaction and Attempted Purges 
With these preoccupations, about thirty members of the Reform 
Group met at Madeleine MacPherson's residence in St Lucia on 2 
October 1978. The resulting pubUc statement bitterly denounced the 
proposals as a betrayal of reform. They did "not sufficiently alter 
the voting system to ensure that all sections of the party are repre-
sented"; they were "so watered down by deals and compromise for 
political expediency as to render them ineffectual".^"^ Because their 
implementation would do nothing to relieve the branch of its 
"autocratic, unrepresentative and incompetent" adminisfration, the 
only desirable remaining course was fuU federal intervention. 
The Queensland Branch is a blot on the whole ALP. We call on all ALP 
members in Queensland and through Australia to rally together to de-
feat the federal proposals. 
Immediate federal takeover remains the least divisive means of sal-
vaging the Queensland Branch. 
The reform group will not cease its activities until the State Branch 
has been restored to effective and harmonious management.'"® 
The statement was not signed, but gave the names of five Reform 
Group members from whom further information could be obtained, 
namely Beattie and Linacre; Rob Whiddon, then research officer to 
George Georges; and ex-Rhodes Scholar David Hamill and Mary 
Alexander, president and secretary respectively of Young Labor in 
(Queensland. 
Murphy dissociated himseU from the Reform Group as a result 
of the statement, '"^ but he joined with four other QCE delegates-
Cross, Linacre, Lindesay Jones and Billy Watts—in circulating 
within the party a more sober discussion paper, which despite his 
personal preference for first-past-the-post voting, also criticised the 
Federal Executive for not prescribing proportional representation.'"! 
Release of the Reform Group's statement provoked a hostile 
reaction from (Queensland party officials, who accused its authors of 
ignoring the Federal Executive's request, made in its July interven-
tion resolution, that party members should cease airing their 
grievances publicly. For the first time, formal discipUnary proceed-
ings were commenced against Reform Group members. On 23 October 
the (2CE caUed on the five Reform Group members whose names had 
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The 1891 pastoral strike leaders, 
convicted of conspiracy under an 
obsolete British statute, were 
finally released in November 1893. 
William Hamilton (foreground) 
was later a minister in the 1915 
Ryan government. (Fryer Library, 
University of Queensland) 
An early photograph of the AWU 
workers' hall in Chillagoe in about 
1905. Gohn Oxley Library) 
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Unionists march at Petrie Bight in the Eight-Hour Day demonstration in 1907. The National 
Hotel (centre), comer Petrie Bight and Adelaide Street, was demolished in 1987. (Fryer 
Library, University of Queensland) 
Members of the Federated Iron, Brass and Steel Moulders Union attend the Annual 
Queensland District dinner in Brisbane — obviously a males-only affair. (Fryer Library, 
University of Queensland) 
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The 1911 Sugar Strike showed the gains to be made from well-planned industrial action. 
Here organisers at a strike camp in Bundaberg are ready to cycle off to organise pickets. 
(John Oxley Library) 
Police "specials" and their horses were billeted on the Domain, now the site of the QIT car-
park. This group is gathered on the steps of Old Government House, armed for the fray. 
(John Oxley Library) Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
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In the 1912 General Strike, all 
work and commercial transactions 
were banned except by express per-
mission of the strike committee, 
The exemption certificate (top) 
gave authority to work and the 
food coupons were legal tender for 
food purchases. (Fryer Library, 
University of Queensland) 
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Unionists rally outside Trades Hall 
on 31 January 1912, at the first 
meeting after the announcement of 
the General Strike. (Fryer Library, 
University of Queensland) 
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Police and "specials", many of them recruited from the Darling Downs, muster in prepara-
tion for an attack on protesting unionists during the General Strike. The day became 
known as Black Friday (2 February 1912). 
The AWU fancied itself as the national 
One Big Union. Syndicalists' suggestions 
that a new structure be established were 
treated with contempt, as this cartoon 
from the Worker shows. (John Oxley 
Library) 
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The AWU's main competitor to 
becoming the One Big Union was 
the Australian Railways Union, 
formerly the Queensland Railways 
Union. This cartoon shows the 
Syndicalist approach. Note the 
diversity of railway officers' ranks; 
from front to rear, conductor, 
engine driver, station master, 
guard and fettler. {Militant, 6 
March 1920, reprinted with per-
mission of ARU) 
T.J. Ryan (undated, c.1916) 
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Queensland's education was picturesque, if undeveloped, throughout Labor's tenure of 
office. This photograph of a school polo team was proudly included in a govemment report 
on Queensland education prepared by J.D. Story in 1915. (John Oxley Library) 
The education system stressed coordinated fitness drills. Here, trainee teachers demonstrate 
what they will soon inflict on schoolchildren. (John Oxley Library) 
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The State Enterprises were set up with the intention that they would last. This magnificent 
building, the State Hotel at Babinda, still stands. 
The State Butchery and State Fish Shop, South Brisbane. (John Oxley Library) 
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The interior of the state Fish Shop shows a generous use of marble and brass in the shop's 
fittings. (John Oxley Library) 
The railway marshalling yards of the State Smelter at Chillagoe in about 1923. (John Oxley 
Library) 
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The Country and Progressive National Party of A.E. Moore used royal commissions to 
gain maximum public exposure of Labor's alleged misdeeds and maladministration. This 
cartoon shows the Worker's attitude to the armouncement of a royal commission into 
hospitals, 28 May 1930. (John Oxley Library) 
New Labor premier, William Forgan Smith (second from right), leads the 1933 Labor Day 
march down Queen Street. (Queensland Newspapers) 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
A rare photograph, taken about 
1935, of three Labor premiers: 
from left, William McCormack, 
E.G. Theodore, William Forgan 
Smith. (Queensland Newspapers) 
Premier Ned Hanlon (right) with 
[7] H.D. McGill, pictured near the 
old Victoria Bridge in 1948. 
(Queensland Newspapers) 
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During the 1948 Railway Strike police besieged Brisbane Trades Hall in order to arrest 
strike leaders. Some fugitives were forced to wear disguises, including women's clothing, in 
order to enter and leave the building. (John Oxley Library) 
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2 TAKEN TO HOSPITAL 
Police anii pickets ciasbeii fiercely in Edward street near Central Railway Station tWs 
Hntac shortly after a march liad left the Trades Hail. Batons were used and two men, one 
Mmnlst Member of Pariiament, Mr. Fred Paterson, were Uken to hospital Mr. Paterson's 
oMHtkHi at first serious later was retorted to be satisfactory. Full report of sensationai 
• I on Page 2. Pictures below were taken at tbe heiglit of the clash. 
On St Patrick's Day, 1948, a demonstration of strikers was set upon by police. Plainclothes 
officers attacked strike leaders without provocation. These front-page photographs in the 
Telegraph show the concealed weapons that were used. (Queensland Parliamentary 
Library) Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Ned Hanlon is remembered more for his 
administration of Queensland hospitals 
than for his excursions into industrial 
relations. This statue, in the grounds of 
the Royal Women's Hospital, Brisbane, 
was unveiled by his successor Vince Gair. 
Among anti-Gair leaders at a meeting at 
Trades Hall in 1956 were Jack Egerton 
(standing) and, seated on his right. Jack 
Devereux, secretary of the Amalgamated 
Engineering Union. (Queensland 
Newspapers) 
AWU leaders meet at Trades Hall during the 1956 Shearers' Strike. Note the noose hanging 
from the ceiling. (Fryer Library, University of Queensland) 
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Screaming banner headlines in the Courier-Mail greet the demise of Labor in office on 
Anzac Day, 1957. (Queensland Newspapers) 
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Above: The glorious progress to socialism in Queensland foreseen by this TLC float in the 
1957 Labor Day parade had come to an abrupt halt one week earlier when the Jack 
Egerton-led TLC unions had split the party. (Fryer Library, University of Queensland) 
Above, centre: Jack Duggan and Perc Tucker, at the opening of the Queensland 
Parliamentary Annexe in Brisbane in 1981. (Fryer Library, University of Queensland) 
Above, right: Pat Mackie, local leader in Mount Isa of the Committee for Membership 
Control, discusses tactics with Brisbane TLC leader Jack Egerton during the Mount Isa 
Mines Strike. Egerton was strong on rhetoric but his material support for the strikers was 
lacklustre. 
Below: Tensions were high in Mount Isa during the Mount Isa Mines Strike in 1964. 
Many workers regarded their union rather than their employer as the main enemy. 
(Queensland Newspapers) 
Below, centre: One of the emerging political issues that Labor ignored in the sixties was 
the growth of the new feminism. Here, Ro Bogner (left) and Merle Thornton in 1964 stage 
the first of a series of eventually successful protests to reverse the ban on women drinking 
in public bars in Queensland. By chaining themselves to the bar they echoed the protests 
of the suffragettes in Britain. Labor support for the protests was conspicuous leither by 
its absence or by its downright opposition. (Queensland Newspapers) 
Below, right: The Labor Party appealed to the advertising industry's image of women as 
solely wives, mothers and consumers, as seen in this 1966 state election advertisement. 
The tactic reached absurd heights with Vilma Ward's party-endorsed CARP campaign 
(Campaign Against Rising Prices) in the early seventies. (Fryer Library, University of 
Queensland) 
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By the eariy 1970s Labor had 
finally come to see the error of its 
electoral ways. Here, Jack 
Houston attempts to explain the 
iniquities of Queensland's electoral 
b o u n d a r i e s to the press. 
(Queensland Newspapers) 
Another political issue largely 
ignored by Queensland Labor was 
the Aboriginal rights movement. 
This grew rapidly after the 1966 
constitutional referendum whick 
made Aborigines citizens of 
Australia for the first time. Here, a 
demonstration for land rights in 
1972. 
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The 1971 Springbok Rugby tour was a 
landmark event in the Queensland 
government's preparedness to use repression 
against peaceful demonstrators. A state of 
emergency was declared to remove any legal 
obstacles to police violence. Virtually the 
entire Queensland police force was assembled 
at the Brisbane Exhibition grounds for the 
Springbok/Wallaby match. The ugliest 
incident for protesters occurred the night 
before outside the Tower Mill Motel where 
the Springboks were staying. Against direct 
orders broadcast over a loudspeaker by 
police commissioner Ray Whitrod, police 
charged at the demonstrators forcing them 
down a steep embankment and over the edge 
of a cutting. This had the effect of politicising 
many future leaders of the civil liberties 
movement and the left, including Terry 
O'Gorman and Peter Beattie. (Queensland 
Newspapers) 
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Gough Whitlam marching with Jack Egerton and Clem Jones, Brisbane, Labor Day, 1968. 
A moratorium march in 1971 filled Queen Street — the protest movement had grown 
enormously since the early days in 1966. 
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The event which led to the overthrow of Egerton: he kneels to receive his knighthood from 
Sir John Kerr in November 1976. (Canberra Times) 
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With the new federal leader Bill 
Hayden (right) are Harry 
Hauenschild and Gerry Jones, 
Egerton's successors. Having a 
federal leader from Queensland 
was something of a coup for the 
state ALP, although it was 
eventually to lead to the 
overthrow of the ruling clique. 
(Queensland Newspapers) 
THE 
CASE FOR REFORM 
irs a 
great party. 
Lefs get it 
working 
again. 
of the 
Queensland Branch 
of iiig Cover of Reform Group pamphlet, 1978. 
Australian Labor Party 
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Self-expelled from the party in the 
legal battles following interven-
tion, Clem Jones was readmitted 
— and had his life membership 
restored — in 1984. From left: state 
frontbencher Terry Mackenroth, 
Clem Jones holding ticket aloft, 
and state leader Keith Wright. 
(Queensland Newspapers) 
The paternal and trustworthy im-
age of Nev Warburton was ex-
emplified by the 1986 election 
slogan: Nev Warburton — Your 
Honest Choice for Queensland. 
(ALP, Queensland Branch) 
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The "New Guard" finally moved in to Breakfast Creek in March 1982. Denis Murphy and 
Peter Beattie, again without furniture, sit incongruously before a giant framed photograph 
of the royal yacht Britannia, shown arriving in Brisbane for the Captain Cook bicentenary 
celebrations in 1970. (Queensland Newspapers) 
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Nev Warburton (left) and Ed 
Casey (waving) lead the 1979 
Labor Day march, accompanied 
by Harry Hauenschild (right) and 
Clem Jones (behind). (Queensland 
Newspapers) 
The interim administration was 
forced by "Old Guard" 
intransigence to move into rented 
accommodation in Charlotte 
Street rather than the party's 
elaborate quarters at Breakfast 
Creek. No funds were available to 
furnish the premises. Here, interim 
president Denis Murphy holds a 
discussion with deputy leader Tom 
Burns in the new headquarters. 
(Courtesy Terry Hampson) 
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"New Guard" leaders Denis Murphy and Peter Beattie at a press conference after 
intervention in 1980. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Wayne Goss, new Queensland ALP leader, 1988 
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appeared on the statement, and also George Georges, on whose office 
telex equipment the statement was released, to show cause why they 
should not be disciplined. It was decided that the six should attend 
an Inner Executive meeting on 20 November to present their case."^ 
Senator Georges was also at the centre of another controversy 
which upset the ALP in Queensland during October, and which the 
QCE meeting debated. This concerned the continuing question of the 
ALP's involvement in the civil liberties campaign for "the right to 
march" in Queensland. Georges, along with federal New South 
Wales frontbencher Tom Uren, was a leading organiser of a protest 
planned for 30 October, at which demonstrators would attempt ille-
gally to march from Brisbane's King George Square to Parliament 
House to present a petition. The PLP dissociated itself from the 
demonstration and asked Bums to raise with the QCE the charge 
that Georges's involvement might bring the party into disrepute. 
Reports in the Courier-Mail and Telegraph suggested that Georges 
would be ordered to terminate his association with the planned 
march and might even receive a "show cause" notice for having been 
involved in the first place."^ The QCE, however, decided that ALP 
members be free to participate in the march, though as individuals 
rather than as party representatives. 
The Inner Executive's deliberations on 20 November were incon-
clusive. Georges presented a letter signed by the six, claiming that 
they could not defend themselves until the vaguely worded charge 
against them had been made more specific. The Executive referred 
the matter back to the QCE. The likely reason for its inaction was 
that on the following Saturday, 25 November, a state by-election 
was to be held in the Sherwood electorate and the executive wished 
to avoid the possibility of yet another round of public controversy. 
After a year of turmoil the ALP was hardly likely to perform well, 
and it received a further blow when Liberal Party MLA Terry Gygar 
alleged in parliament that the ALP had illegally made a large 
amount of money from fraudulent lucky number stalls, at which pa-
trons thought they were supporting the Australian Pensioners 
League."'' These allegations were to have a dramatic impact on the 
course of events within the Queensland Branch during 1979. The 
Sherwood result was a poor one for Labor. Mike Kinnane gained, af-
ter distribution of preferences, a small swing of 2.4 per cent to 
Labor."* The by-election was also important for the low National 
Party vote, reinvigorating Liberal hopes for senior coalition partner 
status. 
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Two days later. Bums shocked delegates at the November QCE 
meeting by announcing his resignation from the parliamentary lead-
ership. The next day, the parliamentary party elected rotund 
Right-to-Lifer Edmund Casey unopposed, as his successor, opening 
cracks for the first time in the monolithic front of the Queensland 
ruling group. Casey's relations with Trades Hall had never been 
felicitous. A past AWU member and staunch Catholic, Casey had 
held his electorate of Mackay since 1969, despite losing party 
endorsement in a purge of right-wing MLAs in 1972. After two terms 
as an independent he had rejoined the ALP, at Bums's instigation, as 
recently as February 1977. "This was not the ideal curriculum vitae 
for a prospective parliamentary leader, but Bums was convinced, on 
the basis of Casey's work as Primary Industries spokesperson, that 
he had the ability to attract the support in rural electorates that 
Labor would need to win government."^ 
The Sherwood by-election over, the QCE again referred to the 
Inner Executive the question of the disciplinary proceedings it had 
coiiimenced against the six Reformists. A motion that the matter be 
referred to the Federal Executive was narrowly defeated."^ The 
telex affair had another consequence later in the week when David 
Hamill and Mary Alexander resigned as Young Labor president and 
secretary, respectively, following the passage of a No Confidence 
motion in them by the Young Labor state executive. A number of other 
executive members resigned in sympathy with them, and Young 
Labor, even more than its parent body, found itself in a state of crisis. 
A New Start? The Last Convention, 
the First Conference 
At the reconvened convention, held in Brisbane on 2 December, divi-
sions emerged from the outset, when an unsuccessful attempt was 
made to have the AWU delegation excluded on the grounds that, 
since it had not been present at the original convention but had reaf-
fiUated in the meantime, it ought not to be represented at the recon-
vened convention. Following the opening session, the Federal 
Executive and Inner Executive met jointly to consider how best to 
have the recommended reforms adopted. It was agreed to advise the 
convention that the reforms should be considered as a single 
package. Despite some opposition the convention agreed to this 
procedure, and in a single vote the Queensland Branch ostensibly 
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"reformed" itself."'' That central forum of Queensland Labor, the 
Labor-in-Politics Convention, had ceased to exist. 
After the convention, Casey set about vigorously trying to re-
store some harmony within the Queensland Branch. His efforts in-
cluded an offer to chair a meeting between rival factions of Young 
Labor. Casey also took the initiative of attending a meeting of the 
Reform Group, and listening for three hours as the Reformists voiced 
their concerns. One Reform Group member commented that "Mr Casey 
in three weeks [sic] leadership has sorted out some issues that have 
been festering for a year"."^ The appearance of harmony which the 
ALP Queensland Branch attained towards the end of 1978 lingered 
into the beginrung of 1979. On 23 January the Inner Executive, goaded 
by the Federal Executive, stopped proceedings against the six 
Reformists associated with the Reform Group telex of October. In re-
turn, the six agreed to take no more actions that might weaken the 
branch's stability."' Eight days later the Reform Group's steering 
committee resolved to suspend its meetings indefinitely for the sec-
ond time in a year. This decision was hailed by state parliamentary 
leader Ed Casey as "typical of a feeling of unity moving through the 
party".i20 
The image of unity proved a mirage. The party's first State 
Conference under the new rules, held from 17 February to 23 February 
in Rockhampton, showed that divisiveness was as pronounced as 
ever. Under the new rules, the eighty-two delegates were now 
branch delegates and only branch members were entitled to vote in 
their selection. But reliance of the new rules on the notoriously 
malapportioned state electoral boundaries, continued to give undue 
representation to country members. 
Apart from the 82 branch delegates, the conference included 3 
delegates elected by the Labor Women's Conference, and 1 by the 
Young Labor Conference. To these 86 delegates were added, in accor-
dance with the 60:40 ratio prescribed by the new rules, uruon repre-
sentation of 129 delegates. In addition, eleven members were dele-
gates ex officio or as representatives of special groups. These were 
Tom Burton (president), Neal Kane and Harry Hauenschild (vice-
presidents), Gerry Jones (secretary). Bill Hayden (federal parlia-
mentary leader), Ed Casey and Jack Houston (state parliamentary 
leader and deputy leader), Frank Sleeman (Brisbane lord mayor), 
and representatives of provincial city aldermen, shire councillors 
and the Union Credit Union. The total voting strength of Conference 
was 226.121 
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The State Conference was the first major public occasion on 
which the branch's nascent Socialist Left faction made its presence 
felt. This appearance of this group had been a factor in dissuading 
the Federal Executive from imposing proportional representation on 
the branch: the federally dominant right wing wished at all costs to 
prevent Queensland becoming a base for the left. Its members were 
generally sympathetic to reform, many of them having been in-
volved in the Reform Group, but were concerned that debates over 
organisational structure were relegating consideration of policy to a 
back seat. They shared a conviction that the party had for too long 
relied on the cultivation of a moderate image to take it to govem-
ment in the state, despite this tactic's obvious record of failure. The 
Socialist Left, whose best known member was Senator George 
Georges, hoped to shift the focus of debate from orgarusation to pol-
icy. It became obvious at the Conference, however, that differences 
over the Branch's organisation were far from resolved. 
Burton's presidential address demonstrated that the bitterness 
of 1978 persisted in the outiook of the ruling group. 
In my opinion, the establishment of the reform group in Queensland 
had a disastrous effect on the image of the ALP in Queensland and did 
absolutely nothing to assist the political, industrial and administrative 
wings of the Party. ... 
Their enunciated policy was to curb the power of certain sections of 
the Labor Movement in Queensland; however, these individuals were so 
politically naive, that they became the victims of their own peculiar poli-
cies. 
They were not content to confine their activities within the Rules and 
the administrative framework of the Party and were gullible enough to 
become the victims of the enemies of the Australian Labor Party, that is, 
the Press and the Media ... 
Let us all sincerely hope we never again experience this type of activ-
ity within the Queensland Branch of the Party.^^^ 
That said. Burton called on the party to "forget the past in-fighting 
and bickering that has taken place".'^3 
On 18 February, on Jones's motion, the new rules were formally 
adopted by the conference. The next day, the election of officers and 
committees revealed the relative strength of competing forces. 
Burton easily retained the presidency by 179 votes to 38. 
Hauenschild was unopposed for the union vice-presidency, while 
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Clem Jones defeated Sue Yarrow by 63 votes to 30 for branch vice-
president.124 
The voting pattern evident in the presidential contest was re-
peated in ballots for the new Administrative Committee. Ruling 
group nominees won all six union positions, including Edgar 
Williams, whose election marked the return of the AWU to a posi-
tion of ii\fluence within the branch^^s jj^g ^^Q dissident candidates, 
AMWSU state president Bryant Bums and Joe Harris of the BWIU, 
each received only 34 votes out of a possible 124. Ruling group candi-
dates likewise took all three branch positions on the committee, all 
National Conference and Federal Executive positions and the new 
returning officer position and Disputes Tribunal positions. 
The impression that little had changed in the Queensland 
Branch was reinforced by the presentation of the finance report. 
Detailed accounts of only one of the party's funds, the General Fund, 
were provided, and many delegates found the conclusions derived 
from them unconvincing. In particular, only minimal information was 
given about the party's enterprises.i^e J ^ Q branch members who were 
chartered accountants subsequently submitted lengthy criticisms of 
the report to David Combe.'27 
Nor was the accounting the only cause for bitterness. The 
Socialist Left later complained that "ultra sexism, racism and 
intolerance were plainly evident in the scurrilous literature 
circulated to delegates".^^^ Georges wrote to national secretary 
Combe that "the vilification of women delegates was such as to 
reduce one in my presence to a state of deep distress". Georges also 
found cause for complaint in the treatment that he received. 
The behaviour of some newly appointed members to the Administrative 
Committee was disappointing. One such member shouted across the 
Conference Room, "Give Georges the microphone so that we can all 
hear the shit he's talking". The President of the Queensland Branch 
when I approached him ... said in the hearing of others on the confer-
ence floor, "You stink! You can start reckoning your superannuation 
now".l29 
The Socialist Left further alleged that personal differences also in-
truded into discussions of policy. "There was a real tendency for 
large sections of the Conference to support policies not on the merits 
of the policies but on who initiated them."^^ 
Others were more satisfied with the outcome of pohcy debates. 
Australian Telecommunications Employees Association (ATEA) 
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delegates reported that "they were happy with their involvement 
in the policy deciding activities of conference",^^1 and the more 
right-wing Reformist MacPherson considered that "the party comes 
from the Conference with excellent policies, enlightened, 
progressive and defendable".^^^ 
The Georges Proxy Affair 
The controversy which overshadowed all others at the conference 
was that which surrounded Hayden's position on the 
Administrative Committee. The new rule 30(a), governing the com-
mittee's composition, laid down that it should include the "State 
Parliamentary Leader or his nominee" and "the federal leader 
(where a Queenslander) or his nominee". The rules clearly gave 
leaders the right to appoint members to serve in their stead. 
Hayden, understanding that an Admirustrative Committee meeting 
might be held during the coivference and having already left it to 
return to Canberra, sent a telegram to Georges on 20 February asking 
him to serve as proxy delegate "to any meetings of the 
Administrative Committee of the State Branch and for the rest of 
the year unless I advise otherwise".^'^ 
Georges's appointment outraged supporters of the ruling group, 
who considered that the defeat of Georges and the Socialist Left in 
the previous day's elections made it clear that the majority of dele-
gates would not want him on the Administrative Committee. One 
"senior official" was reported in the Courier-Mail as saying: "The 
conference has virtually wiped the floor with him, yet Hayden has 
done this. Hayden must be trying to hang himself. He must be 
politically naive".^^^ Dissidents took the opposing view, arguing 
that Georges's appointment would give some representation to the 
substantial minority that had been effectively disenfranchised by 
the operation of the branch's voting system. 
On the morning of 21 February Ed Casey telephoned Hayden 
and requested, unsuccessfully, that Hayden withdraw his nomina-
tion. Casey subsequently issued a press statement in which he re-
ferred to the previous defeats of Georges and his sympathisers, and 
claimed that "Senator Georges' appointment was incompatible with 
the wish of the Labor movement".'^^ Later that day, conference 
changed the branch's new rules to prevent Georges from taking 
Hayden's proxy. Clem Jones requested leave to introduce a motion to 
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remove the words "or his nominee" from the references to the state 
and federal leaders in rule 30(a). It was argued from the floor that 
as the conference had already considered the branch's rules on 18 
February, any motion allowing Jones to proceed should require a 
three-quarters majority. Hauenschild, chairing the conference, ruled 
that Jones's application be dealt with under a different rule which 
required only a two-thirds majority. 
HauenschUd's ruling was challenged but upheld; a subsequent 
vote taken under standing order 13 was declared carried, and Jones 
was able to proceed. It was subsequently alleged that the vote that 
was taken even under standing order 13 should not have caused the 
motion to be declared carried, as two-thirds of all credentiaUed 
delegates (as opposed to "delegates present") had not supported it. 
The procedural question formed the basis of an appeal by Murphy to 
the Federal Executive, and led the Socialist Left to claim that "the 
Chairperson changed rules, ignored rules, and finally made them up 
at whim". ^^ According to Terry Hampson, HauenschUd was heard 
to remark to Burton, "What rules wUl we break todayT".^^'' 
Actual debate on the motion was obfuscated by the ruling 
group's desire to mask its motives. Jones made no mention of Georges, 
but instead produced a case that both Hayden and Casey should be 
obliged to sit in person on the Adminstrative Committee. In view of 
what had occurred, Jones's argument was transparent, and Hamish 
Linacre said so in speaking against the motion. 
This motion is to try to avoid Mr Hayden's nominee from sitting on that 
committee ... 
If it is not clear to the mover or seconder of the motion what this 
game is all about, it is certainly clear to Mr Casey because he rang Mr 
Hayden to try to get him to change his mind. 
When that failed, the next play in the game was to change the rules 
in midstream.1^ 
Jones's motion, seconded by Williams, was carried by 146 votes to 65. 
The enmity which had previously characterised relations be-
tween the "Trades HaU" and both Casey and the AWU was now 
temporarily buried, as the three parties joined forces against the 
threat of further reform and intervention. This arrangement was not 
without cost for its participants: as the alUance hardened, the base 
of the ruUng group's original support in Trades HaU contracted. The 
SociaUst Left provided an alternative organisational base to which 
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left-wing unions that were no longer prepared to support the ruling 
group were increasingly drawn. The alliance with the AWU and 
Casey cast further doubt on the Trades Hall group's left-wing 
credentials. At the conference, union delegates who actively pro-
moted the SociaUst Left were from the AMWSU, ATEA, BWIU, 
FMWU and the Hospitals Employees Federation (HEF). In 
addition, the SociaUst Left received support from delegates of the 
ARU, the Federated Liquor Trades Employees Union and the 
Plumbers and Gasfitters Employees Union (PGEU).^^' Union 
delegates opposed the move against Georges, and subsequently found 
themselves shuimed by supporters of the ruling group. 
The Georges proxy imbrogUo threw the Queensland Branch into 
renewed turmoU. Senator Jim Keeffe wrote to David Combe, asking 
that the Federal Executive again intervene in Queensland, citing 
among grounds for his request the breaches of Standing Orders that 
occurred in connection with the move against Georges. Keeffe, who 
previously had "consistently opposed the poUcy of intervention by 
the Federal Executive in the affairs of State branches of the party", 
told Combe he had become convinced that only "total intervention 
by the Federal Executive", including the suspension of the 
Queensland officers, could remedy the problems that had developed 
in the branch.^''^ Keeffe's request was supported by Doug 
Everingham, MHR for Capricomia, and by Georges and Manfred 
Cross. 1^ ' SimiUar caUs were made by the AMWSU and the PGEU, by 
Brisbane and Ryan FDEs, and by some branches and individual 
members. ATEA suggested that the Federal Executive impose 
proportional representation on the branch, and also make additional 
appointments to the Administrative Committee. 
Meanwhile, the branch had placed itself, as a result of Jones's 
motion, in a difficult predicament. The change of rules required the 
parliamentary leaders either to attend each Administrative 
Committee meeting personally, clearly an impossible demand to 
make of the federal leader whose presence was often needed in 
Canberra and elsewhere in Australia, or to remain unrepresented. 
National president Neil Batt met with the Administrative 
Committee and a compromise was found which was unanimously 
supported by the committee. This was the adoption of a motion, by 
the Administrative Committee, to accept proxy nominees on occa-
sions when the leaders were unable to attend. 
Hayden's own reaction to the events that followed his nomina-
tion of Georges was, at first, similar to that of Keeffe, Everingham, 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Moves for Reform 243 
Georges and Cross. Saymg that he was "disappointed, surprised and 
non-plussed",i''2 j^ g resolved to press for a special meeting of the 
Federal Executive to consider the issue, with a view to intervening. 
The UkeUhood that this would result in proportional representation 
being introduced in the branch, leaving the way open for the 
SociaUst Left to increase its influence nationaUy, was regarded with 
apprehension by right-wmg figures in the other states. The powerful 
leaders of the New South Wales "Right" faction, John Ducker, fed-
eral deputy leader Lionel Bowen, MHR Paul Keating and influential 
South AustraUan MHR Mick Young all pressed Hayden to desist 
from his intention. Hayden was told that he was being used by the 
left for its own purposes. This persuasion was successful, and Hayden 
decided, at least for the present, to take matters no further.^^^ 
Requests for intervention, and other appeals concerning conduct 
of the conference, were considered by the Federal Executive at its 
April meeting. A motion that the executive "intervene finaUy and 
decisively in Queensland" was moved but lapsed for want of a secon-
der.'''^ The appeals were coUectively rejected. Hayden subsequently 
made a point of nominating Jim Keeffe as his proxy to the 
Administrative Committee. Senator Keeffe was, like Georges, asso-
ciated with the Socialist Left. 
Parliamentary Capers: 
Doubts about PLP Competence 
Despite this internal disruption, and despite further revelations in 
parliament about the ALP's alleged Ulegal involvement in running 
Australian Pensioners League fundraising staUs,''*^ the party suc-
ceeded in retaining control of the Brisbane City CouncU in the March 
1979 elections. Under such adverse circumstances this was a remark-
able achievement. Lord Mayor Frank Sleeman enjoyed considerable 
personal popularity, and in his own ward of Banyo achieved a mas-
sive 10.6 per cent swing to the ALP. The ALP obtained an overaU 
two-party-preferred vote of 54.3 per cent, representing a swing of 1.5 
per cent. The ALP also had some pleasing results in other parts of 
the state; most notably in Maryborough, where it won all eight 
wards. 
Three days after the municipal government elections, 
Queensland's coaUtion government sowed the seeds of yet another 
ALP crisis. A Criminal Law Amendment BUI was suddenly intro-
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duced shortly before the Legislative Assembly adjourned for the day 
on 3 AprU which then passed through all stages by 2.38 p.m. the 
following day. The total time given to its consideration was less 
than two hours. Labor members supported the bUl. The provisions 
affecting the Justices Act were designed to regulate private prosecu-
tions in respect of indictable offences by requiring the attorney-
general's approval before proceedings could be initiated; they 
provoked widespread uproar in the community. 
On 5 April, prominent Brisbane criminal barrister Des Sturgess 
launched an attack on the legislation alleging that it removed "a 
citizen's ancient right of access to the courts". At the same time as 
Sturgess voiced his criticisms, it was reported that the purpose of 
the amendments was to protect the twenty-three past and present 
parliamentarians, of all parties, whom the Pe^l Report had found 
guilty of abusing air-travel-voucher entitlements.'*^ 
During the next few days, a formidable array of critics joined in 
condemning the amendments, among whom were former Queensland 
chief justice Sir Mostyn Hangar,'*^ president of the Queensland Law 
Society, Gerry Murphy,'*^ and president of the Queensland Bar 
Association, Cedric Hampson.''*' Editorials in the Courier-Mail and 
Telegraph took the govemment to task.'^° Condemnation was loud in 
the Liberal Party.'^' National Party president Sir Robert Sparkes 
said he was "completely amazed" by the amendments, and Premier 
Johannes Bjelke-Petersen, caring Uttle on this occasion for the prin-
ciples of ministerial responsibility, claimed to have been 
unenthusiastic about the legislation from the outset.'^^ On 9 April 
state Cabinet reconsidered the amendments, which had received 
Royal Assent three days previously, and amending legislation was 
subsequently introduced and carried.'^'' 
The mess in which the government found itself might have 
provided a fine opportunity for Opposition attack, had the PLP not 
itself supported the legislation. Instead, the ALP was even more 
embarrassed than the government. Casey attempted lamely to 
excuse the party by claiming that the haste with which the 
amendments were introduced and debated had given the Opposition 
insufficient time to consider them; the Opposition had, he claimed, 
been left "with no alternative but to accept the credibility of the 
outline given by the Justice Minister".'^'^ Unfortunately for Casey, 
Keith Wright, during the Legislative Assembly "debate" on 4 April, 
told parliament that "the members of my committee have had an 
opportunity to consider the proposals being put forward" and that 
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"we have looked very carefully at aU points" and "support the 
measures".'^^ 
Members and supporters of the ALP were acutely disappointed 
by the state Opposition's faUure to oppose the amendments. The 
consequent widespread feeUng of disenchantment was voiced by 
George Georges in a 10 AprU press statement critical of the PLP. 
"Their failure to oppose the amendment to the Justices Act is unforgiv-
able," Senator Georges said. 
"The attitude of Edmund Casey can no longer go unchallenged. 
"1 have been prepared to accept without comment the statements by 
Mr Casey reducing the efforts of civil liberties campaigners over the 
past two years to a mere 'brawling in the streets' and 'a whole waste of 
time'. 
"But Mr Casey's failure to take a proper stand on this legislation 
indicates that he has no proper understanding of the rights of citizens 
for which so many have struggled for so long."''^ 
Georges subsequently added that the sUence of the parUamentarians 
and of the party secretary over the issue had "browned him off".'5'' 
Casey's pubUc gloating over Georges's resignation in December 1986 
may be traced to this incident. '^ 
Gerry Jones responded to the attack by asking Georges to hold 
urgent discussions with him, prior to the matter being reported to the 
Administrative Committee. Georges refused, replying that he could 
see no useful purpose in such a meeting, and asserting that his re-
marks had been "an attempt to salvage the self-respect of the 
party".'5' Casey, infuriated by Georges's denunciation, raised the 
question of Georges's actions at a meeting of the state parUamentary 
party, which duly wrote to the Administrative Committee request-
ing that Georges be censured.'^° Faced with the possibUity that 
Georges would be severely disciplined, left-wing union leaders 
moved to defend him. Bryant Burns threatened disaffiliating the 
AMWSU from the ALP and forming a new party. His union might 
have to choose, he wamed, between "a new virile honest principled 
party and a do-nothing political party" whUe the BWIU also indi-
cated that it would have to consider its position if Georges were dis-
ciplined, though it stressed that this did not imply that it would 
necessarily disaffiliate.'^' 
On 25 AprU Peter Beattie, who had played little part in events 
since the December convention, entered the fray with an interview 
on the AustraUan Broadcasting Commission's Nationwide television 
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programme in which he described some ALP state parUamentarians 
as "inept" and "dead wood". In particular, he criticised the parUa-
mentary party's failure to oppose the Justices Act amendments, its 
failure to put forward a substantial response to attacks which 
Bjelke-Petersen had recently made on the Queensland Arbitration 
Comnussion, and its faUure to join in community condemnation of the 
midnight demolition of Brisbane's historic Bellevue Hotel on 20 
AprU, as certain Liberal MLAs had done.'^^ 
Unknown to Beattie, Ed Casey had been invited to appear on 
Nationwide on the same evening that Beattie's interview was 
screened and Casey's consequent discomfort contributed to the impact 
of Beattie's attack. On 27 AprU the two met to discuss the incident; 
Beattie afterwards appeared uncharacteristically contrite, ac-
knowledging the difficulties which the Opposition faced in operat-
ing under a government that refused to grant it adequate faciUties,'^ 
and undertook to make no further pubUc complaints.'^ None the less 
on 30 April the Administrative Committee issued notices to Beattie 
and Georges, requiring them to show cause why disciplinary charges 
should not be laid against them. Both were requested to appear be-
fore the committee. 
The Pensioners League Scam 
Early in May 1979 Gerry Jones announced that a third ALP member 
was to attend the forthconxing Admirustrative Committee meeting in 
connection with disciplinary matters. This was Joe Harris, a left-
wing organiser for the BWIU, who had been a member of the 
Communist Party of Australia until 1963. In his case, the 
Administrative Committee's desire to take action arose from the ex-
posure by Liberal backbencher Terry Gygar of aUegations concerning 
ALP fund-raising malpractices. These involved an agreement with 
the Australian Pensioners League under which ALP members staffed 
lucky-number stalls under the League's name, with both organisa-
tions sharing the proceeds. The scheme had originaUy been set up in 
1971 but was later refined when the ALP established Queensland 
Volunteer Finance Raisers (QVFR) as a front organisation, disguising 
to some extent the party's participation. According to a document 
tabled by Gygar in November 1978, QVFR benefited to the extent of 
just over $14,000 from March 1976 to August 1977 alone.'^ 
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The ALP's involvement with the Pensioners League in rurming 
lucky-number staUs was entirely iUegal. Such activities, frequently 
conducted by community organisations, were regulated in Queensland 
under the Collections Act and the Art Unions and Amusements Act. 
These acts prohibited poUtical parties from being granted permits to 
undertake such fund-raising activities. The scam operated smoothly 
untU early in 1978 when the Pensioners League began to express dis-
satisfaction with the arrangement, maintaining that it was not re-
ceiving the proportion of the proceeds to which it was entitled. The 
league's secretary Geoff Goullet complained to Harris, who 
initiated an attempt to resolve matters to the league's satisfaction. 
This failed, and in October the league terminated its agreement 
with the ALP.'** Gygar obtained, along with other information from 
sources within the Pensioners League, a copy of a letter dated 17 
November in which ALP finance director Gordon O'SulUvan advised 
ALP branches that the scheme had been terminated. He raised the 
matter briefly in parUament on 22 November, and more fuUy on 23 
November, two days before the Sherwood by-election.'*'' FoUowing 
his allegations. Liberal attorney-general BUl Lickiss announced 
that the Department of Justice was making a thorough investigation 
of the scheme.'*^ 
Harris and other party members, concerned that this 
investigation might lead to further damaging revelations on the eve 
of the Brisbane City Council poll, decided to consult national 
president NeU Batt. Batt met with them in Brisbane during March, 
and advised Harris to write to Combe, as national secretary, setting 
out what he knew of the scheme and its likely consequences.'*' 
Harris did so on 15 March and made at least ten copies of his letter; 
seven of these he sent to other members of the Federal Executive, and 
three to Queensland ALP federal parliamentarians.'^° One copy 
reached Gygar, who used it on 28 March to make another 
devastating attack. The letter enabled Gygar to provide the most 
comprehensive account of the affair that had yet appeared 
publicly. It also gave him further ammunition by revealing the 
response of the ALP officers to his earUer aUegations. According to 
Gygar (subsequently denied by Jones),'^' Terry MelUfont had drafted 
for Burton and Gerry Jones a document designed to be signed by 
O'SuUivan, by means of which O'SulUvan would personally accept 
fuU liabUity for all improprieties that had occurred. O'SuUivan, 
however, had refused to sign.'^^ 
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In the end, no person was ever prosecuted over the Pensioners 
League affair. The reason for this is unclear. A paragraph of 
Harris's letter, as read in parUament on 31 October, said: "There are 
some who hope to do a deal. The ALP lay off RusseU Island etc., the 
Government lay off QVFR".'''3 Despite the party's generaUy good 
performance in the Brisbane City Council elections, it was felt 
within the mling group that Gygar had succeeded in damaging the 
ALP. For this, Harris was blamed.''"* A physical beating he received 
after the local government election was reportedly associated with 
antagonism towards him arising from this perception.'^^ There was 
no doubt that Gygar's speech was based on Harris's letter, and in 
October Gygar confirmed that this was the case, at the same time 
insisting that it was not Harris who had supplied him with his 
copy.'^* 
The May Purges 
Harris, then, was added to the list of those whose cases were to be 
considered by the Administrative Conunittee on 4 May. Although 
committee members claimed they had been 'sworn to secrecy' about 
its proceedings, it is now known that Georges, reading a prepared 
statement, challenged the propriety of the Administrative 
Committee acting as it was, in view of the clear separation of 
administrative and arbitrative authority in the new rules. Insisting 
that he was therefore attending the meeting voluntarily, "in a 
spirit of co-operation", he expressed his view that he was bound by 
the party's platform to resist infringements of civU Uberties, and 
that this was what he had been doing when he spoke out against 
the Justices Act amendments. '^ ^ On the other hand, he said, "the 
manner in which the amendments were passed through the 
parliament aroused the suspicion that the members of the state 
parliamentary Labor Party not only failed to support the poUcy of 
the party, but in fact were part of an agreement with the CoaUtion 
to expedite the passage of the amendments".'^* 
On 17 May Georges and Harris were notified that discipUnary 
charges had been laid against them. Beattie was simUarly notified 
on 7 June, when he returned from a trip abroad. Under the new rules, 
it was impossible for the Administrative Committee itseU to make 
charges; they were therefore laid individually by two senior offi-
cers. The charges were as follows: 
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(1) Gerry Jones charged Beattie with being "guUty of attacking 
the AustraUan Labor Party and the parUamentary party"; 
(2) Gerry Jones charged Georges with bemg "guUty of attacking 
the Australian Labor Party, the state parliamentary leader, the 
state parliamentary party, and officers of the Australian Labor 
Party"; 
(3) Harry HauenschUd charged Harris with being "guUty of 
disloyalty to the party in that he made allegations of improper 
conduct against the state President, state secretary, and a member of 
the Administrative Committee and aUegations of corrupt practices 
of members of the former Executive Committee".''^ 
Almost immediately after charges were laid, moves began to 
have them withdrawn. Party members received copies of a letter, 
signed by Ian McLean of the ATEA and SociaUst Left, advising that 
a meeting would be held at the Brisbane Trades HaU on 17 June "to 
allow ALP members to voice their opinions".'*° This meeting, in 
which Socialist Left members and other reformists participated, re-
ceived messages from a number of federal parUamentarians express-
ing support for the proposition that the charges should be with-
drawn. These parliamentarians (all on the left of the federal 
caucus) included Senators Ruth Coleman and Gordon Mcintosh of 
Western Australia, Jean Melzer and CyrU Primmer of Victoria and 
Arthur Gietzelt of New South Wales, and MHRs Gordon Bryant, 
Doug Everingham and Stewart West.'*' It was also reported to the 
meeting that six affiliated unions were urging withdrawal of 
charges. They were the AMWSU, ATEA, BWIU, the Hospitals 
Employees Federation, the Seamen's Union and the Federated Ship 
Painters' and Dockers' Union. The meeting unanimously carried a 
motion calling on HauenschUd and Jones to withdraw their charges, 
and "to seek to resolve the problems which have arisen, by 
discussion between party officers, parliamentary leaders and the 
three ALP members concemed".'*^ 
The arguments used in support of this demand are iUustrated by 
a document entitled The Case for the ALPs Administrative 
Committee Withdrawing the Disciplinary Charges against Senator 
George Georges, Joe Harris, and Peter Beattie, which was circulated 
in the party about this time. It was argued that a Pandora's box 
could be opened by the Administrative Committee's apparent wiU-
ingness to use the new Disputes Tribunal as a vehicle for the 
persecution of dissidents; in states with similar Disputes Tribunals, 
New South Wales and Victoria, party officers had "religiously 
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avoided using the Tribunal to settle matters of this nature".'*^ It was 
also pointed out, at the meeting, that it was particularly 
hypocritical to prosecute members for criticising others when Casey 
had made a pubUc statement at the Rockhampton conference in 
which he had questioned the suitabUity of Georges to sit on the 
Administrative Committee.'** 
Casey, meanwhUe, was at the centre of another discipUnary 
hearing. This concerned a Disputes Tribunal charge laid against him 
by a Toowong branch member, Griffith University Environmental 
Studies lecturer Reg Henry. EarUer in the year, Casey had fried to 
embarrass the Liberal Party by sponsoring a Private Member's Bill 
on electoral reform, which proposed the replacement of 
Queensland's four-zone electoral system with one of two zones. 
National ALP poUcy said clearly that the ALP was committed to 
achieving "one-vote one-value" electoral systems at state and 
federal levels. Henry accordingly charged Casey with breaching 
ALP policy. Casey was also charged over his handling of the Justices 
Act amendments, and his involvement in affairs raised in the Peel 
Report.'*^ 
At the Trades Hall meeting it was moved that, in a spirit of 
unity, Henry also be asked to withdraw his charge. This was op-
posed by members who argued that, since the charge against Casey 
of breaching party policy was far more serious than the other 
charges, it would not be inconsistent for the meeting to support it. 
The motion was eventuaUy carried, but reportedly by only four 
votes, with many members abstaining. Casey was reported to have 
been "bitterly attacked".'** 
The pressure on Queensland officials to withdraw the charges 
had no effect. Henry also declined to withdraw his charge. The 
hearings of the four cases, against Beattie, Georges, Harris and 
Casey, before the Disputes Tribunal were scheduled for 23 July. 
These were to be the first deliberations of the new ten-member fri-
bunal headed by Trades and Labor CouncU secretary, Fred Whitby. 
On 23 July Beattie's ALP membership was suspended for three 
months; the other cases were deferred to be dealt with in even less 
auspicious circumstances later in the year. The effect of Beattie's 
suspension was to deprive him of the three years' continuous ALP 
membership necessary before he could nominate for preselection as 
an ALP candidate or for selection as a conference delegate. On 24 July 
he wrote to Burton, appealing against the tribunal's determination. 
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PLP Leadership under Pressure: 
Abortion and Electoral Reform 
In June 1979, a pubUc opinion poU revealed that the level of support 
for the ALP in the Queensland state arena was a creditable 48 per 
cent, a figure which helped insulate the party leadership from 
criticism.'*^ PLP leader Casey, a prominent anti-abortionist, pre-
sented to the Queensland Parliament on 9 August 1979 a petition 
calling for the closure of a private abortion clinic in Greenslopes, a 
Brisbane suburb. He then spoke in parUament on the issue, chaUeng-
ing the government to take action. His attack led eventuaUy to an 
attempt by the Queensland govemment in 1980 to infroduce one of the 
most repressive pieces of legislation tn recent Ausfralian history, 
the Pregnancy Termination Control Bill, 1980, and, by way of public 
response, to one of the most substantial and successful protest cam-
paigns during Bjelke-Petersen's term as premier.'** 
Within the Australian Labor Party abortion was a divisive 
question. Although the Queensland Branch's poUcy was designed to 
ensure that a future ALP government would UberaUse the laws gov-
erning abortion in the state, this was overridden by the national 
poUcy, which declared that no ALP parUamentarian could be bound 
by a state's policy on this particular matter. This sanction enabled 
Casey, and others in the PLP, to claim that they were acting within 
the party's rules when they opposed the Queensland party's abor-
tion policy.'*' WhUe this view was technicaUy correct, it was dam-
aging to party unity to have the parliamentary leader pursuing 
with such zeal a course of action so dramaticaUy at odds with the 
formally agreed wishes of most ALP members, a fact of Labor Party 
life that Vince Gair had discovered some years earUer. 
Ed Casey was already under attack for his "rightwing" 
views."° His goading of the government into action against abortion 
confirmed this impression. The extent of disenchantment was made 
apparent on 14 August 1979, when a new party faction called the 
Centre Caucus made its existence known. It had been formed secretly 
late in 1978 by reformists to the ideological right of the Socialist 
Left. Rob Whiddon, by now on Bill Hayden's staff, was its 
chairperson and Peter Beattie was the new faction's secretary. It 
soon became obvious that one of its major current concerns was the be-
haviour of the state leader. An unnamed representative of the group 
made this clear in a Telegraph report. 
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The timing of our public announcement has been determined by Mr 
Casey. At first people not aUgned with the Socialist Left or the party 
hierarchy thought Mr Casey was a leader much to their liking. But it is 
obvious we didn't know near enough about him.'" 
Later in the year, in its first newsletter, the new group main-
tained its anti-Casey campaign, in particular attacking Casey's 
electoral reform proposals described earUer. The newsletter outlined 
reasons for the group's formation. Its members had perceived an un-
healthy swing to the right in the branch. 
Because of this there was an urgent need to organise to counter that 
swing and preserve a moderate, fair-minded and progressive image for 
the ALP in Queensland. With the advent of the SociaUst Left faction, 
that need became even more necessary. "^ 
The Centre Caucus saw itself as a moderate group, providing an or-
ganisational base for ALP members who, whUe opposed to actions of 
the ruling group, were not atfracted by Socialist Left miUtancy. 
Neither the appearance of factions nor Casey's calamities as-
sisted the ALP in the Gympie and RedcUfte by-elections held on 1 
September. In each case the result was disappointing for the party, 
which gained much smaUer swings than had been expected, given 
the supposed state-wide swing to Labor and the normal by-election 
anti-government swing."^ It was smaU comfort that the RedcUffe 
result was an umnitigated disaster for the previously incumbent 
National party, which lost the seat to future Liberal parUamentary 
leader Terry White. In his RedcUffe post-mortem report, ALP 
Organiser Nick Bos, who had acted as campaign director, high-
Ughted as a reason for the party's faUure to win the election "the 
indication given to the commuruty of corxfUct within our ov^ m organi-
sation with the announcement in the media of the formation of a 
Centre Caucus"."* 
The May Purges Revisited: Georges and Harris 
With the by-elections over, the party leadership moved swiftiy to 
punish its critics. At a meeting on 17 September, the Disputes 
Tribunal considered the three outstanding cases before it. There was 
no question of George Georges's guUt and he was suspended from 
party membership for a fuU six months, reflecting the fact that he 
was not prepared to give an assurance that he would not do the same 
thing again given simUar cfrcumstances. Joe Harris was found guUty 
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of disloyalty to the party and expeUed. By contrast the fribunal 
found that there was no case for Casey to answer and, furthermore, 
that the charges were frivolous."^ 
The tribunal's decision provoked an immediate storm of protest. 
The BWIU, smarting from the expulsion of one of its organisers and 
State Executive members (Harris) issued a statement in which it al-
leged that the treatment of Georges and Harris "smacks of the kind 
of poUtics that is too common in Queensland" and proposed to hold a 
special meeting of its State Management Conunittee "to consider the 
union's relationship with the ALP and whether we should remain 
affiUated to that body"."* 
On 21 September a meetmg of officers and executive members of 
sbcteen unnamed unions caUed for the State CouncU to be convened as 
soon as possible, for the councU to uphold Harris's expected appeal 
and to quash or reduce the severity of the sentences of Beattie and 
Georges. 
We are concerned that the Party has reinforced its public image of sav-
agery when dealing with members who have attitudes which some be-
lieve depart from what is judged to be the Party norm. An internaUy un-
democratic image has emerged and an impression that the Party is un-
able to manage its own affairs with dignity. We are concerned that many 
members and affiliated unions are considering breaking their ties with 
the Party. "7 
Also in the forefront of the campaign against the Disputes 
Tribunal's determination was a group called the ALP Defence 
Committee. Effectively an alliance of Socialist Left and Centre 
Caucus, this committee had been formed foUowing the earUer sus-
pension of Beattie. It maintained that its purpose was "to be a 
'watch dog' on the correct implementation of ALP rules and poUcy 
and to protect the rights of individual ALP members"'^*; this ex-
tended to fund-raising for such things as Harris's legal costs incurred 
as a result of his letter to Combe. The Defence Committee organised 
a protest meeting of ALP members at Trades Hall on 23 September. 
Over four hundred members attended the meeting and embodied 
their attitudes to recent events in seven resolutions. Harris, it was 
agreed, had acted entirely within the confines of the party, and in 
what he believed to be the party's interests; there was no evidence 
that he was responsible for the leaking of the letter. Beattie and 
Georges had "accurately expressed the widespread disenchantment 
within the party" when they made their public criticisms; they. 
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with Harris, should be exonerated. Most fundamentally, concerned 
that the new State CouncU had stiU never met, though under the 
rules it was requfred to do so at least once every three months, the 
meeting demanded a thorough reshaping of the (Queensland Branch. 
This meeting calls for the restructuring of the Queensland Branch of the 
ALP to ensure proper and fair representation of all sections and ideas 
through proportional representation, and to avoid the intimidation of 
one group in the Party by another, as in: 
(1) the disgraceful use of numbers at the State Conference to pervert 
Party Rules and to thwart the spirit of the Rules instituted by the Federal 
Executive; 
(2) vindictive and malicious persecution of Senator George Georges; 
(3) abdication of responsibility to Federal policy which states 'Policy is 
not framed by leadership but by resolution of branches and affiliated 
unions'; 
(4) unwarranted charges, writs and threats of same against individual 
members who have only the interests of the Party at heart. 
In addition, the meeting endorsed the union members' resolution of 
two days earUer, and urged disiUusioned unions and members not to 
disaffiUate or resign but to stay and fight for a democratic party.'" 
On 24 September Joe Harris lodged an appeal to State Council 
against his expulsion. Georges did likewise two days later thus 
averting the necessity for the federal caucus to decide whether he 
could remain a member of it while suspended from the (Queensland 
Branch.200 The cases of Beattie, Georges and Harris thus loomed as 
the ffrst major matters which the State CouncU would have to con-
sider. The election of branch delegates to the new body, on 28 July, 
had resulted in some conspicuous successes for party dissidents, 
though not enough to break the ruling group's hold on the forum. In 
Pefrie, for example, Denis Murphy and Socialist Left activist Terry 
Hampson had taken the two positions, decisively defeating ETU or-
ganiser Dinny Madden.^"' Ian McLean was elected unopposed in 
Lilley. To the thfrty-eight branch delegates (two from each federal 
division), were added one delegate elected by the Labor Women's 
Conference and one by the Young Labor Conference and, in accordance 
with the prescribed 60:40 ratio, sixty union delegates. In addition, 
there were the fifteen members of the Administrative Conunittee, 
the leader and deputy leader of the state parliamentary party, the 
leader of the Brisbane Municipal Labor Party and a Union Credit 
Union delegate. 
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When the State CouncU was eventuaUy convened on 21 October 
the appeals of Beattie, Harris and Georges were easUy defeated. 
The chairperson ruled that Heru-y had no right of appeal against 
the Disputes Tribunal's dismissal of his charges against Casey.2°^ 
Angry scenes took place after the meeting when about forty members 
and supporters disrupted a press conference that was being held by 
Casey, HauenschUd and Gerry Jones, calUng on the officers to "tell 
us how you have sold out the party".^03 Roy Foward, then a senior 
lecturer in poUtics at Queensland University, later announced his 
resignation from the party, after twenty-four years membership, in 
disgust at the treatment that Beattie, Georges and Harris had re-
ceived. 
After the State CouncU meeting Beattie, Georges and Harris 
decided to appeal to the Federal Executive. The alternative was to 
wait untU 1981, and appeal to the next State Conference. However it 
was not clear whether all three had the right of appeal to the 
Federal Executive as national rule 7(c)(vi) was very specific about 
the conditions under which individual ALP members could appeal. 
Georges, as a sitting senator who would presumably wish to renomi-
nate for his position, was clearly covered by rule 7(c)(vi)(c), which 
provided an appeal avenue for any person seeking to be a federal 
candidate. Peter Beattie, on the advice of Manfred Cross, ensured 
that he was simUarly covered by nominating for preselection in the 
federal division of Ryan, a safe Liberal Party seat. He lodged his 
nomination on 20 October, the day before the State CouncU meeting, 
and when nominations closed later that day, his was the orUy one to 
have been received. 
The case of Harris was more difficult. His letter of appeal cited 
rule 7(c)(vi)(a), which referred to appeals against State Conference 
or State Executive decisions inconsistent with National decisions, 
and to rule 7(c)(vii) which gave the Federal Executive plenary 
powers to deal with matters "which, m the opinion of an absolute 
majority of members of the Executive, affect the general weUare of 
the Labor Movement". Harris claimed that his case was a 'national 
matter' because his letter to Combe had been written at Batt's sug-
gestion, and that the expulsion of any member was an event that af-
fected the "general welfare of the Labor Movement" .2°* 
A meeting of the Federal Executive was scheduled for 26 
October, less than a week after the State CouncU's rejection of the 
appeals. A meeting of Socialist Left, Cenfre Caucus and other sym-
pathetic members decided to send a delegation to Canberra to lobby 
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members of the Federal Executive prior to the meeting. The delega-
tion included Socialist Left members Norma Jones, Ian McLean, 
Barbara Robson and Anne Warner, the Centre's Madeleine 
McPherson, and a TownsviUe branch officer, Peter Valentine.^''^ 
By eleven to six, the Federal Executive voted to consider the 
severity of Beattie's and Georges's sentences. As a result the suspen-
sion of Beattie was reduced to a reprimand and that of Georges to a 
severe reprimand. The motion to lift the suspensions was only op-
posed by the Queensland delegates. Federal Executive declined to 
hear an appeal from Harris against his expulsion, but recommended 
that the Queensland branch consider hearing an appeal. Federal 
Executive apparently did not wish to create a situation "where any 
person disciplined by a state branch might feel they had the auto-
matic altemative of coming to the national executive" .^ °* 
The Federal Executive's decisions were none the less poorly re-
ceived among Queensland Branch officials with the exception of 
Casey, who stated that he was "perfectly happy" with the outcome 
of the affair.207 President Tom Burton, on the other hand, 
complained that the branch had abided by the rules which the 
Federal Executive had imposed on it, orUy to find the authority of 
the mechanisms established under these new rules now chaUenged 
by that same Federal Executive.^"* Gerry Jones remarked that 
"apparently logic doesn't count with the federal executive".^^^ The 
response which was to have the most damaging effects for the ruling 
group was that of Fred Whitby, the Disputes Tribunal chairperson. 
On 30 October Whitby circulated a lengthy commentary on the 
Federal Executive decisions to other Disputes Tribunal members. 
This document was leaked to the press in February 1980, at precisely 
the time the Queensland Branch officials were fighting a last-ditch 
stand against renewed federal intervenfion. Whitby displayed open 
contempt for the Federal Executive. 
Despite the treachery at Canberra last Friday we still have a job to do, 
and we must continue to do it according to the principles we have laid 
down for ourselves. We must not allow our better judgement to be influ-
enced by a bunch of political novices. But things are really serious. 
Already 1 have been told by three senior union secretaries that they 
will provide neither physical nor financial support at next year's federal 
election—and they were not fooling. The reaction will be the same in 
many areas throughout the state. One of them made it plain to me that 
if there was one more similar decision from the federal executive he 
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would start advocating that the Queensland branch pull out of the ALP 
federation. Such a proposal would have overwhelming support.^'" 
PoUtical commentator Laurie Oakes revealed that before the 
Federal Executive meeting there was taUc of the Queensland Branch 
seceding from the national organisation if the meeting's outcome 
proved unfavourable to the branch's administration,^" a rumour 
which tends to be confirmed by Denis Murphy's October 1979 note 
"Junta prepared to go alone as a separate party ... if any fed. action 
over George".2'^ 
In view of such hostUity, it was to be expected that the State 
CouncU, when its October meeting was reconvened on 9 December, 
would reject Harris's request for an appeal against the recommenda-
tion of the Federal Executive. The councU proceeded to annoy, with-
out actuaUy defying, the Federal Executive, by carrying a motion in 
which it lifted the suspensions of Beattie and Georges. This action 
made sense only if it were assumed that the Federal Executive's own 
decisions had been invaUd, and this conviction was made expUcit in 
the motion's preamble: 
The decision of the national executive in relation to these matters can 
only be considered as suspect by the state branch. 
It could have even been considered to be beyond the power of that 
executive under its rules.^'^ 
This can be compared with the refusal by Gafr to attend or notice the 
Hobart conference. This clear refusal to accept the executive's own 
determination of its powers also indicated the course which the rul-
ing group was to adopt in March. 
Denied the opportunity to appeal to the Federal Executive, 
Harris would have to wait for the 1981 state conference of the party. 
However, the Defence Committee met on 10 December to plan a fvu--
ther campaign and announced that it would aim generaUy through 
'pubUc agitation' to have the matter reconsidered and might again 
lobby Federal Executive members.^"' 
Branch Finances: Radio 4KQ 
Problems surrounding 4KQ had been a cause of concem for some years. 
From a position of strength in 1971, when it ranked second in 
audience ratings of Brisbane's five commercial radio stations, 4KQ 
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had fallen to bottom in 1975 and had remained there.^'^ This had 
happened despite the abandonment of any pretence at using the 
station for ALP propaganda. As an unpopular radio station it was 
unable to maintain high advertising charges and this led to 
financial difficulties. The company that owned and administered 
4KQ was called Labor Broadcasting Station; a second company. 
Labor Enterprises, owned Labor House, where ALP headquarters was 
located, and other ALP property. The two companies shared 
identical boards of directors who held shares as frustees for the 
ALP. The ALP Defence Committee, working from publicly available 
documents, estimated in January 1980 that the total debts of the two 
companies amounted to $1.3 million.^'* A subsequent appraisal, made 
in 1981 when the party's new admirustration had better access to 
information, confirmed that the companies' liabUity was indeed of 
this magnitude.^''' 
Prior to imposition of the new rules late in 1978, the seven 
directors of the companies, holding one share each, were, under 
party rules and under the companies' Articles of Association, the 
seven members of the Inner Executive. At the end of 1978, these were 
Burton, Gerry Jones, Bums, HauenschUd, Clem Jones, Kane and Arch 
Bevis. Under the new rules, the boards of the companies were to be 
comprised of the president, vice-presidents and secretary, "together 
with three other people appointed by a majority of the 
Adminisfrative Committee". By neglect, the Articles of Association 
were not amended, and therefore when the Inner Executive ceased to 
exist, the companies were left with no directors. On 1 October 1978, 
without reference to the party membership generally, the share-
holders amended the Articles of Association of Labor Broadcasting 
and Labor Enterprises, so that they could appoint anyone as a direc-
tor. They appointed as directors of Labor Broadcasting Burton, 
Hauenschild, Clem Jones and Gerry Jones, and, a week later, Ian 
Brusasco.2'* This alteration, which removed the requirement for di-
rectors to hold a particular position in the ALP, made it easier for 
the directors to rearrange the affafrs of the companies without ref-
erence to the party.2'^ Accordingly, without being told details of 
these arrangements, delegates to the October state council meeting 
were given 
the startling knowledge that the shares in Labor Enterprises are held by 
private individuals as private individuals. They are not held in trust for 
the Labor Party and as far as the officers are concerned the members of 
the party have no right to know anything about these enterprises.^'^ 
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By the end of 1979 the Commonwealth Trading Bank was 
pressing for a reduction in its mortgages over Labor Broadcasting; it 
was resolved by the party hierarchy that a shareholding in the 
company would have to be sold. News of this reached the press 
early in January. The Cenfre Caucus proposed a scheme by which, 
after an increase in the station's authorised capital, shares could be 
offered to ALP members and branches.^^' Queensland entrepreneur 
Jim Kennedy, an ALP member, indicated his interest in buying a 
confroUing stake in the company. Eventually, an agreement was 
formulated with a consortium headed by Col Joye Holdings, entitled 
Affiliated Broadcasters, which involved the formation of a new 
company with two hundred shares. In February 1980 State CouncU 
was aUegedly told, incorrectly, that Affiliated Broadcasters would 
hold ninety-seven of the shares and the ALP ninety-seven, with an 
independent chairperson, who possibly would be Clem Jones, holding 
the remaining six.222 in fact the proposal was that the ALP would 
hold only ninety shares; of the remaining seven shares, which 
apparently would be beneficial shares, one each would be made 
available to Brusasco, Burton, Hauenschild, Kane and the AWU, 
and two to Gerry Jones.^ ^^ FoUowing this agreement, Nick Erby of Col 
Joye Enterprises was dispatched to Brisbane in February to begin 
work on improving 4KQ's performance. 
Party Organisation in Toowoomba 
The other major confroversy that erupted late in 1979 and continued 
in 1980 concerned the party's affafrs in Toowoomba, 110 kUomefres 
west of Brisbane. The ffrst sign of impending trouble in its branches 
came in October 1978, when the QCE refused to aUow Toowoomba 
College of Advanced Education philosophy lecturer Robert Shaw, 
who did not have the necessary qualification of three years' 
continuous party membership, to contest a plebiscite to select the 
ALP candidate in the state electorate of Toowoomba South. The de-
cision was not well received by many local members, who wanted 
Shaw as thefr candidate. The other nominee, Des Barnes, president 
of the Toowoomba Trades and Labor Council, was selected 
unopposed; he did not prove an effective candidate, and stood down 
in September 1979, three months after a motion of No Confidence was 
carried against him by a joint meeting of the two ALP branches in 
the electorate.224 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
260 From 1957 to 1988 
In the other Toowoomba state electorate, Toowoomba North, 
nominations were lodged by two members of the Toowoomba South 
branch, Lindesay Jones, a Toowoomba alderman, and Peter Wood, 
who had previously held a Toowoomba seat from 1966 to 1974.^ 25 
Jones, Uke his wife Norma, was a member of the Socialist Left and 
representative of forces seeking change, whUe Wood was associated 
with the party leadership. A plebiscite between the two was ar-
ranged, but was canceUed, pending an inquiry, in October 1978, after 
the local returning officer reported breaches of relevant rvdes. For no 
obvious reason a long delay ensued, and during this period relations 
between the two sides became very acrimoruous.^^^ This resentment 
reached a height in September when Toowoomba South branch 
members were given notice of a motion by one of thefr number, Frank 
Moore, to expel Lindesay and Norma Jones from the party. 
The motion was considered on 5 October at a branch meeting at-
tended by more observers than members. It was aUeged that 
Lindesay Jones had pubUcly criticised the performance of ALP state 
parliamentarians in connection with the BeUevue Hotel demolition, 
and that he had told a branch member that he had voted for 
Toowoomba mayor Nell Robinson, rather than for an ALP member 
contesting her position, in the March municipal elections. Norma 
Jones was accused of pubUcly attacking Ed Casey in response to his 
campaign against abortion rights.^27 Senator Georges was given 
leave to speak in support of Lindesay and Norma Jones and advised 
that such charges should more properly be taken to the Disputes 
Tribunal. Eighteen members supported the motion and seventeen 
opposed it. Rule 48(a) stipulated that the support of a majority of 
members present was necessary in order for a branch to expel a 
member; as a number of members had abstained, this requfrement 
had not been met and the motion was declared lost. 
Frank Moore subsequently proceeded to lay formal charges 
against Lindesay Jones and Norma Jones before the Disputes 
Tribunal. Meeting on 12 November, the Disputes Tribunal repri-
manded Lindesay Jones and severely reprimanded Norma Jones. 
Meanwhile, in Toowoomba North, branch president Keith 
Eraser on 6 October requested the Admirusfrative Committee to take 
control of the branch's affairs.228 The Administrative Committee 
began an investigation into the branch which, under confroversial 
circumstances, was very quickly extended to include the Toowoomba 
South branch.229 State Organiser Nick Bos, appointed to conduct the 
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inquiry, spent the weekend of 13-14 October in Toowoomba to receive 
submissions. 
The report that Bos eventuaUy produced contained a series of 
aUegations not only against the Toowoomba North and Toowoomba 
South branches, but also against the third Toowoomba branch, 
RangeviUe Centenary Heights. The members of this branch had at 
no time been informed that it was under investigation and had 
consequently not bothered to make submissions.2^ A subsequent cri-
tique written by some branch members commented that the report 
was "based on a quite false conspfracy theory that there are 'persons 
responsible for the turmoil in our party'".23i The prejudices of the 
Queensland party leadership on social issues were demonstrated, for 
instance, by the reproduction in the report of a letter published in 
the Toowoomba Chronicle from a person who was, but who did not 
identify herseU as, a member of the Toowoomba North branch, in 
which she criticised repressive attitudes towards sexuaUty. This 
letter was reproduced in the report without comment, as though to 
imply that its depravity spoke for itseU.232 Bos concluded that 
there can be no doubt ... that in the Toowoomba area the rules of the 
Party have been breached, persons are being admitted as Members to 
the Party who are not an asset to our organisation, some Party Members 
deliberately created a situation which forced the resignation of the 
Candidate for Toowoomba South and that Members have regularly 
used the Toowoomba Chronicle to attack the party.233 
After considering the Toowoomba Report, the Administrative 
Committee decided on 19 November to cancel the registration of aU 
three Toowoomba branches .23'^  In January 1980, the Administrative 
Committee resolved to form two new branches, one in each 
Toowoomba electorate, which the previous year's members in the 
area were requfred to apply to join. Sensing that they were on the 
verge of a wholesale local membership purge, on 3 February 
Toowoomba dissidents convened a protest meeting, attended by 105 
people, of whom seventy-nine had been members in 1979 of the 
deregistered branches. They voted not to recognise the new branches, 
and to request the Federal Executive to inquire into the whole saga. 
The Last Days of the Old Guard 
On 4 February fuU scale federal intervention into the affairs of the 
(Queensland Branch finally became likely. Since the aftermath of 
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the Rockhampton conference, federal leader Bill Hayden had 
firmly resisted dissident pressure for intervention, insisting in July, 
when charges against Beattie, Georges and Harris were throwing 
the party in Queensland into renewed turmoU, that the branch was 
in good shape.235 On 4 February he made it known that he had 
changed his mind. The situation in Queensland was vmdeniably get-
ting worse, he alleged, citing the crises over 4KQ and Toowoomba as 
examples. The rules imposed in 1978 had not been administered with 
good wiU, Hayden commented, and if the branch's organisation were 
not improved, electoral success in Queensland, either federaUy or in 
state elections, would be impossible. Intervention, he said, was in-
evitable.236 National president NeU Batt gave support to Hayden's 
view the foUowing day.237 
Reaction to Hayden's comments was fast and furious. A meeting 
of thirty-five affiUated unions was hastily convened at Brisbane's 
Waterside Workers' Club on the afternoon of 4 February, and issued 
Hayden with a pubUc ultimatum. If he did not withdraw within 
twenty-four hours his support for federal intervention, the unions 
would campaign to have him deposed as federal leader by the 
popular ACTU president Bob Hawke, who was expected to enter 
federal parUament later in the year. Also that evening, the ETU's 
Brisbane sub-branch carried a resolution condemning aU supporters of 
federal intervention;23* the next day AWU state secretary Edgar 
WUUams sent a telegram to Combe supporting the move of the 
thirty-five unions. Williams later commented that "it is a pity Mr 
Hawke is not in parliament now and could immediately take over 
leadership".239 
Not all affiliated unions supported this position. On 5 
February, eight dissident unions met in support of Hayden; they 
were the AMWSU, ATEA, BWIU, HEF, the Liquor Trades Union, 
the Australian Tramway and Motor Omnibus Employees' 
Association, the Railway Station Officers' Union and the United 
Firefighters' Union. These unions formaUy dissociated themselves 
from the position adopted the previous day, and expressed 
agreement with the view of Batt and Hayden that "assistance of 
the Federal Executive is required to settle problems in the 
Queensland Branch".2"*° AMWSU state secretary Aussie Vaughan 
warned later that his union might disaffiliate over the issue. 
Vaughan suggested the AMWSU's substantial affiUation fees might 
better be donated to the Salvation Army, "who are doing more for 
workers in this state than the ALP machine" .2'*' 
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Rumours circulated that if intervention did occur the mling 
group and its supporters might break away from the ALP's national 
organisation. Gerry Jones denied that any such move was being 
planned, but was contradicted by Griffith MHR Ben Humphreys, a 
parUamentarian close to the ruling group, who confirmed, while in-
sisting that he would not be involved, that "certainly there is a real 
possibility of a breakaway party being established" .2*2 Maintaining 
the longstanding hostiUty of Trades Hall unionists towards 
politicians, Fred Whitby claimed that the move for intervention 
"stemmed directly from a campaign by very conservative elements in 
the federal parliamentary Labor Party to obtain absolute control of 
the party and all state branches through the Federal Executive". 
This campaign, he argued, had originated with former federal 
leader Gough Whitlam and, if successful, would eliminate or 
minimise frade union influence in the party .2^ 
Ed Casey, too, emerged as a strong opponent of the threat of in-
tervention, which he described as "catastrophic"; the Queensland 
Branch, he wamed, would not accept federal control.2** This view 
was not shared by prominent Labor MLA for Archerfield Kev 
Hooper, who complained that a group of 'Trades Hall Troglodytes" 
and "power drunk megalomaniacs" in the state branch had hindered 
the party's progress.^^^ 
The Federal Executive meeting at which intervention in 
Queensland would be proposed was to be held at the end of February. 
Before then, there was one last fruit of power which the party hier-
archy planned to pluck. It hung on the selection of the branch's 
Senate candidates, to be decided by the State Council on 17 February. 
Gerry Jones had nominated and sitting senator Ron McAuliffe, ruling 
group supporter and subsequent Queensland Rugby League president, 
did not, having decided to retire but having given no prior notice of 
his intention.2^ The plan of the ruling group was dearly for Jones to 
succeed McAuliffe. During Febmary it emerged that Jones's ambition 
went further; he hoped to take the leading position on the party's 
Senate ticket, relegating Senator Jim Keeffe of the Socialist Left to 
second place or even third. At the February State Council meeting 
this scheme was foiled when a union that usuaUy supf)orted the 
party leadership refused to cooperate. Keeffe defeated Jones in the 
contest for ffrst place on the ticket by fifty-seven votes to fifty-four; 
Jones was placed second, and Longreach grazier Bob Gleeson, also as-
sociated with the mling group, won the third position. 
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BUl Hayden was naturally pleased with the result of the con-
test for ffrst position on the Senate ticket, and afterwards seemed 
confident about the branch's future. 
On the question of future effectiveness of the Queensland Branch Mr 
Hayden said there were a lot of discussions to undertake internally. 
However, he said, there was no reason why the Branch could not be pro-
ductive if the right things were done to make the organization operate 
properly.2'*'' 
His words were ominous for the Queensland party leadership. 
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Federal intervention was not without its difficulties: the subsequent squabbling was 
perceived to be electoraUy damaging. {Financial Review, 4 March 1980; courtesy Patrick 
Cook) 
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Federal Intervention 
Battle for Control of the Party 
Events at the State Council meeting of 17 February 1980 other than 
the selection of Senate candidates strengthened the pro-Hayden 
bloc. Aware of a censure motion against Hayden threatened by mem-
bers of the ruling group, Dr Denis Murphy quickly moved a motion of 
confidence in Hayden's federal leadership, which was passed on the 
voices. The proposed affiliation of the Railway Station Officers' 
Association with the Queensland Branch of the ALP went ahead, 
giving Peter Beattie a voice on State Council and swelled the num-
ber of those who were strong lobbyists for fuU federal intervention. 
Meanwhile, Hayden was personally "courting" members of the 
Federal Executive of whom eleven appeared to be in favour of some 
form of intervention, while seven were against. Federal president 
Neil Batt, although not a voting delegate, was publicly supportive, 
saying: "If the Labor Party is not even capable of running its own 
party, how is it going to run either the State or the 
Commonwealth?"^ On January 22 at a meeting in Sydney, Batt, fed-
eral secretary David Combe, Senator John Button and Bill Hayden 
had authorised Button to prepare a motion of intervention. Hayden 
made various public statements during February regarding the "in-
evitability" of intervention, drawing accusations from Nick Bos that 
he was pre-empting executive decisions.^ 
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The Federal Executive, in the week prior to its 1 March 1980 
meeting instructed Hayden, Ed Casey, and New South Wales party 
president Paul Keating to work out an agreement aimed at the 
democratisation of electoral processes within the party structure. A 
number of compromise moves were put by Casey, Burton, Jones and 
right-wing forces from federal level, but these were rejected by 
Hayden.* He argued that earlier attempts at compromise, the 1978 
reforms, had not worked—they had not given any voice in the power 
structure to opponents of the Trades Hall/trade union cUque. 
I'm not going to flinch from a tough decision regardless of what the costs 
are, if 1 believe it is essential that these things be done. A leader has to 
make tough decisions sometimes that he wishes to God that he did not 
have to make.^  
He was now prepared to put his judgment to the test—a test which 
could have results going far beyond the situation in Queensland. The 
threatened unions were complaining, there was opposition from the 
powerful New South Wales right-wing faction and popular ACTU 
president Bob Hawke was about to enter the federal parUamentary 
arena. These indicated that, in all probability, Hayden was placing 
his leadership on the line.^ 
The Federal Executive meeting on 1 March 1980 in Canberra was 
addressed by, among others, Gerry Jones, Harry Hauenschild, Ed 
Casey as leader of the Queensland parliamentary party, and Paul 
Keating, who claimed that the proposed intervention would prove 
electoraUy damaging with both state and federal elections due.^  
Neil Batt argued that only full intervention could restore unity to 
the divided party and that such unity was necessary to rejuvenate 
the party's electoral credibility.^ As he had stated in Canberra 
earlier that week: "What we need ... is to get the Queensland party 
into a proper, fighting, tight, efficient and effective poUtical 
organisation ... winning seats at both State and federal levels".' 
Hayden and his supporters presented a Ust of seventeen charges 
against the Queensland Branch. Much discussion of these issues fol-
lowed. They included the varying of decisions of the Federal 
Executive on appeals by Senator Georges and Joe Harris, the failure 
to caU the required number of meetings of State Council in 1979 and 
continued abuse of the rules and standing orders at such meetings, 
thus preventing fuU debate by delegates. The problem of control of 
4KQ was raised, with the trustees accused of faiUng to obtain State 
Council's consent, as required under rules 31 and 32, to the sale of 
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property, namely Radio Station 4KQ. (Nick Bos later denied reports 
that part of 4KQ was to be sold at that time.)'° 
The branch was accused of ineffectiveness in winning parlia-
mentary representation at state and federal levels. Other charges 
involved the Electoral Reform Bill proposed by the state 
parliamentary party which contradicted both state and federal 
poUcy; Neal Kane's pubUc statements attacking the federal leader-
ship; domination of the branch by an outside group known as the 
Trades Hall Affiliated Unions Committee, and especially the 
power and influence held by the ETU and the Printing and Kindred 
Industries Union (PKIU) both within caucus and State CouncU; the 
participation of this group of unions in the Senate ticket issue; and 
the failure of the branch to endorse candidates for several state and 
federal seats in an election year. As well, the meeting deplored the 
adverse publicity given to the disbanding of the Toowoomba 
branches, to the financial situation of the branch, and to the 
"widespread and notorious dissension within the branch".'^ 
As the debate continued, various compromises were floated. In 
response to one such effort, Denis Murphy wired Batt to say: 
"Neville Chamberlain found there was an unfortunate end to ap-
peasement. Suggest ChurchilUan stand".^^ Thus stiffened, after two 
days of heated debate, it was resolved 12 votes to 6 that: "The 
Federal Executive is of the opinion that the general welfare of the 
Labor Movement is affected by these matters in the Queensland 
Branch".^ ^ Further discussion followed on the form of action to be 
taken. The legality of the resolution to intervene was based on rule 7 
of the federal rules of the ALP, and on precedents set in other 
states—Victoria and New South Wales in 1970, and Tasmania in 
1975.14 Rule 7 reads, in part: 
Federal Executive to have plenary powers to deal with and decide any 
matters which, in the opinion of an absolute majority of members of the 
Executive, affect the general welfare of the Labor Movement, provided 
that no decision of National Conference shall be abrogated under this 
rule. 
The resolution to intervene was favoured eleven to seven. Those op-
posed included federal deputy leader Lionel Bowen, New South 
Wales state secretary Graham Richardson, shadow nunister for 
Employment Mick Young, Chris Schacht (South Australian state 
seaetary), and Simon Crean, acting as proxy for ACTU president 
Hawke. 
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Labor's ineffectual opposition to the repression of civil liberties was not without its 
humorous side, as Patrick Cook shows. {Financial Review, 5 March 1980; courtesy Patrick 
Cook) 
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Intervention Mark 2 
AU incumbent bodies of the ALP in Queensland were dismissed—the 
Administrative Committee, State Council, State Conference and the 
Disputes Tribunal. An Interim Administrative Committee (lAC), 
enlarged from fifteen to twenty-nine members and mcluding several 
members of the former executive, was established to be the only 
power-holding body, but not to make policy. These appointments, if 
accepted, were to stand until the next State Conference, due in 
February 1981. 
Officers of the former administration were instructed to hand 
over all books, accounts and property presently owned by or held in 
trust for the branch. Chartered accountants were to be appointed to 
audit the books and accounts of Labor Broadcasting, Labor 
Enterprises and the ALP Queensland Branch. The Federal Executive 
re-endorsed all sitting federal and state members, as weU as those 
candidates already endorsed under the rules for federal, state and 
municipal elections. 
Intervention was aimed, as Murphy expressed it, at "the 
democratisation of the Queensland Branch".'^ To this end the I AC 
was to draft new rules that provided for proportional representation 
in the conduct of all ballots. However, this had no impact on the 
preselection of party candidates as each preselection had only one 
winner. The new rules also provided the removal of the Umitation 
on the number of delegates from any one union; voting only by finan-
cial party ticket holders in plebiscites for candidate selection 
(previously members of affiliated unions were also enfranchised); 
and the implementation of affirmative action. The chief bone of 
contention of the Federal Executive resolution was the method of 
delegate selection. Hayden's demand for proportional representa-
tion (PR) was opposed not only by the ousted dominant faction in 
Queensland, but also by right-wing forces on the executive, who 
foresaw that it would increase left-wing influence and who feared 
the long-term implications of this at federal level.^* 
It was intended that there be a balance on the lAC of fourteen 
union, ten branch, and five parliamentary representatives. Former 
president Tom Burton and vice-president Clem Jones were sacked, to 
be replaced by Tom Burns and Alderman Frank Sleeman, respec-
tively.'^ The second vice-presidency went to Denis Murphy. Gerry 
Jones was to remain as state secretary; he later resigned to concen-
trate on the coming Senate elections.'* Manfred Cross of the Centre 
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Caucus took over as acting secretary untU such time as the committee 
appointed a secretary. Over the coming eighteen months he would 
prove to have a conciUatory and uiufying ir\fluence. 
The balance of the new committee appeared to favour the 
Hayden group, selected as it was to mclude members of each faction 
according to its size. It was intended to be seen as a model for propor-
tional representation. The Socialist Left gained four representa-
tives: state president of the Amalgamated Metalworkers and 
Shipwrights Union (AMWSU) and now a Conference and Council 
delegate Bryant Bums, Conference and State CouncU delegate Joy 
ArdUl, Senator Jim Keeffe, and teacher and candidate for the fed-
eral seat of Moreton, Barbara Robson. Many of those approached to 
participate from the Trades HaU group refused. The committee did 
have Ed Casey, Ray McCart (Shop Distributive and AUied 
Employees Association), Harry Melloe from the Federated 
MisceUaneous Workers Union (FMWU) and Pat Dunne (ARU). 
A nine-member interim Disputes Tribunal was appointed. It was 
to be chaired by highly respected Brisbane barrister Lew Wyvill, 
"one of Queensland's outstanding environmentalists and barris-
ters".'^ As a former unsuccessful candidate for preselection, WyviiH 
was a prime example of the way the old preselection methods some 
times excluded talented candidates. 
Fight-back and Lock-out 
The opponents of intervention were down but not yet out. Deposed 
vice-president Clem Jones deplored the decision to intervene as 
"iUegal", as it did not have the required acceptance by the state 
branch, and it gave centraUsed control to federal party leaders.^ " 
Nick Bos could neither accept a reduction in trade union 
representation, nor proportional ballots, which he claimed would 
foster permanent division. He also could not accept changes of the 
rules which were to be made without involvement of the rank and 
fUe.2' On 2 March, Bos, Jones, and Ed Casey met with other members 
of the previous administration and legal adviser to the party, 
Brisbane lawyer Terry MeUifont, to decide whether to accept the 
Federal Executive decision. 
They agreed that the document of resolution was merely the 
opinion of a number of Executive members; that they had not been 
given a fair hearing, as no charges had been laid untU after the 
Federal Executive meeting had started, giving them insufficient 
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time to prepare a defence; that the Federal Executive had no control 
over the businesses of Labor Broadcasting Pty Ltd and Labor 
Enterprises; and that: "of 23 resolutions, 20 are beyond their 
(Federal Executive) power. They're either contrary to the rules or 
ultravires of the rules."^^ The meeting passed the following resolu-
tion. 
The Federal Executive of the Australian Labor Party shall be informed 
by the officers of the party in accordance with this motion and advised 
that the Australian Labor Party (state of Queensland) intends to con-
tinue as the Administrator of the Labor Party in this state until such 
times as charges as may be deemed applicable by the Federal Executive 
are properly laid and heard and if, as a consequence, new elected ad-
ministrative bodies are established.^^ 
Harry HauenschUd, Clem Jones, Tom Burton, Neal Kane, Edgar 
WiUiams, and Nick Bos, as acting secretary, considered themselves 
to be the elected administration and so refused to move from head-
quarters at Breakfast Creek. Media reports claimed that the locks 
were changed to prevent executive access to the branch records.^* 
As a consequence of the lock-out, the newly formed Interim 
Administrative Committee was forced to hold its first meeting in 
the Opposition Committee Rooms at Brisbane's parUament House. 
The meeting of 16 March was chaired by Tom Bums and attended by 
Neil Batt. Editorial, finance, rules and fund-raising committees 
were elected at subsequent meetings in rented premises at Charlotte 
Street." 
During this period there were real fears of another spUt. These 
were fuelled by calls from the Queensland secretary of the 
Federated Storemen and Packers' Union, Fred Nicol, to form a sepa-
rate party. However such moves were rejected by the majority of 
union affiUates and "Old Guard" supporters. 
Moves by some members of the interim committee towards ex-
pulsion of the nine members, who chaUenged the legality of inter-
vention were rejected as, without doubt, this would have precipi-
tated a split.^^ The Federal Executive too, refrained from taking po-
tentially divisive actions, for instance laying charges against indi-
viduals such as Neal Kane in respect of his aUegedly damaging 
pubUc statements. Rule 10, which gave the Federal Executive the 
power to exclude from any of its meetings representatives of a state 
branch in arrears with its contributions, was not ei\forced. Members of 
both groups were determined that there would not be a repeat of 
events of 1957. 
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Union and Branch Responses 
Though some differences of opinion regarding the need for, and the 
extent of, intervention and disciplinary charges were expressed 
among branch members, the most pronounced and the most pubUcised 
divisions occurred within the trade union movement. Reports ap-
peared in the media of a letter to David Combe expressing support 
for the former administration; it was drafted by Fred Whitby and 
signed by the representatives of twelve unions including 
Queensland's largest, the AWU.^'' The Brisbane branch of the 
Waterside Workers Federation (WWF), while strongly critical of 
intervention, offered to continue its physical and financial support of 
state and federal election candidates and to oppose any attempt to 
form a breakaway party.^* State secretary of the powerful TWU, 
Hughie WiUiams, also opposed any moves that would prevent 
unionists from voting in plebiscites unless they were also members. In 
that week however, ninety members of his union wrote to Combe 
supporting intervention moves. 
Several unions showed their support for the interim 
Administrative Committee by reaffiliating. These included the 
SDA, HEF, ATEA, United Firefighters, and Australian Postal 
Telegraphists Uruon. Support was also given by the Federated Ship 
Painters and Dockers' Union, the Queensland Branch of the ARU, 
the BWIU and the AMWSU. 
In contrast to uruon disunity, branch members were overwhelm-
ingly in favour of intervention. A survey of branch opinion found 
that, of 260 branches, 203 were in favour, and 57 against or unde-
cided.^ ^ Of those branches supporting the reforms, some took further 
action. On 9 June, Toowong branch laid charges of disloyalty to the 
party, under rule 108(d), against Hauenschild and Jones.'" A simUar 
move was made against Nick Bos by Oxley/Darra branch, whUe 
Kev Hooper's large Inala branch voted unanimously for Harry 
HauenschUd's suspension from the party, alleging that his state-
ments in the media were "grossly disloyal to the party".'' This lat-
ter action was condemned by the Trades and Labor CouncU of which 
Hauenschild was president. The lAC referred the charges to the 
party's Disputes Tribunal, and fearing a rash of such actions would 
render the groups irreconcilable, requested that branches and affiU-
ated unions not exercise their right to initiate severe disciplinary 
action against members. 
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Of the state Labor parliamentarians, intervention had been 
supported aU along by Kev Hooper, who saw the new committee as 
"weU-balanced"'2 and by Bob Gibbs (Wolston), Jim Fouras (South 
Brisbane), and Terry Mackenroth (Chatsworth). Parliamentary 
leader Ed Casey and deputy leader BiU D'Arcy (Woodridge) al-
though previously opposed to intervention, were forced to take a 
neutral stance for the sake of unity after the defeat of a proposal by 
Casey that caucus declare itself against intervention. Casey had 
then declared that the fight against intervention was lost and 
called upon members of the former administration to consider com-
promise with the Federal Executive. Letters of support from state 
and federal members and candidates were received by incoming fed-
eral president NeviUe Wran, further weakening "Old Guard" sup-
port. 
Litigation and Elections 
Several attempts to reconcUe the estranged groups were made during 
AprU and agreement was reached on some points: 60/40 representa-
tion of trade unions/branches on committees including the Interim 
Administrative Committee; the right of union members to partici-
pate in candidate preselection; fuU disclosure of the financial posi-
tion of party enterprises, and consultation between Federal Executive 
and current directors of those enterprises. However, both sides con-
sidered their positions on proportional representation to be non-
negotiable.'' 
On 30 May 1980 a Supreme Court writ chaUenging the new com-
mittee's legaUty was issued against twenty-one members of the re-
constituted committee including Denis Murphy, Ed Casey, Bill 
Hayden, Manfred Cross, and Peter Beattie.'^ (Tom Bums had since 
resigned the presidency for reasons of iU-health). The case againsi 
Federal Executive intervention, and the appointment of the Interim 
Administrative Committee was to be based on three major points.' 
that the Queensland Branch had never adopted the federal rules; 
that the federal rules did not give the Federal Executive power to 
intervene in the branch's affairs as was done; and that the Interim 
Committee was not entitled to use the name ALP (State of 
Queensland).'^ Plaintiffs to the writ included Tom Burton, Clem 
Jones, Harry HauenschUd, Neal Kane, and Nick Bos, "on behalf of 
aU members of the ALP (Queensland Branch) except the defendants, 
and as trustees of property belonging to the ALP (Queensland 
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Branch)". Labor Party members issuing writs against other Labor 
Party members in this way was unprecedented. 
Controversy over the 1980 Senate ticket continued. Concern was 
expressed among party members over Gerry Jones's blatant opposition 
to federal intervention, his refusal to serve on the committee, and 
the method by which he had obtained endorsement. Many branches 
demanded a recall of Senate nominations. In May and August the 
Administrative Committee recommended to the Federal Executive, 
on the strength of branch demands, that fresh Senate nominations be 
called.3^ This call was rejected by the Federal Executive on the eve 
of the elections. Threatened countermoves by the "Old Guard" to run 
its own ticket giving Jones the number one spot, were seen by Hayden 
and Hawke as potentially damaging to ALP Senate votes.37 
ALP electoral support in Queensland had dropped to 36 per cent 
during February/March—^its lowest level since 1974.38 Recognising an 
urgent need to restore a sense of purpose and win government a mem-
bership committee was established. A series of "Revival Rallies" 
aimed at "rejuvenating and refreshing the party's organisation, its 
ambition, drive and energy" was held.3^ Aware of the value of the 
north Queensland vote (20 per cent of state seats and four House of 
Representatives seats), the committee sent its leaders, including Ed 
Casey, himself from Mackay, to provincial centres such as 
Townsville, Cairns, Kuranda, Rockhampton, Mt Isa, Charters 
Towers, Maryborough, and Warwick. These rallies drew enthusias-
tic crowds of Labor supporters, long-time members and new recruits. 
Financial support, too, was forthcoming, with pledges from several 
unions.*' 
In view of coming federal and state elections, both sides initi-
ated further peace moves in August with Ben Humphreys, federal 
member for Griffith, acting as intermediary. A meeting on 8 
September of Hayden, Bowen, Murphy, Cross, Kane, Hauenschild, 
Bos, retiring ACTU president Hawke and newly elected federal 
president Wran outlined several areas of agreement, including the 
need for both groups to co-operate towards the common objective of 
defeating the Eraser and Bjelke-Petersen governments. To this end 
both groups would refrain from making public statements relating to 
each other, there was to be a stay of legal proceedings, and Manfred 
Cross was to run the election campaign, in liaison with Nick Bos.*^  
In spite of pessimistic newspaper forecasts on the intervention's 
electoral effects, the federal poll of 18 October saw Labor's primary 
vote in Queensland increased by 5.1 per cent. On a state by state basis 
this was one of the highest pro-Labor swings. While national leader 
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Bill Hayden gained a swing of 9.1 per cent in his electorate of Oxley 
the increased vote overall netted only two extra seats: the seat of 
Brisbane, regained by Manfred Cross, and Lilley, won by Elaine 
Darling.*^ The Brisbane result owed much to the co-operation of 
Cross and Nick Bos. 
The 1980 state election results were not nearly so encouraging. 
For a start the seat of Caboolture was contested by two Labor candi-
dates—Tom McLoughlin, endorsed by the "Old Guard" and Norrie 
Hall, endorsed by the "New Guard" .*3 In March, state Liberal 
leader William Knox had warned his party of a possible 5 per cent 
swing to Labor following intervention, and a resulting loss of nine 
Liberal seats, and, although it was not expected that Labor could 
gain the necessary 19 seats to win government, optimism was high 
following the swing to Labor in the federal sphere. 
The expected closeness of the vote, the rift in the coalition, and 
Labor's need for a good result to provide a stabilising factor, made 
for a tense election campaign. Because the Liberals were appearing 
more as an opposition party than a coalition partner, in a few key 
seats where the Liberals could be undermined, ALP preferences were 
given to the Nationals. 
In spite of the increasingly bitter divisions between the coali-
tion parties, and the style of the Bjelke-Petersen government (its 
confrontationist attitude, its abuse of parHamentary procedures, its 
hastily drafted legislation, its suppression of debate and 
dissemination of information were all major election issues), the ALP 
primary vote decreased slightly to 41.49 per cent. The party had 
hoped to take the marginal northern seats of Barron River and Mt 
Isa, following savage cost of living increases in the north, but could 
only increase its twenty-three seats by two—Townsville West and 
Mourilyan. Hampered by a widely perceived lack of talent among 
candidates, mostly "Old Guard" nominees endorsed before in-
tervention. Labor failed to present itself as an alternative govem-
ment. 
Peace Is Declared 
The public in-fighting resumed when the election truce was over and 
the poor result gave ammunition to both sides. Both groups attacked 
each other by circulars to members and through the media. Criticism 
focused on Dr Denis Murphy, the decline in union involvement, the 
federal administration and its system of proportional representa-
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tion,*^ and aUegations that the Charlotte Street group had accumu-
lated debts of $250,000 in its first twelve months.''^ In late November 
Murphy announced, in response to a move by the Breakfast Creek 
group to print its OWTI membership tickets, that members had until 
the end of March 1981 to take out tickets with the Charlotte Street 
office, or thereafter to lose continuity of membership. Murphy, at a 
press conference in December 1980, wamed that any branch members 
who knowingly took out tickets with the former administration 
would place themselves outside the ALP.*^ This provoked accusa-
tions of intimidation, especially after the closure of two branches, 
Clontarf and GreenhUls/Alderley, which had expressed full sup-
port for the Breakfast Creek administration.'*'' At the same time the 
lAC passed a motion that any unions affiliating with the former 
administration would place themselves outside the party."** 
Following this a meeting of affiliated unions in December of 1980 
expressed concern at unions' diminished role in party administra-
tion.49 
In March 1981 Federal Executive considered a proposal by Nev 
Warburton. The plan, listing signatories from both groups, was co-
ordinated by Bob Hawke and Lionel Bowen, exercising their highly 
regarded skiUs as concUiators. It expressed concem at the continuing 
division within the party in Queensland, and requested that a State 
Conference be convened as soon as possible, chaired by National 
president Wran and confined to administrative matters.^° 
The Federal Executive accepted the plan but reiterated its 
decision on three non-negotiable conditions that were to be accepted 
by aU who attended such a State Conference—the Supreme Court 
litigation must be abandoned, proportional representation must be 
accepted, the authority and direction of the Federal Executive must 
be recognised.^ ^ During the last weekend of March, David Combe and 
NeviUe Wran visited Brisbane to ensure that unions which had re-
mained neutral were able to participate in a fully representative 
state Conference. 
The long-running sore of Toowoomba was also healed at this 
time. After a visit by Manfred Cross, the lAC voted on 29 March to 
re-estabUsh the deregistered branches, to issue 1980 tickets to indi-
vidual members (affording them continuity of membership), to caU 
nominations for those two Toowoomba seats and to maintain a re-
view of the situation. The candidates endorsed were the SociaUst 
Left's Lindesay Jones, who outpoUed former nominee Peter Wood, 
and Ronald Eraser.^ ^ 
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Finances 
In the meantime, the lAC faced the ongoing tasks of administration. 
Denied access to the branch's records and assets, and hampered by 
the loss of affUiation fees from fifteen unions, the committee had 
many problems, especially financial. David Combe's report to the 
Federal Executive on 24 May 1980 showed that the companies owned 
by Labor in Queensland appeared to have been "subject to misman-
agement on a massive scale".^' Even if the party were to make 
$660,000 by selling 48.5 per cent of 4KQ, as was mooted, it stiU faced 
debts of between $600,000 and $750,000. Among the debts, $800,000 
was owed to the Commonwealth Bank, $30,000 to the Federal 
Executive, and $90,000 to other creditors. It appeared that since the 
death in 1974 of former general manager Len Bioley, an astute busi-
ness person, the businesses had been managed by party officials with 
few financial skUls. Added to this, the cost of state and federal 
election campaigns of 1980 amounted to around $340,000 leaving the 
admirustration with an overdraft of $30,000 on its campaign account 
at the close of 1980.54 
In view of the inherited debts, the lAC asked its affiUated 
unions to pay their 1981 fees early, in 1980. Branches also responded 
to appeals, as did some businesses, to the tune of $30,000 apiece.^ ^ An 
ALP Defence Committee was formed, an aUiance of representatives 
of unions and branches, and from aU factions, to act as a "watchdog" 
on correct implementation of ALP rules and policy, especiaUy re-
garding the business enterprises. 
An earUer proposal, drawn up by Clem Jones, for the sale of 48.5 
per cent of shares in Labor Broadcasting to Col Joye Enterprises was 
negotiated throughout 1980. The Defence Committee had argued 
that such a sale would be in breach of rule 30 as approved by State 
Conference in 1979 which provided that any dealings in property 
should be first endorsed by State CouncU.^ ^ The meeting of 29 March 
of the lAC voted to have its officers investigate the 4KQ financial 
and legal situation. Meanwhile Nick Erby, employed by Kevin 
Jacobsen of Col Joye Enterprises had taken over programming and the 
new format led to a September profit of $17,000, which increased to 
$45,000 m November. 
Late in 1980 the lAC made court appUcation for removal of 
company control from its present directors, and for the appointment 
of a receiver to investigate company operations, to audit the books, 
and to report to court on the company's management and financial 
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position. This application was based on aUeged breaches of rules 30, 
31 and 32. During the January court proceedings, the sale deal was 
caUed off, and $65,000 repaid to Jacobsen, being his deposit on 
shares. In his mUng, brought down on 8 January, Mr Justice ConnoUy 
said that, because other Utigation as to who was entitled to control 
the companies was in progress in the Supreme Court, the current di-
rectors of Labor Broadcasting could not be removed. Defendants 
Burton, HauenschUd, Kane and Jones undertook to refrain from 
aUotting or transferring shares, or seUing any part of either of the 
two companies. 
The 1981 State Conference and a New Image 
By March 1981 the feud became the butt of much humour from colum-
nists and cartoonists. More seriously, the Australian of 24 March 
1981 editorialised: 
The faction fighting in Queensland has stopped Labor presenting itself 
as a believable Opposition in Queensland, making life much too easy 
for the Premier, Mr Joh Bjelke-Petersen. Naturally, the Party's 
comparatively poor performance in the northern state has contributed 
to its overall failure to win office. 
Prior to the State Conference planned for June/July, much lobbying 
took place regarding the composition of future conferences, corrunittee 
and delegate positions and the new rules for candidate selection. A 
committee of thirteen, headed by Ian McLean, had been formed in 
February to draw up rule changes to be submitted to State 
Conference.^^ The conference began in an atmosphere of apparent 
unity. A president and three vice-presidents were simultaneously 
elected in one baUot of all delegates, using proportional representa-
tion. Denis Murphy, publicly endorsed by BiU Hayden was the pop-
ular choice for president, taking 117 votes to the 78 polled by 
Socialist Left candidate, George Georges, who thus became vice-
president. Joy ArdUl also of the Left, became a vice-president, the 
first woman to hold such high office in the Queensland Branch. The 
Centte Left's Hughie WUUams took the third vice-presidency. 
The Centre Left group took the majority of positions, though the 
SociaUst Left polled well, winning six of fifteen committee posi-
tions. This was not unexpected as there were only eighteen unions 
represented, not including the AWU and other moderate unions. 
Each faction was to have a delegate to the Federal Executive, these 
being Denis Murphy and Ian McLean, and ex-officio members would 
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be federal Opposition leader Hayden, state Opposition leader 
Casey and a secretary to be appointed at a later date. A Disputes 
Tribunal was also elected. 
At the conference, the plebiscite system was abandoned in 
favour of an electoral coUege system for preselection of all federal, 
state and local government candidates. The new system involved all 
branch members and trade union and branch delegates. Branches 
would henceforth select candidates through postal ballot with the 
branch vote converted to the equivalent of forty votes. Candidates 
then address the Electoral CoUege, made up of forty State Council 
delegates chosen by proportional representation on a 60/40 ratio of 
trade union and branch members. The successful candidate is the one 
with the highest number of votes from the combined local branch 
and central college votes. While the former system was seen to 
promote the choice of "good old hard-working party hacks" instead 
of more able and attractive candidates^* the electoral coUege system 
was opposed (surprisingly) by Manfred Cross, who described it as 
"elitist" .5^ State Conference also resolved to increase the role of 
women on all committees, through a programme of Affirmative 
Action. 
The exercise of participatory democracy at the conference 
brought a sense of unity and optiirusm to aU who attended and ob-
served. This mood was enhanced by a much-awaited and weU-timed 
announcement by Denis Murphy, concenung the "Old Guard" court 
action. Fourteen months after the issue of writs, Mr Justice Lucas of 
the Supreme Court handed dov^ m his decision. He rejected the chal-
lenge to the legaUty of intervention, declared that the resolution of 
1 March 1980 taken by the Federal Executive was effective, that the 
appointed Adnunistrative Committee was legal, and that conttol of 
all ALP assets must be handed to the federally backed administta-
tion. Murphy's announcement was greeted with scenes of unrestrained 
emotion. It provided the highest legal authentication of the subor-
dination of state branches to the Federal Executive, and of National 
Conference as the supreme governing authority of the party. The 
party could at last, it seemed, present a united front as an efifective 
opposition. 
The decision was a personal triumph for Bill Hayden. His 
telegram to State Conference read: 
Suddenly our backside has stopped itching. A great victory has been 
won for our members and for the future of the Party. Let's go on now, 
giving the people of Queensland the sane and sensible govemment they 
deserve.^'' 
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That BiU Hayden was ready to risk his leadership for his convic-
tions enhanced his standing in the federal sphere in the face of the 
growing menace of Bob Hawke, the new member for WUls, as an al-
ternative party leader. On his arrival at the conference next day, 
Hayden was given a prolonged standing ovation. But beyond the eu-
phoria of the conference room, dissension stiU rumbled. 
Affirmative Action 
After intervention the Interim Administrative Committee was re-
quired to draft new rules to implement, among other things, the 1978-
79 National Committee of Inquiry recommendations in regard to 
Affirmative Action. To the ALP, Affirmative Action meant an 
Austtalia-wide programme within the party for making positions 
available for women both on the decision-making bodies of the 
party and eventuaUy for seats in parUament. 
UntU the 1970s, only four women from any poUtical party had 
ever been elected to the House of Representatives and only four to 
the Queensland Parliament. Prior to intervention, women in the 
Queensland Labor Party (as elsewhere) had been used as unpaid or-
ganisers and campaign fodder. "The traditional view of women as 
unseen workers and helpmates prevented them from being seen as 
political identities in their own right."*^ The Labor Women's 
Organisation had attempted to provide a support system for party 
women and had encouraged an increase, especiaUy since 1976, in 
numbers of women serving on ALP policy committees and campaign 
committees; it also played a strong role in certain controversial cam-
paigns, such as the abortion issue of the late 1970s when, with Jim 
HerUhy, it was able to influence the ALP Justice Committee. 
FoUowing Labor's poor performance at the 1977 federal elec-
tions, the party set up a committee of inquiry to investigate the rea-
sons. The report, which was made pubUc, indicated that, among 
other problems. Labor was not attracting the women's vote: "The 
Committee is of the view that the need for the Party to relate to 
women as voters is a matter separate from, but related to, the status 
of women in the party". Labor women decided to tackle this problem 
through the party and through the unions. 
The Labor Women's Organisation had won the right at the 1977 
state Labor-in-Politics Convention to send three delegates to the 
convention and one representative to the Queensland Central 
Executive. The first such QCE delegate was CoUeen Freeman, who 
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made detailed reports back to branches. The same convention de-
cided that one branch member from each federal district would be 
elected to the QCE. Of runeteen Federal Divisional Executive (FDE) 
delegates, two were women—^Joy ArdiU from McPherson, whose 
husband WUf was by this time TLC president, and BilUe Watts, 
from the Ryan FDE. 
The Labor Women's Organisation set about educating its mem-
bers on meeting procedures, encouraging them to participate at 
branch level, to stand for office, to get into union executives. In 
1979-80, a National Labor Women's Conference was estabUshed. 
The January 1981 Labor Women's Conference adopted the 
recommendations of the ALP National Committee of Inquiry, then 
submitted to the Federal Executive its guidelines for the 
implementation of the Affirmative Action programme. The 
Committee of Inquiry had recommended a policy of affirmative 
action in favour of women for a fixed period of seven or ten years. 
During this period, women were to be guaranteed representation on 
all party committees, conferences or delegations at least in 
proportion to their membership of the relevant branch or voting 
body (unless the total delegation is Umited to one in which case 
Affirmative Action was not to apply). Unions too would be required 
to include women in their delegations in proportion to female 
membership in the union. By this means women were to gain 
representation on all poUcy committees, executive conunittees and 
advisory bodies of the party. It was further recommended that 
positive steps be taken to endorse women for safe and winnable seats, 
that the National Secretariat organise regular national forums on 
topics particularly relevant to the status of women, that all party 
pubUcations and party ballot papers give an indication of sex by the 
use of given names, and that a further assistant national secretary be 
appointed to act as a focal point within the party at the national 
level for all party activity related to women.^^ 
When it was established that women represented about 30 per 
cent of party membership, the Labor Women's Conference guideUnes 
aimed at 30 per cent female representation on aU decision-making 
bodies by 1982, or 1985 in the case of state and federal policy 
committees, administrative committees. National Conferences and 
Federal Executives. The guidelines proposed Affirmative Action 
procedures for women standing as candidates at local, state and fed-
eral level, untU such time as women comprised 30 per cent of caucus 
groups at aU three levels. The guidelines were endorsed by the 
National ALP Conference of July 1981.^' Immediately prior to this, 
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the Queensland State Conference of June 1981 had given effect to the 
policy with the election of six women to the Administrative 
Committee. 
New Faces at Breakfast Creek 
FoUowing the mle changes, by September 1981, the apparatus for 
reform within the Queensland Branch of the ALP was in place. The 
vast majority of party members accepted the actions of Hayden, the 
reformists, and the Federal Executive over the past two years. The 
conference had seemed an outstanding success both within the pairty 
and publicly. Morgan GaUup polls conducted by the Bulletin showed 
that ALP support in Queensland had risen by 6 per cent between May 
and August, 1981 to 40 per cent whUe coalition support had faUen by 
5 per cent to 53 per cent. Now that intervention had been legaUy 
vindicated, several unions which had remained neutral awaiting 
the court's judgment began moves to reaffiUate. 
In September 1981, a state secretary was selected to succeed 
Manfred Cross, who had regained the federal seat of Brisbane in 
1980. Of twelve nominations for the position, three were short-
Usted—McLean, state secretary of the ATEA and member of the 
SociaUst Left faction, Ian Henderson, a member of Hayden's staff 
whose nomination was initially supported by Murphy, and a late 
nomination, leading Reformist, Peter Beattie. Rob Whiddon had 
also nominated, but withdrew to support Beattie. McLean appeared 
to have the upper hand during preselection lobbying, but when 
Beattie entered the field, support polarised between him and 
McLean.^ "* Peter Beattie was chosen with the comfortable margin of 
fifty-nine out of ninety-seven votes of State Council, his main sup-
port coming from Centte caucus plus the remnants of the "Old Guard". 
Questioned on what he saw as the priorities of his new role, 
Beattie stressed unity within the party and a determination to 
avoid factionalism. "Labor is traditionally an umbrella political 
organisation and the main aim is to have all groups working for the 
same objective—an ALP government." While his work with the re-
form group had reduced union dominance of the ALP in Queensland 
Peter Beattie accepted Labor's traditional links with unionism, and 
aimed to reaffiUate those unions, representing around 100,000 work-
ers, such as the AWU, the ETU, and the FMWU.^ ^ ^ e caUed for a 
reinvigoration of support for the party, publicly and through mem-
bership drives. Another main task was the establishment of a sound 
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financial infrastructure for the party. At that stage, it was expected 
that, even after the transferral of party assets from the "Old 
Guard", there would be a severe shortage of funds with which to 
fight the coming March 1982 local government elections. On 26 
October 1981, his first day of official duties as state secretary, 
Beattie declaimed sanguinely: "No-one knows what the future 
holds. I can only pray that I will be able to lift the Spirit of this 
tired, sleeping Uon called the Labor party, and lead it roaring into 
Government!"^ 
n Old Guard" Gives In: Reaffiliation 
A meeting of the LAG voted fouteen to five on 4 September to readmit 
"Old Guard" uruons and the AWU. It was thought at this time that 
the AWU would align itself with the Centre Caucus faction. 
Socialist Left members, perhaps wishing to delay for as long as pos-
sible this coalescence and the resultant lessening of their ov^ m rela-
tive voting strengths, argued that such readmissions should not be 
considered untU aU branch assets stiU held by the"01d Guard" at 
Breakfast Creek were returned.^^ The latter became one of the 
conditions of reaffiUation. 
During the following week, new Administrative Committee 
members Murphy, Cross, Hughie WiUiams, Ian McLean, Joe Harris 
(newly readmitted with full continuity of membership), Bryant 
Bums, and Pat Dunne met with newly elected ALP national secretary 
Bob McMuUan in Sydney, to finalise reaffiUation of these unions. In 
October 1981, the AWU voted to retum. This foUowed discussions 
among Murphy, Beattie, Cross and the union's newly appointed state 
secretary, Errol Hodder, who appeared to take a more conciUatory 
stance than his predecessor Edgar WiUiams. The decision was rati-
fied at the November meeting of the new State CouncU, its terms be-
ing that the AWU hold two positions on the Administrative 
Committee, ten on State CouncU and twenty-six at State Conference. 
In October, the Federated Liquor and Allied Industries 
Employees' Union agreed to reaffiliate officially in 1982, the 
Seamen's Union did so in November, as did the WWF, following the 
Supreme Court rejection of the "Old Guard" appeal. These decisions, 
ratified by State Council on 5 December, increased to 180,000 the 
membership represented by affiUated unions. Moves from within 
the union for return of the 21,000-member Federated MisceUaneous 
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Workers Union (FMWU) were given impetus by the election of Wilf 
ArdiU to succeed retiring "Old Guard" secretary, Harry MeUow. 
The path to fuU union representation on Labor's decision-mak-
ing bodies was not always as smooth. In November 1981, Federated 
Storemen and Packers Union (FSPU) state secretary Fred Nicol 
presided over a meeting which threatened to form a breakaway 
group called "Traditional Labor People" to field election candi-
dates.^* This was in response to the broadening of the union/blue-
collar base which clearly would result from the administrative re-
forms. The president of the same union, Ernie Adsett, later expressed 
anger at the Socialist Left influence within the party and what he 
saw as a lack of rank-and-fUe representation.^^ Despite these pos-
turings, the FMWU, ETU, FSPU, Vehicle Builders' Union and 
Federated Engine Drivers and Firemen's Association were eventu-
aUy to reaffiUate. This was to be effected at the March 1982 State 
CouncU meeting, following the final settlement of the then current 
dispute over the party's assets. 
WhUe unions one by one formally renewed their support for the 
ALP, by early 1981 branch membership had dropped by almost one-
third. One aim of intervention had been to restore vitality to the 
party, but this had not occurred. Instead, a mood of despondency and 
pessimism prevailed, a disillusionment with having been out of 
goverrunent for so long, and a weariness resulting from prottacted or-
ganisational ructions. Although pledged to win back the traditional 
union base, Beattie recognised the need to attract the support of 
unions such as the QSSU and the Bar\k Employees' Union. Surveys 
had shown "white collar" service work to be an area of dramatic 
growth in unionism.^° Such moves were encouraged by Denis Murphy, 
BiU Hayden, Errol Hodder and others, especially of the Centre 
Caucus, but opposed by more traditionaUst elements. Clem Jones—a 
miUionaire himself^argued that any policy or image shift aimed 
at middle income groups would "move away from philosophies 
which look after those at lower income levels".^^ 
Healing the Wounds: Property and Preselections 
Negotiations continued between the new administtation and rem-
nants of the "Old Guard" which, while lacking party support, stUl 
retained its hold on the party's assets. In early September 1981, the 
Administrative Committee proposed that all records, accounts and 
property be handed over for audit, and that shares stiU held by 
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former directors be transferred to a panel elected by State Council. 
(Although Clem Jones had made earUer assurances to the contrary, 
he had lodged an appeal to the FuU Bench of the Supreme Court 
against the June ruling; refusing to relinquish his shares in radio 
station 4KQ, he claimed that they were held outright, not in trust, 
and that branch assets remained the property of the "previously 
elected administration" .)^ 2 xhe comnuttee was prepared to accept 
responsibiUty for debts incurred by the former administration up un-
tU the July court decision, and provide a total of six positions on the 
committee for union representatives. Continuity of membership was 
offered even to those involved tn the Supreme Court writ, provided 
Clem Jones withdrew his appeal.^' All shareholders, with the ex-
ception of Clem Jones, were ready to accept^* and his refusal was 
rendered irrelevant when his appeal, heard on 23 November, was 
unanimously rejected after the consideration of the history and rules 
of federal and state organisations within the ALP.^ ^ 
When the 25 November deadline for the handover of party as-
sets had passed, yet another Supreme Court action was instigated, 
this time by the new administration against "Old Guard" trustees 
Jones, Hauenschild, Burton and Kane, to recover shares in the now 
lucrative radio station and in Labor Enterprises. A writ was also is-
sued against "Old Guard" secretary Nick Bos for $80,000 aUegedly 
received and held by him on behalf of the state branch since inter-
vention. These legal disputes continued into 1982. In January the 
peace proposals were accepted; whUe the "Old Guard" endeavoured 
to persuade previously affiUated unions to rejoin the party, it was 
agreed their legal expenses would be met by Labor Broadcasting.''^ 
After much discussion among the committee members and 
Brusasco, Hauenschild, Conway, Adsett and Bos, the proposals were 
passed, approved by the Federal Executive in Canberra and an-
nounced jointly by Murphy and Hauenschild. Labor Enterprises Pty 
Ltd and Labor Broadcasting would be jointly administered by direc-
tors from both groups, the chairman of both to be Ian Brusasco, with 
Hauenschild, Murphy, Burton and Kane among the directors. 
FoUowing these disappointments, Clem Jones resigned from the ALP 
on 17 February. He was persuaded to withdraw his resignation in 
June of 1982 and in July 1984, in an act of pubUc heaUng, his role as 
one of Labor's most successful politicians in Queensland was ac-
knowledged with the presentation of life membership. 
The dispute was formally discontinued on 27 March 1982 with 
the return of the administration to its Breakfast Creek headquar-
ters. Prior to this, the strength of unity, still embryonic, was tested 
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at State CouncU—one of the most important innovations of interven-
tion. Meeting four times a year, it provided for fuU reporting of 
party finances, poUcies, preselections, and so forth. At the meeting 
in early March, the newly readmitted "Old Guard", together with 
the AWU, would constitute a votmg bloc of sufficient magrutude to 
alter the balance of influence. A priority for discussion was the com-
position of the Senate team for the 1983 elections. Sitting Senators 
Georges and Colston were challenged by Madeleine MacPherson, a 
committee member and former Toowong delegate to State Conference, 
supported by Centte Caucus, Frank MeUt, weU-known former Rugby 
League star, and Bob Gleeson, a grazier from Longreach and former 
State CouncU delegate, the "Old Guard" nominee. Under the system 
of proportional representation support for MacPherson was expected 
to erode that of Colston, aUowing Gleeson to benefit. The ticket fi-
nally endorsed by the meeting presented a balanced team—Georges 
(Socialist Left), Colston (Centre) and Gleeson. 
Other issues debated concerned the party's role in local govem-
ment elections, then imminent. A ward system had been imposed by 
the National/Liberal state government on the provincial cities of 
Rockhampton, TowTisvUle, Maryborough and Toowoomba, and the 
coaUtion had launched an aU-out bid to diminish Labor's strong in-
fluence in these areas. However, the National Party, despite heavy 
advertising expenditure, suffered state-wide rebuffs in the elections 
of 27 March, while the Liberals performed somewhat better. In 
Brisbane City, despite a drop of 2 per cent in their overaU vote. 
Labor held eleven wards to the Liberals' ten. Roy Harvey was 
subsequently elected to the mayoralty following the retirement of 
Frank Sleeman. The choice of Harvey and of Len ArdiU as vice-
mayor represented a further setback for the former mUng group, 
whose nominations were Bryan Walsh, a former mayor, and Ian 
Brusasco. Ironically, Brusasco had also been backed by state secre-
tary Beattie and president Denis Murphy, who despite ideological 
differences, saw Brusasco's elevation to the mayoralty as reinforcing 
his tenuous hold on the marginal seat of Lutwyche.^^ 
Labor also maintained control of councils in Ipswich and in 
Rockhampton where the ALP candidate Jim Webber defeated the 
conservative mayor of thirty years. Rex Pilbeam. In Townsville a 
swing of 16 per cent to the ALP was seen as a protest against the 
changing of the local government system in that area by Local 
Goverrunent miruster Russ Hinze. The fuU ALP aldermanic team was 
elected and Mike Reynolds returned as mayor. 
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Overall, it seemed that the accomplishments of the local 
lovernment elections manifested the end of a traumatic period for 
Labor in Queensland. The internecine factional disputes seemed set-
tled, most unions were reaffiUated, and by means of proportional 
representation, all sections could participate in the administration 
of the party and the selection of candidates. The new Electoral 
CoUege system of candidate selection was designed to eliminate pa-
ttonage and present the "best" candidates for the job of winning gov-
ernment. With the parliamentary wing more unified than before, 
and the national voting trends tending to favour Labor, the mood was 
positive, with state and federal Labor victories in 1983 expected by 
many members. 
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Legacy of Reform in the Eighties 
Despite the depth of feeling, the damage and apparent polarisation 
of the groups before, during and after intervention, the party had 
avoided another split. As Murphy wrote: "The major achievement of 
that period ... was that we did stop a split. People tend to remember 
those who start wars, not those who prevent them".' 
That the party avoided a spUt between 1980 and 1982 was to a 
great extent attributable to Denis Murphy himself, his skills of ne-
gotiation and mediation and his tireless dedication to bringing about 
much-needed reforms. His role during that turbulent period was 
summed up by Peter Trundle in July 1983 as "one of conciliation, 
reconciliation, and rebuilding" .^  Bob Carr too, in July 1981, paid 
tribute to Murphy's leadership. 
Despite the Socialist Left gains, the Conference [of '81] may have wit-
nessed the advent of some much-needed political talent in the form of 
president Denis Murphy. The University of Queensland historian 
proved himself a competent vote-drawer and chairman, and, in com-
menting on the Supreme Court decision, the best public spokesman the 
Queensland party has had in memory.' 
Murphy saw the Labor Party as the vehicle of much needed 
radical reforms in health schemes, wealth redistribution and the 
provision of opportunities for people on below-average wages. In 
1981 influential Brisbane journalist Quentin Dempster had written: 
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"With its [the ALP's] soUd core of (Queensland voter support it would 
only take a man (or woman) of vision, credibiUty and leadership, to 
rebuild this once great party".'' It seemed, at the time, that Murphy 
was to be that leader. 
Growth of Factions 
The 1982 ALP State Conference was scheduled for the June long 
weekend at the Greek Community Centre in South Brisbane. 
Although intended chiefly as preparation for the 1983 state elec-
tions the conference's main focus was the election of party officials, 
delegates to National Conference and Federal Executive, members of 
a Disputes Tribunal and returning officers. As the first conference 
since the formerly affUiated unions rejoined the party, it was hoped 
that it would stabiUse the stiU-precarious unity. 
The need to reinforce unity had been Ulustrated less than two 
weeks earUer during preselection plebiscites, when Denis Murphy 
nominated for the marginal Liberal-held state seat of Stafford. 
Murphy had won only narrowly in the face of continued "Old Guard" 
resentment, failing to obtain a majority of votes from the local panel 
and only making up the leeway with cross-factional support in the 
Electoral College. A compromise deal to gain the necessary votes 
had been hastUy arranged between the Centre and Socialist Left 
groups. Murphy's selection for Stafford was supported by the 
Socialist Left in return for Centre support of Left nonunee Anne 
Warner in the equally marginal Liberal seat of Kurilpa. Denis 
Murphy had thus paved the way to enter parUament, but faced, yet 
another challenge, this time to his presidency. 
On the day before the conference opened, state secretary 
Beattie said: "it is crucial that the election at the Conference results 
in a power sharing of all major views within the party" .^  Under 
proportional representation, the candidates for the office of presi-
dent and the three vice-presidential positions were elected not 
separately but as a group of four, meaning that proportional repre-
sentation applied. There had been apprehension that the "Old 
Guard" in alliance with the newly readmitted AWU might regain 
control of the executive positions at the conference. Although the 
Reformists had split into the ideologically committed "Socialist 
Left" and the more pragmatic "Centre Caucus" group, it was under-
stood that these would amalgamate, as demonstrated during the 
preselection plebiscites, to defeat the "Old Guard". 
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Apart from the "Old Guard" and former Reform Group group-
ings, the 1982 coixference saw the emergence of a further player. The 
AWU indicated its intention to take an effective role in Labor poU-
tics once again by nominating for the presidency its ambitious new 
state secretary Errol Hodder, then aged forty-three. Hodder, a for-
mer shearer with professional training in administration, managed 
in an historically bizarre alignment, to secure the support of the 
"Old Guard". Confronted by this alliance which threatened 
Murphy's leadership, Hayden led a motion to separate the presi-
dential ballot from the vice-presidential posts. This was unsuccess-
ful so a vote using proportional representation was taken for the four 
positions. Other nominees were Jean Davis (wife of state member for 
Brisbane Brian Davis) and sitting vice-presidents Hughie WilUams 
(TWU) and Joy ArdUl. George Georges had earUer nominated, but 
withdrew as part of the agreement which, as predicted, was 
reached between Centre and Socialist Left factions, in order to safe-
guard Murphy's leadership and thus retain the balance of power for 
the former Reform Group. 
Under this agreement. Murphy gained the numbers to retain his 
presidency, whUe Hodder, only twenty-seven votes behind, took a 
vice-presidency along with Davis and WiUiams. As was also pre-
dicted, the "Old Guard"/AWU alliance made significant gains, 
winning nine of the twenty-seven Administrative Committee posi-
tions. In consideration of the history of relations between the "Old 
Guard" and AWU, the balance of power stiU appeared to be held by 
the Centre, with nine positions, while the Socialist Left secured 
eight positions.^ The "Trades HaU monoUth" which had mled for so 
long, appeared to have been dismantled. AU the elements in the 
party had appropriate representation in the central party 
organisation. 
This emergence of factional groupings was to be one of the chief 
legacies of reform. Although brought about, in part, by the 
polarisation of opinion in the fierce dispute, the entrenchment of in-
stitutionaUsed factions was a direct consequence of the system of 
proportional representation. As Bob Carr, later New South Wales 
Labor leader, wrote in the Bulletin of 6 September 1982: 
Federal intervention ... saw the introduction of proportional representa-
tion as the new party voting system. It meant success in ballots for two or 
more positions went to candidates backed by blocs of votes, stimulating 
the Party membership to form factions.'' 
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He described the Queensland Branch, two years after the 
Federal Executive intervention, as "a case study in the rise of Labor 
factional politics at a national level",* each faction in Queensland 
providing an organisational focus primarily aimed at "getting the 
numbers". 
The establishment of the Labor Unity faction from the ruins of 
the "Old Guard" traditionaUsts illustrates the path of this devel-
opment. Labor Unity maintained that the party's future was depen-
dent upon trade uruons, as marufested by the leadership of the 
Trades and Labor CouncU. In C^eensland, this group evolved during 
the sixteen months foUowing intervention, to oppose the continuing 
administration of the party by non-elected (federally appointed) 
officials as undemocratic and untrue to basic Labor principles. Prior 
to the 1983 state elections (and not unexpectedly considering the 
power to preselect parliamentary candidates which the faction's 
predecessors had enjoyed for so many years) the majority of state 
Labor parUamentarians were aUgned with this group, including Tom 
Bums and Ed Casey, as well as Ben Humphreys, federal member for 
Griffith. The faction was associated federally with the dominant 
New South Wales-based "Right" faction which identified itself 
with pragmatic policy development; its pragmatism eschewed any 
radical social reformism, based on the beUef that a naturally con-
servative AustraUan electorate would reject any but the most grad-
ual change.' 
The Socialist Left faction played a strong role in the reform of 
the (Queensland Branch. It was formed in 1978 by such members as Joe 
Harris (BWIU), Bryant Bums (AMWSU^O), and Joy and Wilf Ardill 
(FMWU) out of a need to ei«ure that moves for reform did not degen-
erate into a "union versus branch" conflict. The most progressive 
tmions formed an alliance with active leftwing branch people to as-
sist in the struggle to democratise the party in Queeixsland. Indeed it 
was the support of uruons such as the Metalworkers', Building 
Workers', Meatworkers', Transport Workers', Telecommunications 
Employees' and others which gave the movement for reform the au-
thority needed for success. Branch members were able to convince 
leftist union officials that ideological commitment to the union 
movement did not exclude a positive role for branch members, espe-
cially given the stranglehold on the party forums exercised by the 
"right-wing" Trades Hall leadership. This understanding was 
demonstrated prior to the 1979 conference when Harris, Bums and 
Ian McLean (ATEA) indicated their intention to support branch 
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people for certain positions. Terry Hampson sees this point as the 
begirming of the end of unfettered TLC control of the party." 
The SociaUst Left's commitment to radical social reformism ex-
tended to its internal organisation: it maintained an effective 
Affirmative Action programme in selection of the faction's official 
organisers and panels of nominees for party and parUamentary posi-
tions. For the first time the radical women's movement had an 
effective voice within the Labor Party and this has been reflected in 
the fact that many Socialist Left activists have been women. The 
faction has made the pursuit of Affirmative Action within the 
party a prime goal. 
Generally, the Socialist Left's concerns have been for the need 
to maintain and revitaUse the party's socialist objectives and the 
ttansformation of poUcy to reflect these objectives. Senator George 
Georges, as the faction's Queensland spokesman, said in July 1981: "It 
was vital that the ALP in Queensland unite behind a socialist pro-
gramme. It is crucial that the ALP develop a viable socialist pro-
gramme and put it to the electorate."'^ The SociaUst Left worked to 
retum the ultimate power of policy formation and integration to 
rank and file members. Also, "the Left believes in educating the 
pubUc on ALP ideals and policies through direct action and pubUc 
demonstration if necessary."" Though radical pubUc stances have 
been successfully opposed by other elements in the party, the Left 
from its inception maintained its active involvement in issues such as 
an implacable stand against uranium mining. The Queensland 
Socialist Left has also been especially outspoken on civil liberties 
questions, again taking up the cudgels on behalf of leftist causes tra-
ditionally excluded from the ALP: it was no accident that the im-
mediate cause for Senator George Georges's resignation from the fed-
eral caucus in December 1986 should have been his opposition to leg-
islation to set up a national identity card system. 
The Left has also recognised the need for pragmatism in its ef-
forts to prevent right-wing elements increasing their power and en-
dangering socialist policies.''* In August 1981 Socialist Challenge 
stated: "The Socialist Left recognises that ... the support and in-
volvement of the unions in the Party is basic to Labor's political ex-
istence".'^ The Left's power on decision-making bodies increased 
dramaticaUy at the 1981 State Conference in the absence of many 
"Old Guard" unions. This influence extended to the Federal 
Executive when ATEA secretary Ian McLean was elected as one of 
two delegates. 
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The other major faction to emerge at the 1983 State Conference 
was the Centre Majority. This faction was formed by an uneasy al-
liance of the former Centre Caucus (federally, the Centre Left fac-
tion), the AWU and some smaUer uruons at a meeting in the AWU 
headquarters in Dunstan House, Adelaide Street, on 18 June 1983, in 
the face of growing Socialist Left influence. Among the founding 
members were former Reform Group activists Peter Beattie, Mike 
Kinnane and Madeleine MacPherson, together with AWU officials 
Errol Hodder and John Black and supporters Uke Con Sciacca and 
Wayne Swan. The faction adopted a two-tiered structure with a 
branch secretary (Kinnane) and a union secretary (Black). At the 
formation Madeleine MacPherson volunteered the optimistic projec-
tion that eventuaUy the party would contain only two factions, 
namely the Socialist Left and "all those opposed to the Socialist 
Left".'^ Divisions soon emerged within the faction as the AWU used 
its disciplined voting strength to dominate meetings and the old 
Centre Caucus soon re-estabUshed itself as a de facto grouping in re-
sponse.'^ 
The new faction received the active support of former federal 
leader BUl Hayden and the tacit support of Denis Murphy, who was 
apparently reluctant to identify himself with a faction whUe occu-
pying the position of inaugural president of the reformed 
Queensland Branch. The group was highly organised, placing high 
priority on finding quaUty candidates for all levels of goverrunent, 
and especiaUy on getting Labor into office in Queensland.'^ 
Although factionalism within the Labor Party is often cited as 
a reason for its not attaining govemment, there is increasing accep-
tance both within and, more importantly, outside the party, that, 
because the Labor Party is a party of change, there must be differ-
ences of opinion within its ranks. As Denis Murphy predicted in 
April 1980: 
The Australian Labor Party covers a Wide spectrum of ideological views 
and people have a right to express those views ... there is going to be in-
tense lobbying within the Party. This is not a bad thing, and with propor-
tional representation there is a guarantee that all views will be heard.' 
Policy on Women under the New Arrangements 
While the proportional representation method of preselection for 
party office and candidacy had proved quite successful in its aim of 
broadening participation, the Affirmative Action programme to in-
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crease female participation met with mixed results. The 
Affirmative Action principle was endorsed by the 1981 State 
Conference and rules were drafted accordingly for the conduct of 
elections for all presidential positions, the Administrative 
Committee, Disputes Tribunal, delegates to Federal Coi\ference, re-
turning officers, poUcy committees, and branch member delegates to 
State Council. Of thirty-eight branch-member delegates elected to 
State Council, nineteen were required to be women, according to the 
new rules. In June 1981, twenty women were elected to State CouncU, 
yet the Affirmative Action rule needed to be applied in only two 
cases. Proportional representation had proved its effectiveness.2° 
However, there were two glaring omissions from the 
Affirmative Action programme. The first concerned the election of 
delegates to State Conference, the poUcy-making body of the party. 
The existing procedures, without Affirmative Action, Umited the 
pool of women available for further positions in the party. Because 
State Conference is made up of only one delegate from each state 
electorate. Affirmative Action does not apply. This situation was 
not resolved at the 1984 State Conference, despite motions to effect 
change submitted by several Regional Conferences and by four 
branches;^' it was stUl a problem in 1988. 
The second omission concerned rules for preselection of candi-
dates for pubUc office. The aim was to increase the number of women 
contesting winnable seats but with the exception of Anne Warner's 
preselection for Kurilpa in 1982, and that of Barbara HiU (Dawson, 
1983) and Janine Walker (Stafford, 1984, 1986), this has not eventti-
ated. The party has been unable to formulate a rule which enables 
more women to win preselection for pubUc office. As most Labor Party 
policy recommendations originate at the branch level the fact that 
the Affirmative Action programme was imposed from the top has 
generated some opposition from conservative elements of the party. 
Affirmative Action's success was at State Council level and espe-
ciaUy with the increased numbers of women on poUcy committees. 
This influence was Ulustrated in the platform in policy areas such as 
justice, education, welfare, industrial affairs, and the status of 
women. 
At the 1984 State Conference in TownsviUe, it was announced 
that the proportion of women members of the Queensland Branch of 
the ALP had increased from 27 per cent in 1980 to 32 per cent in 1983. 
This was beUeved to be due to the pubUcation and promotion of the 
party's policy on the status of women and, in particular, to the 
adoption of the policy of Affirmative Action.^^ Other successful re-
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suits of Affirmative Action were the election of a wholly female ex-
ecutive of the Brisbane Federal Division Executive, the election of 
Anne Warner as delegate to the 1982 National Conference, and 
especiaUy the increase in the numbers of women on State Council. 
The Affirmative Action programme did not have the same 
level of success within the trade union movement, despite the 
continued efforts of the Labor Women's Organisation to develop 
links with affiliated unions, especially their women members. 
Although some unions had a majority of women members, their 
leadership in many cases was male, and often "Old Guard". Change, 
however slow, was indicated when, in January 1982, the TWU and 
the Australian Postal Telegraphists Union (APTU) financed 
delegations to the Labor Women's Conference.^' The 1984 conference 
saw increased representation from union executives and councUs, as 
weU as organisers, research and industtial officers, and other union 
staff. The Labor Women's Organisation continued to push for the 
introduction of Affirmative Action programmes for union elections, 
but lacked time and faciUties to promote awareness among women 
workers as to how they could benefit by becoming poUticised. 
Rebuilding the Branches, 1981-82 
Soon after his election as ALP president. Murphy resolved to visit as 
many branches in country areas as possible. With secretary Beattie 
or assistant secretary Hampson, Murphy often piloted a light air-
craft and covered most of Queensland. According to Hampson, the 
team was highly regarded and appreciated for these visits. Murphy 
was acknowledged as the first president for years to be reaUy in-
volved with rank-and-file members. Although both Beattie and 
Murphy recognised that it would probably take five years to restore 
the ALP's financial base in Queensland, they were able to repay 
debts of more than $1 miUion by running the organisation "with 
skill, care and utmost frugality".^'* Together they investigated 
means of stabilising and expandling the financial resources of the 
party. As Beattie explained in November 1982: "Unless the Labor 
Party looks to reorganising its financial base, we're simply not going 
to be in a position to compete" .^ ^ 
Murphy and Beattie advocated setting up a fund, tentatively 
known as the T.J. Ryan Fund, to accept donations and to foster 
connections with business organisations. Following an initial dona-
tion of $20 from Senator Georges who said he was "fed up" with lis-
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tening to Murphy talk about it", the idea was adopted in principle 
by the Administrative Committee on 2 November 1982. (IronicaUy, 
the party had earUer spent much time and printer's ink denouncing a 
sinular concept successfully adopted in 1979 by the Natiorwl Party. 
The Bjelke-Petersen Foundation aimed to raise $2.5 nulUon for the 
purchase of buUdings in Brisbane and provincial towns. It had re-
portedly raised $1.5 million by November 1979.)"^ Beattie claimed 
the ALP fund would be different, in that it would not be directly as-
sociated with the party leader. Disingenuously, he offered to make 
all donations pubUc if the Bjelke-Petersen Foundation would do the 
same; dividends and interest from the reserves of 4KQ were to be 
paid into the fund. 
Less than one month later, in parliament, the Liberal miiuster 
for Employment and Labour Relations, Sir WUIiam Knox, tabled 
proposed amendments to Section 57 of the Industrial Conciliation 
and Arbitration Act. The proposals, approved by Cabinet, would: 
outlaw the then present system of direct and confidential 
contributions by trade unions to parties for political purposes; 
require imions to seek the written consent of individual members 
before making political donations; 
require trade unions to establish "political objectives funds" 
separate from other union funds, such funds to itemise each con-
tribution to a political party and be open to govemment scrutiny. 
The proposal was condemned by Labor spokesmen as the vicious at-
tempt to strangle the ALP's finances that it was. The government 
had not sought to protect the interests of shareholders by proposing 
similar legislation for companies—and there was no requirement 
that businesses making private donations to the Bjelke-Petersen 
Foundation obtain shareholders' consent."^^ 
The legislation was passed and in retaliation the ALP called 
for public funding of all electoral campaigns, a move which would 
have eliminated controversy over outside influence on parties, as 
well as setting limits on campaign spending. In view of the National 
Party's record for big-spending campaigns it is not surprising that 
such legislation has not been enacted in Queensland. 
Electoral Strategies for the 1980s: Exit Ed Casey 
Now that the AustraUan Labor Party in Queensland was relatively 
stable, it was time to re-examine its electoral performance. Over the 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
322 From 1957 to 1988 
years. Labor apologists had accumulated many and varied excuses 
for the party's electoral impotence in Queensland; for example, the 
unfair electoral boundaries and zonal system which gives vastly 
greater value to the rural vote, and the financial strength and effi-
ciency of the National Party's pubUc relations machine and its out-
put of propaganda which deliberately and blatantly equates the 
terms "socialist" and "communist" with all that is contrary to its 
own pbUcies. Also, as Murphy wrote in 1978, Labor since 1972 had 
sought solace in the popular notion that Queenslanders are differ-
ent.^^ He argued that this provided "a convenient excuse for Labor 
Party leaders not to examine their own organisational structure and 
efficiency" .2' 
When the vital organisational restructuring appeared to be 
complete attention turned to Labor's parUamentary wing. In a party 
newsletter of April 1980, Murphy wrote: 
This is not the first time the Australian Labor Party has gone through an 
intemal turmoil. How quickly it recovers from this will depend on the ca-
pacity of the state parliamentary party to show itself as a party of reform, 
and on the capacity of the party officials and party members to accept 
that Labor must strive to govern.'" 
Long the subject of debate within party circles, the Labor 
Party's poor parUamentary performance in (Queensland was increas-
ingly becoming the subject of much pubUc comment. The Opposition in 
Queensland has lacked direction, co-ordination and political force. 
At this level the role of opposition has passed, by default, to the media, 
the churches, concerned individuals and radical groups. Hence the 
state government can systematically deal with, and smother, its critics 
because the latter stand alone, lacking the support of a determined, ef-
fective, well-organised and continuing Parliamentary opposition." 
This was particularly evidenced by the lack of parliamentary 
opposition to the Justices Amendment Act, 1979, an issue which had 
to be taken up by outside forces, mainly legal groups and the media, 
after its repressive nature had bypassed those supposedly in 
Opposition. 
The rift between the governing coalition parties, precipitated 
in early 1979 by the Liberal decision to run a separate Senate ticket, 
had been widening over other issues such as aUegations of conflict of 
interest over the rezoning of Gold Coast land by the state govem-
ment, the intioduction of an Essential Services biU by RusseU Hinze 
rather than the appropriate Liberal minister, and the Redcliffe by-
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election. Yet Labor's parliamentarians seemed unable to take 
advantage of this situation. 
Criticism of any group tends to focus on its leader. Ed Casey's 
assumed electoral appeal to provincial, mral Queenslanders had 
been an important factor in his elevation to the leadership of the 
parliamentary party in December 1978. The initial enthusiasm for 
his leadership faded with his poor performance against the Bjelke-
Petersen govemment. His stance on abortion law and his poUcy on 
electoral reform were seen by many in the party as anti-Labor. His 
image had not been helped by his stand against intervention and his 
continued attendance after Febmary 1980 at "Old Guard" meetings at 
Breakfast Creek, although it must be said that Casey did well in 
keeping the PLP together during this period. He attempted to sepa-
rate the parliamentary wing from the squabbling, declaring "the 
machinations within the organisational wing had nothing to do 
with [his] parliamentary camp".^^ pjg fgjt ^^^^^ much pre-interven-
tion agitation was aimed at him personally. "As leader, I have been 
subjected to a stream of criticism from sources within the party de-
signed to destroy pubUc confidence in my capacity to govern."^ 
Following the disappointing results of the November 1980 state 
elections when Labor managed to win oiUy two extta seats, criticism 
of Casey's leadership re-emerged. To his dettiment had been his 
support for the distribution of preferences towards the National 
Party against sitting Liberal members, as this caused three Liberal 
seats to be lost to the Nationals.^* A challenge to Casey's position 
presented on 14 January 1981 by shadow treasurer Keith Wright, and 
deputy Opposition leader Bill D'Arcy was defeated by fourteen 
votes to eleven. Wright and Burns subsequently refused Shadow 
Cabinet posts, thus considerably weakening the front bench. 
Wright's public popularity was expanding through his media-ori-
ented stances on consumer issues. In spite of this defeat, the level of 
dissatisfaction within caucus increased during 1981, heightened by 
Casey's authoritarian approach to caucus matters, his failure to 
unite caucus effectively and his colourless public image.^ A Morgan 
GaUup poU of May 1981, showed orUy 26 per cent pubUc approval of 
his leadership, a drop of 16 per cent since the November election pe-
riod.^ 
In November, former prime minister Gough Whitlam attacked 
the Labor leadership in Queensland as "incompetent and intransi-
gent" .^ 7 One week later Tom Bums escalated the offensive, moving 
for a "spUl" of positions. This move was again defeated by eighteen 
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votes to seven, the main reason being that caucus, while not happy 
with Casey, could provide no altemative leader possessing the 
skills with which to weld a forceful and cohesive Opposition; Tom 
Bums, the most likely person, was hampered by poor health. It was 
thought, too, that a change of leadership at this stage would jeop-
ardise the party's chances in the 1983 federal poll, an attitude 
shared by Hayden and the Left.^ 
Within the party, Casey continued to carry the weight of 
blame for Labor's ineptitude into 1982. Whitlam continued to con-
demn his leadership and his failure to stand up for Labor's one-vote 
one-value principle of electoral reform.^ He was referring to Casey's 
inability to make a popular issue of gerrymandered ward boundaries 
in local govemment elections in four provincial cities. Casey's ad-
mission in June that he had accepted, without party approval, a 
$30,(X)0 donation from a poker machine lobby group to fight the 1980 
elections made media headlines and no doubt contributed to the fur-
ther decline in his personal popularity rating, at a time when sup-
port for the party was rising.*" By June, there appeared to be consen-
sus among seventeen of the twenty-five Labor MPs on the need for 
stronger leadership. The dissidents continued soimding out various 
combinations including Keith Wright, Nev Warburton and Tom 
Burr«.*^ 
During the week before the June 1982 conference, a further chal-
lenge, this time from Bums, Wright and Warburton, was ruled out of 
order on a technicality (one of thirteen telegrams requesting a spe-
dal meeting of Caucus was not dated).*^ Caucus had stiU not groomed 
a replacement, and it seemed that the Bjelke-Petersen govemment, 
although plagued by its own intemal squabbles and pubUc mistakes, 
would win the next election by default, in part because of "the con-
tinuing failure of the Parliamentary ALP to get itself together and 
exploit the personality faults and policy mistakes of its oppo-
nents".*^ Although in July Casey took a strong stand in opposition to 
the Queensland government's confrontationist policies towards 
peaceflU demonstrations by Aboriginal land rights advocates, sud 
stands were notable by their infrequency. 
The Morgan Gallup poll of August 1982 indicated a further drqp 
of 2 per cent in Ed Casey's electoral popiUarity in (Queensland.** The 
most significant downturns were in urban, middle-class areas—the 
very areas where Labor was cultivating new ground.*^ Soon after the 
release of these figures, Peter Beattie, having previously refrained 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Legacy of Reform in the Eighties 325 
from criticism of the parliamentary leadership, made his first pub-
Uc expression of doubt. 
The organisation will not interfere with any Caucus decision ... but the 
present situation cannot be tolerated if we are to be a serious contender 
at the next election. We cannot afford to be going on with continuous 
leadership doubts.*^ 
Federal leader Bill Hayden was even more direct. On 19 
October 1982, speaking at an ALP meeting in Bowman, one of the 
federal seats Labor hoped to wrest from the Liberals, he called for 
Casey to stand down. He was concerned that instabiUty within the 
Queensland Branch might affect Labor's chances federally in the 
next year's elections. Referring to the recent challenge to his own 
leadership from Bob Hawke, he said, ironically as it eventuated: 
The damned thing has to be cleared up once and for all. I faced a situa-
tion a few months ago and I decided I could not keep my self-respect if 
that continued ... I knew I would be doing a disservice to the Labor Party 
if I didn't tidy it up. So I tidied it up. I got a lot of respect out of it. And the 
Labor Party's standing in the polls has taken off since then. I think there 
is a lesson there, and I hope it is going to be learned very quickly.*^ 
WhUe Casey continued to reject suggestions that he declare the 
leadership vacant, much lobbying went on to establish an altema-
tive ticket, acceptable to the majority of caucus members. Finally at 
a special caucus meeting. Bob Gibbs (Wolston) successfully moved for 
a spill of positions. In a secret, first-past-the-post ballot, Keith 
Wright assumed the leadership, fifteen votes to ten, while Nev 
Warburton took the deputy position from Bill D'Arcy, sixteen to 
nine. Casey and D'Arcy were to remain in the shadow ministry, 
while Tom Bums took the role of Parliamentary Whip from sixty-
year-old Brendan Hansen (Maryborough); Hansen retired from po-
litical Ufe in January 1983 after twenty-five years' service.*® 
Although this was not publicly acknowledged, the 
Wright/Warburton ticket had also been promoted by the union 
(especially the ETU) and administrative wings of the party to 
facilitate balance between Centre Caucus and traditionalist fac-
tions.*' The new deputy leader, fifty-year-old traditionalist Nev 
Warburton, had been secretary of the ETU for thirteen years and a 
Brisbane City CouncU alderman before entering state parliament to 
represent Sandgate in 1977. 
Keith Wright's background was somewhat different. Allegedly 
a fundamentalist Christian, he was a lay preacher and former 
school teacher and held two tertiary degrees. A stiong spokesman for 
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law reform and civU Uberties (though not in relation to abortion), he 
was respected state-wide among consumer groups as a consumer 
advocate.5" The factionally unaligned Wright was heavily in-
volved in his own community of Rockhampton, where he ensured his 
high profUe by owning a local newspaper. Despite persistent ru-
mours about his personal Ufe, the ambitious forty-year-old was 
seen—and saw himself—as a winner. 
The Bjelke-Petersen goverrunent was initiaUy apprehensive of 
this aggressive, positive Labor leader; early in 1983, smear cam-
paigns began within the protection of parliament. Llew Edwards 
initiated attacks on Wright's integrity. In response, Wright rather 
fooUshly threatened to retaliate in kind and referred to his own 
"hit list". He quickly learned from these early mistakes and by mid 
1983 his pubUc approval rating as leader had reached 50 per cent.^ ' 
In view of the inadequacies of the Eraser goverrunent, the mood 
within the Labor Party throughout AustraUa for several months 
had been optimistic. The general feeUng was that Labor could wm 
federal government in 1983. On 4 February, Malcolm Eraser achieved 
a double dissolution and called a snap election but the real shock 
came less than an hour later when BUl Hayden resigned as leader of 
the federal Opposition to open the way for Bob Hawke to lead Labor 
to victory. Ironically, these events took place in Hayden's own 
territory, Brisbane, where his support was strongest and where the 
disappointment of not having a potential prime minister from 
Queensland was felt most painfuUy. The near certainty of Labor 
victory made Hayden's stand-down aU the more poignant. The same 
day, he commented: "I beUeve a drover's dog could lead the Labor 
Party to victory, the way the country is."^^ 
Labor to Powen 1983 Federal Election 
During late January of 1983 there had been growing pressure within 
the party from the Hayden/Beattie/AWU groups to demote the 
SociaUst Left's George Georges from the number one position on the 
Senate ticket; he was to be replaced by Mai Colston or Gerry Jones. 
AppaUed by what he termed "this sad confUct", Senator Jim Keeffe, 
also a left-winger, withdrew his own nomination on 7 February in 
order to support that of his colleague.^' A former ALP state seaetary 
and federal president from 1962 to 1970, Keeffe beUeved that "any 
attempt to replace George Georges as team leader [would] have dis-
astrous consequences".^ The Federal Executive, in order to queU ad-
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verse publicity, pre-empted State CouncU's decision on the matter 
and endorsed Georges, "the consdence of the ALP",55 in the top posi-
tion, foUowed by Mai Colston, Gerry Jones, then Margaret Reynolds, 
a choice which ensured the presence of a woman, and a voice for the 
north, to replace Keeffe, also from the north. Fifth and sixth posi-
tions were fiUed by Bob Gleeson, representing the rural sector and 
"Old Guard", and Sue Yarrow (MisceUaneous Workers' Union), the 
Socialist Left. 
The Queensland Branch budgeted to spend $197,000 on the fed-
eral campaign. Thirty-four affUiated unions voted to pay for two 
full-time organisers and to raise $20,000 towards costs. "The AWU 
offered the services of its forty organisers on a part-time basis, as 
weU as financial assistance. Appeals to business netted the party 
$40,000 by the end of February, and $72,000 in all.^^ AU federal 
shadow ministers were enUsted to campaign in Queensland, as was 
the new leader Bob Hawke. 
The final result was an overall swing to Labor of 5 per cent, 
which enabled Bob Hawke to claim govemment. In Queensland, the 
swing was nearer to 3.9 per cent, but sufficient to increase Labor's 
representation of Queenslanders by five seats, making a total of ten. 
This was the first time Labor had held a majority of Queensland 
House of Representatives seats since 1961. Of these gains, two were 
at the expense of former Cabinet ministers. The seat of Leichhardt 
was won by John Gayler from Science and Technology miruster David 
Thomson (National Party) and Petrie was taken by thirty-four-
year-old phUosophy lecturer and author Deane WeUs from Liberal 
minister for Immigration John Hodges. The former Liberal minister 
for Defence, Jim KiUen, only narrowly retained his seat of twenty-
eight years, Moreton, on preferences. 
Queensland Labor's Bid for Power 
The overaU federal election result was seen by Peter Beattie as giv-
ing "a good organisation basis from which to work for the next state 
Election in Queensland, later this year".^^ Premier Joh Bjelke-
Petersen's predictable campaign against the "Canberra socialists" 
began almost immediately when, after an initial refusal to partici-
pate at aU, he agreed to attend the national economic summit, seemg 
it as "a platform from which he could attack federal govemment 
poUcies, rather than as a forum for achievement of consensus on na-
tional economic problems" .^ ^ In April, the Queensland parUamen-
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tary Labor Party boycotted the Constitutional Convention in protest 
at the prerruer's reduction of the Labor delegation to three, com-
pared with rune from his goverrunent, a departure from the custom-
arUy equal representation. In view of the premier's confrontationist 
attitude, a Commonwealth government plan to hold an August 
referendum on fixed term parliaments was postponed at the request 
of the Queensland Branch, concerned for its chances in the coming 
state poU.^' 
"That recurring itch in Labor's side—^the state's iiwlapportioned 
four-zonal electoral system which seriously disadvantaged both the 
Labor and Liberal parties—again manifested itself. With the goal 
in nund of achievement of a more equitable distribution of bound-
aries leading to one-vote one-value, both the Labor and Liberal par-
ties had at various times delicately broached the possibUities of co-
operating on the issue. Immediately foUowing the November 1980 
state election, a letter from the Queensland ALP Admirustrative 
Conunittee to Dr John Herron, Liberal Party president, outiined 
Labor Party preparedness to enter into discussions on the formation of 
a minority Liberal govemment. This was possible given the balance 
of seats at that time.^° Denis Murphy talked with an apparently 
enthusiastic John Herron soon after but the discussion did not bear 
fruit. It seems Llew Edwards was the stumbling block. During 
Christmas 1981, secret discussions took place between Peter Beattie 
and Liberal Welfare Services minister Terry White, reportedly 
with the consent of Llew Edwards, though he later denied this." 
The Liberal parUamentariar\s were driven to negotiate with Labor a 
second time, because Llew Edwards refused to accept the premier's 
nomir\ation of a junior judge (and friend of Sir Edward Lyons, chief 
fundraiser for the Nationals) for the position of chief justice. 
Edwards seemed prepared to break the coalition rather than accept 
this appointment. During their talks. White and Beattie reached 
understanding on several points: 
Labor would compromise its one-vote one-value policy for a two-
zone system, then Liberal Policy, in a move towards a fairer 
electoral distribution system; 
three distribution commissioners would be appointed to achieve 
this; 
Liberal and Labor parties would exchange preferences. 
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Labor's proposals were set out in a letter to John Herron, dated 
13 January 1982, which was the topic of discussion at a special 
Liberal executive meeting the next day. The letter read, m part: 
The Australian Labor Party, state of Queensland, believes that the most 
important political issue in this state at the present time is the restora-
tion of parliamentary democracy to the Legislative Assembly by a fair 
and equitable redistribution, which will enable at all future elections the 
electors of Queensland to elect a parliament accurately reflecting the 
political balance within the state. The Australian Labor Party takes note 
of the resolution carried by the 1979 Liberal state Convention and finds it 
identical with the policy of the Australian Labor Party. The Australian 
Labor Party is prepared to enter into discussions with the Liberal Party 
with a view to forming a minority govemment, to be formed from either 
party. 
The agreement would include the introduction of electoral legisla-
tion to bring down a redisttibution on the one vote one value principle ... 
The agreement would include a legislative programmeme and a firm 
commitment to regular consultations between the two parties. The 
agreement would be for such time as is necessary to pass the legislation 
to bring down the distribution, to take all necessary preparations for an 
election. ^^  
At the Liberal Executive meeting, legal sources advised the Liberals 
on various options concerning the formation of a minority govern-
ment. Again the ambivalence of some Liberals caused them to back 
down, the final vote of the Liberal caucus tying at eighteen all. 
Herron refused to make a casting vote, as the tied vote did not indi-
cate conseitsus. 
News of these negotiations, subsequently leaked to the premier 
and his government, resulted in his blatant disregard for the coaU-
tion at the 1983 elections. Needing only seven seats to win govem-
ment in its own right, the National Party decided to run a campaign 
separate from the Liberals. Following this, the Liberal spokesperson 
aimounced the party would contest about sixty seats, including some 
held by National Party ministers.^' Angered over the Liberal back-
down on electoral redisttibution. Labor leaders threatened to aUo-
cate Labor preferences against Liberals, to Nationals. 
Labor needed to win an exfra seventeen seats above the twenty-
five it then held, a swing of 6 per cent, to gain control of the 
Legislative Assembly. Stormclouds were threatening the coaUtion 
government. The National Party, which, unUke the ALP, usually 
kept its intemal problems a close secret, was pubUcly embarrassed 
by divisions between its organisational and parUamentary wings, by 
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the enforced retirement (organised under the auspices of party 
president Sir Robert Sparkes) of ministers Vic Sullivan and Ken 
Tomkins following a series of public gaffes, and the failure of Joh 
Bjelke-Petersen to nominate Mike Ahem, then aged forty, as his 
deputy and possible "heir". 
Aside from the ALP/Liberal "conspiracy" debacle, which had 
already undemuned the coaUtion, events of 1983 were to lead to its 
final collapse. In early August, Ian Prentice, Liberal member for 
Toowong, moved in parliament for a debate on the estabUshment of a 
public accounts committee. As public accountabUity of governments 
held a place on the platforms of both Liberal and Labor parties, 
Welfare Services nuruster Terry White and six Liberal backbenchers 
voted with Labor on 4 August 1983 to force a debate. Accused of 
breaching Cabinet solidarity. White was immediately sacked from 
Cabinet by Llew Edwards.^ 
Arguing his entitlement to a consdence vote, especiaUy as the 
matter was in line with Liberal poUcy, White challenged the lead-
ership and was elected unopposed when Edwards declined to recon-
test. Three weeks later, Edwards announced that he would not con-
test his seat of Ipsv»dch at the coming election. Following Bjelke-
Petersen's announcement that under no drcumstances would he accept 
White as Liberal leader because of his actions on 4 August breaking 
"govemment solidarit)^", the Liberal Cabinet nninisters had little 
alternative but to resign, albeit unwillingly for some. Bjelke-
Petersen was then able to form a minority goverrunent for the period 
leading up to the election. 
The damage continued when two sitting Liberal members lost 
party endorsement and subsequently defected to the National 
party.^ The Morgan Gallup poU published in the Bulletin of 17 
August further eroded Liberal confidence as it gave the National 
Parity 26 per cent of the Brisbane vote, usually the area of Liberal 
strength, compared to 20 per cent for Liberals. Labor polled 49 per 
cent, a lead over the coalition. 
The ALP in (Queensland, advantaged by these events, endeav-
oured to emphasise its "stability". The ALP launch sought "to con-
vince the electorate that Labor was a fully legitimate force, that it 
could, and indeed deserved, to win".^ Besides coalition disarray. 
Labor planned its campaign around several issues, such as the 
Stanwell and Tarong power-station tenders; the Greenvale nickel 
project; and casino licences, the subject of much government 
procrastination and allegations of political interference notably in 
regard to Mr Hinze. Ed Casey charged that "people with close con-
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nections with the National Party are the survivors on the short list" 
of those appUcants to be considered for licences.^'' Other issues were 
the irregularities of the Peanut Marketing Board and Grain Board, 
staffing changes in Queensland RaUways, school class sizes and the 
government's failure to implement certain recommendations of the 
Ahem Select Committee's report on education.^^ ConfUct within the 
dairy industry too, made good electoral fodder. It was aUeged by 
some sections of the dairy industry that others were making huge 
profits, and that they effedively controUed the industry because of 
questionable deals in the purchase of additional mUk quotas. The 
Primary Indusfries minister Mike Ahem, whUe armouncing a review 
of the industry, admitted that Queensland milk would remain the 
most expensive in AusfraUa. 
Much was made of the downturn of the Queensland economy, 
evidenced by the stagnation of manufacture, the threatened closure 
of a coal mine at Ipswich, and the imminent shutdown of the GMH 
car assembly plant at Acacia Ridge. Among the more principled and 
controversial issues pursued were sandmining on Moreton Island 
(Labor promised to revoke aU mining leases on the island), proposals 
to estabUsh a uranium enrichment plant near Brisbane, the state 
government's Aboriginal land rights and health poUcies, the con-
frontationist approach of the Bjelke-Petersen govemment towards 
industrial relations, especially with regard to the Essential 
Services Act, and the interference by the state govemment in local 
authorities such as Maroochy Shire CouncU. 
DetaUed ALP poUcies were formulated in many areas—par-
Uamentary electoral reform, tourism, smaU business, rural industry, 
education, welfare, health, the economy and unemployment. 
Committees had already been estabUshed to monitor and advise on 
rural issues, women's issues, unemplojmient, economic sfrategy, local 
govemment, family welfare, justice and legislative review, and in-
volved not orUy ALP members but experts in these fields from outside 
the party .^' 
However, there remained a major area of weakness in ALP pol-
icy: its leaders still presented no firm public stance on issues involv-
ing civil liberties—issues such as the use of state of emergency legis-
lation and the resulting increase in poUce powers, the conduct of po-
lice in general, street march legislation, the regulations associated 
with the Commonwealth Games Act, and censorship. For several 
years, as the coalition government continued its erosion of civil 
liberties, the ALP in Queensland had come in for sfrong criticism 
from interest groups and from within its own ranks over its weak op-
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position voice. The role of opposition came increasingly to be played 
by disjointed (and often near-resourceless) pressure groups such as 
civil Uberties and environmentaUst groups, militant unions, stu-
dents, academics, feminists, the Law Society, the Bar Association, 
church leaders, and Aboriginal activists. Only the Socialist Left of 
the ALP was actively involved in such opposition.''^ 
In 1983 campaign priority was given to areas directly affecting 
famiUes (narrowly defined)—taxation, education, unemployment, 
health care costs and the costs of home finance and constmction 
caused by rising interest rates. "We will be aU-out to capture the 
middle vote—white coUar, clerical, married with a couple of kids 
and buying a house."^' Labor's proposed initiatives in these and 
other areas were detailed in a policy booklet, launched on 15 
September, for disfribution among business and conununity organisa-
tions. Aiming to forge new links with the business community, 
Beattie and Murphy sent more than a thousand letters to businesses, 
calling for support for Labor's policies.^^ 
Still owing $50,000 of federal campaign costs, and with debts 
lingering from the intervention period, the party was forced to bor-
row to finance the election.''' It was expected that fund-raising ap-
peals would be badly affected by the new Section 57(a) of the 
Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act. In an earlier effort to 
boost exhausted funds State CouncU, after a long, emotional debate, 
had voted fifty-two to forty-nine to seU 4KQ for $6 miUion to a con-
sortium of Brisbane business men.'''' Objections came from a coaUtion 
of "Old Guard" and SociaUst Left unions who felt that the rank-
and-fUe should be consulted; they requested more information on 
why the sale was necessary. This internal opposition to the sale 
provoked much media attention, as weU as concem that union action 
might block Broadcasting Tribunal approval. In view of these 
speculations, Keith Lloyd, head of the consortium, attempted to 
renegotiate the deal at the lower price of $5 mUUon. As this was 
unacceptable to the 4KQ board, the sale negotiations collapsed.''^ 
EventuaUy the party was able to raise sufficient funds to cover the 
costs of the campaign. In all $227,750 of the budgeted expenditure of 
$250,000 was donated by business, unions and the community at 
large.''^  
The party's more professional approach to the campaign in 
Queensland was iUustrated by "candidates' schools", conducted in 
several areas, especiaUy the north, to famiUarise candidates with 
the role and craft of the politician. These courses were conducted 
mairUy by the Opposition leader and his shadow mirusters. A media 
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monitoring unit was set up to ensure fair election coverage in what 
was expected to be a "no holds barred" campaign.'''' 
A more imaginative approach to campaigning was initiated. 
Tom Burns deUvered the ALP heritage policy in front of the con-
demned Her Majesty's Theatre, and in defiance of the draconian 
City Mall Act.'^^ PersonaUties were expected to be an important fea-
ture of this election buUd up and campaign slogans were persordfied: 
"Now, more than ever, Queensland needs Joh and the Nationals"; 
"Keith Wright—the new direction". WhUe the goal of "selection of 
ffrst class candidates in marginal state seats"^' had in some cases 
been attained, Keith Wright's election as leader was expected to 
make the much needed difference in marginal metropolitan seats 
such as Stafford (Denis Murphy), SaUsbury (Wayne Goss), Windsor 
(Pat Comben), Kurilpa (Ann Warner), and Ashgrove (Tom Veivers). 
With these sfrong new candidates and shadow mirusters such as Jim 
Fouras (freasurer). Bob Gibbs (attorney-general), Terry Mackenroth 
(Housing), Nev Warburton (Employment and Labour Relations), Ken 
Vaughan (Mines and Energy), and Geoff Smith (Education), the 
party fielded its potentially most effective team for many years.*" 
Disappointing Result 
The ALP contested every seat, forty-four of which were three-cor-
nered contests. The party increased its primary vote by 2.5 per cent to 
44 per cent, making a net gain of seven seats with, as hoped, narrow 
wins in former Liberal-held seats of SaUsbury, Ashgrove, Kurilpa, 
Windsor and Stafford (by a narrow margin there of thirty-nine 
votes). TownsviUe went to Labor by a sfrong swing of 7 per cent, and 
Llew Edwards's former seat of Ipswich was won decisively by David 
HamiU, thus confirming the results of an earlier poll which had 
been labelled "fraudulent" by Edwards.^' Good swings, though 
insufficient to win, were recorded in Toowong, Ithaca, WaveU and 
Yeronga. Results in rural areas were disappointing, with Labor los-
ing support to Nationals. 
Although Labor took Mt Isa from the Nationals, it lost 
Maryborough to them, albeit by the dosest of margins (eight votes). 
Post-election analysis suggested that the party was disadvantaged 
to a large extent by its official stance condemning the electoral 
malapportionment, where a counfry electorate of eight thousand 
voters has equal representation to a city electorate of twenty-nine 
thousand voters. Labor's one-vote one-value poUcy was loudly and 
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successfully condemned by the Nationals, as entailing reduced 
representation for rural voters. 
The election proved disastrous for the Liberal Party: the 
Liberal vote dropped 12 per cent, while its share of seats was re-
duced from twenty to eight, a declme compounded by two defertions. 
When it appeared that Bjelke-Petersen's Nationals were within a 
seat of governing in thefr own right, the premier refused to reacti-
vate the coaUtion, a refusal not unexpected, as he had stated sev-
eral times prior to the election that he would not accept Terry 
White's leadership of the Liberal Party. To ensure a majority for 
the Nationals, manoeuvres were initiated to recruit deserters from 
the sinking Liberal ship. Two were soon forthcoming: Brian Austin 
and Don Lane defected to the Nationals two days after the election 
and were rewarded with ministries.^^ 
The National Party vote had climbed by 11 per cent to 38.9 per 
cent. Including the defections, the party made a net gain of seven 
seats to hold forty-three. For the first time, the Nationals succeeded 
in their ten-year push to gain a strong metropolitan base. This was 
at the expense of the traditionally city-based Liberal Party. 
Several reasons for the Labor Party's disappointing result were 
suggested. Max Walsh pointed to the professionalism of the 
Nationals' public relations machine, especially its high-powered 
campaign aimed at big business, and its appeal to state chauvinist 
parochialism. He also felt that Labor put too much emphasis on 
"instabiUty" issues and not enough on the economic mismanagement 
of the govemment. "In fact, the stabiUty issue provided a weapon 
for the Nationals to use against the Liberals. It enabled Joh to cam-
paign for government in his own right."^' As Walsh suggested, in 
such a polarised electoral climate, voters tend fraditionally to opt 
for continuity with the incumbents rather than change. 
Labor's lack of funds was also a factor. The election cost the 
party about $275,000, which was $25,000 more than budgeted for 
initiaUy. The increase, according to Peter Beattie, was made possi-
ble by extra donations. He claimed that the National Party spent 
weU over $1 miUion on its campaign.** As Paul Reynolds saw it: 
"There was Uttle the ALP could do to counter the Nationals single-
minded myth-making, and exclusive identifying with aU that was 
positive in Queensland political culture".*^ 
The overaU feeling within the ALP itseU was that thfrty-two 
seats, the highest number held by Labor since the early seventies, 
should ensure a strong effective opposition, especially with 
"improved talenr present m the front benches. The party committee 
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system had been found to be pubUcly ineffective, so shadow nain-
isfries were formed. New parliamentary members to step sfraight 
into the Shadow Cabinet were Wayne Goss (Lands, Forestry and 
Police Matters), Denis Murphy (Health) and Ken McEUigott 
(Welfare Services and Ethiuc Affairs), with Tom Burns to serve as 
Opposition Whip. InitiaUy some party members beUeved that im-
proved performance could pave the way for victory at the next poU. 
Even Liberal leader Sfr WilUam Knox, whUe calling for a renewal 
of the conservative coalition or, at least, better relationships be-
tween Liberal and National parties, made a public prediction of 
possible Labor vidory in 1986.^ 
Aftermath of 1983 
The optimism and pubUc unity showm during the lead-up to the 1983 
election soured as the party reaUsed that yet again, despite the best 
opportunity for a generation, it had failed to win office. The 
National Party was now in office in its own right and could be ex-
pected to alter the eledoral system in its favour so that Labor would 
never stand a chance again. The abuses of the parUamentary process 
perpetrated under the former coaUtion could be expeded to worsen, 
without the supposed moderating influence of some of the Liberals. 
PLP leader Keith Wright blamed the Nationals' campaign 
claims that a Labor govemment would introduce new taxes for the 
defeat,*'' but many in the party focused thefr attention on the Labor 
campaign. The main theme of "stabiUty in govemment" confUcted 
with the slogan "Keith Wright—the new direction", and neither 
was inspirational. Queensland had had the most stable 
adrrurustration in AusfraUa for decades. The premier was far better 
known than Keith Wright and was likely to win any electoral bat-
tle fought as a leadership popularity contest. What had been miss-
ing from the campaign was emphasis on party poUcies which repre-
sented a credible alternative to the simplistic sloganeering of the 
Nationals. The Nationals had been aUowed to set the terms of the 
campaign with the slogan: "Now, more than ever (Queensland needs 
Joh and the Nationals)". As the Labor victories with Whitlam in 
1972 and Hawke in March 1983 had shown. Labor poUcies needed to 
set the terms under which all parties fought the campaign in order 
for Labor to win office. Sometimes, as in the 1980 federal eledion, 
this tactic could backffre, but it was stiU a necessary condition for 
the party to win an eledion from opposition. 
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Wright's own leadership position was unstable now that the 
PLP was infused with new blood. Many saw Denis Murphy—the 
spiritual leader of the Reformists and now party president—as a 
natural leadership contender to complete the reform process. It was a 
stunning blow for the party when it became clear in May 1984 that 
Murphy was dying of cancer. Like fellow Labor academic Max 
Poulter who had died in 1961 after winrung a Senate seat. Murphy 
was never able to realise his promise as a potential state Labor 
leader approximating the calibre of his hero T.J. Ryan. Ironically 
one of his few speeches in the Queensland Parliament was on condo-
lences for the death of popular Labor Reformist Kev Hooper. 
Factional brawling in the subsequent preselections for the by-elec-
tions in Archerfield (the state's safest Labor seat) and Stafford, and 
the loss of Stafford to former Liberal incumbent Terry Gygar, made a 
mean epitaph for the widely respected party president, reformer 
and leader. 
The by-elections also reflected badly on Keith Wright. Wright 
lacked a factional base in the PLP of the kind needed to insulate him 
from challenge: despite new faces, caucus was stiU very much popu-
lated by "Old Guard" members. Wright had achieved his positon in 
a vacuum of talent when the PLP was desperately trying to replace 
Ed Casey as leader; and the gossip about Wright's private life, be-
gun in National Party circles during 1983, also began to appear in 
ALP circles in 1984. Wright decided to quit the state scene for a ru-
moured mirusterial position in Canberra and stood down as state PLP 
leader in order to contest the 1984 federal election. Caucus elected 
deputy leader Nev Warburton in his place and reinstated former 
leader Tom Bums as the new deputy. 
Warburton's first action as leader was to caU for unity in the 
party: "UrUess we have unity, we are not going anywhere as a 
ParUamentary Labor Party" .^ ^ The vote which elected him leader, 
however, showed no concern for unifying the factions. "Old Guard" 
nominees were steamroUed into the jobs made vacant by a general 
spill of positions: Tom Burns was elected deputy leader, Brian Davis 
as Whip and MLA for Port Curtis Bill Prest as leader of Opposition 
business. According to Peter Morley, it was "the classic 'when they 
are down kick them in the guts' approach".^ 
Only a year after the encouraging display of unity and purpose 
the party was suffering from dubious leadership and resurgent fac-
tional strife. The 1984 federal election confirmed the slide. While 
most of the seats won in 1983 were held, the notable exception being 
Pefrie, lost by former academic Deane Wells, none of the new 
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marginal seats created by the federal redistribution went Labor's 
way. Queensland returned to having a majority of House of 
Representative seats held by non-Labor parties. 
1985 Power Strike and PLP Brawling 
The Electrical Trades Union—a militant player in the industrial 
arena—^had been foremost among the "Old CJuard" uiuons. The ETUs 
front line in its industrial campaigns had been for some years the 
electricity distribution system workers in the Brisbane Mefropolitan 
area. The service had been taken over from the Brisbane City 
Council by the state government as part of the reorganisation of 
electrical infrastructure attendant on the secret Gladstone alu-
iTunium smelting deals of the late 1970s.^ The fransfer to state con-
trol under the South-East Queensland Electricity Board (SEQEB) 
had freed the union from any conflicts of loyalty it might have feh 
when the Labor-controlled Brisbane City Council was the employer. 
In 1980 the union had won substantial pay increases and reduc-
tion in hours through strike action despite the state's Essential 
Services legislation designed to break such strikes. Premier Bjelke-
Petersen had capitulated and had been forced to shake the hand of 
TLC secretary Fred Whitby.'^ The ETU had mistakenly thought 
that these events showed the govemment had no stomach to tackle a 
full-on power strike. 
The government sought to break the uruon's hold over the 
industry through the replacement of day labour with contract 
labour. The issue came to a head in 1984 when day labour was ex-
pressly excluded from work on a new suburban property develop-
ment.^2 After a few months of skirmishing, the ETU conunenced in-
definite strike action on 6 February 1985. On 8 Febmary, after an 
Industrial Commission order to retum to work had been ignored, a 
state of emergency under the Transport Act, 1938 was declared and 
aU 920 sfrikers were sacked. The state of emergency declaration, in 
force for a month, had the effect of removing the dispute from the 
jiuisdiction of the Industrial Comnussion. 
Advertisements for the positions left vacant by the sacked men 
appeared in the press from 11 February, and government press re-
leases gave daily updates on applications allegedly received. An 
advertising campaign under the slogan 'Tower to the People" was 
conducted by the government, justifying its stance. Other unions 
engaged in isolidarity action during the working week beginning 11 
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February, notably the Municipal Officers' Association (MOA) 
which covered power-statioi\ operators. From 13 Febmary power was 
rationed on a "one hour on, one hour off" basis. The press, apart from 
the solidly pro-government Daily Sun, adopted an even-handed 
"plague on both your houses" stance. The Telegraph 's 13 February 
editorial was typical: 
The government is supposed to act for the benefit of the entire commu-
nity. Instead, it has inflamed the situation so that now the state is suf-
fering power cuts...The two sides need to be told right now: Stop ...The 
block-headed threats have to end. The parties must get back to the orig-
inal issue and sort it out sensibly. (Emphasis in original) 
The Labor Party's response was to back the arbitration system. 
PLP leader and former ETU secretary Nev Warburton thought he 
might approach the governor to lift the state of emergency. 
I've got to assume the position that Bjelke-Petersen has vacated during 
this dispute. Something has to be done ... We now have positive proof 
that [the Premier] is the only person standing between a successful 
resolution and disaster. Not only has he rejected the court's decision but 
now he's gone on a crusade of denoxmcing the Industrial Commission.'^  
This hand wringing from well outside the contest might have been a 
useful ploy were so much not at stake and were the govemment to 
beat a costly refreat. The goverrunent did no such thing and the role 
played by the Labor leadership was seen by all sides as an ineffec-
tual "two bob each way". 
After the eventual return to work, legislation was quickly 
rammed through parUament and enacted.'* It permanently removed 
the elecfricity supply industry from the jurisdiction of the Industrial 
Comnussion and granted to police, the designated minister and 
SEQEB commissioner exfraordinary coercive powers against strikers 
and picketers. Existing legislation making workers engaged in sym-
pathy strikes liable for civil damages was employed to threaten 
power-station officers with confiscation of their property unless bans 
were lifted. 
The collapse of the strike on the evening of 21 Febmary was 
greeted with screamer headlines by the press who abandoned their 
previously eqmvocal stance to support the goveri\ment. The Courier-
Mail's editorial even commended Bjelke-Petersen for his 
magnanimity in offering the sacked workers their jobs back—on 
reduced terms and provided they sign a no-strike agreement!'^ 
Poor tactical planning by the unions, in particular an over-
reUance on one smaU section of workers to apply pressure—the MOA 
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station operators—and a coirfusion of demands which often reduced 
public debate to questions of what the Industrial Contmiission had 
said rather than the substantive issue of confrad as opposed to wage 
labour had played into state goverrunent hands. After fifteen days 
of constant power interruptions Queensland industry's support of the 
goverrunent must have been weakening. Reports of industry losses 
were increasing'^ and letters to the editor of the Courier-Mail began 
to blame the goverrunent for prolonging the crisis. No amount of sub-
sequent ACTU action could disguise the fact that Queensland unions 
had faced a test of wUl and been foimd wanting. The sacked men re-
mained sacked and while the industrial wing of the labour move-
ment was faced with putting the pieces back together again, the po-
litical wing had proved itself irrelevant. 
Factional Brawling, 1985 
About the time of the power strike and without any public an-
nouncement the Centre Majority faction of the Queensland ALP split 
asunder. The reasons for the spUt are not documented, but personal 
animosity between AWU secretary Errol Hodder and Peter Beattie 
was certainly a factor. Another was the AWU's greed for choice 
preseIectioi\s for its favoured sons. In 1984 the AWU had drawn the 
only two plums on offer—a Senate seat and the safest state seat. 
Clearly the Reformists and Centre Caucus members of the faction 
wanted their share of the spoils. 
The split did not become pubUc knowledge—although it was 
much discussed in the inner drcles of the party—^until a preselection 
battle empted for a by-election in the marginal National Party seat 
of Redlands in September 1985.'^ Peter Beattie nominated for the 
preselection, saying that the "ramifications of a loss [would be] 
serious", but that a victory would be excellent preparation for the 
1986 election.'^ The Courier-Mail's state political reporter suggested 
that moves were afoot to oust Beattie at the next State Council 
meeting, when his position came up for review, and that Beattie's 
move was an attempt to pre-empt his being sacked from the 
secretaryship." 
Despite Beattie's high public profile and a strong desire on the 
part of many to avoid the embarrassment of a factional battle 
against him, the AWU's support of incumbent local candidate Con 
Sciacca made Beattie's chances, as he said, only "fifty fifty". 
Sciacca won the local plebiscite (147 to 103) after a campaign 
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concenfrating on parochial issues (Beattie did not live in the 
Redlands district). Beattie was relying on the combined support of 
his own faction (the remnants of the old Centre Majority), the 
Sodalist Left and the "Old Guard" to win the preselection in the 
Electoral CoUege. This plan was thwarted when the "Old Guard" 
numbers were ralUed in favour of Sciacca, aUegedly by PLP leader 
Warburton. According to one uni\amed source from Beattie's faction 
quoted in the Courier-Mail:: 
Peter had the Old Guard vote wrapped up until Saturday night [5 
October] when Warby [Nev Warburton] went in, boots and all, and be-
gan turning it arotmd. I don't know why he did it, but Warby continued 
Simday morning and got eight of the 10 [sic] Old Guard votes switched to 
Sciacca. 
Another pundit conunented: "The Old Guard has long memories and 
what happened today was their way of settling an account from five 
years ago". Warburton shrugged off questions about his role in influ-
encing the CoUege vote. He not only denied having any input but 
claimed, "I don't know who the Old Guard are."^°° 
The day after the Electoral College vote, Beattie went public 
with .claims (attributed to "Mr Beattie's supporters") that he 
"would find it difficult to work with Mr Warburton, although a 
united front would be found for the by-election". Lurid details of the 
Warburton coup were leaked, including the allegation that the cru-
cial deals were done in a "secret carpark meeting just before the 
Electoral College plebiscite".^"^ Warburton retaliated with a unan-
unous PLP vote endorsing Sciacca's candidacy, and the affair soon 
faded from public view as the campaign proceeded. 
Despite the early infighting. Labor looked set to vrin the by-
election in a campaign which swimg from state-wide economic issues 
to the parish pump. The battie between Liberals and Nationals was 
as hotly fought as the main Labor/non-Labor contest, since 
whichever came second behind Labor would benefit from the other's 
preferences.^ ''^  On the eve of poUing, Warburton claimed victory and 
predicted that the defeat would prompt the Nationals to replace 
Bjelke-Petersen as premier.^"^ A swing to Labor of less than 4 per cent 
was insufficient to give the party victory and National candidate 
Paul Clauson scraped home on Liberal preferences. Each party 
daimed that the result was a victory for its policies.^"* In reality, 
the result indicated that despite the coUapsing economy and persis-
tent crises affecting the govemment the ALP vote was static and the 
outiook for the 1986 election poor. 
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Factional Politics, 1986 
The split between the AWU and Beattie groups of the Centre 
Majority was formalised on 16 and 17 March 1986 at the now defunct 
faction's annual general meeting. AWU-aligned Queensland federal 
parliamentarians, including John Black, Mai Colston and David 
BeddaU, announced they woiUd form a new "centre" grouping vriUiin 
federal caucus, although this had Uttle practical effect since policy 
differences did not distinguish the two sides of the spUt.^ °^ 
The factional break-up of the (Queensland Branch was bev^l-
dering to observers and party members alike. Three of the four fac-
tions—Cenfre Majority (AWU), Cenfre Unity ("Old Guard") and 
Centre Left (Beattie)—were almost indistinguishable on ideological 
grounds. As George Langley wrote in the Australian: 
The workings of the state ALP defy logic. Only the SociaUst Left can be 
accepted at face value. It is of the left. 
Consider the Centre Majority, which is neither Centre nor the 
majority. A better name would perhaps be the Right Group.^ "* 
There were indeed differences between the three, most notably on 
questions of electoral tactics—for example, the Centre Left put great 
emphasis on "modem" campaign methods such as computer-aided 
mailing techniques for "massaging the elctorate", which Beattie 
had studied during a month's visit to the United States in June 
1985.^ °^ The Cenfre Left was also happier with "trendy" themes such 
as Affirmative Action and environmental conservation than were 
the other non-Left factior\s. The main thing dividing Centre Left and 
Centre Unity remained festering grudges from intervention. The 
AWU (Centre Majority) was marginally to the "right" of the other 
two on a number of issues, notably the environment (favouring ura-
nium mining) and Affirmative Adion (lukewarm or opposed). 
The non-Left factions were kept apart by personal animosities 
and networks of personal association and patronage. All four fac-
tions, including the Socialist Left, were prepared to do deals— 
though not on matters of party platform—with any of the others in 
order to obtain favoured intemal appointments and preselections for 
winnable seats at all levels of government. Matters of party 
platform, however, were sacrosanct—they were not open to the 
negotiated deal. 
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1986 Election 
The increasmg bittemess of much publicised factional infighting and 
the multiplication of factions highUghted by the Redlands by-
election campaign presaged eledoral disaster in 1986. The popular-
ity of the federal Labor govemment declined as affected groups 
mobiUsed against new taxation measures. The launch of a new 
austerity campaign to satisfy the money markets led some in the 
party to fear a retum to the dark "cricket-team" days after 1974. 
Yet there were reasons for optimism if the party was able to 
take command of the campaign and make the running on the issues. 
These mcluded the premier's age (seventy-five years), the govern-
ment's inability to deal with structural weaknesses in the 
Queensland economy, the disregard for the natural environment, 
goverrunent contempt for the needs of working women, continued at-
tacks on the arbitration system, wages and conditions, and electoral 
malapportioiunent made worse through blatant gerrymander in the 
1986 redistribution. In addition the party's coffers were at last full 
with the sale of 4KQ for over $10 million, and in a symbolic break 
with the past the branch office moved to plush new quarters in the 
new Trades HaU in South Brisbane. 
The election year began poorly for the party with bitter prese-
lection fights exacerbated by the redistribution. The worst fight 
erupted in South Brisbane between two incumbent MLAs: Anne 
Warner, the only woman and one of only two Socialist Left members 
of the PLP and Jim Fouras, frontbencher, member of the Beattie fac-
tion and of the large West End Greek community. The redisttibution 
had converted two marginal Labor electorates (South Brisbane and 
Kurilpa) into one safe Labor (South Brisbane) and two marginal non-
Labor electorates. After a hard-fought branch plebiscite,^"* Warner 
won at the Electoral CoUege with Cenfre Unity support. (In return 
the Socialist Left were to support incumbent MLA Joe Kruger in 
Murrumba but the plan backffred when unaligned delegates voted en 
masse for the Cenfre Left's Deane WeUs, former MHR for Petrie.) 
Fouras resigned from the Opposition front bench and announced that 
he would go quietly and not contest the seat as an independent.^"' 
Ading on advice of opinion pollsters imported from the success-
ful Western AusfraUan Branch, the party unveiled a new image and 
new slogans for the forthcoming eledoral contest in an early mini-
campaign. The Canberra Times's Andrew Stewart, describing the 
campaign, noted: "sugary sentimentaUty and aggressive patriotism 
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atfrads the goodwUl of (Queenslanders, and Labor, havuig laughed 
it aU off before, has embraced it". Beattie was quoted as confident 
about the party's chances: 
There's an expectation in the electorate that an era is ending and we 
think Queenslanders will be looking at this poU very differently. They 
won't be choosing between Joh [Bjelke-Petersen] and the rest, but be-
tween parties, none of which have Joh [because he must retire on ac-
coimt of his age], so polides and issues might count more.^ ^" 
Despite Beattie's suggestion that the Queensland electorate 
was ready for new policies, the mini-campaign focused on the 
National Party's broken promises and creating a more positive im-
age for Neville Warburton. The idea was to release detailed 
portfolio policies in the months leading up to the election, have 
these taken up by the media and so set the campaign agenda. Party 
research in June attempted to deterirune sources of voter dissatisfac-
tion with the government and revealed that unemployment and 
state taxes were the two major sources of voter concern. Candidates 
were advised to emphasise these issues."^ 
The most innovative policy addressing the unemplo5mient issue 
was the proposal to infroduce Youth Emploment Schemes guarantee-
ing young (Queenslanders a choice of further education or on-the-job 
fraining after leaving school. This policy was launched on 16 April 
1986 complete with press kit, logo, slogan and posters but was over-
shadowed by the preselection ructions of two days earlier. The lack 
of sustained follow-up as the party launched other policies meant 
that the initiative failed to take off as a campaign issue. 
It was difficult for the party to keep the momentum buUding up 
when the date of the election was unknown. The latest it could be 
held was the end of January but speculation favoured October or 
November (it was eventually called for 1 November). In the months 
leading up to the expected date, policies were launched in areas as 
diverse as Main Roads, famiUes, and women. All came with glossy 
press kits. The policy on women was accompanied by a substantial 
booklet entitled Equity Opportunity Choice: A Strategy for 
Queensland Women. Warburton's speech to launch the policy was 
delivered in the dark, owing to a power failure at the new party 
headquarters; many (Queensland women remained unenlightened by 
the policy as too few copies were avaUable to allow widespread 
distribution. OveraU media analysts gave Beattie and Labor's cam-
paign managers credit for a "professionally"-run campaign. 
According to Hugh Limn: 
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You can see [professionalism] in the dozen policies Labor has launched 
at large, well attended functions this year. You can see it in the 
Warburton speeches where, for once, the Labor Party at election time 
has come up with some original thoughts:... "There is a saying that when 
the going gets tough, the tough get going. The Liberals' version of get-
ting tough and getting going is to join the National Party." 
You can see it in the refeshing honesty: "The Labor Party admits that 
in 1949 it did implement an electoral gerrymander. But we progressed 
from that mistake. We disov^m that manipulation." 
And you can see it in Parliament this year where Warburton contin-
ually had the Bjelke-Petersen government off-balance by raising em-
barrassing allegations concerning govemment propriety.^^^ 
This last asped emerged as the cenfrepiece of Labor's campaign 
in 1986. Some accurate leaks either from the financial institutions or 
Brisbane's Chemnel 9 executives (or both) were used by Warburton in 
the last days of the outgoing parUament to expose the out-of-court 
settlement of a defamation case against Channel 9 by the payment of 
$400,000 to Bjelke-Petersen. The station's new owner, Perth tycoon 
Alan Bond, had received state goverrunent approval for several new 
projects in Queensland (including the buUding of a private imiversity 
on the Gold Coast) since the pajonent. The issue was kept on the boil 
after the dissolution of parl iament by the shrewd tactic of 
challenging Channel 9's licence renewal in the AustraUan 
Broadcasting Tribunal. Unhappily for the ALP, Bond confessed to 
the supposedly secret figure four weeks before the election and 
Bjelke-Petersen continued to insist that Bond had in fact got off 
lightly—the damages sought had been $1 miUion." ' Subsequent 
revelations that the Channel 9 defamation lawyers had advised 
against out-of-court settlement, that $400,000 was an oufrageously 
high sum"'* and further aUegations that $1 mUUon was in fact paid 
with $600,000 going to the Bjelke-Petersen Foundation"^ faUed to 
raise much interest. 
The Labor Party committed itself to the corruption issue with a 
campaign based on the slogan, "Your honest choice for Queensland". 
The opiruon polls seemed to indicate that at last Labor was on to a 
winner. Despite a disconcertingly high proportion of "undecided" 
voters, polls up to election eve showed a consistent swing towards 
Labor . ^^ ^ The premier's threat to call another election if the 
Nationals failed to win an oufright majority was regarded at the 
time as a bonus for Labor."'' 
Queensland news colunms in the final fortnight of October 1986 
read like the lists of a mediaeval tournament as a bevy of 
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(Queensland knights went public with criticism of Sir Johannes 
Bjelke-Petersen's administration. Ffrst Sir Roderick Proctor of the 
Gold Coast Casino, then Sir Joseph McAvoy of the Cane Growers' 
Council, Sir Theodore Bray, Sfr Jack Egerton, Sir James Killen, Sfr 
Vernon Christie and Sfr Robert Mather all came out with comments 
critical of the govemment and implying corrupt administration. 
Even Wally Lewis, (Queensland and AusfraUan Rugby League cap-
tain, on tour in Britain, successfuUy demanded that a National 
Party advertisement which had used footage of hun without per-
nussion be withdrawn. A National Party attempt to have an ALP 
advertisement, which implied cormpt deaUngs, withdrawn served 
only to draw attention to the allegations.^^* 
A week before election day. National Party president Sir 
Robert Sparkes wamed of the "danger" of an ALP victory."' Over 
the last ten days the National Party ran a huge media campaign 
with double, triple, and even quadruple-page spreads in the press 
and as much television advertising as the stations could carry. 
Statistics showing Queensland's economic decline were countered 
with barefaced denials based on meaningless statistical compar-
isons;^ '^' advertisements suggested that a vote for the Nationals 
would somehow reduce federal taxes and reverse the balance of 
payments problems;^^^ authoritarian, populist leadership was em-
phasised.^^ 
Pre-election polling and all pundits with the exception of 
Malcolm Mackerras suggested that the worst Labor could hope for 
was a return to Liberal/National coalition with a Liberal promise of 
fair eledoral boundaries. Only on the morning of 1 November, elec-
tion day, was there any hint that things had gone awry. The 
NewspoU in the Australian and Daily Sun showed that the uncom-
mitted votes and some "soft" Labor votes had swung to the Nationals 
in the final days. This analysis, based on a sample taken a few days 
after the final Morgan Gallup poll which had been in line with 
earher trends, proved to be correct. 
As the figures went up on the board in the tally room, it 
emerged that the non-Labor vote had increased by 2.4 per cent on 
1983 results and that the Labor vote had declined by a similiar fig-
ure; 2 per cent of the swing was towards the Liberals and 0.4 per cent 
to tiie Nationals. The Nationals retained all thefr seats, with the 
exception of Toowong, which fell to the Liberals. With the addi-
tional seats gamed tiirough the redistribution tiiey woiUd be able to 
govern comfortably without the need for a coalition. Labor lost two 
existing seats (Ashgrove, where former Test cricketer Tom Veivers 
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was defeated by a Liberal on National preferences and Mount Isa 
where the Liberals nominated a popular local identity). Labor 
picked up two new seats (Bowen amd Logan) leaving its parUamen-
tary standing unchanged at thfrty seats, though within an erUarged 
Legislative Assembly (eighty-seven seats as against eighty in the 
old parliament). 
On the spot analysis of the result by Labor commentators again 
emphasised the role played by the zonaUy malapportioned elec-
toral system. Senator Mai Colston told a despondent election night 
party that he would be bringing forward a Private Member's BiU to 
force fair electoral distribution. The internal party news-sheet. 
Labor Review, declared "Gerrymander the winner". Nev Warburton 
wrote: 
There is no use pretending we weren't disappointed and dismayed at the 
outcome: disappointed that our vote was not considerably higher; dis-
mayed that the National Party could so comfortably retain govemment 
in its own right. 
In reality the election outcome is nothing more than a stunning suc-
cess for the National Party government's corrupt electoral laws. There is 
nothing very clever about an electoral system that allows a party with 39 
per cent of the vote to win 54 per cent of the seats. ^ ^' 
Warburton's analysis of why the ALP vote had declined re-
ferred to federal issues and the tnabiUty of the party to match the 
National Party's advertising bombardment in the closing stages of 
the campaign. Peter Beattie thought the holding down of losses to 
2.5 per cent meant that the campaign had in fad succeeded. 
It could have been better, but it could have been a lot worse. To put it 
bluntly, the party needed to achieve the best campaign in years just to 
hold onto gains made in 1983. Our own research all along indicated that 
federal and other factors were having a great impact ... and four weeks 
out from the poll we were still traiUng our '83 vote by 5 per cent.^ *^* 
Opinion poUsters, concerned that they had incorrectly pre-
dicted the outcome, cited the Nationals' big spending campaign over 
the last days leading up to the election as the prime factor m the 
swing back to the Nationals.^^s NSational Times on Sunday joumaUst 
Sally Loane identified a further factor, namely, the petty bourgeois 
metropoUtan vote: 
Overwhelmingly small business—shopkeepers, restaurateurs, real es-
tate agents, land developers—they are the political whores who will get 
into bed with whoever's [sic] in power. The Nationals won with three fac-
tors: the middle class vote, the gerrymander and a saturation advertising 
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campaign costing several million dollars. Liberal and Labor were simply 
swamped.^ 26 
True to his word Mai Colston took his Private Member's Bill 
along to federal caucus, which referred it for Cabinet's considera-
tion.^ 27 Federal party officials, reportedly be lukewarm about the 
idea, were xmwUIing to provoke a constitutional confrontation with 
the states (Western Australia's electoral system would also be 
chaUenged), given that "the (Queensland Branch has failed to make 
the gerrymander an issue because [since 1957] it has been unable to 
win even 50 per cent of the vote to demonsfrate conclusively that it 
has been denied power".'28 AS the Courier-Mail's Peter Morley 
pointed out: 
But if any of these plans for electoral justice succeed, what are Labor's 
chances? One-vote, one-value—if there is such a thing—is not going to 
get them on to the government benches when they cannot come any-
where near a majority of the vote in a majority of seats.'^ 
However, as we shaU see, this misses a fundamental point. 
Principles and Pragmatism: 
New Factional Deals for 1987 
The 1986 election increased the Socialist Left's numbers in the PLP 
from two to four. Its status as a tiny minority within caucus was un-
changed by this success. The other factions came out of the election 
with unchanged or slightly reduced representation though the "Old 
Guard" no longer commanded a majority of the PLP, having only fif-
teen out of thirty. A meeting of the eleven Centre Left, Cenfre 
Majority (AWU) and unaligned members—referred to as "the 
boys"—on 18 November at the Kookaburra Cafe in Brisbane's newly 
gentrified Paddington stitched up a deal with the Socialist Left for 
a unity ticket to get Anne Warner, Clem Campbell, Paul Braddy, 
David Hamill and Pat Comben to the Opposition front bench. Some 
time between this convivial event and the 27 November caucus 
plebiscites, Pat Comben (one of "the boys") had a major change of 
political heart and joined the "Old Guard". The first mention 
Comben made of his altered affiliation to his former coUeagues was 
on the morning of the plebiscite.'^o of the five new faces the diners 
had wanted to see on the front bench, only Pat Comben (on "Old 
Guard" votes including his own) and David Hamill succeeded. For 
the first time since the formation of the Reform Group nearly a 
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decade before the Reformists had had an opportunity of reforming 
Labor's parliamentary wing but had been befrayed by one of their 
own number. The rejection of Warner also underUned the conspicuous 
faUure of the Queensland ALP, despite its Affirmative Action pol-
icy, to elect women to positions of influence. As Sybil Nolan com-
mented in the Weekend Australian, in Queensland "the National 
Party seems to do a better job of representing women than the 
ALP"."i 
This debacle served to reinforce the determination of the two 
main excluded factions—the Centre Majority (AWU) and the 
SociaUst Left—to break the "Old Guard" hold on Queensland Labor. 
They thrashed out an alliance of convenience designed to 
"transform" the Queensland Branch. The bargain involved the 
Eledoral CoUege selecting the AWU's Con Sciacca in Bowman and 
ousting sitting member Len Keogh (Cenfre Left), whUe the Socialist 
Left's Bryant Burns took number one spot on the Senate ticket. 
Perhaps more importantly, the deal induded an agreed disttibution 
of branch officials' positions (president and secretary to the 
Socialist Left, union vice-president and assistant secretary to the 
AWU) and agreement of future preselections at state and federal 
levels. 
The Socialist Left gave thefr former Reform Group coUeagues a 
last opportunity to make alternative offers on the afternoon of 12 
December 1986. Beattie, other Centre Left members and some "Old 
Guard" senior members took time out from the Trades HaU 
Christmas party that afternoon to Usten to Socialist Left represen-
tatives. Each side subsequently accused the other of having been 
drunk,"2 and the meeting was less than cordial. No altemative of-
fers were made. The deal was formaUy agreed by a general meeting 
of the Socialist Left faction hours later on the evening of 12 
December. 
The SociaUst Left was in no mood for compromise that week as 
it was reeling from the shock departure of Senator George Georges, 
Georges had long made it clear that he would not seek re-eledion 
when his term expired, but he decided to accelerate the process and 
go with a bang. Earlier in 1986 he had been discipUned for voting 
against the govemment (and the Opposition and the Democrats) on 
legislation to allow an abbreviated deregistration procedure of the 
maverick AustraUan BuUding Construction Employees and BuUder's 
Labourers Federation. On that occasion he had cited party poUcy in 
favour of his stance and had pointed to the fact that he had not 
voted with the Opposition. On 10 December 1986 Georges voted with 
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the Opposition against legislation to introduce a national identity 
card, and armounced he would be resigning from the party and 
probably the Senate, thereby saving the party the frouble of ex-
peUing him.'^ 
Despite this and despite Georges's forty-two years' loyal mem-
bership,'^ there were moves afoot the following day to expel the 
rebel senator before he had a chance to resign, in order to cancel his 
vote at the 13-14 December State CouncU meeting.'^ Wiser counsels 
prevaUed when Beattie told a meeting of his faction that Georges's 
vote would not affect the outcome of the Council meeting and that an 
expulsion could act as the constitutional trigger for Bjelke-Petersen 
to replace Georges (should he resign from the Senate) with another 
stooge of the Albert Field ilk.'^^ Socialist Left members were out-
raged that the idea of expelling their long-serving "great old 
trouper"'^^ had even been canvassed. 
The AWU-Socialist Left deal, dubbed the "unholy aUiance" by 
some in the Socialist Left, was intended to last at least until after 
the 1987 federal election. At the close of 1986, for the first time since 
federal intervention, the end of the "Old Guard" Trades Hall unions' 
dominance of the party looked in sight. Had Anne Warner, the 
SociaUst Left candidate, been allowed to get on to the front bench in 
November, it is doubtful that the faction would have been moti-
vated to deal with the despised AWU. An unnamed spokesperson for 
the new aUiance is quoted as saying: "The Left unions and the AWU 
make big contributions to the party, but we got no sympathy. So we 
said, that's enough thanks".'^ 
The early days of the new arrangement were far from smooth, 
as the deposed powerbrokers of the branch appealed for federal in-
tervention to restore their position, and were preparing to have the 
Disputes Committee intervene to overturn preselection results."' 
Some also floated the notion that the alliance was nothing more 
tiian a plot to oust high-profile secretary Peter Beattie. Some confu-
sion was caused when the supposed Socialist Left nominee for the job, 
assistant secretary Terry Hampson, indicated he would not be 
standing against Beattie.'^ The plan as spelt out to the 12 December 
SociaUst Left meeting was for Beattie to enter state parliament at a 
by-election in 1987. Another ploy, allegedly with backing from 
prime minister Bob Hawke, was for the already-delayed State 
Conference to be postponed untU 1988, after the federal election, so 
that tiie aUiance could not use its numbers to effect mle changes.'*' 
This also failed. 
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The most serious threat to the alliance erupted early in 1987 
when state parliamentarians Wayne Goss and Henry Palasczuk re-
signed from the AWU faction, claiming lack of consultation over the 
deal. Palasczuk seemed to have taken the greater gamble based on 
preselection figures. Goss's loss appeared to be the more permanent 
for the faction given that his sfrong branch support would overpower 
alliance voting at the Electoral College.'*^ -J^Q defections did not 
affect the balance of voting within the PLP, where the "Old Guard" 
maintained a majority since Comben's defection. 
The "unholy alliance" of December 1986 marked the first occa-
sion since at least the 1960s that militant unions and "left" activists 
were able to participate in a dominant alignment within the party. 
At a sfroke, the tendency of the previous three years towards re-
consolidation of the "Old Guard" Trades Hall-based Centre Unity 
was reversed. It remains to be seen whether the alliance will last 
long enough to effect changes, given the diametrically opposed goals 
of tiie "Old Guard" and the Socialist Left. In 1988 the state confer-
ence, discussed below, proved the aUiance to be capable of amending 
rules and changing persormel. 
The 1987 Federal Election and Its Aftermath 
A federal election had to be held no later than the end of March 
1988. Opmion within the party was divided on the most advanta-
geous date, although the consensus leaned toward postponing it untU 
the last possible date, to take advantage of the expected bicenten-
nial euphoria of early 1988, and to allow the Queensland party or-
ganisation and finances time to recover from the 1986 state election 
defeat. Prime minister Hawke, however, toyed publicly with the 
idea of an early election based on the double dissolution "trigger" 
offered by the Senate's rejection of the Australia Card legislation. 
The legislation appeared to have widespread electoral support, and 
the worsening global economic scene had forestalled vote-buying 
budgetary options for a new year election. 
The (Queensland party, with its continued public displays of in-
temal cUvision, had thus become a major impediment to Labor's fed-
eral electoral sfrategy. Because Con Sciacca had been preselected for 
Bowman the sitting MHR Len Keogh threatened immediate elec-
toral embarrassment through exercising his power to resign from 
parUament in order to bring on a federal by-election. Memories of 
the disastrous Bass by-election in 1975, which allowed the 
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Opposition parties to buUd up momentum to trounce Labor later in 
the year, were revived. The federal orgarusation was thus encour-
aged to accept paradoxical "Old Guard" and Centre Left caUs for in-
tervention about this matter, although not with the same goals in 
view. A compromise agreement was hammered out in early AprU 
1987, when the Federal Executive intervened to re-open nominatiorw 
for Keogh's seat, giving greater weight to local party members' 
plebiscites, and canceUed the forthcoming state conierence untU af-
ter the federal election. The deal was understood to include deputy 
leader Tom Bums leaving state parUament to take up the post of 
ambassador to Greece, allowing Con Sciacca to move into state par-
liament via a safe seat.''*' This deal coUapsed on 29 April when 
Bums reneged on the agreement (which he denied had ever been 
made), allowing Sciacca to re-nominate for Bowman. Keogh's 
continued threats to resign his seat and the poor faith exhibited by 
the "Old Guard"-Centre Left forces decided the federal organisation 
against any further moves to support the incumbent member. Sdacca 
was preselected in the renewed selection process. Generous press 
treatment of the May federal mini-budget impeUed Hawke to ad on 
his early general election threats of March, rendering Keogh's 
threatened resignation in order to bring on a by-election a useless 
ploy. Much to the surprise of his former coUeagues, George Georges 
rejected offers to return to the fold in an organisational capacity and 
stood as an independent for the senate on the slogan "principles are 
important", backed by animal rights groups and campus radicals. 
Queensland electors, apparently, were not in agreement, and Georges 
departed the scene with orUy a tiny parcel of votes. 
The 1987 election, despite the foregoing bloodletting, was a fri-
umph for Queensland Labor. Four new seats were won, giving Labor a 
majority of Queensland federal seats. The much-vaunted Bjelke-
Petersen move into federal politics failed to materialise and the 
National machine was made to look foolish. Whereas Labor was 
barely able to hold its position in other Australian states, in 
Queensland there were satisfying uniform swings averaging 1.6 per 
cent state-wide. This result caused the federal leaders to look anew 
at Queensland's poor representation on the federal ministry: BiU 
Hayden was the only minister from this electoraUy vital state. 
After some initial refusal by the federal factions to select 
(Queensland candidates for mirusterial vacancies, Hawke was able 
to secure the nominations of senator Margaret Rejmolds (SociaUst 
Left) and Ben Humphries ("Old Guard", federal Right). Queensland 
Labor had in Reynolds its first woman minister, state or federal. 
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The further disintegration of National Party unity in late 1987, 
with numbers of pretenders emerging for the premiership coupled 
with highly pubUcized brawling between Sfr Robert Sparkes and 
the ageing Bjelke-Petersen and open division on such issues as con-
dom vending machines and the siting of a hazardous chenucal plant 
in a marginal National seat, appeared to offer Labor prospeds for 
once undreamt-of victory at the next state election, which might 
even be brought on by a 1957-style split in the rulmg party. 
However, the uninspiring performance of many of the 
Opposition front bench and the glacial pace of change m alignments 
in the stUl "Old Guard"-dominated caucus—despite the factional 
shift in balance of the party organization to the AWU/SociaUst 
Left alUance—caused concern. This led some ambitious elements to 
attempt a coup against state leader Neville Warburton in October 
1987. Results of party research showing the woeful performance of 
many on the Opposition front bench were judiciously leaked to the 
media in an attempt to set the agenda for a coup. One piece of re-
search noting that several senior Opposition spokespeople had 
made vfrtuaUy no appearance in the Brisbane press for the previous 
twelve months was particularly damaging, and was given promi-
nence by a media anxious to pubUcise stories other than the ongoing 
National Party mctions. Comments such as those from the influen-
tial journaUst Quentin Dempster that the Warburton team's parUa-
mentary performance was "feeble"''''* added fuel to the flames. The 
pretender to Warburton's position was ex-lawyer and justice 
spokesperson, the telegenic Wayne Goss, a former member of the 
AWU faction, who in September formed a new parliamentary 
grouping caUed, curiously, the "Independents" from existing and 
former AWU partisans. 
Any campaign to destabilise Warburton's leadership needed to 
win converts from Warburton's own "Old Guard" faction, and the 
impUcit threats to remove non-performers from the front bench 
served orUy to galvanise those under threat. Others who might oth-
erwise have supported a chaUenge were reluctant to come forward 
when it was doomed to faUure: a close-run defeat would only mag-
nify the damage to Labor's electoral stocks. Still others were upset 
they had not been consulted about the tactics or were opposed to the 
means used, notably to Goss's persistent denials of any intention to 
move against Warburton prior to the actual attempt.''^^ In the event 
Goss's chaUenge on 28 Odober 1987 was lost twenty to nine, with 
three out of the four SociaUst Left members voting for Warburton, 
and one abstention. FoUowing his victory, Warburton publicly at-
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tacked a "conspiracy" against him allegedly fomented by "a tiny 
nest of intriguers who want to overheat the parliamentary party 
and shatter confidence in its leadership as a step towards a wider 
power grab".'** This foUowed his earlier chastisement of "faceless 
men" from the party machine (identified as Ian Maclean and Errol 
Hodder) and calls for AWU members to support him. 
The Labor Party in Queensland was thus in no shape to take 
advantage of growing National Party disunity arising from the 
premier's declining leadership capacity and allegations of corrupt 
admirustration and gross personal impropriety among government 
figures coming from the inquiry into police corruption by Tony 
Fitzgerald QC. Personal intervention by Bob Hawke on 30 July had 
finally paved the way for a reconvened state conference—^two years 
overdue—to be held in 1988, and for some federal action against the 
inequitable Queensland electoral system. The AWU-Socialist Left 
Alliance determined to use the conference to change the mles for se-
lection of delegates to one based on federal boundaries: five confer-
ence delegates to be elected by proportional representation from each 
federal division, rather than the one delegate per state division as 
was the case. This would finally remove the tainted Queensland 
electoral system from the party's internal workings, but was strongly 
opposed on factional grounds by "Old Guard" and Centre Left mem-
bers "at regional conferences in October-November. 
Impetus for change in Labor parliamentary leadership came fi-
nally from the National Party when Bjelke-Petersen attempted to 
recover his autocratic authority by purging the Cabinet of disaf-
fected elements, particularly the prominent Mike Ahem. In the 
showdown which followed between Bjelke-Petersen and National 
Party president Sir Robert Sparkes, the ageing premier was deserted 
by his parliamentary colleagues. Ahern took over as leader, amid a 
near constitutional crisis, in late November 1987. Remarkably, the 
ALP state secretary Peter Beattie secretly met Bjelke-Petersen at 
Kingaroy in order, as he saw it, to prolong the crisis and inflict max-
imum damage in the National Party. However, this action, and 
Beattie's later appearance in a TV dramatisation of the incident, in 
which he played himself, provided the Socialist Left/AWU al-
liance with sufficient grounds to remove him from his position in the 
ALP administration.'*^ 
The departure of Bjelke-Petersen precipitated changes in the 
parliamentary leadership of all Queensland political parties. Sir 
William Knox stepped down from the leadership of the Liberal 
Party in favour of Angus Innes, and on 2 March 1988, Nev Warburton 
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resigned the leadership of the PLP and was replaced with Wayne 
Goss. The new Opposition front bench included Labor's orUy female 
parliamentarian, Arme Warner, and gave more prominent positions 
to talented individuals such as Rockhampton lawyer Paul Braddy 
and former Rhodes Scholar David Hamill. Largely owing to 
hearsay evidence about Bob Gibbs given before the Fitzgerald en-
quiry, Tom Bums was able to cling to the position of deputy leader. 
On 6-7 May 1988, the Queensland ALP held its first state con-
ference for four years. Four days earlier, the 1988 May Day march 
was the worst attended for decades, despite the fact that 
(Queensland, alone among the states, has a public holiday for May 
Day. That evening the ABC's 7.30 Report in (Queensland screened a 
long segment dwelling on the empty streets along which the poorly 
attended procession moved, accompanied by voice-overs of elderly 
unionists endeavouring to explain the importance of May Day. 
The ALP in Queensland is seen throughout AusfraUa as the 
epitome of destructive factionaUsm and irresponsible machine p>oli-
tics. As of June 1988 the (Queensland ALP has four distinct factional 
groupings. The "Old Guard", formerly Cenfre Unity, is dominated by 
the Trades Hall ruling clique. The "Old Guard"'s pre-intervention 
sfranglehold over preselection for parliamentary seats means that 
this faction remains heavUy over-represented in the Parliamentary 
Labor Party. The Socialist Left faction, which coalesced during the 
movement towards intervention, has significant union support, and is 
by confrast, under-represented. The Centre Left faction, another out-
growth of the intervention movement, although lacking union suj?-
port, holds significant parliamentary representation. Although 
loosely affiliated to the national Right, the AWU, calling itself 
the "Cenfre", is also under-represented in parliament at state level. 
The May 1988 State Conference saw the "Old Guard" and 
Centre Left trounced at every turn. Media reports highlighted 
Labor's new found "unity"—shorthand, apparently, for 
"predictability". The conference set up an expanded state council 
with almost two hundred directly elected and union-nominated 
members. Since then Council has the power to make policy and 
change mles. State Conference will in future meet only trienially. 
Rather than face defeat on the conference floor, state secretary Peter 
Beattie armounced he would be standing down from his position to 
contest preselection for the safe Labor state seat of Brisbane Cenfral, 
previously held by Brian Davis. 
On 28 July 1988 Beattie was replaced as state secretary by the 
Sodalist Left's Terry Hampson who had served as Beattie's assis-
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tant throughout his eight-year term. On the same day, AWU nonu-
nee Wayne Swan was elected to replace Hampson as assistant secre-
tary. Neither nomination was contested. 
Standing for preselection against the SociaUst Left's nominee 
Brisbane solicitor Tim Carberry, on 5 August 1988, Beattie—a 
formidable campaigner—^won party selection for Brisbane Cenfral by 
gaining a surprisingly large 71% of plebiscite votes. 
The year 1988 had at last seen some action from the federal 
govemment against Queensland's zonal electoral system. The 
Hawke government adopted the tactic suggested by the Ausfralian 
Democrats, namely, to amend the constitution through a referendum, 
rather than the more expedient but reversible method of direct leg-
islation. The one-vote-one-value referendum, along with three oth-
ers set down for 3 September 1988, was opposed by the National 
Party and the federal Liberal Party, but not the Liberals' 
Queensland branch. United state and federal Liberal Party opposi-
tion would probably have sunk the proposal, given the history of 
contested referendums in AusfraUa and the requirement that an 
amendment must be passed by both a majority of electors and a 
majority of states. 
Despite sfrong membership concem, the Queensland ALP lead-
ership opted for a low-key approach to the issue; with assets of 
$25m at the end of July 1988, the Labor Party only spent $90,000, as 
opposed to the $400,000 media campaign to promote Ylayne Goss's 
image as leader. 
In the run-up to the September poll, the Queensland branch was 
thrown into turmoil and factional conflict by Bill Hayden's remark-
able dedsion to accept the vice-regal appointment of governor-gen-
eral. Preselection for Hayden's seat of Oxley—the safest federal 
Labor seat in Queensland and the only one to be retained in the 
Liberal federal landslide of 1975—was contested initially by David 
HamiU (Ipswich: Cenfre Left) and Bob Gibbs (Wolston: Socialist 
Left) whose state seats were both contained within the Oxley 
boundaries. Factional warfare was inflamed by the involvement of 
(Queensland Miners Federation president Andrew Vickers, who 
threatened to stand against Hamill should he gain preselection in 
this traditional coal mining area. While Bob Gibbs was persuaded 
by ALP leader Goss to withdraw from the preselection fight, David 
Hamill—a protegee of Bill Hayden—nevertheless nominated for 
Hayden's federal seat of Oxley. If Hamill should succeed in 
obtaining pre-selection, Andrew Vickers, state president of the 
Miners Federation, which on 29 August voted in Queensland to break 
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ties with the Labor Party, wiU stand against him as an independent. 
HanuU's federal preselection would force a by-election in the state 
seat of Ipswich, held until 1983 by former Liberal leader. Expo 
Authority chairman Sir Llew Edwards. Given large scale unemploy-
ment in the city, and considering dissatisfaction with the Labor 
Party, tiie Liberals would have some chance of regaining the seat. 
Prospects of the ALP and the Unions 
While Labor's state parliamentary party remains divided, 
(Queensland unions are faced with an onslaught on their legal rights 
and legitimacy as representatives of workers. The demise of Bjelke-
Petersen has done nothing to slow this assault. 
Union membership in Queensland is declining as traditional, 
highly unionised, industries give way to tourism and mecharusation. 
In formerly highly unionised industries such as mining, mechanisa-
tion has meant that the remaining workers are a kind of labour aris-
tocracy, enjojdng relatively high rates of pay. The poUtical effects 
of this process may be seen in a community such as Blackwater, 
where there is no ALP branch, the local National Party member is 
strongly supported, and the combined mining unions' chief function is 
to give financial support to their nominee for the Miss Queensland 
contest. 
The Queensland union movement shows no sign of developing 
the soUdarity and organisational skills which will allow a success-
ful defence against the economic and political assaults being 
launched upon it. Since the 1985 SEQEB dispute, unions have 
avoided direct confrontation with the new state industrial laws. 
TLC rhetoric emphasises the arbitration system as guarantor of 
workers' rights in a display of apparent arrmesia over the events of 
1985 and ignorance of the govemment moves to remove categories of 
workers from the system by legalising labour contracts with below-
award conditions. Leadership battles within individual unions 
have exhausted those who might otherwise have helped to form a 
vanguard.'*^ 
The only hope for stopping the political assault on the 
(Queensland labour movement thus remains an ALP state govemment. 
This is a faint hope indeed. The next election is not due until the end 
of 1989. Despite Mr Ahem's promise to respect the outcome of the 
"fair elections" referendum, the next state election wiU most likely 
be held on the existing malapportioned and gerrymandered electoral 
boundaries. This is because, if passed, the constitutional change 
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would not take effect until January 1990. In order to win a state elec-
tion on existing boundaries. Labor would require 57 per cent of the 
two-party preferred vote, that is, a swing of 15 percent. This could be 
achieved by a massive, and therefore unlikely, shift in Liberal and 
National preferences, or by a landslide of by-election proportions. 
The former seems more and more unlikely since the removal of 
Bjelke-Petersen. The Fitzgerald inquiry's discovery of a political 
culture of corruption seems to have had little impact on the Labor 
vote. Indeed, the beneficiaries of Fitzgerald's exposures to date 
have been extreme reactionaries, who proiruse a return to the 
supposed certainties of the Bjelke-Petersen era. 
At a time when the working conditions and rights of 
Queensland workers to organise are under severe attack (with the 
proliferation of coercive legislation and the threatened introduction 
of labour contracts to replace arbitrated awards), Queensland Labor 
appears unable to provide any focus for poUtical opposition to the 
National Party gerontocracy or the new-look Liberal Party under 
Angus Innes. A complete absence of goodwiU among competing Labor 
factions, other than within normally short-lived alliances, and an 
astounding capacity to seek fadional advantage over principle (and 
indeed over electoral advantage), has rendered Queensland Labor 
impotent. 
Workers and liberal opponents of an authoritarian regime must 
soon consider, as in the 1890s, whether some new political 
organisation is required. Indeed, there are other similarities with 
the 1890s. Current right-wing attacks on the union movement 
through the infroduction of confract labour open up the whole debate 
about the parliamentary road to social change versus the road of 
direct industrial action. 
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Conclusion to Part Two 
Queensland Labor in 1988 
hi 1988 Labor faced being in opposition for the foreseeable future. 
The 1983 and 1986 elections, and abysmal showings in two 1988 state 
by-elections, demonstrated that, even given spUt and warring anti-
Labor parties, the ALP was unable to approach the popular vote 
required to win office. This placed considerable strain on Labor's 
traditional role. 
For over a generation, the issues of political goals and electoral 
strategy, while hotly debated within the party, have been irrele-
vant to the development of public policy in Queensland. If the 
AustraUan Labor Party (Queensland Branch) is going to be incapable 
of securing a parliamentary majority in the foreseeable futiu-e, it 
needs to be asked what claim it can legitimately make on the 
continued loyalty of the labour movement? 
The 1986 election was, as then PLP leader Nev Warburton said, 
a jolt. By all normal indicators, the sounds coming from the Bjelke-
Petersen govemment were those of a death rattle. Sustainable aUe-
gations of corruption, knights leaving the National Party like rats 
deserting a sirUcing ship, hysterical reactions from National Party 
leaders, a government campaign which addressed none of the issues 
being canvassed by the media and which changed themes from day 
to day in reaction to the latest allegations—this was the stuff of a 
government facing landslide defeat. However the Labor vote 
actually fell from its unexceptional 1983 level. Yet addressing the 
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1988 state conference, the new PLP leader Wayne Goss clauned tiiat 
a "forward looking and united party" could win in 1989.' 
Origins and Effects of Federal Intervention 
For the first fifteen years after the 1957 split, the Labor vote 
remained at a respectable level, showing the same "glacial" rise as 
the Labor vote throughout AustraUa. Only the 5 per cent QLP (DLP) 
vote, with its discipUned preference allocation, kept Labor from re-
suming office. The 1974 election revealed Labor's confidence in in-
evitable retum to office to be ill-founded. The Queensland Labor 
machine was shown to be pathetically ill-eqtdpped to tackle the 
resurgent anti-labour forces then being unleashed on the Ausfralian 
poUty. Federal Labor's cmshing defeat in 1975 was directly linked 
to the inept performance in (Queensland the previous year. 
Labor had been led since the spUt by a dique of union leaders 
cenfred around Jack Egerton, which had displaced the former AWU 
Labor aristocracy and purged its members from positions of influence. 
Although before and during this process the Egerton group employed 
the rhetoric of ideological purity and militancy, the positions t^en 
on significant poUcy questions by the 1970s were indistinguishable 
from "right-wing" Labor factions in other states. The ease with 
which the AWU slotted back into the ruUng cUque fri the final days 
before intervention Mark 2 demonstrates the ideological distance 
fravelled since 1957. When interviewed in 1974, for instance, Tom 
Bums saw himself as being on the left of the Party, but immediately 
qualified the assessment by disavowing all other national left fac-
tions.2 Ideological confusion—^about objectives and strategy—was 
matched by anachronistic and incompetent campaign organisation in 
the Queensland ALP of the mid 1970s. 
The dominant clique chose to ignore the evidence of its own 
faiUngs and placed the blame for electoral disaster instead at the 
feet of a technocratic federal party and a mindlessly conservative 
Queensland voting public. Accordingly, platform and image were 
adjusted to appeal to the rednecked voter and intemal critics were 
silenced as being emissaries of the detested southern technocrats. 
Even longtime associates of the dominant grouping were exduded if 
they were not clique trusties. This refusal to entertain intemal de-
bate about the causes of the 1974 and 1977 electoral catasfrophes led 
to the very thing the dominant clique had sought to avoid: the 
emergence of an organised intemal opposition. Just as the AWU/PLP 
group's demonstrated electoral success had legitimated its purges 
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and donunation of the movement from 1915 to 1957, so electoral de-
feat removed the Trades Hall clique's claim to members' and affiU-
ates' loyalty. 
Once again Michels's "Iron Law of Oligarch/' seems to have 
been at work. The Breakfast Creek drinking fratemity of the mid 
1970s had so isolated itself from party rank-and-file that they were 
able to convince themselves the Reformists were allied with the 
DLP. In many ways they shared the outiook of the Queensland non-
Labor parties; hatred of intellectuals such as Denis Murphy ran 
deeper than mere political differences. The low level of support 
that the "Old Guard" managed to attract when the axe finally fell 
shows how far out of touch with reality they had become. Yet, had 
intervention not occurred, there is little doubt they would have con-
tinued to hold all official positions in a party with an avowedly 
"democratic" constitution and that they would have succeeded in 
purging Reformist elements. 
Aftermath of Intervention: 
Has Reform Occiirred? 
The effect of intervention has been to change the ideological com-
plexion of the party's organisational forums and assemblies to re-
flect something of the diversity of opinion abroad in the movement. 
This has meant a change of personnel in the party office and livelier 
debate on certain policy issues. The emergence of organised factions 
has been a side-effect of this same process, but this has simply 
recognised and given coherent form to informal networks which have 
always existed in the party. While factions have been presented as 
signifying party disunity, it is doubtful they have much electoral 
impad. Perhaps the major impad of factional organisation has been 
to give media commentators a ready reckoner for calculating party 
leaders' ideological predelictions. 
While the party organisation has undergone major stmctural 
changes as a result of federal intervention, the same is not true of the 
PLP. Most incumbent parliamentarians still belong to the "Old 
Guard" because they were preselected for their safe seats before 
intervention. The replacement of Warburton by Goss does not signal 
any shift in allegiance on the part of the dominant "Old Guard" 
faction within the PLP. Rather, Warburton's demise was a tactical 
move to forestall a holocaust of sitting "Old Guard" members which 
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would have been brought about by the orgaiusational supremacy of 
the AWU/Socialist Left alliance. 
In the heyday of the Egerton clique the PLP was subjected to 
rigorous control by the organisation—^incumbents were preselected on 
their willingness to toe the line. The emphasis placed on electoral 
success since intervention has ruled out many options available to 
disendorse non-performing candidates for fear of antagonising 
electors by removing local parliamentarians. (This fear tends to be 
exaggerated, as the 1986 election victories of Anne Warner and 
Deane Wells, after preselection fights against sitting members, 
attest.) While the Goss victory resulted from fears that 
disendorsements were in the offing, the National Executive's 
imposition in May 1988 of a ruling requiring automatic endorsement 
of candidates polling more than 60 per cent at plebiscite provides 
sitting members with some comfort.3 This is because many of the 
poorest performers so stack their local branches as to be quite safe 
under the 60 per cent rule. 
The failure to reform the parliamentary party has been the 
chief failure of reform. The disinclination of many members of the 
Parliamentary Labor Party to convey with any conviction the 
party's policy package to the electorate has continued to weaken the 
party's electoral performance. Even when the government has done 
its best to lose an election. Labor in Queensland has not been able to 
present itself as a legitimate alternative. 
Electoralism and the Gerrymander 
As Peter Morley said, it is no good bleating about the unfair electoral 
system if you can't convince people to vote for you.* The electoral 
system nevertheless remains a major factor in (Queensland politics 
because it taints the whole system; it is also a vital matter for Labor 
because it renders the notion of electoralism suspect. Until the rule 
changes introduced by the AWU-Left alliance in August-September 
1987, the ALP conference structure in Queensland mirrored these 
malapportioned and gerrymandered state boundaries which, among 
other deleterious consequences, gave advantages to the "Old Guard" 
and the AWU, and discriminated against minority factions and 
women. 
The grossly unfair Queensland electoral system is demoralising 
for the party's workers and supporters. The fact that a Labor gov-
ernment installed the system in the first place is also humiliating. 
Participating in the rorted system by duplicating state boundaries in 
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the party's own stmcture lent it legitimacy. Hence the August-
September 1987 change is likely to be the most significant reform 
since federal intervention. 
The ALP Queensland Branch has great difficulty holding out 
electoralism as the way forward for the working class when the 
system appears to deny it any possibility of success. The persistent 
outbreaks of non-electoral forms of political and industrial action in 
(Jueensland have been fuelled by this. The party leadership's 
failure to lend its legitimating support to such actions stems from 
their continued commitment, however ill-founded, to exclusively 
electoral solutions. 
It may be that the "unholy alliance" between the SociaUst Left 
and the AWU factions forged at the end of 1986 will succeed in dis-
placing some lethargic "Old Guard" personnel from the PLP. The 
August 1988 defeat of sitting "Old Guard" member for Manly 
(formerly Wynnum) Eric Shaw may be a foretaste of changes to come. 
The longevity of the alliance despite persistent federal attempts to 
break it up would suggest this. Some new blood wiU certainly be Left 
members who could help rebuild links—which have been allowed to 
atrophy in the last fifteen years—between the labour movement and 
the many extraparliamentary progressive organisations: feminist. 
Aboriginal rights, civil libertarian, environmentalist, and peace; 
organisations like the Queensland School and the Queensland 
Coalition for Democratic Rights; and labour movement radicals 
operating outside the party. Goodwill between these groups and the 
ALP needs to be estabUshed, although the dominance of the federal 
party by the "right" faction threatens to damage such links 
irreparably. As Queensland Labor showed in the lead-up to 1915, 
victory in an unfair contest is only possible where the whole of the 
state's progressive forces are effectively harnessed. Extraparlia-
mentary organisation and direct action are needed if the existing 
National Party machine or government by a new National-Liberal 
coalition is to be seriously disturbed in the next state election. 
In 1987, the ALP (Queensland Branch), still reeling after its 
disasfrous 1986 electoral defeat and another series of bitter public 
facHonal brawls, had an actual membership of 7800— a^n increase of 
only 1600 on the low pre-intervention figure of 1979. In comparison, 
the Queensland National Party boasted 35,000 full and associate 
members.^ Clearly, if (Queensland Labor is again to be a force to be 
reckoned with, it needs to win tiie support of women, of the young, of 
blacks and of the disadvantaged, as weU as what remains of its fra-
ditional state constituency. This must involve a retum of the ALP to 
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its radical and refomust fraditions but without the racist and sexist 
overtones associated with those fraditions. Put simply, the ALP in 
Queensland needs both to project itself as a party of principle and 
actually to be a principled party in terms of stated poUdes. 
If the referendum on 3 September 1988 fails, the first 
demonstration of this resolve should be immediate moves at the 
federal level, regardless of perceived short term political fallout, to 
remove the Queensland electoral malapportionment. However, 
while not discoimting the fundamental importance of one-person one-
vote one-value, both in terms of fjurness and in overcoming the 
political immobilisation of so many Queenslanders who perceive 
that it is not possible to change the system through voting, it is 
strategicaUy as wrongheaded to place exclusive blame on the in-
equitable electoral system as it is on the age-old excuse that 
Queensland's political culture is essentially different from the rest 
of Australia. Admittedly there are empirical ways of differentiat-
ing Queensland, but as Brian Head has argued: 'To some extent, the 
Queensland system is already becoming more like the rest of 
Australia under the surface, but the rhetoric of State differences and 
political chauvinism obscures these processes".^ 
Head maintains, somewhat optimistically, that the forces of 
Queensland parochialism are being slowly undermined by the uni-
versities, big business and the elecfronic media. A modernising Labor 
govemment could, he argues, especially in the absence of an obstruc-
tive upper house in parliament, dramatically change the style of 
Queensland politics. Head is surely right in questioning the 
seriousness of Labor's commitment to civil liberties and pubUc 
accountability. Certainly the ALP in (Queensland needs to endorse 
quality candidates, including women, for safe seats, and needs to 
develop long-term, principled poUcy strategies. However, as he so 
rightly concludes, the prevailing assumption that Queensland's 
political culture is different may be self-fulfiUing if "Labor is too 
tainted by its own conservative-repressive history to become a 
vehicle for liberalisation, democratisation and modernisation. The 
onus is on Labor supporters to disprove that assumption."^ 
In 1915 the Ryan-led Labor Party was able to draw on vast re-
serves of enthusiasm and optimistic projections of radical reform in 
the labour movement of the day in wresting office from the en-
trenched conservative forces. Despite continuing difficulties for the 
National Party attending the departure of the aged Bjelke-Petersen, 
the National Party is a well oiled machine, supported by frans-
national capital and local powerful interests, including the 
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monopolistic media. If it, or a reborn conservative alUance, is to be 
overthrown by Labor, this wUl require a level of optimism, 
enthusiasm and energy equalling the halcyon days of 1915. The only 
way of ensuring this is for the ALP in Queensland to retum to a 
genuine commitment to principled reform. Given the current crisis in 
the CJueensland economy and declared govemment policies which 
can only have the effect of deepening the crisis, increasing un-
employment and redisfributing wealth in favour of vested interests, 
a state Labor Party actually committed to the well-being of ordinary 
citizens and disadvantaged groups would have certain electoral 
appeal. 
The present malaise affecting progressive forces in (Queensland, 
generated in large part by a maladroit and ineffective Labor Party 
which has not essentially differentiated itself in terms of policy 
from the conservative parties, can only continue if such a conunit-
ment is not forthcoming. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
376 Conclusion to Part Two 
Notes to Conclusion to Part Two 
1 Wayne Goss, "Unity and Hard Work Needed to Win', in Labor Review, 
vol. 7, No.l, May 1988, pp. 5-6. 
2 Tom Burns interviewed by Colin Hughes, in Tom Burns: Political 
Campaigns: Changing a Government, cassette tape, Brisbane: University of 
Queensland Press, 1975. 
3 For the 60 per cent rule, see letter R. Hogg (ALP national secretary) to P. 
Beattie, 6 May 1988. 
4 Courier-Mail, 15 November 1986. 
5 Kris Houghton and Sybil Nolan, "ALP Bid to Revitalise Branches", 
Australian, 22 January 1987. 
6 Brian Head, "Queensland. Political Culture: A Critical Note on an 
Enduring Legend", in Social Alternatives, vol. 5, no. 4 (November 1986), 
pp.45-47, quote p.46. See also Ross Fitzgerald, "The ALP in Queensland: 
Hope for the Future?" in Social Alternatives, vol. 5, no. 4 (November 1986), 
pp.28-31. 
7 Head, ibid., p.47. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Bibliography 
Unpublished Reference Materials 
ALP Adminisfrative Committee Papers, 1979. 
ALP Queensland Branch Archives: Letters and Circulars—1915-1979. 
Armstrong, J. "Closer Unity in the Queensland Trade Union 
Movement 1900-1922." M.A. Thesis: University of Queensland, 
1975. 
Beatson, James. "Communism and PubUc Opinion in (Queensland 1939-
1951: An Explanation of Queensland's Vote in the 1951 Anti-
Communist Referendum." B.A. Thesis: University of 
Queensland, 1974. 
Blackmur, Douglas. "Industrial Relations Under an Ausfralian State 
Labor Govemment: The Hanlon Government in Queensland 
1946-1952." Ph.D. Thesis: University of (Queensland, 1986. 
Blackmur, Douglas. "The Primary Industries of Queensland 1919-29: 
A ShJdy in Policy." B.Econ. Thesis: University of Queensland, 
1965. 
Botham, T.J. "The Red Flag Riots: Conservative Reactions." B.A. 
Thesis, ANU, 1975. 
Bray, Pamela. "E. G. Theodore and the Queensland Labour 
Movement 1909-25." B. A. Thesis: University of Queensland, 
1959. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
380 Bibliography 
Bryan, Harrison. "The establishment of the University of 
Queensland." Unpublished paper. Fryer Library collection. 
University of Queensland. 
BTQ Channel 7. Transcript of 6pm News, 13 Febmary 1980. 
Cope, M. "A Study of Labour Goverrunent and the Law in Queeiwland 
1915-1922." B.A. Thesis: University of Queensland, 1972. 
Correspondence: Supervisor, State Butchery and Trade 
Commissioner. QSA (BUT 17). 
Dalton, J.B. "The Queensland Labour Movement 1889-1915." B.A. 
Thesis: University of Queensland, 1961. 
Documents confiscated from Russian Association, Brisbane. AA 
(MP95/1). 
Gall, William James. Papers and Manuscripts, 1917-28. Fryer 
Memorial Library. 
Governor's Secret and Confidential Outward Dispatches and 
Telegrams. QSA (GOV.68). 
Greenwood, David G. "E. G. Theodore: PoUtician, Tactician and 
Financial Administrator." B. Econ. Thesis: University of 
Queensland, 1966. 
Hamill, David. "Indusfrial Group Activity in Queensland: A Case-
study of the Elecfrical Trades Union." B.A. Thesis: Uruversity 
of Queensland, 1978. 
Hawker, R.B. "The Motives and Mechanisms Involved in the 
Abolition of the Queensland Legislative Council." B.A. 
Thesis: University of Queensland, 1977. 
Hepworth, John. "The Bishops and the Movement." UnpubUshed 
seminar paper. University of Adelaide PoUtics Department, 
1983. 
Hunt, D.W. "A History of the Labour Movement in North 
Queensland." PhD Thesis: University of C^eensland, 1979. 
Hunter, Thelma. "The Body Politic, Numberl." Transcript of radio 
programmeT/ie Body Program.. Broadcast 3-8 AprU 1983. 
AusfraUan Broadcasting Comnussion. 
L a v ^ , J. R. "Some Aspects of Education m Queensland 1859 to 1904." 
Ph. D. Thesis: Monash University, 1968. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Bibliography 381 
Leggett, C.A.C. "The Organisation and Development of the 
Queensland Hospitals in the Twentieth Century." M. A. 
Thesis: University of Queensland, 1976. 
Memoranda to Muiister re State Trade Department November 1916-
August 1920. QSA (BUT 16). 
Minutes of Inaugural General Meeting of Cenfre Majority, 6 July 1983. 
Minutes of Interim Adminisfrative Committee, 1980. 
Minutes, 1st State Conference of the Australian Labor Party 
(Queensland Branch, 1979. 
Minutes, 28th Labor-in-PoUtics Convention, 1971. 
Minutes, 1984 State Conference TownsviUe. 
Murnane, Mary. "The Workers Educational Association of 
Queensland 1913-1939." B. A. Thesis: University of 
Queensland, 1969. 
Murphy, D. J. Papers, From Fryer Memorial Library CoUection. 
PhUUps, J.A. "The TownsviUe Meat Workers' Strike: A Perspective 
on Social ConfUct fri Queensland 1918-1919." B.A. Thesis: 
University of Queensland, 1977. 
(Queensland Cenfral Executive Minutes, 1910-1976. 
Rawson, D.W. "The Organisation of the AustraUan Labor Party 
1916-1941." Ph.D. Thesis: University of Melbourne, 1954. 
Rayner, S. A. "The Evolution of the Queensland Labour Party to 
1907." M.A. Thesis: University of Queensland, 1947. 
Register of Questions asked m State ParUament, 1915-29. QSA (BUT 
32 A/25922). 
Report of Proceedings of Meeting of AusfraUan Labor Party members 
at Trades HaU, Brisbane on Sunday 17 June 1979. 
Reports submitted by the Supervisor, RetaU Butchery Department to 
the Minister in Charge of State Enterprises, August 1916— 
November 1920. QSA (BUT 16). 
Reynolds, Paul. "The 1983 State Elecrion: A Watershed in 
Queensland PoUtics." UnpubUshed seminar paper. University 
of Queer«land Govemment Department, 1984. 
Robm, P. D. "The British Medical Association—Queensland origins 
and development to 1946." B.A. Thesis: University of 
(Queensland, 1966. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
382 Bibliography 
Royal Commision on PubUc Hospitals, Shorthand Notes of Evidence, 
1930. Supreme Court of (Queensland Registry. 
"Ryan's Disloyal Associations—Dossier". Defence Army, Secret and 
Confidential correspondence files, multiple number series 
1906-1935, fUe N^ 2021-1-270. AA (BP197). 
Senate Mmutes, 1910,1956. University of Queensland. 
Shaw, G.P. "Conscription and Queensland 1916-1917." B.A. Thesis: 
University of Queensland, 1966. 
Shearman, Richard. "The Politics of the 1948 (Queensland RaUway 
Strike." B. A. Thesis: University of Queensland, 1973. 
State CouncU Correspondence, 1979-1985. [From Peter Beattie's 
personal papers.] 
Sullivan, Martin G. "Education and the Labour Movement in 
Queensland 1890-1910." M. A. Thesis: University of 
(3ueer«land, 1971. 
Swan, Wayne. "FadionaUsm—the Case of (Queensland Labor 1959-
1966." B.A. Thesis: University of Queensland, 1975. 
Thornton, Harold. "Socialism at Work? Queensland Labor m Office 
1915-1957." Ph.D. Thesis: University of Adelaide, 1987. 
Toowong Branch [ALP] Correspondence, 1980. 
Trade Union Congress Reports, 17 Odober 1959. 
Transcript of Court Case no. 1919, Brisbane, 1980. Supreme Court of 
Queensland Registry. 
Transcript of News, 7.45am, 6 February 1980. Radio 4QR. 
Transcript of News, 18 Febmary 1980. Radio 4QR. 
Transcript of Radio Program AM, 5 February 1980. Australian 
Broadcasting Commission. 
Transcript of Radio Program PM, 3 March 1980. AustraUan 
Broadcasting Commission. 
TyrreU, Ian. "The Reform of State Education in (Queensland 1900-
1914." B.A. Thesis: University of Queensland, 1968. 
Williams, E. "The Foundation of University Adult Education in 
AustraUa." B.A.Thesis: Uruversity of Adelaide, 1966. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Bibliography 383 
Articles 
AUen, J. "Aspeds of Vere Gordon Childe." Labour History, 12 (1967), 
pp.52-59. 
BeU, Jaqueline. "Queensland's PubUc Hospital System: Some 
Aspects of Finance and Confrol." Social Policy in Australia: 
Some Perspectives. Ed. Jill Roe. Sydney: CasseU,1976, pp. 284-
294. 
Berry, J.W. "The Stereotypes of the Ausfralian States." Australian 
Journal of Psychology, 2: 3 (1969), pp.227-233. 
Berzins, Baiba. "Symbolic Legislation: The Nationalists and 
Profiteering fri 1919." Politics, 6:1 (May 1971), pp. 41-52. 
Birrell, Margaret. The Workfrig Man 1911-1918." Historical Society 
of Queensland Journal, 4: 4 (December 1951), pp.590 ff. 
Black, Laurel. "Corporatism, Keynes and Social Democracy." 
Australasian Political Studies Association Conference Paper, 
Adelaide, August 1982. 
Blackmur, Douglas. "The ALP Indusfrial Groups in Queensland." 
Labour History, 46 (May 1984), pp. 99-102. 
Brigden, J. B. "State Enterprises in AustraUa." International Labour 
Review, 16 (1927), pp.26-49. 
Bryan, Harrison. "The Establishment of the University of 
Queensland." Historical Society of Queensland Journal, 4: 5 
(1951), pp. 637-661. 
Bulbeck, ChiUa, and A. Holden. 'The Resources Boom: Is Democracy 
a Worked-Out Lead?" Arena: 59 (1981), pp. 57-70. 
Bulbeck, Chilla. "Some uses of Historical Analysis in the Study of 
the State." Australia and New Zealand Journal of Sociology, 
17:1 (March 1981), pp. 77-82. 
Butler, Gavin. "The Limits to De-regulation." Australian Journal of 
Political Economy: 11 (January 1982), pp. 31-43. 
CampbeU, Ian. "AprU Fools Month fri Queensland: The Justices Act 
Amendments", in Legal Services Bulletin 4: 3 (June 1979), 
pp.79-82. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
384 Bibliography 
Carr, Bob. "Factions Grow to National Proportions." Bulletin, 6 
September 1983. 
ChUde, V.G. "A Labor Prenuer Meets His Masters." Labour Monthly 
6: 1 (May 1924), pp. 282-285. 
ChUde, V.G. Letter. Daily Standard, 4 January 1919. 
Clark, Dave. "The Poverty of Class Analysis: A Critique of Cormell 
& Irving." Paper presented to O. E. S. Conference, Griffith 
University, Queensland, 6-19 July,1981. 
Clark, Dave. "The Snowy: Ocker Dream—and ReaUty." Australian 
Financial Review, 20 May 1983, pp. 29-34. 
Coaldrake, Peter. "The Coalition Crisis and the Queensland 
Eledion of 1983." Politics: 19 (May 1984), pp.88-97. 
Coates, R. "Notes on the Indusfrial Workers of the World." Labour 
History 6 (May 1964), pp. 25-28. 
ConneU, R. W. "On the Wuigs of History." Arena 55 (1980), pp. 32-
55. 
Conway, H. E. "Labour Protest Activity in Sierra Leone." Labour 
History 15 (November 1968), pp. 49-63. 
Cook, P. "The End of the 'World'." Labour History: 16 (May 1969), 
pp. 55-57. 
Costar, Brian. "Arthur Edward Moore: Odd Man In." Queensland 
Political Portraits: 1859-1952. Ed. D. J. Murphy and R. B. 
Joyce. Brisbane: University of (Queensland Press, 1978, pp. 385-
387. 
Costar, Brian. "The Great Depression: Was (Queensland Different?" 
Labour History 26 (May 1974), pp. 32-48. 
Cribb, Margaret Bridson. "Queensland Politics." Current Affairs 
Bulletin 51: 11 (AprU 1975), pp.23-31. 
Cribb, Margaret Bridson. "Queensland Politics." Current Affairs 
Bulletin 58: 5 (Oct 1981), pp.22-32. 
Cribb, Margaret Bridson. "State in Emergency: The (Queensland 
Railway Strike of 1948." In Strikes: Studies in Twentieth 
Century Australian Social History. Ed. John Iremonger, John 
Merritt and Graeme Osborne. Sydney: Angus and 
Robertson/Australian Sodety for the Study of Labour History, 
1973, pp. 225-248. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Bibliography 385 
Cribb, Margaret Bridson. "The A.R.U. m Queensland: Some Oral 
History." Labour History 22 (May 1972), pp. 13-22. 
Crouch, Colin. "The State, Capital and Liberal Democracy." In 
State and Economy in Contemporary Capitalism. Ed. C. 
Crouch. London: Groom HeUn, 1979: pp. 13-54. 
Current Affafrs BuUetin. "Queensland: One Hundred Years." Current 
Affairs Bulletin 24: 7 (3 August 1959). 
Cutler, Terrence. "Sunday, Bloody Sunday: The Townsville 
Meatworkers Strike of 1918-19." In Strikes: Studies in 
Twentieth Century Australian Social History. Eds John 
fremonger, John Merritt and Graeme Osborne. Sydney: Angus 
and Robertson/AustraUan Society for the Study of Labour 
History, 1973: pp.81-102. 
Dale, Roger. "Education and the Capitalist State: Contributions and 
ContradictioAs." In Cultural and Economic Reproduction in 
Education. Ed. M. W. Apple. London: Routledge, 1982, pp. 127-
161. 
Davis, E. "Participation in Six Ausfralan Trade Unions." Journal of 
Industrial Relations 23: 2 (June 1981), pp. 190-216. 
Daw, E.D. "Church and State in Queensland: Aspects of AngUcanism 
in the 1860s."Queensland Heritage 3: 2 (May 1975), pp. 360-
372. 
Department of PubUc Instruction. "Reducing Wastage Among the 
Gifted."Research and Guidance Branch Bulletin 13 (1957). 
Dickmson, Michael. "Resort Boom Goes Ahead Despite Housing 
Gloom."Nflf/o«fl/ Times, March 14-20 1982, p. 49. 
Dow, Geoff, Stewart Clegg and Paul Boreham. "From the PoUtics of 
Produdion to the Production of PoUtics."T/iesis Eleven 9 (July 
1984), pp. 16-32. 
Dowling, C. "Clearuig the Pacific." In History of the First World 
War, vol.1. London: PurneU, 1970-73: pp.334-340. 
Duncan, Graeme. "The ALP: Socialism in a Bourgeois Society?" In 
Critical Essays in Australian Politics. Ed. G. Duncan. Sydney: 
Edward Amold (Aust.), 1977, pp.77-96. 
Eccleshall, Robert. "Ideology as Commonsense: The Case of British 
Conservatism."Rflrficfl/ Philosophy: 25 (Summer 1980), pp. 2-
8. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
386 Bibliography 
Evans, Gareth. "A SodaUst Objective for the 1980s." In Ubor Essays 
1980. Ed. Gareth Evans and John Reeves. Melbourne: 
ALP/Dmnunond, 1980, pp 173-181. 
Evans, Gareth. "Reshaping the SociaUst Objective."T/ig Socialist 
Objective: Labor and Socialism. Ed. Bmce O'Meagher. Sydney: 
Hale & fremonger, 1983, pp. 63-78. 
FarreU, Frank. "Dealing with the Communists 1923-36." In Jack 
Lang. Eds Heather Radi and Peter Spearritt. Sydney: Hale & 
Iremonger and Labour History, 1977, pp. 49-68. 
Fitzpatrick, Brian. "Indentured Labour in Ausfralia."L<ifeoMr History 
9 (November 1965), pp. 3-5. 
Freeland, John. "Class Struggle in Schooling: MACOS and SEMP in 
Queensland."Intervention 12 (AprU 1979), pp. 29-62. 
Fry, E. C. "The Parliamentary Papers of Queensland 1860-
l890."Labour History 8 (May 1965), pp.37-45. 
Galligan, Brian. "The Political Economy of the States." In 
Australian State Politics. Ed. Brian Galligan. Melbourne, 
Longman Cheshfre, 1986, pp. 244-265. 
GUbert, A.D. "The Conscription Referenda 1916-17: the Impact of 
the Irish Crisis."HisforiCfl/ Studies 14: 53 (1969), pp. 54-71. 
Gollan, R.A. "American Populism and Australian 
Utopianism."L<i&OMr History 9 (November 1965), pp. 15-21. 
Gollan, R.A. "An Inquiry into the AusfraUan Radical Tradition-
McQueen's 'New Britarmia'." Arena 24 (1971), pp. 32-44. 
Gordon, Douglas. "An arranged marriage: the story of an unusual 
teaching hospital."Medical Journal of Australia 1: 14 (8 April 
1967), pp. 693-699. 
Gow, N. "Anti-conscription Documents, Brisbane 1916." Labour 
History 26 (1974), pp.87-91. 
Graham, B. D. "Graziers in Politics, 1917-1929." In The Simple 
Fleece: Studies in the Australian Wool Industry. Ed. A. 
Barnard. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1962, pp. 
592-601. 
Graves, A. A. "The AboUtion of the Queensland Labour Trade-
Politics or Profits?" Essays in the Political Economy of 
Australian Capitalism: 4. Ed. E. L. Wheelwright and Ken 
Buckley. Sydney: ANZ Book Company, 1980, pp. 41-57. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Bibliography 387 
Greenfield, Cathy, and Peter WiUiams. "StruggUng for the People: 
PopuUsm v Democracy in Queensland."Socia/ Alternatives 5: 4 
(November 1986), pp. 37-41. 
Greenfield, Cathy. "'In the People's Name': Populism as a PoUtical 
Form."AMSfrfl//fln Journal of Cultural Studies 3: 2 (1985), pp. 
89-103. 
Groenewegen, P. D. "The political economy of federaUsm 1901-81." 
In State and Economy in Australia. Ed. Brian Head. 
Melboume: Oxford University Press, 1983, pp. 186-187. 
Guyatt, Joy. "The Labor Govemment and the Shearer's Sfrike of 
l956."Labour History 33 (November 1977), pp. 53-64. 
Harcourt, G. C. "The Social Science Imperialists."Po/ifJCS 16: 2 
(November 1979), pp. 243-251. 
Harris, W. Joe. "The Struggle against Pacific Island Labour."LflboMr 
History 15 (November 1968), pp. 40-48. 
Head, Brian. "Queensland PoUtical Culture: A Critical Note on an 
enduring Legend."Socw/ Alternatives 5: 4 (November 1986), 
pp.45-47. 
Head, Brian. "The Queensland Difference."Po//hcs 21: 1 (May 1986), 
pp. 118-122. 
Hempel, J. "Ital ians in Queensland: Aspects of 
Assimilation."Quadrant, Spring 1959, pp. 45-53. 
Higgins, E. M. "Queensland Labor: Trade Unions Versus 
Premiers."Hisfonca/ Studies Australia and New Zealand 9 
(November 1959-May 1961), pp. 140-155. 
Hughes, C. "Land and Settlement." In Labor in Power: The Labor 
Party and Governments in Queensland 1915-1957. Eds D.J. 
Murphy, R. B. Joyce and Colin A. Hughes. Brisbane: 
University of Queensland Press, 1980, pp. 228-229. 
Hull, Darryl. "Queensland Sugar Ports: Labour and Technological 
Change."/oMrMfl/ of Australian Political Economy 6 (1979), pp. 
60-73. 
Hyde, Jim. "The Development of Australian Tertiary Education to 
1939." In Melbourne Studies in Education 1982. Ed. Stephen 
Murray-Smith. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1983, 
pp. 105-140. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
388 Bibliography 
Ignatieff, Michael. "Strangers and Comrades."New Statesman, 14 
December 1984, pp. 25-27. 
Iremonger, John. "Cold War Warrior." In Jack Lang. Eds Heather 
Radi and Peter Spearitt. Sydney: Hale & Iremonger and 
Labour History, 1977, pp. 227-248. 
Jensen, H. I. "The Darwin RebeUion."LflboMr History 11 (November 
1966), pp. 3-13. 
Johnston, W. Ross. "The University of Hard Knocks."Sewper, 15 
AprU 1985. 
Jordan, P.K. "Health and Social Welfare." In Labor in Power: The 
Labor Party and Governments in Queensland 1915-1957. Ed. D. 
J. Murphy, R. B. Joyce and Colin A. Hughes. Brisbane: 
University of (Queensland Press, 1980, pp 312-329. 
Kennedy, K. H. "The South Johnstone Sfrike and RaUway Lockout, 
-l927."Ubour History: 31 (November 1976), pp. 1-13. 
Kennedy, K. H. "Theodore, McCormack and the Amalgamated 
Workers' Association."LifcoMr History, Vols 32-34 (1977-78), 
pp. 14-28. 
Kennedy, K. H. "WiUiam McCormack: Forgotten Labor Leader." In 
Queensland Political Portraits: 1859-1952. Eds D. J. Murphy 
and R. B. Joyce. Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 
1978, pp. 341-373. 
Kingston, Beverley. "Not a Good Book." Letter in Age Monthly 
Review (May 1982). 
Knight, Kenneth W. "Edward Michael Hanlon: a City 
Bushman."Queensland Political Portraits: 1859-1952. Eds D.]. 
Murphy and R. B. Joyce. Brisbane: University of Queensland 
Press, 1978, pp. 433-458. 
Lehmbruch, Gerhard. "Liberal Corporatism and Party 
Government."Comparative Political Studies 10: 1 (AprU 
1977), pp. 91-128. 
Lewis, Glen. "Nationalism and Capitalism in Australia: The 
Queensland Economy 1890-1930."Arena 38 (1975), pp. 81-92. 
Lewis, Glen. "Queensland Nationalism and Ausfralian Capitalism." 
In Essays in the Political Economy of Australian Capitalism 
vol. 2. Ed. E. L. Wheelwright and Ken Buckley. Sydney: ANZ 
Book Company, 1978, pp. 110-147. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Bibliography 389 
Lewis, Glen. Review of D. J. Murphy and R. B. Joyce Queensland 
Political Portraits 1859-1952. Intervntion: 13 (October 1979) 
pp. 95-96. 
Lewis, Glen. "Violence in Australian History: The Queensland 
Experience."Mefl«/m 33 (1974), pp. 313-319. 
Lindblom, Charles E. "Another State of Mind." American Political 
Science Review 76, pp. 9-21. 
Lloyd, Clem. "Fragmented History."Nflho«fl/ Times (May 2 to 8 
1982), p. 21. 
Lonie, John. "(Queensland's CindereUa Days."Nation Review, (6-12 
AprU 1978), p.l5. 
Maclntyre, Stuart. "Radical History and Bourgeois 
Hegemony."Intervention: 2 (October 1972), pp. 47-73. 
Maclntyre, Stuart. "The Making of the AustraUan Working Class: 
an Historiographical Survey."H/sfoncfl/ Studies 18 (1978-79), 
pp. 233-253. 
Martin, J. A. "Brief History of State Hotel—Babinda."MM;^rfli;e 
Shire Historical Society Bulletin 32 (October 1980). 
Matthews, The Hon Mr Justice [B. H]. "A History of Indusfrial Law 
in Queensland with a Summary of the Provisions of the 
Various Statutes."H/sforicfl/ Society of Queensland Journal 4: 
2 (December 1949), pp. 150-181. 
McCarthy, Paul. "Power Without Glory: The (Queensland Elecfricity 
Dispute."/ournfl/ of Industrial Relations 7: 13 (September 
1985), pp. 364-382. 
McMichael, Philip. "The Genesis of Settler Capitalism in 
Australia."Intervention 13 (Odober 1979), pp. 39-78. 
McQueen, Humphrey. "Shoot the Bolshevik! Hang the Profiteer." 
In Essays in the Political Economy of Australian Capitalism 
vol.2. Ed. E. L. Wheelwright and K. Buckley. Sydney: ANZ 
Book Company, 1978, pp. 185-206. 
McCJueen, Humphrey. "The Queensland Mining Tradition."N<jf/oM 
Review, 4-10 May 1978, p. 14. 
McVey, Judy. "The Right to Life sfrice 1963", m Hecate, 9 (1983), pp. 
32-41. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
390 Bibliography 
Morrison, A. A. "MUitant Labour in Queensland 1912-1927."Royal 
Australian Historical Society—Journal and Proceedings 38 
(1955), pp. 209-234. 
Morrison, A. A. "Queensland: A Study in Distance and 
Isolation."Me/boMrne Studies in Education 1960-1961. Ed. E. L 
French. Melboume: Melbourne University Press, 1961, pp. 191-
203. 
Morrison, A. A. "The Govemment of Queensland." In The Government 
of the Australian States. Ed. S. R. Davis. London: Longmans, 
1960, pp. 249-332. 
Mullins, Pat. "Hedonism and Real Estate: An Analysis of Resort 
Tourism and Gold Coast Development." Seminar Series, urban 
Research Unit, ANU, 11 July 1983. 
Mullins, Patrick. "Australia's Sunbelt Migration: The Recent 
Growth of Brisbane and the Moreton Bay Region."/oMrnfl/ of 
Australian Political Economy 5 (July 1979), pp. 17-32. 
Murphy, D. J. "Agriculture 1932-57."Labor in Power: The Labor Party 
and Governments in Queensland 1915-1957. Eds D. J. Murphy, 
R. B. Joyce and Colin A. Hughes. Brisbane: University of 
Queensland Press, 1980, pp. 194-221. 
Murphy, D. J. "Queensland's Image and AustraUan National-
ism." Awsfra/wn Quarterly: 50 (1978), pp. 77-91. 
Murphy, D. J. "Religion, Race and Conscription in World War 
I."Australian Journal of Politics and History 20: 2 (1974), 
pp.155-163. 
Murphy, D. J. "State Enterprises." In Labor in Power: The Labor 
Party and Governments in Queensland 1915-1957. Ed. D. J. 
Murphy, R. B. Joyce and Colin A. Hughes. Brisbane: 
University of Queensland Press, 1980, pp. 138-156. 
Murphy, D. J. "The EstabUshment of State Enterprises in Queensland 
1915-1918."LaboMr History 14 (May 1968), pp. 13-22. 
O'Shaughnessy, Terry. "Joh and Don: Capital and PoUtics in Two 
Peripheral States."Intervention 12 (AprU 1979), pp. 3-28. 
Offe, Glaus. "Some Contradictions of the Modern Welfare 
State."Prfla:/s International 1: 3 (October 1981), pp. 219-229. 
Panitch, Leo. "The Development of Corporatism in Liberal 
Democracies."Comparative Political Studies 10: 1 (1977), pp. 
61-90. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Bibliography 391 
PhUlipp, June. "1890—The Turning Point?" In Historical Studies 
Selected Articles Second Series. Compiled by Margot Beever 
and F.B. Smith. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1967 
pp. 126-135. 
"PoUtical Chronicle". Australian Journal of Politics and History 
1983-1988. 
Proctor, S. K. "The Rise and Decline of the Australian BuUding 
Industry Employees' Union in Brisbane 1912-1918."Labour 
History 13 (November 1967), pp.26-32. 
Rawson, D. W. "The A.L.P. Indusfrial Groups." In Australian Labour 
Relations: Readings. Ed. J. E. Isaac and G. W. Ford. Melbourne: 
Sun Books, 1966, pp. 160-177. 
Reynolds, Harry. "Greed: The Northern Symptom."y4ge Monthly 
Review, AprU 1982, pp. 4-5. 
Reynolds, Harry. "(Queensland: Past and Future."/s/fl«<i Magazine 14 
(Auhimn 1983), pp. 33-39. 
Reynolds, Paul. "Queensland's Autocracy: The Fatal Flaw for 
LahoT."Labor Reform 1: 4 (June 1979). 
Richards, H. J. "Brisbane's First Bishop: The Right Reverend 
Edward Wyndham Tufnell, M.A., D.D."Queensland Heritage 
3: 5 (November 1976), pp. 17-25. 
Robinson, Joan. "Michael Kalecki: A Negleded Prophet." New York 
Review of Books, 4 March, 1976, pp. 28-30. 
Ross, George. "Nicos Poulantzas, Eurocommunism, and the Debate on 
the Theory of the Capitalist State."Socia/isf Review: 9 
(1979), pp. 143-158. 
Rowley, Kevin. "Pastoral Capitalism: Australia's Pre-Industrial 
Development."Intervention: 1 (AprU 1972), pp. 9-26. 
Rowse, Tun. "Class Stmcttare: A Grid with Gaps"Meanjin 2 (1981), 
pp. 259-268. 
Rushton, P. J. "The Trial of the Sydney Twelve: The Original 
Charge."LflfcoMr History: 25 (November 1975), pp. 53-57. 
Sawer, Marian. "Political Manifestations of Libertarianism in 
Australia."AMsfrfl//fl and the New Right. Ed. Marian Sawer. 
Sydney: George Allen & Unwm, 1982, pp. 1-19. 
Schedvin, Bernie. "E. G. Theodore and the London Pastoral 
Lobby."Po;/f/cs 6: 1 (May 1971), pp. 26-41. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
392 Bibliography 
Schmitter, P.C. "StiU the Century of Corporatism?" In The New 
Corporatism: Social-Political Structures in the Iberian World. 
Ed. F.B. Pike and T. Sfritch. Nofre Dame, Indiana: Uruversity 
of Nofre Dame Press, 1974, pp. 85-131. 
Shaw, G.P. "Patriotism versus Socialism: Queensland's Private 
War, 1916."Australian Journal of Politics and History 19: 2 
(1973), pp.167-178. 
Shogren, D. "Agriculture 1915-29." In Labor in Power: The Labor 
Party and Governments in Queensland 1915-1957. Ed. D. J. 
Murphy, R. B. Joyce and Colin A. Hughes. Brisbane: 
University of (Queensland Press, 1980, pp. 180-181. 
Simms, Marian and Kosmas Tsokhas. "Ideology, Rhetoric and 
Liberal Party Policies on Public Enterprises."Po/if/cs 14: 2 
(November 1979), pp. 252-264. 
Smith, Patricia Y. "Queensland's PoUtical Culture." In The Bjelke-
Petersen Premiership 1968-1973: Issues in Public Policy. Ed. 
AUan Patience. Melboume: Longman Cheshfre, 1985, pp. 17-
32. 
Smith, Patricia Y. "The Queensland Premier's Department."Po/itics 
17: 1 (May 1982), pp. 36-45. 
Solomon, David. "Qld's agrarian schemes likely to be 
challenged."Australian Financial Review, 21 March 1984. 
Stoodley, June. "Miner v Landowner: The ConfUct Over Mining on 
Private Land in Queensland."Lfn;yers/fy of Queensland Law 
Journal 5: 3 (August 1967), pp. 353-369. 
Stoodley, June. "The Development of Gold-Mining Unionism in 
Queensland in the Late Nineteenth Century."La&owr History 
11 (November 1966), pp. 14-27. 
Theodore, E. G. An address given by the Premier to farmers of the 
Laidley district on 21 February 1922. "Organisation of the 
Agricultural Industry: A State-Wide Co-operative Scheme: 
Enrichment of Rural Liie." Queensland Agricultural Journal 17 
(AprU 1922), pp. 193-200. 
Theodore, E. G. Speech to Inaugural Session of (Queensland Dairy 
Conference, Land Court Room, Brisbane, 24 March 
1922.Queensland Agricultural Journal 17: 2 (April 1922), pp. 
150-158. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Bibliography 393 
Thompsen, Elaine. "Reform in the [Commonwealth] Public Service: 
Egalitarism to the SES." Paper delivered to the 1985 
Australasian Political Studies Association Conference, 
Adelaide, 1985. 
Thornton, Merle. "Is sex equaUty good enough for feminism?" In 
Feminist Challenges. Ed. Carole Pateman and Liz Gross. 
Melboume: George AUen and Unwin, 1986. 
Tucker, Robert C. "Culture, Political Culture and Commurust 
Society."Po/ificfl/ Science Quarterly: 88: 2 (1973), pp. 173-190. 
Tumer, Ian. "Socialist PoUtical Tactics 1900-1920."LflboMr History 2 
(1962), pp.5-25. 
Tyrrell, Ian. "The Failure of State Secondary Education Reform 
\900-l91A."Queensland Historical Review 3 (1970), pp. 4-13. 
Walker, K. J. "Ecological Limits and Marxian Thought."Po/if jcs 14: 
1 (May 1979), pp. 29-46. 
Wanna, John. "Groups in Contention: Industrial Relations 
Theory."AreMa 64 (1983), pp. 100-109. 
Webley, frene. "Women Who Want to be Women"./lMsfrfl/ifl and the 
New Right. Ed Marian Sawer. Sydney: George Allen & 
Unwfri, 1982, pp.125-157. 
WUenski, Peter. "DUemmas of Democratic SociaUsm." In The 
Socialist Objective: Labor and Socialism. Ed. Bruce 
O'Meagher. Sydney: Hale & fremonger, 1983, pp. 44-62. 
WUenski, Peter. "Reform and its Implementation: the Whitlam 
Years in Refrospect." In Labor Essays 1980. Ed. Gareth Evans 
and John Reeves. Melboume: ALP/Dmmmond, 1980, pp. 40-63. 
Winkler, J.T. "The Corporatist Economy." In Industrial Society. Ed. 
R. Scase. London: George AUen and Unwm, 1969, pp. 47-65. 
Wood, G. I. "A Contemporary Advocate of National Insurance." In 
Social Policy in Australia: Some Perspectives 1901-1975. Ed. 
JUl Roe. Sydney: CasseU AustraUa, 1976, pp. 140-143. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
394 Bibliography 
Books 
Abercrombie, Nicholas, Stephen Hill and Bryan S. Turner. The 
Dominant Ideology Thesis. London: George Allen & Unwin, 
1980. 
Abercrombie, Nicholas. Class, Structure and Knowledge: Problems in 
the Sociology of Knowledge. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980. 
Apple, Michael W, ed. Cultural and economic reproduction in 
education: Essays on class, ideology and the State. London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982. 
Attorney-General's Department. The Australian Constitution 
Annotated. Canberra: Australian Government PubUshing 
Service, 1980. 
Barcan, Alan. A History of Australian Education. Melboume: Oxford 
Uruversity Press, 1980. 
Barnard, A., ed. The Simple Fleece: Studies in the Australian Wool 
Industry. Melboume: Melboume University Press, 1962. 
Bernays, Charles Arrowsmith. Queensland—Owr Seventh Political 
Decade. Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1931. 
Bernays, Charles Arrowsmith. Queensland Politics During Sixty 
(1859-1919) Years. Brisbane: Govemment Printer, n.d. [1920]. 
Birnbaum, Pierre, Jack Lively and Geraint Parry, eds. Democracy, 
Consensus and Social Contract. London: Sage PubUcations, 
1978. 
Boland, T. P. James Duhig. Brisbane: Uruversity of Queensland Press, 
1986. 
Broom, L., F. Jones, P. McDonneU and T. WilUams. The Inheritance 
of Inequality. London: Routiedge & Kegan Paul, 1980. 
Browne, R. K. and P. Botsman. Community Attitudes to Education in 
Queensland. Melboume: ACER, 1978. 
Burgmann, Verity.Owr Time: Socialism and the Rise of Labor, 1885-
1905. Sydney: George AUen & Unwfri, 1985. 
Burns, Tom. Tom Burns: Political Campaigns: Changing a 
Government. [Tom Burns interviewed by Colin Hughes.] 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Bibliography 395 
Cassette tape pubUshed by University of (Queensland Press 
1975. 
Butlin, N. G., A. Barnard and J. J. Pincus. Government and 
Capitalism: Public and Private Choice in Twentieth Century 
Australia. Sydney: George AUen & Unwfri, 1982. 
Cannon, Michael. The Land Boomers. Melbourne: Melbourne 
Uruversity Press, 1966. 
Canovan, M. Populism. London: Junction Books, 1981. 
Catley, R. and B. J. McFarlane. Australian Capitalism in Boom and 
Depression: Options for the 1980s. Sydney: Alternative 
Publishing Cooperative, 1981. 
Catiey, R. and B. J. McFarlane. From Tweedledum to Tweedledee: 
The New Labor Government in Australia. Sydney: ANZ Book 
Company, 1974. 
Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies: Education Group. 
Unpopular Education: Schooling and Social Democracy in 
England since 1944. London: Hutchfrison/CCCS, 1981. 
Charlton, Peter. State of Mind: Why Queensland is Different. 
Sydney: Methuen Hayes, 1983. 
Chief Secretary's Department [compiled by J. E. Broadbent]. 
Socialism at Work: Results of the Workings of Various State 
Enterprises Established by the Queensland Government or: 
How the Queensland Government Succeeded in Profitably 
Establishing State Ventures where the Needs of the People 
Call for the State Competition or State Monopoly. Brisbane: 
Govemment Printer, 1918. 
Childe, Vere Gordon. How Labour Governs: A Study of Worker's 
Representation in Australia. Ed. and with a foreword by F. B. 
Smith. Melboume: Melbourne University Press, 1964. 
CUento, Sfr Raphael and Clem Lack (snr). Triumph in the Tropics: 
An Historical Sketch of Queensland. Brisbane: Smith and 
Paterson, 1959. 
Cilento, Sir Raphael. Medicine in Queensland: A Monograph. 
Brisbane: Royal Historical Society of Queensland, 1963. 
Clark, Dave. "The 1930s and Now." Paper presented to 6th National 
PoUtical Economy Conference. Adelaide: 8-9 August, 1981. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
396 Bibliography 
Coghlan, T. A. Labour and Industry in Australia: From the First 
Settlement in 1788 to the Establishment of the Commonwealth 
in 1901,4 vols. Melbourne: MacmiUan, 1969. 
Communist Party of AusfraUa, Queensland Branch. Judge Brennan 
Exposed. Brisbane: Queensland Guardian, 1945. 
Connell, R. W. Ruling Class, Ruling Culture: Studies of Conflict, 
Power and Hegemony in Ausralian Life. Cambridge: 
Cambridge Uruversity Press, 1977. 
ConneU, R. W. Socialism & Labor: An Australian Strategy. Sydney: 
Labor Praxis, 1978. 
Connell, R. W., and T. H. Irving. Class Structure in Australian 
History: Documents, Narrative and Argument. Melbourne: 
Longman Cheshire, 1980. 
Cribb, Margaret Bridson, and P.J. Boyce, eds. Politics in Queensland: 
1977 and Beyond. Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 
1979. 
Crisp, L. F. Ben Chifley: A Political Biography. Sydney: Angus & 
Robertson, 1977. 
Crisp, L. F. The Australian Federal Labor Party 1901-1951. Sydney: 
Hale & Iremonger, 1978. 
Crouch Colin. The Politics of Industrial Relations. Glasgow: 
Fontana/ColUns, 1979. 
Crouch Colin. Trade Unions: The Logic of Collective Action. 
Glasgow: Fontana, 1982. 
Cumow, G. R. and C. A. Saunders, eds. QANGOS: The Australian 
Experience. Sydney: Hale & Iremonger/Royal Australian 
Institute of Public Administration, 1983. 
Curthoys, Ann and Andrew Markus, eds. Who Are Our Enemies?: 
Racism and the Australian Working Class. Canberra: Hale & 
Iremonger in association with Australian Society for the 
Shidy of Labour History, 1978. 
Curthoys, Ann, Susan Eade and Peter Spearritt, eds. Women at 
Work. Canberra: AustraUan Society for the Study of Labour 
History, 1975. 
D'Alpuget, Blanche. Robert J. Hawke: A Biography. Melbourne: 
Schwartz/Pengufri, 1982. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
BibUography 397 
Dabscheck, Braham and John Niland. Industrial Relations in 
Australia. Sydney: George AUen & Unwm, 1981. 
Dale, Roger, Geoff Estland, Ross Fergusson and Madeleine 
MacDonald. Education and the State 1. Lewes, Sussex: FaUner 
Press/Open University Press, 1981. 
Davis, S. R., ed. The Government of the Australian States. London: 
Longmans, 1960. 
Davis, W. In Pursuit of the Millennium. Brisbane: AMIEU, n.d. 
Denoon, Donald. Settler Capitalism: The Dynamics of Dependent 
Development in the Southern Hemisphere. Oxford: Oxford 
Uruversity Press, 1983. 
Deparhnent of PubUc Instruction. State Education in Queensland. 
Brisbane: Goverrunent Printer, n.d. [1915]. 
Department of PubUc Instruction. State Education in Queensland. 
Brisbane: Goverrunent Prmter, n.d. [1928]. 
Department of PubUc Instruction. State Education in Queensland. 
Brisbane: Govemment Prmter, n.d. [1937]. 
Dickey, Brian. No Charity There: A Short History of Social 
Welfare in Australia Melbourne: Nelson, 1980. 
Dixon, R. Labour in Queensland. [Text of report to southern and 
northern conferences of the ACP.] Brisbane: AustraUan 
Communist Party, 1937. 
Duncan, Graeme, ed. Critical Essays in Australian Politics. 
Melboume: Edward Amold, 1978. 
Ebbels, R. N., compUer. The Australian Labor Movement 1850-1907: 
Extracts from Contemporary Documents. Ed., and with 
infroduction by L. G. Churchward, and with a memoir by C. M. 
H. Clark. Sydney: Noel Ebbels Memorial Committee/ 
Australasian Book Society, 1960. 
Ellis, M. H. A Handbook for Nationalists: Containing Useful 
Information about Labour's Record in Office in Queensland 
1915-18. Brisbane: Publicity Department, National PoUtical 
Coundl of Queensland, 1918. 
Ettershank, David and Peter Morgan. Busting with the Boom: What 
Gladstone Development Means to People. Ed. Pete Thomas. 
Brisbane: BWIU in association with TLC, 1980. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
398 Bibliography 
Etzioni-Halevy, Eva. Bureaucracy and Democracy: A Political 
Dilemma. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983. 
Evans, Gareth and John Reeves, eds. Labor Essays 1980. Melboume: 
Dmmmond, 1980. 
Evans, Raymond, The Red Flag Riots: A Study of Intolerance. St 
Lucia, University of (Queensland Press, 1988. 
Farrell, Frank. International Socialism and Australian Labour: The 
Left in Australia 1919-1939. Sydney: Hale & Iremonger, 1981. 
Fitzgerald, Ross. From 1915 to the Early 1980s: A History of 
Queensland. Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 1984. 
Fitzgerald, Ross. From the Dreaming to 1915: A History of 
Queensland. Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 1982. 
Fitzpatrick, B. C. A Short History of the Australian Labour 
Movement. Melboume: Rawson's Bookshop, 1944. 
Fitzpatrick, Brian. Public Enterprise Does Pay: A Story of Successful 
Government Industrial and Financial Enterprises in Australia 
1911-1944. Melboume: Rawson's Bookshop, 1945. 
Forgan Smith, W. Summary of Labor's Policy—State Elections 1932. 
Brisbane: Worker Newspaper, 1932. 
Frenkel, Stephen J., ed. Industrial Action: Patterns of Labour 
Conflict. Sydney: George AUen & Unwin, 1980. 
Full Employment in Australia. White Paper presented to the 
Commonwealth Parliament, 30 May 1945. Canberra: 
Govemment Printer, 1945. 
GalUgan, Brian, ed. Australian State Politics. Melboume: Longman 
Cheshire, 1986. 
Gibb, D. M. and A. W. Hannan, eds. Debate and Decision: Political 
Issues in 20th Century Australia. Melboume: Heinemaim, 1978. 
Gollan, Robin. Radical and Working Class Politics: A Study of 
Eastern Australia I850-29I0.Melbourne: Melboume 
University Press, 1960. 
Gollan, Robin. Revolutionaries and Reformists: Communism and the 
Australian Labour Movement. Canberra: AustraUan National 
University Press, 1975. 
Goodman, Rupert. Secondary Education in Queensland 1860-1960. 
Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1968. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Bibliography 399 
Gough, Marian, Helen Hughes, B. J. McFarlane and G. R. Palmer. 
Queensland: Industrial Enigma—Manufacturing in the 
Economic Development of Queensland. Melbourne: Melbourne 
Uruversity Press, 1964. 
Gowers, Arm and Roger Scott. Fundamentals and Fundamentalists: A 
Case Study of Education and Policy-Making in Queensland. 
Australasian Political Studies Association Monograph 22. 
Adelaide: Ausfralasian Political Studies Association, 1979. 
Griffiths, Tony. Contemporary Australia. London: Croom Helm, 
1977. 
Hanlon, E. M. The Work of the Home Department: A Survey of Its 
Activities and Sub-Departments from 1932 to 1934. Brisbane: 
Govemment Printer, 1935. 
Hanson, J., M. Healy and R. Brown. The Truth about the Meat 
Strike. Brisbane: Queensland Trades and Labour CouncU, 1946. 
Harman, G. S. The Politics of Education: A Biographical Guide. 
Brisbane: University of (Queensland Press, 1974. 
Harris, Joe. The Bitter Fight: A Pictorial History of the Australian 
Labour Movement. Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 
1970. 
Harrison, John. Marxist Economics for Socialists: A Critique of 
Reformism. London: Pluto Press, 1978. 
Head, Brian W., ed. State and Economy in Australia. Melbourne: 
Oxford University Press, 1983. 
Herbert, Robert. The Queensland Years of Robert Herbert, Premier: 
Letters and Papers. Ed. Bruce Knox. Brisbane: University of 
Queensland Press, 1977. 
Holland, Stuart. Strategy for Socialism: The Challenge of Labour's 
Programme. Nottingham: Spokesman Books, 1975. 
Holland, Stuart. The Socialist Challenge. London: (Quartet, 1976. 
Holthouse, Hector. Looking Back: The First 150 Years of Queensland 
Schools, n.p. [Brisbane]: Department of Education, 1975. 
Hughes, Colin A. Images and Issues: The Queensland State Elections 
of 1963 and 1966. With constihiency studies by K. W. Knight, 
M. N. B. Cribb, Ian N. Moles and Jennifer Stevenson. Canberra: 
AustraUan National University Press, 1969. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
400 Bibliography 
Hughes, Colin A. The Government of Queensland. Brisbane: 
Uruversity of (Queensland Press, 1980. 
Hughes, CoUn A., and B.D. Graham. A Handbook of Australian 
Government and Politics 1890-1964. Canberra: Australian 
National University Press, 1968. 
Hunt, Alan, ed. Class and Class Structure. London: Lawrence and 
Wishart, 1977. 
Hyams, B. K. and B. Bessant. Schools for the People? An 
Introduction to the History of State Education in Australia. 
Melboume: Longmans, 1972. 
Hyman, R. Industrial Relations: A Marxist Introduction. London: 
MacmiUan, 1975. 
Iremonger, John, John Merritt and Graeme Osborne, eds. Strikes: 
Studies in Twentieth Century Australian Social History. 
Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1973. 
Isaac, J. E. and G. W. Ford, eds. Australian Labour Relations: 
Readings. Melboume: Sun Books, 1966. 
Jessop, Bob. The Capitalist State: Marxist Theories and Methods. 
Oxford: Martm Robertson, 1982. 
Johnston, W. Ross. The Call of the Land: A History of Quensland to 
the Present Day. Brisbane: Jacaranda, 1982. 
Jupp, James. Australian Party Politics. Melbourne: Melbourne 
University Press, 1964. 
Jupp, James. Party Politics: Australia 1966-1981. Sydney: George 
AUen & Unwfri, 1982. 
Kasper, Wolfgang. Australian Political Economy. Melbourne: 
MacMillan, 1982. 
Kelly, J.H. Beef in Northern Australia. Canberra: A.ustralian 
National Uruversity Press, 1971. 
Kelly, J.H. Struggle for the North. Sydney: Australasian Book 
Society, 1966. 
Kelly, J.H. The Beef Cattle Industry in the Leichhardt-Gilbert 
Region of Queensland: An Economic Survey. Canberra: Bureau 
of Agricultural Economics, 1959. 
Kennedy, K. H. The Mungana Affair: State Mining and Political 
Corruption in the 1920s. Brisbane: University of d^eensland 
Press, 1978. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Bibliography 401 
Kennedy, Richard, ed. Australian Welfare History: Critical Essays. 
Melboume: MacMiUan, 1982. 
Kewley, T. H. Social Security in Australia 1900-72. Second Edition. 
Sydney: Sydney Uruversity Press, 1973. 
Khoros, V. Populism: Its Past, Present and Future. Moscow: Progress 
PubUshers, 1980. 
Lack, Clem. Three Decades of Queensland Political History. 
Brisbane: Govemment Printer, n.d. [1962]. 
Laclau, Emesto. Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory. London: 
New Left Books, 1978. 
Lane, E. H. ("Jack Cade".) Dawn to Dusk: Reminiscences of a Rebel. 
Brisbane: WilUam Brooks, 1939. 
Lane, William. ("John Miller".) The Workingman's Paradise: An 
Australian Novel. Introd. Michael WUding. Sydney: Sydney 
Uruversity Press, 1980. 
Larcombe, J. Notes on the Political History of the Labor Movement in 
Queensland. Brisbane: Worker Newspapers, 1934. 
Larrain, Jorge. The Concept of Ideology. London: Hutchinson, 1979. 
League of Nations Economic Committee. The Agricultural Crisis, 
vol.1. Geneva: League of Nations, 1931. 
Lewis, Glen. A History of the Ports of Queensland: A Study in 
Economic Nationalism. Brisbane: University of Queensland 
Press, 1973. 
Lindblom, Charles E. Politics and Markets: The World's Political-
Economic Systems. New York: Basic Books, 1977. 
Logan, Greg and Eddie Clarke. State Education in Queensland: A 
Brief History. Brisbane: Queensland Department of Education, 
PoUcy and Information Services Branch, 1984. 
Louis, L.J. and Ian Turner, eds. The Depression of the 1930s. 
Melboume: CasseU, 1968. 
Love, Peter. Labour and the Money Power: Australian Labour 
Populism 1890-1950. Melboume: Melbourne University Press, 
1984. 
Loveday, P. Promoting Industry: Recent Australian Political 
Experience. Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 1982. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
402 Bibliography 
Loveday, P., A. W. Martin, and R. S. Parker, eds.. The Emergence of 
the Australian Party System. Sydney: Hale & Iremonger, 
1977. 
Lowenstein, Wendy. Weevils in the Flour: An Oral Record of the 
1930s Depression. 2nd Edition. Melbourne: Hyland House, 
1979. 
Lumb, R. D. The Constitutions of the Australian States. Fourth 
Edition Brisbane: University of (Queensland Press. 1977. 
Lunn, Hugh. Joh: The Life and Political Adventures of Johannes 
Bjelke-Petersen. Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 
1978. [2nd ed. Brisbane: Uruversity of (Queensland Press, 1984]. 
Mandel, Ernest. From Class Society to Communism: An Introduction 
to Marxism. Trans. Louisa Sadler. London: Link Inks, 1977. 
Mansbridge, A. University Tutorial Classes. London: Longman's, 
1913. 
Marx, Karl, and Frederick Engels. TTte Manifesto of the Communist 
Party. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1968. 
Marx, Karl. Capital A Critical Analysis of Capitalist Production. 
Trans. Samuel Moore and Richard Aveling. Moscow: Progress 
PubUshers, n. d. 
McKinlay, Brian, compiler. A Documentary History of the 
Australian Labor Movement 1850-1975. Melboume: Drummond, 
1979. 
McQueen, Humphrey. A New Britannia: An Argument Concerning 
the Social Origins of Australian Radicalism and 
Nationalism. Revised edition, 1976. Ringwood (Vic): Penguin, 
1978. 
McQueen, Humphrey. Gone Tomorrow: Australia in the 80s. Sydney: 
Angus and Robertson, 1982. 
Menghetti, Diane. The Red Nofth: The Popular Front in North 
Queensland. TownsviUe: James Cook University, 1981. 
Metcalfe, lan.Their Own Right: The Rise to Power of Joh's 
Nationals. Brisbane: University of (Queensland Press, 1984. 
Metin, Albert. Socialism Without Doctrine. Trans. Russel Ward. 
Sydney: Alternative PubUshing Cooperative, 1977. 
Miliband, R. The State in Capitalist Society. London: (Quartet, 1969. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Bibliography 403 
Moles, Ian. A Majority of One: Tom Aikens and Independent Politics 
in Townsville. Brisbane: University of (Queensland Press, 1979. 
Moss, Jim. Sound of Trumpets: History of the Labour Movement of 
South Australia. Adelaide: Wakefield Press, 1985. 
Murphy D. J. Hayden: A Political Biogrphy. Sydney: Angus and 
Pobertson, 1979. 
Murphy D. J. T. J. Ryan: A Political Biography. Brisbane: University 
of Queensland Press,1975. 
Murphy D. J., and R. B. Joyce, eds. Queensland Political Portraits: 
1859-1952. Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 1978. 
Murphy D. J., ed. Labor in Politics: The State Labor Parties in 
Australia 1880-1920.. Brisbane: University of Queensland 
Press, 1975. 
Murphy D. J., ed. The Big Strikes: Queensland 1889-1965. Brisbane: 
University of Queensland Press, 1983. 
Murphy D. J., R. B. Joyce and CoUn A. Hughes, eds. Labor in Power: 
The Labor Party and Governments in Queensland 1915-1957.. 
Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 1980. 
Murphy D. J., R. B. Joyce and Colin A. Hughes, eds. Prelude to Power: 
The Rise of the Labour Party in Queensland 1885-1915. 
Brisbane: Jacaranda, 1970. 
Murray, Robert. The Split: Australian Labor in the Fifties. 
Melboume: Cheshfre, 1970. 
National Committee of Inquiry, Affirmative Action in Favour of 
Women. Report. Canberra: ALP, 1979. 
Niland, John. Collective Bargaining and Compulsory Arbitration in 
Australia. Sydney: New South Wales University Press, 1978. 
Nolan, Frank. You Pass This Way Only Once: Reflections of a Trade 
Union Leader. Ed. D. J. Murphy, with a foreword by John 
Egerton. Brisbane: Colonial Press, 1974. 
O'Connor, James. Accumulation Crisis. New York: BasU BlackweU, 
1984. 
O'Connor, James. The Fiscal Crisis of the State. New York: St 
Martin's Press, 1973. 
O'Meagher, Bruce D., ed. The Socialist Objective: Labor and 
Socialism. Sydney: Hale & Iremonger, 1983. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
404 Bibliography 
Official Record, State Labor-in-Politics Convention 1905, 1916, 1918, 
1920, 1923, 1926, 1928,1941,1944, 1947, 1950, 1956, 1960, 1963, 
1968. 
Parkin, Andrew and John Warhurst, eds. Machine Politics in the 
Australian Labor Party. Sydney: George AUen & Unwin, 1983. 
Parkin, F. Class, Inequality and the Political Order. , London: 
Paladin, 1971. 
Partridge, P. H. Society, Schools and Progress in Australia. Oxford: 
Pergamon Press, 1968. 
Patience, Allan, ed. The Bjelke-Petersen Premiership: Issues in 
Public Policy. Melboume: Longman Cheshfre, 1985. 
Patrick, Ross. A History of Health and Medicine in Queensland 
1824-1960. Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 1987. 
Pearl, Cyril. Wild Men of Sydney. Melboume: Cheshfre-Lansdowne, 
1965. 
Playford, J., and D. Kfrsner, eds. Australian Capitalism: Towards a 
Socialist Critique. Melboume: Penguin, 1972. 
Potter, S. B. M. Socialism in Queensland. London: I.L.P. PubUcation 
Department, 1926. 
Queensland, Chief Secretary's Department. Story of a State's 
Revival: Queensland Government's Three Years' Record 
Progress. Brisbane: Govemment Printer, 1935. 
Radi, Heather and Peter Spearritt, eds. Jack Lang. Sydney: Hale 
and fremonger and Labour History, 1977. 
Rawson, D.W. Labor in Vain? A Survey of the Australian Labor 
Party. Melboume: Longman's, 1946. 
Reynolds, Paul. The Democratic Labor Party. Brisbane: Jacaranda, 
1974. 
Roe, Jill, ed. Social Policy in Australia: Some Perspectives 1901-
1975. Sydney: CasseU AustraUa, 1976. 
Saunders, Kay, and Helen Taylor. "'To Combat the Plague': The 
Construction of Moral Alarm and the Role of State 
Intervention in Queensland during World War Tvfo."Papers of 
the Fourth Women and Labour Conference, Brisbane 1984. 
Brisbane: Organising Committee, Fourth Women and Labour 
Conference, 1984, pp. 491-533. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Bibliography 405 
Sawer, Marian, ed. Australia and the New Right. Sydney: George 
AUen and Unwm, 1982. 
Scott, Ann and Roger Scott. Reform and Reaction in the Deep North: 
Education and Policy-Making in Queensland. Melbourne: 
University of Melbourne Centre for the Study of Higher 
Education, 1980. 
Scruton, Roger. A Dictionary of Political Thought. London: 
Pan/MacmiUan, 1983. 
Smart, Don. Federal Aid to Australian Schools. Brisbane: 
Uruversity Of (Queensland Press, 1978. 
Souter, Gavin. A Peculiar People. The Australians in Paraguay. 
Sydney: Sydney Uruversity Press, 1968/1981. 
Spearritt, Peter. Sydney Since the Twenties. Sydney: Hale & 
fremonger, 1978. 
Spence, William Guthrie. Australia'a Awakening: Thirty Years in 
the Life of an Australian Agitator. Sydney: The Worker 
Tmstees, 1909. 
Spence, William Guthrie. History of the A.W.U. Sydney: The 
Worker Trustees, 1911. 
Strinati, Dominic. Capitalism, the State and Industrial Relations. 
London: Croom Helm, 1982. 
The Econonust InteUigence Unit Ltd. Economic Development of the 
State of Queensland, with particular reference to the 
Prospects for Secondary Industry. Brisbane: Government 
Printer, 1961. 
The University of Queensland: Its Development and Future 
Expansion. Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 1949. 
Theophanous, Andrew C. Australian Democracy in Crisis: A Radical 
Approach to Australian Politics. Melbourne: Oxford 
Uruversity Press, 1980. 
Thomas, Pete. Who Owns Queensland? Second Edition. Brisbane: 
Coronation, 1955. 
Thomis, Malcohn I. A Place of Light and Learning: The University of 
Queensland's First Seventy-five Years. Brisbane: University 
of (Queensland Press, 1985. 
Thomis, MalcoUn I., and Murdoch Wales. From SGIO to SUNCORP. 
Brisbane: Suncorp Insurance and Finance, 1986. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
406 Bibliography 
Troy, P. N., ed. A Just Society. Sydney: George AUen and Unwin, 
1981. 
Turner, Ian. Industrial Labour and Politics: The Dynamics of the 
Labour Movement in Eastern Australia 1900-1921. Sydney: 
Hale and Iremonger, 1979. 
Tumer, Ian. Sydney's Burning. Melboume: Heinemarm, 1967. 
Turner, Ian. Union is Strength: A History of Trade Unions in 
Australia 1788-1974. Melboume: Thomas Nelson, 1976. 
Walker, Kenneth F. Industrial Relations in Australia. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard Uruversity Press, 1956. 
Warde, Alan. Consensus and Beyond: The Development of Labour 
Party Strategy Since the Second World War. Manchester: 
Manchester Uruversity Press, 1982. 
Waters, M. Strikes in Australia: A Sociological Analysis of 
Industrial Conflict. Sydney: George AUen and Unwin, 1982. 
Waterson, D. A Biographical Register of the Queensland 
Parliament 1860-1929. Canberra: Australian National 
University Press, 1972. 
Weber, Max. Economy and Society. Eds. Guenther Roth and Glaus 
Wittich. New York: Bedmfrister Press, 1968. 
Wheelwright, E. L., ed. Radical Political Economy: Collected 
Essays. Sydney: ANZ Book Company, 1974. 
Whitelock, David. The Great Tradition: A History of Adult 
Education in Australia. Brisbane: University of Queensland 
Press, 1974. 
Wiltshire, Kenneth W. 'Portuguese Navy': The Establishment of 
the Queensland Department of Industrial Development. 
Brisbane: Queensland Regional Group, Royal Institute of 
Public Adminisfration, 1973. 
Wyeth, E. R. Education in Queensland: A History of Education in 
Queensland and in the Moreton Bay District of New South 
Wales. Melbourne: Australian Council for Educational 
Research, n.d. [1953?]. 
Young, Irwin. Theodore: His Life and Times. Sydney: Alpha Books, 
1971. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Bibliography 407 
Pamphlets and Other Minor Publications 
[AustraUan Workers' Union?]. Win the State Election for Labor. 
Unauthorised pamphlet drculated to ALP Branches, 1959. 
"A Letter to aU ALP Members in (Queensland." [Report of ALP Protest 
Meeting, Trades HaU, Brisbane, Sunday 23 September 1979]. 
Unauthorised pamphlet. [Brisbane?]: [Reform Group?], 
[1979?]. 
ALP Defence Committee. Press Releases, 1980. 
Ausfralian Telecommunications Employees' Association. Report of 
ATEA Delegates [to Ffrst State Conference ALP (Queensland 
Branch]. Brisbane: ATEA, 1979. 
Ausfralian Telecommunications Employees' Association. Report of 
the Committee on ALP Restucture in Queensland. Brisbane: 
ATEA, 1978. 
Baker, T. Deregistration of Toowoomba ALP Branches. n.p.:n.p., 
n.d.[1980?] 
Beattie, Peter. "Address to the 5 Febmary 1978 Bardon Reform Group 
Meeting." 
Birdwhistle, Ivor. Ryan & Co.'s Policy Examined and X-Rayed. 
Melboume: National Campaign Coundl, 1919. 
Centre Caucus Newsletter, 1980. 
Department of Public Lands. Particulars of Queensland Government 
State Stations to be Offered for Sale at Public Auction in 
Brisbane on Tuesday 17th September, 1929. Brisbane: 
Govemment Printer, 1929. 
"Draft PoUcy on Primary Indusfry", State Convention, June 1984. 
Eraser, E., and Dave Underwood. The Labor Party in Toowoomba. 
n.p.: n.d. [1980]. 
Georges, George. Press Releases, 1979. 
Labor 1980. Newsletter 2, 21 AprU 1980. 
Labor News, 1981. 
Labor Review. Joumal of the Queensland Branch of the ALP, 1986. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
408 Bibliography 
"Mickey SpUlaU". Nick Cops a Left. Unauthorised dupicated sheet. 
Brisbane: n.p., n.d.[1978?]. 
Murphy, Denis. "Can we improve the organisation of the Labor 
Party in Queensland? A paper prepared for circulation among 
members of the Ausfralian Labor Party.", duplicated paper, 
n.d.[1978]. 
Newsgram, 1978. 
O'Brien, M. and A. Macdonald. Report and Balance Sheet of the 
Queensland Railway Strike February 2nd to April 6th, 1948 (9 
weeks). Brisbane: Queensland Railways Central Disputes 
Committee, 1949. 
Pamphlet: Administrative Actions of the Labour Government with 
Certain Further Statistics and Extracts. Brisbane [?]: 
Govemment Prmter [?], 1920 [?]. 
Reform Group. Press Releases, 1978. 
Socialist Challenge: 1981. 
Statement of Accord by the Australian Labor Party and the 
Australian Council of Trade Unions Regarding Economic 
Policy. [Melboume]: [ACTU], [1983]. 
Summary of Labor's Policy: State Elections, 1932. Brisbane: Worker 
Newspaper, 1932. 
Talking Points, 1985-1988. 
The Case for Reform of the Queensland Branch of the Australian 
Labor Party: Brisbane: [Reform Group], [1978]. 
Whitlam, E. G. Election Speech, Blacktown, 13 November 1972. 
Whitlam, E. G. Reform During Recession: The Way Ahead. [Text 
ofthe T.J. Ryan Memorial Lecture 1978]. Brisbane: ALP 
Toowong Branch, 1978. 
Why a Socialist Left? [Brisbane]: [Socialist Left], [1979]. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Index 
Adsett, Ernie, 190, 303, 304 
Adult Suffrage Act, 1905, 12 
Advocate (ARU), 39, 43 
Affirmative Action, 299-301, 317, 
318-20, 342 
agrarian socialism, 99, 163, 182, 187 
agriculture, 89, 95-100, 105-7 
Ahem, Michael, 330, 332, 356, 359 
Alexander, Mary, 234, 236 
Amalgamated Engineering Union, 
145 
Amalgamated Meat Industry 
Employees Union, 28, 33, 35, 50 
Amalgamated Metalworkers and 
Shipwrights Union, 215, 228, 242, 
245, 249, 262, 286, 289, 316 
Amalgamated Workers Association 
(AWA), 9, 25, 31, 36, 41, 64 n55, 
90 
and the 1911 sugar strike, 13-14 
Anti-Communist Australian Labor 
Party, 149 
Anti-Conscription Campaign 
Committee, 28 
arbitration system, 25-26, 39, 48, 50, 
56. See also Commonwealth 
Conciliation and Arbitration 
Court; Industrial Arbitration 
Court 
labour's attitude to, 35 
Ardill, Joy, 286, 297, 300, 315, 316 
Art Unions and Amusement Act, 247 
Austin, Brian, 335 
Australian Council of Trade Unions, 
262, 283, 292, 340 
Australian Federated Union of 
Locomotive Enginemen, 43, 45, 
47, 54 
Australian Labor League, 2 
Australian Labor Party, 8, 12, 16, 
37, 40, 44, 49, 56, 152-53, 154, 
168, 176, 177, 179, 182, 186, 190, 
196, 199, 200, 330, 332, 357, 359, 
373-75. See also elections; 
individual Labor premiers; 
Parliamentary Labor Party; 
Queensland Central Executive; 
individual unions 
and abortion, 251 
and Administrative Committee, 
231-33, 239, 240-43, 245, 246, 
254, 258, 260-61, 285, 303, 315, 
319, 320-33 
and Affirmative Action, 299-301, 
317, 318-20, 342, 350 
agricultural policy, 89, 94-100, 
105-7 
and AWU, 10, 175, 180-83, 194, 
195 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
410 Index 
Central Political Executive 
(CPE), 11, 15, 31-32, 33, 61 n26 
communist influence in, 50-51, 
56 
Defence Committee of, 253, 
257-58, 296 
and Disputes Tribunal, 232, 249, 
250, 252-53, 255, 256, 260, 285, 
286, 289, 298, 314, 319, 351 
early policies of, 11-12, 23-24, 
69, 163 
education policy of, 117-23, 
126-27, 167 
and Electoral College, 298, 306, 
341, 353 
electoralism, and, 24, 27, 47, 48, 
55, 161-62, 167-68, 182, 191-92, 
321-22, 372-75 
electoral redistribution and, 
328-29 
Electorate Executive Committee 
(EEC), 185, 207 n38, 213, 221, 
224 
factions, 254, 255-56, 263, 302, 
314-15, 325, 340-42, 349-53, 
355-56. See also Reform Group. 
AWU/Socialist Left, 350-53, 
355-56, 372-73 
Centre Caucus, 251-53, 259, 314, 
318, 325 
Centre Left (federal), 297, 342 
Centre Majority, 318, 340, 342, 
349 
Labor Unity, 316 
"Old Guard", 302-3, 314-17, 320, 
323, 333, 337-38, 341, 349-51, 
353-57, 371-73 
"Old Guard"/AWU, 315 
Socialist Left, 238-43, 249, 
286, 297, 314, 316-17, 333, 
349-53, 356-57, 372-73 
Federal Executive, 225-43, 
255-57, 261-63, 271 nll7, 
281-96, 298, 300-01, 314, 316, 
317, 326-27, 354, 375 
federal intervention in Qld, 
229-36, 261-65, 281-83, 285-86, 
288-90, 292-93, 297-306, 374-79 
federal split over conscription, 31 
free hospitals, 108-17, 167 
ideology of, 23-24, 72-73, 94, 
109, 117-18, 124, 126, 154, 
161-62, 168 
industrial arbitration and, 26-27, 32 
Industrial Groups, influence of, 
58, 144 
Inner executive, 190, 197, 201-2, 
212, 214, 218, 220, 225, 227-31, 
235-37, 258 
and Labor Enterprises Pty Ltd, 
194-95, 258-59, 296-97, 304 
land settlement schemes and, 
100-7 
litigations and, 290, 292, 297, 
298, 304 
May Purges, 248-50, 252-57 
membership of, 373 
origins of, 7, 11, 166 
policy on arbitration, 26-27 
power strike (1985), 338-40 
plebiscite system, 232, 298, 314 
proportional representation 
within, 232-34, 238, 242, 285, 
286, 290, 300, 305, 306, 314, 315, 
318, 319, 356 
Queensland Branch's response to 
conscription, 31 
and the "Queensland System", 
89, 98-100 
and the Reform Group, 211-31 
railway strike (1948), 52, 55-56 
relations with ARU, 39, 43-44, 
155 
relations with IWW, 28 
relations with labour, 12, 23-24, 
27, 35, 48, 50, 141 
relations with unions, 23-24, 31-36 
39-42, 48, 56, 142-43, 153-54 
relations with University of 
Queensland, 123-26 
rural base of, 88-96, 106-8, 
162-63, 165, 182 
rural corporatism of, 96-99, 107 
split (1957), 141-55, 173-79, 198, 
374 
State Conference, 231-32, 238, 
285, 297-99, 314-15, 317, 318, 319, 
356-57, 372 
State Council, 231-32, 253-55, 257, 259, 
263, 281, 282, 285, 305, 319-20, 357 
state enterprises and, 71-88 
tramways and general strike 
(1912), 15 
and women, 191-93, 211, 
298-301, 318-20, 345 
Australian Labour Federation, 3, 8, 12, 
15 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Uidex 411 
Austr<ilian Pensioners League, 235, 
243, 246-48 
Australian Postal Telegraphists 
Union, 320 
Australian Railways Union, 9, 29, 
47, 62 n37, 119, 149, 151, 154, 
227. See also Australian Labor 
Party 
attitude to OBU-ism, 43 
attitude to State Enterprises, 43 
composition of, 42-43 
conflict over pledge, 39 
conflict with Theodore, 36-37, 38 
reaction to AWU-PLP faction, 
42 
relations with ALP, 39, 43-44, 
155 
role in 1925 basic wage strike, 43 
and South Johnstone sugar 
strike, 45-57 
Australian Shearers' Union, 2 
Australian Stock Breeders Company, 
76 
Australian Teleconununications 
Employees Association, 227, 
239-40, 242, 249, 262, 271 nl26, 
301, 316, 317 
Australian Workers Union (AWU), 
10, 15, 24, 31, 38, 39, 46, 51, 58, 
98, 141, 149, 151, 147 n24, 
173-76, 181, 183-85, 187-88, 191, 
195, 223, 231, 241, 289, 301-2, 
315, 318, 340, 341, 342, 350, 351, 
353, 355-56, 372, 374-77 
amalgamation with AWA (1913), 
41 
and Centre Majority, 318, 340, 
342, 349 
communist infiltration of, 30, 47 
composition of, 41, 162 
conflict within, 47 
and co-operation with TLC, 
144-46, 150, 154-55 
disaffiliation from ALP, 175, 180, 
181 
disaffiliation from TLC, 48, 175 
effects of early defeats on, 40-41 
expelled from ALP, 194 
facsimile ballot papers, 173 
first national award, 41 
forms alliance with Socialist-Left, 
350, 355-56, 372-73 
and Mt Isa dispute, 188-89 
opposes ban on Conununist 
Party, 57 
origins of, 9, 24 
reaction to OBU-ism, 29 
reaffiliation with ALP, 182-83, 
220, 302 
relations with PLP, 35-36, 41-42, 
142-43, 154, 162, 181, 185, 370 
rural basis of, 90, 162 
and South Johnstone sugar strike, 
44-45 
AWU/Socialist Left faction. See 
Australian Labor Party, factions 
Babinda State Hotel, 70, 75-76, 86 
Bacon, Ted, 52, 66 n91, 120 
basic wage 
raising of, 38, 56 
rate of, in Queensland, 52-53, 
106 
reductions in, 36-37, 81, 164 
Batt, Neil, 230, 231, 242, 247, 255, 
262, 281, 282, 283, 288 
Beattie, Peter, 217, 219, 221, 225, 
226, 228, 231, 234, 245-46, 251, 
253-56, 281, 290, 305, 314, 318, 
320, 321, 324-25, 327, 328, 333, 
340, 341, 345, 348, 350, 351, 
356-58, 365 nl07 
election of, as state secretary, 
301-2 
expanded union base, views on, 
303 
and federal intervention, 224 
May Purges, 248-50 
problems in ALP, views on, 215 
and Reform Group, 216 
union position of, 220 
BeddaU, David, 342 
Begley, Joe, 275 nl89 
Bellevue Hotel, 246 
Bennett, Col, 181, 205 nl4 
Bjelke-Petersen Foundation, 321, 346 
Bjelke-Petersen, Sir Johannes, 179, 
197, 198, 199, 201, 327, 330, 335, 
338-39, 341, 346, 351, 354, 
355-58, 359, 360, 374 
becomes premier, 195 
govemment of, 66 n93, 168, 198, 
224, 293, 323, 324, 326, 332, 369 
Black, John, 342 
Blackbum Declaration, 87, 131 n48 
Blair, James, 135 nl02 
"Bloody Sunday" (1919), 34 
Board of Trade and Arbitration, 
38, 42, 81, 142 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
412 fridex 
Boilermakers Society, 149, 157 n24, 
180 
Boland, H., 144 
Bond, Alan, 346 
Boote, Henry, 40 
Bos, Nick, 197, 222, 252, 260-61, 
281, 283, 286, 289, 292-93, 304 
Bowman, David, 12, 14 
Brennan, Frank, 97, 132 n67 
Brigden, J.B., 124 
Brisbane Courier 46, 75, 78, 102, 
105, 112 
Brisbane General Hospital, 113 
Brisbane Industrial Council, 30, 31, 
43 
Brisbane and South Coast Hospitals 
Board, 109, 112, 125 
British Medical Association, 109, 
113-14 
alliance with conservative 
elements, 110 
and appointment of Cilento, 112 
control of medical services, 
110-11 
decline of, in Queensland, 115 
as viewed by labour movement, 
111 
Brosnan, Mick, 143 
Brusasco, Ian, 258-59, 304, 305 
Bryan, Harrison, 125 
Building Workers Industrial Union, 
157 n24, 197, 239, 242, 245, 246, 
249, 253, 262, 289, 316 
Bukowski, ("Midnight") Joe, 48, 51, 
146, 150-51, 154, 174-75, 180, 
182, 183 
Bums, Bryant, 228, 239, 245, 286, 
302, 316, 350 
Bums, Tom, 190, 202, 218, 221, 226, 
231, 235, 258, 285, 288, 290, 307 
nl7, 316, 323, 324, 325, 334, 336, 
354, 370 
becomes national president, 197 
becomes Opposition leader, 199 
conflict with Hayden, 219 
as deputy leader, 337 
relations with Reform Group, 
214, 230 
resigns as Opposition leader, 236 
role in street march protest 
debacle, 224-25 
Burton, Tom, 197, 202, 214, 217, 
222, 226, 228, 230-31, 237-38, 
250, 256, 258-59, 282, 285, 288, 
290, 297, 304 
By-elections 
Redcliffe (1979), 252, 322-23 
Redlands (1985), 340-41, 364 n97 
Sherwood (1978), 235-36 
Byrne, Condon, 149 
Campbell Royal Commission (1930), 
78 
Carr, Bob, 313, 315-16 
Carriers' Union, 2, 3 
Casey, Edmund, 240, 244-46, 255, 
260, 263, 275 nl90, 282, 286, 
290, 292, 298, 316, 330, 337 
and abortion, 251 
and AWU, 241-42 
challenges to, 323-24 
criticism of, by Hayden, 325 
defeat of, 325 
electoral reform bill of, 250, 252 
political career of, 236 
and Reform Group, 237 
Casey, Gilbert, 12 
Catholics, 167 
and education, 121-22 
and Industrial Groups, 51, 56 
Centre Caucus faction. See 
Australian Labor Party, factions 
Centre Left faction. See Australian 
Labor Party, factions 
Centre Majority faction. See 
Australian Labor Party, factions 
Chalk, Sir Gordon, 137 nl32, 151, 
195, 197 
Chard, Tom, 197 
Childe, V. Gordon, 84, 88, 119, 123, 
136 nl23 
Chillagoe. See State Mines and 
Smelters 
Chuter, Charlie, 112 
Cilento, Sir Raphael, 47, 112-13, 
115, 124 
Citizens Municipal Organisation, 186 
City of London Loan, 87, 95, 102-3 
Cify Mall Act, 334 
civil liberties, 211, 215, 224, 235, 
317, 332, 372 
Clark, Colin, 119 
Clauson, Paul, 341 
closer settlement, 100-104, 118 
Collections Act, 247 
Collins, Chariie, 81 
Colston, Mai, 305, 326, 327, 342, 
349 
Colonial Sugar Refining Company 
(CSR), 91, 93, 95. See ako sugar 
industry 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Index 413 
Comalco, 197 
Comben, Pat, 215, 269 n66, 349 
Committee for Membership Control, 
188-89 
Commonwealth Conciliation and 
Arbitration Court, 14, 32 
Communist Party, 49, 53, 54, 120, 
149, 178 
ban on, in union movement, 57 
influence of, in ALP, 30-31, 50, 
56 
and opposition from Industrial 
Groups, 51, 57 
role in strikes, 51-52 
union domination by, 51, 57 
Connolly, Mr Justice, 297 
conscription, 28, 31, 32. See also 
Australian Labor Party 
Constitution Act Amendment Act, 
1922, 98 
consumerism, as justification for 
State Enterprises, 73, 83 
Coombe, David, 228, 230, 239, 
242, 253, 255, 262, 281, 289, 295, 
296 
Cooper, Frank, 48, 115 
Council of Agriculture, 96, 98 
Country Party, 89, 91, 96, 99, 127, 
152-53, 163, 176, 177, 178, 179, 
182, 190, 195, 197, 198, 205 nl5. 
See also Country and Progressive 
National Party; National Party 
Country and Progressive National 
Party, 85, 86, 96, 99, 105 
Courier-Mail, 214, 224, 226, 235, 
244, 339, 340, 341 
Cowen, Sir Zelman, 198 
CPE. See Central Pohtical Executive 
Crane, Gordon, 119 
Criminal Law Amendment Bill, 
243-44 
Cross, Manfred, 227, 228, 242-43, 
285-86, 290, 292-93, 295, 298, 
301, 302 
Crouch, Colin, 41, 162 
Culell, Frank, 195-96 
Cutler, Terence, 61 n29, 62 n32 
D'Arcy, Bill, 290, 323, 325 
Daily Standard, 31, 39, 66 n86, 103, 
119, 123 
Daily Sun, 339 
Daily Telegraph (Sydney), 5-6 
Darling, Elaine, 293 
Davis, Brian, 315, 337 
Davis, Jean, 315 
Dawson, Anderson, 11 
Dawson, Arch, 149 
Dawson River Irrigation Scheme, 102 
Demaine, Bill, 31, 32, 72 
Democratic Labor Party, 148, 176, 
179, 198, 200, 226, 370 
Dempster, Quentin, 313-14, 355 
Denham, Digby, 13, 16, 91, 119 
and the 1912 election, 14-15 
depression. See Great Depression 
Devereux, Jack, 145 
Dickson, James Robert, 11 
Dillalah station, 131 n46 
Diplock, Frank, 125 
Dittmer, Felfac, 153 
Donald, Jim, 153, 205 n25 
Ducker, John, 232-33 
Dufficy, Jack, 189 
Duggan, Jack, 52, 145, 149, 
152-53, 180-82, 184-86, 189, 202 
conflict with Egerton, 183, 185 
resigns, 190 
Duhig, Archbishop Sir James, 51, 
167 
Dunne, Pat, 227, 228, 286, 302 
Dunstan, William, 38 
EEC. See Electorate Executive 
Committee 
Edmonds, Bill, 149 
education, 167, 184. See also 
University of Queensland 
in Catholic schools, 121-22 
ideological view of, in ALP, 
117-18, 126-27 
funding for, 118, 122 
neglect of, 122 
role of WEA in, 119-20 
and scholarships, 121-22 
secondary, 121-23 
Education Act, 1875, 117 
Edwards, Sir Llew, 326, 328, 330, 
334, 359 
Egerton, Sir Jack, 144, 148, 151, 
157 n24, 174, 179-87, 189, 
194-95, 206 n29, 214, 370, 372 
accepts knighthood, 201-2 
conflict with Gair, 150 
as organiser, 149-50 
on reaffihation of AWU, 183 
resigns, 202 
eight-hour day, 3 
Einasleigh Mine, 79-80 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
414 Index 
elections 
1912, 14, 15 
1915, 15, 71, 88, 90, 91, 118 
1918, 32, 33 
1920, 35, 95 
1921, 163 
1926, 100 
1929, 47, 85, 104, 107 
1932, 88, 105, 111, 165 
1935, 112, 113 
1957, 152, 175-76 
1960, 177, 178, 181, 182, 183 
1961 (municipal), 186 
1963, 178, 179, 184, 185, 186 
1966, 190, 195 
1969, 195 
1972, 197 
1974, 199, 200, 370 
1979 (municipal), 243 
1980, 293, 323 
1983 (federal), 326-27 
1983 (state), 316, 333, 334-37, 
369 
1986, 343-49, 369, 373 
1987 (federal), 353-57 
Elections Act Amendment Act, 1959, 
177 
Elections Act Amendment Act, 1962, 
178-79 
Elections Districts Act, 1949, 55, 
108, 153 
Electoral Districts Act, 1958, 176-77, 
182 
Electoral Reform Bill, 283 
Electorate Executive Committee 
(EEC), 185, 207 n38, 213, 221, 
224 
Electrical Trades Union, 143, 149, 
174, 180, 197, 205 n24, 222, 224, 
225, 254, 262, 283, 301, 303, 310 
n65, 325 
and contract labour, 338 
and power strike (1985), 338-40 
Essential Services Act, 332 
equal opportunity. See Affirmative 
Action 
Equity Opportunity Choice: A 
Strategy for Queensland Women, 
345 
Everingham, Doug, 242, 249 
factions. See Australian Labor Party, 
factions 
Fadden, Artie, 152 
Fallow, Clarrie, 47, 56, 150 
Farmer-Labor alliance. See 
Australian Labor Party 
Federal Divisional Executive (FDE), 
215, 218, 221, 228, 242, 300 
Federal Executive. See Australian 
Labor Party 
Federated Clerks Union, 51, 57, 58, 
142, 151, 153, 154 
Federated Miscellaneous Workers 
Union, 215, 242, 301-3, 316 
Federated Storemen and Packers 
Union, 146, 191, 288, 303 
Field, Albert Patrick, 201 
Fihelly, John, 74 
first-past-the-post voting system, 
55-56, 178 
Fisher, Andrew, 8 
Fitzgerald, Tony, 356, 359, 360 
Fitzpatrick, Brian, 73 
Forgan Smith, William. See Smith, 
William Forgan 
Forgan Smith govemment, 47, 124 
and education spending, 122 
forty-four hour week, 37-38, 81, 145 
forty-hour week, 52, 56, 81, 142, 
145, 169 
4KQ radio station, 194-95, 217, 227, 
257-59, 262, 282-83, 296, 321, 
333, 343 
Fouras, Jim, 290, 334, 343 
Foward, Roy, 255 
Fraser, J. M., 115 
Eraser, Keith, 260, 277 n228, 295 
Fraser, Malcolm, 326 
free hospitals. See Australian 
Labor Party 
Freeberg, N. P., 119 
Freeman, Colleen, 299-300 
Free Workers' Union, 13 
Gair, Vincent, 53, 55, 57, 65 n76, 
174-79, 195, 198, 205 nl4, nl8, 
257 
and annual leave issue, 142-43, 
145, 147 
attack on University of 
Queensland, 125-26 
attempt to hold office, 152 
becomes premier, 58 
conflict with Egerton, 150 
conservative support for, 146 
expulsion of, 148-49, 151, 154 
Industrial Groups and, 58, 
142-44, 151, 153-55 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Index 415 
political demise of, 155 
seeks new alignment in party, 141 
state of emergency declaration, 
146, 154 
Galloway, W .M., 1 
Gardiner, Margaret, 366 nl08 
Georges, George, 238, 260, 282, 315, 
317, 320, 327 
challenged for Senate seat, 305, 
326 
and civil liberties, 235 
and federal intervention, 228 
and Justices Act, 245 
and May Purges, 248-50, 252-57 
party positions held, 297 
personal attacks on, 239 
and Reform Group, 215 
resignation of, 350-51 
role in proxy affair, 240-43 
as independent candidate, 354 
Gibbs, Bob, 221, 227, 290, 325, 
334, 357, 358 
Gillies, William, 38, 75, 81, 94, 99, 
100 
Glassey, Thomas, 2, 11 
Gleeson, Bob, 263, 305, 327 
Golden Casket lottery, 109 
Gollan, Robin, 5 
Goodman, Rupert, 121-22 
Goss, Wayne, 334, 336, 353, 355-57, 
370, 371, 372 
Govemment Employees' Anti-
Reduction Committee, 37 
Graves, Alan, 131 n54 
Great Depression (1929-33), 36, 47, 
103, 105, 106, 107, 164, 165 
Griffith, Sir Samuel, 3 
Groupers. See Australian Labor 
Party; Industrial Groups 
Committee 
Guyatt, Joy, 193, 199, 207 n50 
Gygar, Terry, 235, 246-48, 337 
Hamill, David, 234, 236, 334, 349, 357, 
358-59 
Hampson, Terry, 241, 254, 268 n45, 
n60, 269 n66, 310 n65, 317, 320, 
351, 357 
Hanger, Sir Mostyn, 244 
Hanlon, Ned, 56, 58, 117, 141, 176, 
206 n30 
actions of, in industrial disputes, 
50, 53, 55, 114 
career of, 50, 112-13, 115 
death of, 116, 141 
and electoral gerrymander, 55 
voting reform of, 55-56 
Hansen, Brendan, 325 
Harris, Joe, 246-50, 252-57, 282, 
302, 316 
Harrison, Gailene, 220 
Harvey, Roy, 305 
Hayden, Bill, 192, 201, 202, 221, 
222, 227-28, 230, 233, 237, 276 
n200, 290, 292, 293, 297, 315, 
318, 324, 354 
attitude to Reform Group, 214, 
217-19, 229 
becomes Opposition leader, 214 
Casey's leadership, views on 325 
conflict with Burns, 219 
conflict with Kane, 225-26 
and federal intervention, 262, 
265, 281-82, 285, 298-99 
and Georges proxy affair, 240, 
242-43 
resigns to become governor-
general, 358 
resigns as Opposition leader, 326 
Hauenschild, Harry, 219, 224, 
237-38, 240, 249, 258-59, 282, 
288, 289, 290, 292, 297, 304, 307 
nl7 
Hawke, Bob, 222, 262, 282, 292, 
295, 299, 325, 326, 336, 351, 353, 
354, 356, 358 
Hayes, J., 42 
Head, Brian, 374 
Healy, Mick, 51, 52, 54, 120 
Henderson, Ian, 301 
Hendricks, Bob, 224 
Henry, Reg, 250, 255 
Herbert, D., 125 
Heriihy, Jim, 225-26, 299 
Herron, John, 328-29 
Higgins, Justice Henry, 14, 32 
Hill, Barbara, 319 
Hinchcliffe, Albert, 2, 12, 13, 15 
Hinze, Russell, 195-96, 305, 322, 330 
Hodder, Errol, 302, 303, 315, 318, 
340, 356 
Hooper, Kevin, 263, 289, 290, 337 
Hospital Benefits Act, 1945 (federal), 
115 
Hospital Benefits Act, 1951 (federal), 
116 
Hospitals Act, 1923, 109 
Hospitals Act, 1936, 113-14 
Hospitals Act, 1944, 116 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
416 hidex 
Hospitals Employees Federation 
(HEF), 242, 249, 262, 289 
Houston, Jack, 189, 197, 237 
Howie, Jean, 174 
Hughes, Colin, 175, 206 n30 
Hughes, William, 8, 31, 32 
Humphreys, Ben, 263, 292, 316, 354 
Hunter, John McEwen, 75 nl29 
Industrial Arbitration Act, 1916, 26 
Industrial Arbitration Act 
Amendment Act, 1924, 37-38 
Industrial Arbitration Act 
Amendment Act, 1925, 38 
Industrial Arbitration Court, 26, 32, 
36, 38, 53, 54, 98. See also 
arbitration system; 
Commonwealth Conciliation and 
Arbitration Court; trade uruons 
Industrial Conciliation and 
Arbitration Act amendments to, 
321, 333 
Industrial Conciliation and 
Arbitration Acts Amendment 
Act, 142 
Industrial Groups, 51, 55, 57, 58, 
142-44, 146, 153. See also trade 
unions; Gair, Vincent 
Industrial Groups Committee, 51, 
57, 143 
Industrial Law Amendment Act, 
1948, 54 
Industrial Peace Act, 1912, 25-26 
Industrial Workers' of the World 
(IWW), 27-29, 34, 61 n29 
Irmes, Angus, 356, 360 
Inter-Colonial Trades Union 
Congress (ICTUC), 1-2 
Interim Administrative Committee 
(lAC), 285-86, 295, 302 
and Affirmative Action, 299 
legal action against, 290, 292 
party finances and, 296-97 
union support for, 289 
Jondaryan station, 3 
Jones, Alfred, 80-81 
Jones, Clem, 186, 190, 207 n42, 228, 
239, 240-41, 258-59, 285, 286, 288, 
290, 296, 303, 304 
Jones, Gerry, 197, 214, 216-18, 
220-24, 230-31, 237-38, 245, 249, 
256, 258-59, 263, 278 n229, 282, 
285, 292, 304, 326 
Jones, Lindesay, 234, 260, 295 
Jones, Norma, 256, 260 
Julius, Max, 54 
Justices Act, 1979, 244-45, 248, 250, 
322 
Kanakas. See sugar industry 
Kane, Neal, 197, 225-29, 237, 
258-59, 269 n66, 283, 288, 290, 
292, 297, 304 
Keeffe, Jim, 153, 186, 190, 220, 
242-43, 263, 286, 326 
Kermedy, Jim, 259 
Kennedy, K.H., 42, 78 
Kermy, Sister Elizabeth, 113 
Keogh, Len, 350, 353, 354, 365 nl05 
Kerr, Sir John, 201 
Kidston, William, 69, 148, 166 
splits PLP, 12 
King, Reginald, 121 
Kinnane, Mike, 235, 318 
Knox, Sir William, 293, 321, 336, 357 
Kruger, Joe, 343 
Kyle, Arthur, 156 nl2 
Labor Enterprises Pty Ltd, 194-95, 
258-59, 296-97, 304 
Labor Unity faction. See 
AustreJian Labor Party, factions 
Labor Party. See Australian 
Labor Party; Queensland Labor 
Party 
Labor-in-Pohtics conventions, 33, 
35, 37, 39, 72, 84, 110, 118, 120, 
125, 143, 144, 154, 164, 169, 181-82, 
183, 189, 194, 199, 207 n36, 299 
abolition of, 231, 237 
adoption of socialist objective, 12 
debacle of 1907, 12-13 
divisions in 1950, 56-57 
first of, 8, 11 
greater union participation in, 
31-32 
Reformists' view of, 213, 223 
response to communist ideas, 30 
Labor Women's Central Organising 
Committee, 192-93 
Labor Women's Corrference, 192-93, 
237, 254, 300 
Labor Women's Organisation, 
299-301, 320 
Labour Electoral Leagues, 8 
labour movement 
effect of early industrial defeats 
on, 1, 7, 10-11 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Index 417 
effect of meatworkers strike 
(1919) on, 34 
electoral reform, demand for, 12 
influence of IWW on, 28 
industrial arbitration and, 25-27 
and parliamentary representation, 
1-2 
radicalism as part of, 27, 164 
railway strike (1948), 55-56 
relations with ALP, 23-24, 27, 
35, 48, 141, 185 
relations with state, 24-25 
role of public sector unions in, 43 
separation of industrial and 
political arms of, 11, 13 
and split of 1907, 13 
and State Enterprises, 72-73 
Tramways and general strike, 
14-15 
land 
closer settlement, 100-4, 118 
soldier settlement, 101 
Land Act Amendment Act No. 1, 
1919-20,102 
Land Act Amendment Act, 1927, 
103 
Land Administration Board, 103 
Lane, Don, 335 
Lane, Ernie, 36, 119 
Lane, William, 8, 40, 89 
Lang, Jack, 105, 106 
Langley, George, 342 
Larcombe, J., 62 n41 
Leahy, P. J., 132 n59 
Left Book Club (Queensland), 120 
Legislative Assembly, 15, 163, 164 
Legislative Assembly Act, 
1922, 98 
Legislative Council, 11, 26, 98, 101, 
102, 108, 163 
anti-Labor stance of, 74, 93 
referendum to abolish, 74 
Lermon, William, 98 
Leptospirosis. See Weil's disease. 
Liberal-Labor coalition, 12 
Liberal Party, 153, 176, 178, 190, 
197, 205 nl5, 235, 244, 250, 305, 
330, 341, 347-48, 357-58, 360 
and electoral redistribution, 
328-29 
and 1983 election, 335 
Linacre, Hamish, 199, 215, 220, 234, 
241 
Lloyd, Eric, 185, 189-90 
Loane, Sally, 348-49 
Lourigan, Bart, 190, 197, 201, 202 
Lucas, Mr Justice, 298 
Lunn, Hugh, 345-46 
Lyons, Joseph Aloysius, 105 
McAuliffe, Ron, 263 
McCart, Ray, 286 
McCawley, T.W., 26-27, 32, 33 
McCormack, William, 9, 13, 27, 37, 
44, 81-82, 90, 100, 150 
becomes premier, 38 
and Chillagoe State Mines, 78-79, 
81-82 
conflict with ARU over pledge, 
39 
govemment of, 47, 78, 81, 104-5 
and Labor's closer settlement 
policy, 102-4 
relations with AWU, 41 
and South Johnstone sugar strike, 
45-46, 105 
MacDonald, Alex, 51 
McDonald, L., 119 
McEUigott, Ken, 336 
McLean, Ian, 227, 249, 254, 256, 
297, 301, 302, 316, 317, 356 
Mcllwraith, Thomas, 3 
Mackenroth, Terry, 290, 334 
Mackerras, Malcolm, 347 
Mackie, Pat, 188 
MacPherson, Madeleine, 234, 240, 
256, 271 nl26, 305, 318 
McQueen, Humphrey, 121, 122 
Madden, Dinny, 254, 276 n201 
Malouf, David, 119 
Mann, Jack, 152, 189 
Mansbridge, Albert, 188 
manufacturing industry, 107, 165 
Maternity Act, 1925, 110 
meatworkers' strike. See strikes and 
lockouts 
Mellifont, Terry, 247, 286 
MeUoe, Harry, 286 
Michels, Robert, 41, 63 n53, 161, 
371 
Miliband, Ralph, 162, 169 nl 
Milliner, Bert, 184, 190, 197, 200 
Miners' Association, 2 
Moore, Arthur Edward, 82 
government of, 85-86, 110-11, 
121, 127 
Morley, Peter, 349, 372 
Moroney, Tim, 37, 39 
Morris, Ken, 152 
Morrow, WUIiam, 61 n31 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
418 Index 
Motor Spirits Distribution Bill, 1957, 
157 n27 
Mount Isa Mines, 175 
dispute at, 66 n93, 188-89 
Mount Morgan copper mine 
judgment (1917), 27 
Movement, The, 51, 58, 155, 175 
ideological foundation of, 56-57 
Mullins, Brian, 58 
Mungana mines, 79-80 
Mungana Royal Commission, 78 
Municipal Executive Committee 
(MEC), 221 
Municipal Officers Association 
(MOA), 339 
Murphy, Denis, 31, 57, 72, 91, 145, 
215, 221, 222, 224, 226, 227, 233, 
234, 254, 257, 281, 283, 285, 290, 
293, 295, 297, 298, 302, 320, 322, 
328, 337, 371 
chaUenge to presidency of, 
314-15 
early labor mythology, views on, 
10 
factionalism, views on, 318 
joins shadow ministry, 336 
purpose of ALP, views on, 313 
reform in ALP, views on 312-13 
Murray, Robert, 157 n20 
National Party, 89, 98, 179, 199, 
235, 252, 305, 321, 322, 323, 329, 
335, 336, 341, 345, 346-48, 355-56, 
358, 359, 360, 369, 373, 374 
New Australia Movement, 89 
New South Wales, 12, 25, 28, 30, 52, 
91, 105, 200, 221, 222, 282, 283, 316 
Labor success in, 8 
unemployment in, 106 
Nicklin, Sir Frank, 151-52, 168, 182, 
189 
govemment of, 66 n93, 176, 187 
Nicol, Fred, 227, 228, 288, 303 
Nolan, Sybil, 350 
Oakes, Laurie, 257 
O'Conner, Justice, 41 
"Old Guard" faction. See Australian 
Labor Party, factions 
"Old Guard "/AWU faction. See 
Australian Labor Party, factions. 
O'SuUivan, Gordon, 247 
One Big Union (OBU), 8-9, 28-29, 
37, 43. See also Amalgamated 
Workers' Union; Amalgamated 
Railway Union 
Palasczuk, Henry, 353 
Parliamentary Labor Party (PLP), 
81, 84, 118, 124, 142, 143, 150, 151, 
168, 173, 180, 181, 187, 189, 224, 
235, 244, 375-77. See also Australian 
Labor Party 
attitude to Industrial Groups, 58 
conflict with unions over basic 
wage reduction, 37 
early history of, 11-15 
numerical control of conventions, 
31-32 
and Reform Group, 221 
rejects socialist objective, 12 
relations with AWU, 31, 35-36, 
41-42, 46, 154 
supports Gair, 149 
Pastoral Workers Industrial Union, 
47 
Paterson, Fred, 49, 54, 164 
Peace Preservation Bill, 1894, 5, 11 
Peel Report, 231, 244 
People's Parliamentary Association 
(PPA), 11 
Peterson, J.C, 97 
Philp, Sir Robert, 11, 95, 102 
pledge, 39-40, 43, 49 
Plumbers and Gasfitters Employees 
Union, 235 
Pont, G., 57 
Poulter, Max, 337 
preferential voting, 179, 205 nl6 
Pregnancy Termination Control 
Bill, 1980, 251 
Prentice, Ian, 330 
Prest, BUl, 337 
Primary Producers' Co-operative 
Association Act, 1923, 44 
Primary Producers' Organisation 
Act, 1922, 99 
Primary Producers' Organisation 
and Marketing Act, 1926, 99 
Primary Producers' Organisation and 
Marketing Act, 1932, 105 
Primary Products Pool Act, 1922, 
99 
Printers and Newspapers Act, 1953, 
146 
Printing and Kindred Industries 
Union, 184, 197, 202, 283 
Qantas, 75 
Queensland Agricultural Joumal, 97 
Queensland Butter Board, 133 n80 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Index 419 
Queensland Central Executive 
(QCE), 125, 126, 145, 146, 150, 153, 
154, 174, 180-85, 189, 213, 217, 219, 
227-28, 230, 232-33, 235 
abolition of, 231 
affirms right of dissent in party, 
36 
dismisses Gair, 148-49, 151 
and Industrial Groups, attempt 
to control, 51 
reorganisation of committee 
stmcture, 193 
role in South Johnstone sugar 
strike, 45 
and signing the pledge, 39, 42-43 
women's membership of, 299 
Queensland Coalition for Democratic 
Rights, 373 
Queensland Industrial Groups 
Committee, 51 
Queensland Labor Party, 149, 
152-53, 154, 175-79, 182, 195, 370 
Queensland Labourers Union, 2, 3, 9 
Queensland Meat Export Co., 76 
Queensland Producers' Association, 
96-100 
Queensland Railway Employees 
Association, 9 
Queensland Railways Union, 28, 32, 
34, 62 n37. See also Australian 
Railways Union 
Queensland Shearers' Union, 2-3, 9 
Queensland State Services Union, 51, 
142, 144, 153 
"Queensland System", 98-100 
Queensland Trades Union Act, 2 
Queensland Volunteer Finance 
Raisers, 246, 248 
railways, 10, 12, 59 n2. See also 
strikes and lockouts. 
Railway Maintenance Employees' 
Union, 57 
Railway Refreshment Rooms (RRR), 
86 
Rasey, Tom, 51, 143 
Rayner, S.A., 19 n29 
Red Flag Riots, 30 
Referendum (1988), 358, 374 
Reform Group, 230, 238, 315, 
349-50 
establishment of, 211-13 
extent of support for, 214-15 
federal intervention as policy of, 
223-24, 226-33 
party finances, views on 217 
and regional conferences, 216, 
218-19 
relations with QCE, 212, 214-16, 
220, 221, 222, 234 
tactics of, 213-23, 226 
union representation, views on 
215 
voting reform in ALP, views on 
232-33 
Reid, Matt, 8, 12, 13, 15 
Reinhardt, Deius, 223 
Reynolds, Margaret, 327, 354 
Reynolds, Paul, 335 
Richmond, Norman, 119-20 
Riordan, William J., 45, 141, 154 
Robson, Barbara, 256, 286 
Ross, Charles, 76-77 
Royal Commission into Hospitals 
(1930), 110-11 
Russian Association, 29, 60 nl8 
Russians political involvement of, 
29-31 
Ryan T.J., 11, 13, 14, 79, 91, 93, 
374 
chat\ges in electoral support 
under, 92 
govemment of 
attitude to WEA, 119 
conflict with Legislative 
Council, 74, 101 
election of, 31, 71 
electoral reform, 55 
as employer, 27 
land legislation of, 101 
meatworkers strike (1919), 
34-35 
membership of, 15 
radicalism of, 15 
relations with IWW, 28-29 
State Enterprises, 71, 77, 78 
railway strike (1917), 32 
resignation of, 35 
union support for, 32-33 
Rymer, George, 36-37, 39 
Schey, W.F., 2 
Schmella, Jack, 156 n i l , 175, 177, 
186 
Sciacca, Con, 340-41, 350, 353-54 
Seamen's Union, 1 
Seymour, Charles, 12 
Sharkey, Stan, 72 
Shaw, Robert, 259, 373 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
420 Index 
Shop Distributive and Allied 
Employees' Association (SDA), 51, 
187, 286 
Sleeman, Frank, 237, 243, 285, 305 
Smith, Geoff, 334 
Smith, William Forgan, 44, 46, 56, 
99, 104, 112, 113, 114, 124. See also 
Forgan Smith govemment 
agricultural policy of, 105-7 
attitude to WEA, 120 
and industrial relations, 48 
retirement of, 115. 
socialism, 24, 71-73, 88, 94, 99, 
117, 126, 163, 166-68 
Socialism at Work, 71, 72 
Socialist Left faction. See Australian 
Labor Party, factions 
soldier settlement, 101 
Solidarity or Disruption ? 36 
South-East Queensland Electricity 
Board (SEQEB), 338 
South Johnstone sugar strike. See 
strikes and lockouts 
Sparkes, Sir Robert, 179, 244, 330, 
347, 355-56 
Spence, W. G., 2, 8, 26 
Springbok Rugby tour, 66 n93, 197 
State Butchery, 70, 75-78, 82, 83, 86 
State Enterprises, 70-72, 93, 108, 
163, 165. See also individual names 
creation of, 73-78 
ideological basis of, 69, 71-73, 77 
opposition to, 73-74 
scandal surrounding, 78-85 
sale of, 85-86 
threat to capital of, 87, 94-95 
State Enterprises Act, 1918, 71 
State Government Insurance Office, 
70, 74-75, 86 
State Mines and Smelters, 78-83, 84, 
86, 87 
State Pastoral Stations, 70, 78, 83-85 
State Trade Commissioner, 86 
states of emergency, 50, 53, 66 n93, 
154, 197, 338 
Stewart, Andrew, 343, 345 
Stopford, Thomas, 109-10 
Storey, J.D., 123 
strikes and lockouts, 
capital's reaction to, 3, 7 
government's reaction to, 3, 6-7 
maritime (1891), 1 
meatworkers (1919), 33-34, 50 
meatworkers (1946), 50, 53 
Mount Isa Mines, 66 n93, 188-89 
power (1985), 338-40 
railway (1917), 32 
railway (1925), 38 
railway (1948), 52-55 
shearers (1891, 1894), 1, 3, 6-7, 
14, 90, 146, 154 
South Johnstone sugar (1927), 
44-47, 100, 104 
and stmctural changes in unions, 
9-10 
sugar (1911), 13-14, 25 
tramways and general (1912), 
14-16, 25, 26 
Sturgess, Des, 244 
Sugar Acquisition Act, 1915, 44, 93 
sugar industry, 9, 41, 95, 100, 162. 
See also Colonial Sugar Refining 
Company 
Melanesian labour in, 90-91 
and Labor electoral success, 
91-92 
Sullivan, Vic, 330 
Suncorp. See State Govemment 
Insurance Office 
Sunday Mail, 219 
Swan, Wayne, 358 
syndicalism, 8, 27-29, 30, 34, 88 
Telegraph, 235, 244, 251-52, 339 
Theodore, Ted, 9, 13, 27, 35, 41, 56, 
69, 91, 94, 97-98, 102, 167 
and ARU, 38, 39 
and AWU, 90 
and basic wage, 36-37 
and Chillagoe State Mines, 78-81 
and conflict with pastoral 
interests, 95 
as deputy leader of PLP, 14 
loses and regains PLP 
leadership, 37 
mral corporatism of, 96 
and Socialism, 72, 87 
university education, views on, 
123 
Thornton, Merle, 192 
Thomton, W.T., 57-58 
Tomkins, Ken, 330 
Toowoomba branch of ALP, 219, 
259-61, 262, 277 n226, n228, 283, 
295 
Tozer, Horace, 5 
trade unions. See also individual 
unions 
and Affirmative Action, 300, 320 
and arbitration, 25-27, 32 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Index 421 
changing aspects of, 358-59 
communist influence on, 30-31, 
50-51 
control of CPE over, 11 
early unionism, 2, 7-8, 9-10, 25 
and federal intervention, 262, 
289, 302-3, 316 
Industrial Groups within, 51, 55, 
57, 58, 142-44, 146, 153, 174, 
180, 187 
and IWW, 28 
and meat workers strike (1919), 
33-35 
and PLP, 23-24, 31-36, 39-40, 
56, 142-43, 153-54, 180 
in public sector, 43 
relations with Reform Group, 215 
and Ryan government, 31-32, 33 
and South Johnstone sugar strike 
(1927), 47 
and the state, 24-25 
and State Enterprises, 77 
and sugar strUce (1911), 13-14, 25 
and Tramways and general strike 
(1912), 14-15, 25 
and WEA, 119 
Trades Hall AffUiated Unions 
Committee, 283 
Trades HaU, 192, 215, 218, 222, 227, 
241, 286 
and the AWU, 173-75, 179-83, 
188 
control of ALP, 187-88, 190-91, 211 
control of QCE, 190 
convention of 1963, 184-85, 189 
Mt Isa dispute and, 189 
Trades and Labour Council (TLC), 
43-46, 48, 58, 144, 186, 189, 230, 
250, 289, 316 
origins of, 1-2 
'Traditional Labor People" (group), 
303 
Tramways and general strike. See 
strikes and lockouts 
Transport Act, 1938, 50, 197, 338 
Transport Workers Union, 151, 320 
Truth (Brisbane), 79 
Tucker, Percy, 190, 198, 199 
Turner, Ian, 9, 27, 29, 131 n48 
Unemployed Workers' Act, 1919, 73 
unemployment, 48, 73, 95, 106, 108, 
111, 118, 163, 169 
unions. See trade unions, individual 
unions 
United Australia Party, 105 
United Graziers' Association, 95, 144 
Universal Freedom League, 28 
University Act Amendment BiU, 
1956-57,146 
University Bill, 1909, 123 
University of Queensland 
conservative nature of, 123 
and ALP, 123-26 
siting of, 124, 137 nl27 
Upper Burnett and Callide Land 
Settlement Act, 1923, 102 
Vaughan, Aussie, 262 
Vaughan, Ken, 334 
Vickers, Andrew, 358 
Victorian Wages Board, 25 
Victorian Miners' Union, 2 
Vietnam War, 189, 190, 191 
wages, 8, 14, 24, 26, 27, 37-38, 48, 
55, 95, 187, 189 
of railway employees, 53 
rates of, in Queensland, 53, 
165-66 
Walker, Janine, 319 
Walsh, Bryan, 305 
Walsh, E.J., 51, 57, 143, 144 
Walsh, Max, 335 
War Precautions Act, 29-30 
Warburton, Neville, 295, 324, 325, 
334, 339, 341, 345, 348, 355, 357, 
369, 371 
becomes leader of Opposition, 
337 
Ward, Russel, 201 
Wamer, Anne, 256, 314, 319, 334, 
343, 349-51, 357, 372 
Waterside Workers' Federation, 
228-29, 289 
Watson, John, 8 
Watts, Billie, 234, 300 
Weil's disease, 47-48 
"Westminster System", 74 
Wells, Deane, 327, 337, 343, 372 
Wheat Pool Bill, 95 
Whiddon, Rob, 234, 251, 301 
Whitby, Fred, 174, 190, 250, 256, 
263, 289, 338 
White, Terry., 252, 328, 330, 335 
Whitlam, Gough, 201, 213, 214, 221, 
222-23, 265, 323-24, 336 
govemment of, 198, 199, 200, 
201, 202 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
422 Index 
WUliams, Edgar, 184-85, 228, 239, 
262, 288 
Williams, Hughie, 289, 297, 302, 315 
women; 191-93, 211, 298-301, 
318-20, 345. See also Affirmative 
Action 
Wood, Les, 153, 180 
Wood, Peter, 260, 277 n225, 295 
Worker, 5, 15, 31, 40, 59 n i l , 114 
workers compensation, 37, 57, 108, 
109, 163, 169 
Workers Educational Association, 
119-20, 124, 126 
Workers' Political Organisations, 8, 
11, 31, 61 n26 
Workers' Political Reform 
Association, 2 
Workers' School of Social Sciences, 
119 
Workingmen's Parliamentary 
Representatives Association, 2 
Workman's Compensation Act, 1916, 
74 
Wran, NevUle, 290, 292, 295 
Wright, Keith, 244-45, 323, 324-26, 
334, 336-37 
becomes Opposition leader, 325 
resigns as leader, 337 
WyviU, Lew, 286 
Yarrow, Sue, 239, 327 
Young Labor Association, 193, 228, 
236, 237 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
LABOR IN QUEENSLAND 
Following their remarkable forty years of almost unbrokern 
government in Queensland, the ALP has been in the political 
wilderness since 1957. Although the party had its origins in 
Queensland as an extension of the militant labour movement of 
the legendary 1890s, in no other state or federally has It been 
out of office for so long. 
This revealing account of Queensland Labor's hundred-year 
history describes the often uneasy relationship between labour 
movement, unions, party organisation and parliamentary wing. 
Over the years the radical goals of the labour movement have 
been pushed aside in favour of more conservative platforms and 
of maintaining a number of cliques within the party, often to the 
detriment of progressive policies and parliamentary success. 
The party that suffered ideological compromise in power 
became demoralised in Opposition after the split in 1957. The 
Trades Hall group rose to supremacy and the AWU and 
parliamentary party, formerly pre-eminent, took their place out in 
the cold. The blinkered intransigence of the ruling factions, 
together with incompetent campaign organisation in the mid 
seventies, led to organised opposition within the Queensland 
Branch and ultimately federal intervention and supposed 
" re fo rm" . 
The book analyses the shifting factional alignments in the party 
since intervention and Labor's various bids to restore its cred-
ibility as a serious contender for power. 
DQHJi^PERBACKS 
Australian History 
ISBN D-7QeE-ElSE-X 
9 780702"221521 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
